Islam

I suspect most of the AfPak attention will be focused on the revelations that President Hamid Karzai's brother has been on the CIA payroll, the Taliban attack that killed six people at a U.N. staff house in Kabul, and the bombing that killed more than 80 people in Peshawar. Plus, there are new reports that the United States is going to adopt a strategy that eschews counterinsurgency throughout all of Afghanistan and concentrates on protecting major cities. These are all important stories, because they underscore just how difficult it has been, is, and will be to do social engineering on the lives of 200 million Muslims in Central Asia.

But I want to focus on somewhat broader question today. Yet another justification for continuing the war in Afghanistan is the belief that the Afghan Taliban, al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, and groups such as the Haqqani network form a tight ideologically-inspired alliance that is relentlessly anti-American and dedicated to attacking us no matter where we are or what we are doing. In this view, these various groups are "birds of a feather flocking together." This belief fuels the fear that a Taliban victory in Afghanistan would produce a dramatic increase in al Qaeda's capabilities, once their Islamic soulmates provided them with territory, recruits, and other forms of support for attacks on the West in general and the United States in particular.

Such an outcome cannot be wholly ruled out, I suppose, and well-informed experts like Ahmed Rashid apparently think it's likely. But there are several good reasons to doubt it. The first is that we know that there have been intense frictions between some of these groups in the past, as well as intense divisions between Osama bin Laden and some of his own associates. In his prize-winning book The Looming Tower, for example, Lawrence Wright describes the repeated tensions between Mullah Omar and Bin Laden, which nearly led the former to turn Bin Laden over to the Saudis. The rift was reportedly healed after bin Laden swore an oath of loyalty to Omar, but their interests and objectives are not identical and one can easily imagine new quarrels in the future.

A second reason to be skeptical that these groups are tightly unified by a set of common beliefs or doctrines is the fact that the foreign presence in the region gives them an obvious incentive to help each other. In other words, what looks like ideological solidarity may be partly a manifestation of balance-of-power politics, and these groups' tendency to back each other might easily dissipate once the foreign presence were reduced. Afghan political history is one where diverse coalitions form, dissolve, and realign in myriad ways, and similar dynamics are likely to resurface once the the United States and its foreign allies are gone.

A third reason has to do with the nature of certain types of political ideology. Unlike liberalism, which emphasizes the need to tolerate a wide range of political views, political ideologies that rest on a single authoritative interpretation of "truth" are inherently divisive rather than unifying. In particular, ideologies that call for adherents to obey the leadership because it wields the "correct" interpretation of the faith (whether in Marxism, Christianity, Islam, etc.) tend to foster intense rivalries among different factions and between different leaders, each of whom must claim to be the "true" interpreter of the legitimating ideology. In such movements, ideological schisms are likely to be frequent and intense, because disagreements look like apostasy and a betrayal of the faith.  Instead of flocking together, these "birds of a feather" are likely to fly apart.

During the Cold War, for instance, hawks repeatedly worried about a "communist monolith" and were convinced that Marxists everywhere were reliable tools of the Kremlin. In reality, however, world communism was rife with internal tensions and ideological schisms, as illustrated by the furious Bolshevik-Menshevik split, the deadly battle between Trotsky and Stalin, and the subsequent rift between Stalin and Tito. China and the Soviet Union became bitter rivals by the early 1960s -- on both geopolitical and ideological grounds -- and the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam ended another yet another period of illusory communist unity and quickly led to wars between communist Vietnam, communist Kampuchea, and communist China.

Such historical analogies should be used with caution, of course, but in this case the logic is similar and compelling. Islamic fundamentalists rely in part on specific interpretations of Islamic thought to recruit and motivate their followers, and disagreements over doctrine and policy can easily lead to bitter internal quarrels, especially once the immediate need to cooperate against a common enemy is gone. We've already seen amples sign of division within al Qaeda and its clones, and more are to be expected.

This is not to say that global terrorists won't continue to learn from each other, to inspire imitators (much as Marxism-Leninism once inspired a wide array of fringe groups who had nothing to do with Moscow) and they may even provide each other with various forms of tactical support on occasion.  But there are good reasons to question the facile assumption that they are eternally loyal comrades-in-arms, united forever by a shared set of a deeply held politico-religious beliefs. And if there is considerable potential for division among both the leaders and even more among their followers, then a strategy of divide-and-conquer makes more sense than a long and costly counterinsurgency campaign that gives them every reason to stay united.

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Several friends and associates have asked me how it feels to have our book on the Israel lobby plugged by Osama bin Laden. While it is usually gratifying to get kudos for your work, that is certainly not the case in this instance, given what bin Laden has done in the past and given what he stands for. I just wish we had captured him long ago, making it impossible for him to issue any statements to the world.   

I do have a few additional comments on the matter, however. To start, Bin Laden's announcement that there is a powerful "Israel lobby" in the United States is not exactly a news flash. If he had not cited us, he could just have easily quoted the late Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) who wrote in his memoirs that "I was never put under greater pressure than by the Israeli lobby ... it's the most influential crowd in Congress by far." Or he could have cited former Senator Ernest ("Fritz") Hollings (D-SC), who said that "you can't have an Israel policy other than what AIPAC gives you around here." He might have invoked notorious terrorist sympathizer Newt Gingrich (R-GA), who called AIPAC "the most effective general interest group ... across the entire planet," or even former Senate Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO) who told AIPAC's annual conference that "without your constant support ... the U.S.-Israeli relationship would not be." Heck, bin Laden could even have brought up Alan Dershowitz, who once wrote that "my generation of Jews ... became part of what is perhaps the most effective lobbying and fundraising effort in the history of democracy." In short, he didn't need our book to tell people there's an Israel lobby with a powerful influence on U.S. Middle East policy.

It is also important to ask why bin Laden called attention to U.S. support for Israel, and to the lobby's role in generating that support. He did this because he understands -- along with plenty of other people -- that the combination of unconditional U.S. support for Israel and Israel's brutal treatment of the Palestinians is a source of great resentment in the Arab and Islamic world. This is hardly an original insight on his part either. The 9/11 Commission reported "it is simply a fact that American policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict ... is [a] dominant staple of popular commentary across the Arab and Muslim world."  imilarly, the State Department's Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World found that "citizens in these countries are genuinely distressed at the plight of the Palestinians and at the role they perceive the United States to be playing." Not only is Bin Laden personally motivated by this issue -- as his own family and prior statements attest -- he knows it is a good way to attract support.

Third, my co-author and I have a very different idea of how to deal with this situation than bin Laden does. He recruits people to engage in despicable acts of violence against innocents, in the grandiose (and vain) hope of toppling all of the states in the region (not just Israel). He's perfectly happy to kill Muslims, Christians, Jews, atheists, and just about anyone else if it will advance that goal. By contrast, Professor Mearsheimer and I reject his aims and abhor his chosen means. We believe the United States should defend Israel's existence, and we said so repeatedly in our book. (My guess is that bin Laden missed those parts). We also think the United States should oppose Israel's occupation of the West Bank and control of Gaza and treat Israel the same way it treats other democracies. Why? Because ending the occupation and having a normal relationship with Israel would be better for us, better for Israel, and better for our other friends in the region. In short, we want the United States to pursue a smarter and more ethical policy in the Middle East. Needless to say, that's a far cry from bin Laden's murderous agenda.

Ironically, bin Laden's "endorsement" of our book could even be a self-defeating gesture. If enough people were to read our book and U.S. policy were to evolve in the manner we recommend, bin Laden's call to arms would fall on deaf ears and he'd become even more irrelevant than he is today. Furthermore, any would-be imitators who might subsequently emerge would find an even less receptive audience.

And if Juan Cole is right and bin Laden's statement was a sign of weakness, so much the better.

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Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has reportedly penned a "searing critique" of efforts to improve U.S. relations with the Muslim world via "strategic communication." According to the New York Times, Mullen argues that "we need to worry a lot less about how to communicate our actions and much more about what our actions communicate."

Sounds right to me. Like most great powers, and especially dominant ones, the United States tends to believe that its motives are pure, that its noble aims are apparent to all, and that other peoples ought to be grateful for its self-less assistance. (Never mind that U.S. foreign policy is mostly driven by perceived self-interest, even if we don't like to admit it to ourselves). If people overseas are mad  at us, this must be due to a some sort of misunderstanding. If we just explained it to them a little better, they would support whatever it is we are doing, even if it involves reorganizing their way of life, helping select who runs their country, supporting various allies even when they are mis-behaving, or sending Predators or cruise missiles from afar to blow up suspected terrorist sites on their soil.  And if anti-Americanism isn't just a misunderstanding, it is because some misguided people "hate our values." Whatever it is, it's never our fault.

To his credit, Mullen appears to be acknowledging that U.S. actions really do have consequences--including negative consequences--and maybe we ought to think about them differently. This isn't the first time that the Pentagon has said smart things about the sources of anti-Americanism, by the way. A 1997 study by the Defense Science Board found "a strong correlation between U.S. involvement in international situations and increased terrorist attacks on the United States," and a 2004 DSB study on strategic communication concluded that "Muslims do not ‘hate our freedom," but rather they hate our policies."  It also observed that in the eyes of the Muslim world, the "American occupation of Aghanistan and Iraq has not led to democracy there, but only more chaos and suffering." The Pew Global Attitudes Survey reached a similar conclusion in 2002, observing that "antipathy toward the United States is shaped more by what it does in the international arena than by what it stands for politically and economically."

Of course, one can still debate whether a given policy is the right one or not; sometimes policies that are in the U.S. interest will annoy or anger other people. That's just life in the international system: conflicts of interest inevitably arise and foreign policy isn't a popularity contest. Given America's privileged position, however, one of our main foreign policy goals should be to try to minimize the amount of global irritation we face, and to go to some lengths to make sure we don't generate antipathy unnecessarily.

The key point to bear in mind is that there are real limits to America's ability to improve its global image simply by improved "messaging," "spin," or even by electing a black President. And there's an important lesson there for Obama, whose rise to power was elevated in good part by his remarkable communications skills. The lesson is that an eloquent, learned, and well-delivered speech-like the one he gave in Cairo--is just a first step, and the effects wear off quickly. To bring about genuine change, lofty rhetoric needs to be accompanied by policies that will actually address the legitimate concerns and grievances of his listeners.  You know the old line: talk is cheap. And here's another old saw: actions speak louder than words.

In the end, what will matter to people around the world is what the United States actually does with its vast power at its disposal. If it is seen as both competent and committed to morally defensible aims and broadly benevolent purposes, it is likely to be viewed as a positive force by most people (though the sheer magnitude of U.S. power will still make many nervous, and there will always be some who cannot be won over). If it is seen as bumbling, venal, cruel, or deeply hypocritical, however, then no amount of clever packaging is going to fool the world for long.

P.S.  Mullen's article is due to be released today in Joint Forces Quarterly.  It wasn't on-line when I was writing this, so my discussion is based solely on the Times story. I'll read the article as soon as it's available, and will let you know if my thinking changes after I read the whole thing.  

(Editor's note: Mullen's article is now available on ForeignPolicy.com)

I'm jetlagged in Geneva, but I spent part of the flight over thinking about thee bits of seemingly good news:

1. The pro-Western March 14 coalition won a clear victory in the Lebanese election, a promising step towards more enduring stability in that deeply-divided country.

2. The Iranian presidential election campaign has turned into a real dogfight between incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and challenger Mir Hossein Mousavi. Although recent polls in Iran suggest that Ahmadinjed will still win, Mousavi seems to be gaining ground and there may well be a run-off. Even if Mousavi loses, there's clearly a lot of popular disconnect with Ahmadinejad's rule, and a lot of it centers around his bizarrely self-defeating approach to foreign policy. (Side note: is there any other major world figure who has done as much public relations damage to his own country's image and interests? Nominations welcome). Moreover, there seems to be widespread popular support for improving relations with the United States.

3. The New York Times reports that some Pakistani villagers are turning against the Taliban, and may even be supporting the government's more active role against them.

It would be a mistake to give Barack all (or even most) of the credit for these developments, but I don't think its completely unrelated either. (Juan Cole agrees, see here). By striking a fundamentally different tone towards all three countries (and the Arab/Muslim world in general), Obama hasn't made reflexive anti-Americanism go away. But he has made it a less potent political weapon, so leaders like Ahmadinejad or Sheik Nasrallah don't reap the same domestic benefits from America-bashing. (Even Republicans should recognize that Bush and Cheney were nearly-ideal bogeymen; heck, even GOP candidates in the last election did their best to pretend they didn't know them.) It's also possible that Pakistan's government decided to take a more assertive stance against the Taliban after President Zardari got a rather chilly reception up on Capitol Hill, where several key members suggested that they weren't going to shell out endless billions to a government that continued to play footsie with Mullah Omar and his associates. The key lesson: if the United States stops trying to do everything itself, sometimes others will start addressing common problems because it is in their interest to do so too.  

Matt Yglesias is right: elections in most countries turn on local conditions and issues and not on what's happening in Washington. But it sure looks like Obama's approach is helping tip the scale in the right direction. Legendary baseball executive Branch Rickey used to say that "luck is the residue of design." If Obama has been getting "lucky" the past week or so, maybe that suggests that his foreign policy design is better suited to contemporary world conditions than that of his predecessor.

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A few quick thoughts on President Obama's Cairo speech.

Overall, Obama once again demonstrated his willingness and ability to wrestle with complex and difficult ideas in public. One of his hallmark features as a leader is to show respect for his listeners by appealing to their sense of reason. As he did in the "race" speech during the campaign, and in his Notre Dame speech on abortion, Obama acknowledged room for disagreement and contestation and showed that he understands and respects alternative views even when he does not share them. Yet there are also clear limits to his tolerance: the speech included a forthright rejection of violence, a reminder to his audience that his "first duty is to protect the American people" and that "al Qaeda killed 3,000 people on [9/11]," and a clear statement of the American commitment to basic human rights. In seeking a "new beginning," he didn’t start with an act of appeasement.

I thought his handling of the Israel-Palestinian issue was clear and straightforward, He reaffirmed both the bedrock U.S. commitment to Israel's existence and security and the necessity of an independent Palestinian state. He understands -- even if others do not -- that "this is in Israel's interest, Palestine's interest, America's interest and the world's interest." He also rejected the poison of Holocaust denial and "vile stereotypes about Jews" in clear and direct language, and told his listeners that such beliefs helped prevent "the peace that the people of this region deserve." I wish he had offered a few more specifics, but overall he handled this issue well.

He did not avoid the tricky issue of democracy and human rights -- an especially delicate subject in Egypt -- but he left a lot of wiggle room by saying "there is no straight line to realize this promise." And while his focus on women's rights isn't likely to endear him to some Islamists, he was right to include it, for it is a fundamental issue that is bound to play a major role in the years to come.

His discussion of nuclear weapons acknowledged the current double standard "that some countries have [nuclear weapons] while others do not," and tried to square that circle by referring to "America's commitment to seek a world in which no nations hold nuclear weapons." This was less convincing -- at least to me -- but at least Obama acknowledged the contradictions in the U.S. position.

What was more significant was his statement but that "any nation -- including Iran -- should have the right to access peaceful nuclear power if it complies with its responsibilities under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." The big question: does "the right to access" mean control of the full fuel cycle (under full NPT safeguards, including the Additional Protocol), or does it merely mean one of the various proposals that would deny Iran control of the full fuel cycle but provide nuclear fuel via some sort of international consortium? If it's the latter, there's no deal possible; if the former, it is at least conceivable that a deal that kept Iran from building a nuclear weapon might still be negotiated. We'll see.

The truest thing he said? "No single speech can eradicate years of mistrust." But he has committed himself to a set of principles and policies in front of the entire world. And if you think that "audience costs" (both domestic and foreign) matter, it will be hard for him to backtrack on the commitment to get out of Iraq on schedule, to leave Afghanistan as quickly as possible, to make significant changes in nuclear weapons policy, and to focus like a laser beam on the Middle East peace process. He's committed his administration in public, and that means he (and the country) will pay a bigger price if he doesn’t follow through.

Now he needs to follow up words with deeds. And so do his listeners.

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McClatchy News reports that the United States is planning to spend over $700 million dollars to build a major new embassy complex in Pakistan, while negotiating to purchase a five-star hotel to serve as the new consulate in Peshawar. These new facilities are intended to support the "surge" of diplomats and aid workers that the United States intends to deploy as part of President Obama's deepening involvement in Central Asia. The obvious comparison is to the huge U.S. embassy in Iraq (which cost nearly $600 million dollars and occupies on 104 acres (in downtown Baghdad), but I’m also reminded of the former U.S. embassy in Tehran, which was one of the largest U.S. facilities in the 1970s and was later occupied by Iranian students in the infamous 1980 hostage incident.

I'm all for providing U.S. officials with adequate facilities, but this idea merely underscores the inherent contradictions in the current U.S. approach. One of America's main problems in places like Pakistan and Afghanistan is the widespread popular belief that it is now addicted to interfering in these societies, usually in a heavy-handed and counter-productive way. In their eyes, Washington is constantly telling them which leaders to choose, which leaders should step down, which extremists to go after and how they should reorder their own societies to make them more compatible with our values. And oh yes, we also drop bombs and fire missiles into their territory, which we would regard as an act of war if anyone did it to us. Even when well-intentioned, these activities inevitably lend themselves to various conspiracy theories about America's "real" motives, and reinforce negative impressions of the United States. As of last year, only 19 percent of Pakistan’s population had a favorable view of the United States, and this hardly makes it easier to get meaningful cooperation on issues that we should (and do) care about, such as the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

Building a costly new embassy -- which will undoubtedly resemble a giant fortress -- is  not going to help win "hearts and minds" there, or allay concerns about our ambitions in that part of the world. And if we need a facility like that in order to execute our overall strategy, doesn’t that cast some doubt on the merits of the strategy itself?

I haven't watched a video of it, but the text of President Obama's speech to the Turkish parliament sure reads like a home run to me. He offered the gracious words of praise that any guest offers his hosts, but he also managed to be eloquent on matters of great sensitivity and to convey a healthy respect for his listeners. A few highlights, and maybe a bit a tea-leaf reading:

1. Obama began by noting that Turkey was "part of Europe," and later said it "is not where East and West divide -- it is where they come together." And he made it unequivocally clear that the United States supports Turkey's entry into the EU. French President Nicolas Sarkozy wasn’t pleased, but I’ll bet Obama’s audience was.

2. As he did in his famous speech on race during the campaign, Obama used his and our own experiences in order to address the delicate issue of Turkish-Armenian history. In the race speech, he invoked the example of his white grandmother to appeal to white Americans who were struggling in their own way with the implications of our troubled racial history. And he managed to do that in a way that conveyed his deep affection for her despite her human lapses. In this speech, he spoke of America's own "darker periods," and reminded his Turkish audience that "human endeavor is by its nature imperfect. History, unresolved, can be a heavy weight. Each country must work through its past." He deftly turned attention away from his earlier comments about the Armenian genocide (and did not use that word), by noting that "this is really about how the Turkish and Armenian people deal with the past." By referring to America’s own treatment of blacks and native Americans, and to our shameful reliance upon torture under President Bush, he avoided the self-congratulatory hubris that appeals to American audiences but usually puts foreign audiences’ teeth on edge.

3. He thanked Turkey for its diplomatic efforts in the Middle East, and once again stated that the United States "strongly supports" the goal of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side-by-side in peace. His language treated the two sides equally, and he again committed himself to "actively pursuing" that goal.

4. Obama also went to some lengths to engage the Muslim world in a broad and expansive manner that looked to the future instead of dwelling on the past. He acknowledged that there have been strains in recent years and made it clear that the United States was still committed to combating terrorism. Yet he emphasized that "America's relationship with the Muslims cannot and will not be based on opposition to Al Qaeda." I'm sure that played better than "you're either with us, or with the terrorists."

5. Finally, I was struck by the language he used when addressing Iran’s nuclear program. He said that “the peace of the region will also be advanced if Iran forgoes any nuclear weapons ambitions” (my emphasis), adding that "Iran's leaders must choose whether they will build a weapon or build a better future for their people." Was this a subtle hint that the United States might be willing to tolerate Iranian enrichment, provided that we are confident that it was not masking a covert weapons program? Hmmmmm.

All in all, I thought it was a terrific speech. But my opinion hardly matters: the real question is what his audience thought. I’ll be very interested to see what they have to say about it.   

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I wasn't able to follow the fallout from Obama's message to Iran in much detail while traveling, but the magic of the internet allowed me to catch up a bit this afternoon (Monday in Singapore). A few quick thoughts:

First, having called for a more accommodating and open approach to Iran, I can only applaud Obama's New Year's message. It showcased his strengths as a leader: confidence, a ready willingness to abandon failed policies, and an ability to see how things might look to the other side. If we follow up with clear, resolute, and disciplined diplomacy, and if we have the patience to realize that you don't unwind thirty years of animosity overnight, we may succeed in defusing a serious problem, and maybe even turn Iran from an adversary into an asset over time.

Second, I though Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's response (given in a speech to a gathering at a shrine in Mashhad) was about what we should have expected, and not discouraging at all. Juan Cole has provided a translation on his website here, and I agree with his analysis here. Stripped of the somewhat harsh rhetoric, Khamenei was making the wholly sensible point that the key to changing the relationship lies in what each country does, not just what it says. After all, how would we respond if some adversary's leader made a friendly speech? We would welcome the words but we'd make it clear that real change would depend on actions, which is essentially what Khamenei did. And I had to love this passage of Khamenei's speech:

Regarding our vital issues, we are not sentimental. We do not make decisions based on emotion. We make decisions through calculation.

Who'd have thought that the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran was a realist? Well, me, but also someone like Trita Parsi, who knows a lot more about Iran than I do. And when you think about it, Khamenei's response was a lot more encouraging than the U.S. reaction when Iran offered to negotiate a "grand bargain" with us back in June 2003. The Bush administration rejected the overture out of hand, and look where that got us.  

So I'd call this a good first step. But I'd remind everyone that this journey will be a long one, and if history is any guide, there will lots of opportunities for both sides to stumble.

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