Monday, December 21, 2009 - 3:41 PM

What happened in Copenhagen? The answer is: not much. Facing a very real possibility of complete failure -- a two-year buildup to a cacophonous conference that ended in de facto deadlock -- a select group of major powers cobbled together a non-binding “agreement” to undertake various purely voluntary actions, aimed at an arbitrary target for limiting future atmospheric warming. As Greenpeace noted on its Twitter page: “2 years planning, 2 weeks negotiating = worse than half-assed deal in the last 2 hours. Climate change you can believe in.” And I assume you didn’t missed the symbolism of Obama leaving the conference a day early so he could get back to Washington before it snowed.
Environmental issues aren’t my main thing, you understand, but I can’t resist the urge to offer a few comments.
First, you shouldn’t be surprised by this outcome, especially if you’ve been reading this blog. As the Economist noted a week or so ago, “Climate change is the hardest political problem the world has ever had to deal with.” In addition to the scientific uncertainties (not about the fact of climate change, but about the impact of different policy responses), dealing with man-made climate change is a classic collective action problem. All countries would like to avoid the consequences of atmospheric warming, but they would also like someone else to pay the costs of addressing it. Furthermore, the worst negative consequences won’t be evenly distributed and won’t occur for several decades, which means that today’s leaders would have to impose costs on their citizens now in order to leave future generations better off. That’s do-able, but hardly a tempting prospect for most politicians. In addition, there is still no consensus on the best way to proceed: some states favor “cap and trade” systems while other prefer a straightforward “carbon tax.” Finally, the main polluters are in very different economic circumstances; the developed world created the problem but now wants to get rising powers like China and India to undertake potentially costly measures that could slow their own growth. Needless to say, that's not very attractive to Beijing or New Delhi. Toss in the reality that any agreement would be unwieldy, expensive, and rife with verification problems, and you have an issue that makes reforming health care here in the United States look absurdly simple by comparison.
Second, the outcome in Copenhagen does lend support for FP chief Moises Naim’s concept of “minilateralism.” If you can’t get 192 states to agree on a global agreement (and it sure looks like you can’t), then focus on getting the biggest economies (who are the biggest source of the problem and the states with the resources to help the others), and see if you can get some sort of agreement among them. Thus, an optimist could see the face-saving “deal” that emerged at the very end of the conference as the building block for a new initiative that would eschew a grand global bargain in favor of a more focused deal among the major powers.
Third, this episode offers another revealing glimpse at Obama’s diplomatic style; indeed, his entire approach to politics. A master of soaring rhetorical style, he sets ambitious goals and imposes short deadlines (remember when he said he wanted to get a two-state solution in his first term?). When those lofty goals (inevitably) turn out to be unreachable, he grabs what’s available (a flawed health care deal, more photo-op "diplomacy" in the Middle East, a compromise “surge” in Afghanistan, etc.), and talks about the need to keep “moving forward.”
The “glass half full” interpretation is that this approach avoids complete deadlock and helps Obama avoid the appearance (and maybe the reality) of complete and obvious failure. And in some cases—most notably health care—you end up with a reform that is better than having done nothing, even if it is far less than the American people deserve. Given the complexity of some issues -- such as climate change -- and the barriers to bold action that are central to America’s checks-and-balances, multiple veto-point system of government, this may be the best he/we can do.
But there’s a “half-empty” version of this story too. By setting too many lofty goals, and showing a too-ready willingness to cut deals in order to save face, Obama is teaching his opponents that he’s never going to walk away and that they can always get a better deal if they stonewall him and drag things out as long as they can. That’s a problem no matter who is doing it: the GOP, China, the Karzai government, Benjamin Netanyahu, or Iran. What makes it worse is Obama’s penchant for thrusting himself into the middle of negotiations at the wrong time, as he did over the City of Chicago’s Olympics bid and as he appears to have done in Copenhagen as well. (If climate change is really that important he should have been there longer; if it was clear that no deal was going to happen, maybe he shouldn’t have gone at all).
But what really worries me is that Obama is in fact making the best of a set of bad options, and that it still won’t be nearly good enough.
ADRIAN DENNIS/AFP/Getty Images
Tuesday, June 23, 2009 - 4:05 PM
Moises Naim offers a characteristically outside-the-box solution to the gridlock that is currently stifling global problem-solving. Instead of pursuing the Holy Grail of multilateralism and giving all states an equal voice in global deliberations, he suggests we "forget about trying to get the planet's nearly 200 countries to agree." Instead, he writes, "we should bring to the table the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem." He dubs this new approach "minilateralism."
Need I point out that this is a decidedly realist approach? Realists have always emphasized the role of power and argued that the agenda of world politics -- including the prospects for meaningful cooperation -- depends mostly on the actions of the major powers. If they are on board, progress is at least possible; if a sufficient number are opposed, prospects for cooperative solutions are dim. This reality does not mean that minor states have no influence at all; nor does it imply that the great powers can simply dictate to the rest. It simply reminds us that powerful states exert more influence on average than weaker states do, and obtaining their assent is a necessary and in some cases sufficient condition for meaningful progress. You know the line: "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."
And that's why "minilateralism" will work in some contexts but not in others. In some issue-areas, agreement among the major powers can lead to cooperative arrangements that weak states must either accept if they wish to obtain the benefits of participation. As Lloyd Gruber argued in his excellent book Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions, strong states are sometimes able to force weaker states to accept institutional arrangements that were less-than-optimal from the weaker actors' point of view, because being in a sub-optimal arrangement was still preferable to being entirely excluded. If the G20 established new rules governing global trade and finance, for example, most states might be inclined to go along with these rules even if they disagreed with certain aspects and resented being excluded from the negotiating process, because remaining outside the framework would leave them even worse off.
Unfortunately, "minilateralism" won't do much for us when the most important powers disagree, and that list includes some pretty significant issues. The main obstacle to a global agreement on climate change isn't getting Palau, Thailand, Luxembourg or Ecuador on board; the real problem is that the interests of some of the world's largest economies (and biggest emitters of greenhouse gases) are sharply at odds. To take the most obvious example, China and India both want some sort of exclusion that will enable them to continue to develop economically, but the U.S. Senate isn't going to approve a climate deal that imposes stiff limits on the developed world but not on them. On this issue (and others), going "minilateral" won't solve the problem.
Implicit in Moises's proposal is another important piece of advice: states really ought to stop making lofty feel-good pledges that they don't intend to keep. The failure of ambitious multilateral agreements like the Millennium Declaration or the Kyoto Protocol is regrettable in part because worthy goals aren't met, but also because repeated failures of this sort undermine confidence in all global institutions. Adopting less ambitious targets and actually achieving them will do a lot more for humanity than symbolic declarations that soon fall by the wayside. In short, Moises is reminding us to be realistic, and who am I to disagree?
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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