State Department

From Washington and Jerusalem: more bad news

Mon, 11/02/2009 - 10:46am

Back in 2007, we wrote that AIPAC has an "almost unchallenged hold on Congress." Little has happened since then to alter that conclusion, and we will probably get another demonstration of Congressional spinelessness this week. On Tuesday, the House is scheduled to vote on H.R. 867, an AIPAC-sponsored resolution denouncing the recent Goldstone Report on possible war crimes by Hamas and Israel during the Gaza War last year. You can read the resolution here. You should then read Judge Goldstone's response here, which points out the errors in the House resolution. And then read historian Tony Judt's eloquent statement here. If you're convinced that the resolution makes a mockery of America's professed commitment to justice and human rights, then you might express that sentiment here or here. Or just call your Congressman's office and tell him/her to grow a backbone and vote against it.

Meanwhile, over in Israel itself, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is completing the Obama administration's humiliating retreat from the principles set forth in the president's Cairo speech of less than five months ago. In a joint press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Clinton did not criticize continued Israeli home demolitions in East Jerusalem (a practice she had previously denounced), and praised Netanyahu for making "unprecedented concessions" on settlement expansion. Huh? This is Clintonian double-talk worthy of her husband. Netanyahu's "concession" was to insist that Israel would keep building whatever and wherever it wished in East Jerusalem, and would also continue the "natural growth" of settlements in the West Bank, but would not start any completely new settlements for awhile. Bear in mind that virtually every country in the world regards all of the settlements -- both the unauthorized outposts and the vast neighborhoods built by the Israeli government -- as illegal under international law, and the United States used to say this too. And for this "concession" the Palestinians are supposed to enter into another meaningless round of discussions, while the bulldozers and construction crews continue to eat away at the land on which they hope to establish a state of their own. To praise Netanyahu's position as an "unprecedented concession" is like discovering someone is robbing your house, and then expressing gratitude when they offer to do it a bit more slowly.

The two-state solution was on life-support when Obama took office, and at first it appeared he might make a serious effort to nurse it back to health and make it a reality. At least, that's what he said he was going to do.  Instead, he and his Secretary of State are in the process of pulling out the plug. But what will they do when "two states for two peoples" isn't an option and everybody finally admits it, and the Palestinians begin to demand equal rights in "greater Israel?" Will the United States support their claims for equality, democracy, and individual rights, or will it continue to defend and subsidize what will then be an apartheid state? Well, if it's up to our courageous reps in Congress, you know what the answer will be.

Avi Ohayon/GPO via Getty Images


Actions Speak Louder Than Words

Fri, 08/28/2009 - 2:14pm

Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has reportedly penned a "searing critique" of efforts to improve U.S. relations with the Muslim world via "strategic communication." According to the New York Times, Mullen argues that "we need to worry a lot less about how to communicate our actions and much more about what our actions communicate."

Sounds right to me. Like most great powers, and especially dominant ones, the United States tends to believe that its motives are pure, that its noble aims are apparent to all, and that other peoples ought to be grateful for its self-less assistance. (Never mind that U.S. foreign policy is mostly driven by perceived self-interest, even if we don't like to admit it to ourselves). If people overseas are mad  at us, this must be due to a some sort of misunderstanding. If we just explained it to them a little better, they would support whatever it is we are doing, even if it involves reorganizing their way of life, helping select who runs their country, supporting various allies even when they are mis-behaving, or sending Predators or cruise missiles from afar to blow up suspected terrorist sites on their soil.  And if anti-Americanism isn't just a misunderstanding, it is because some misguided people "hate our values." Whatever it is, it's never our fault.

To his credit, Mullen appears to be acknowledging that U.S. actions really do have consequences--including negative consequences--and maybe we ought to think about them differently. This isn't the first time that the Pentagon has said smart things about the sources of anti-Americanism, by the way. A 1997 study by the Defense Science Board found "a strong correlation between U.S. involvement in international situations and increased terrorist attacks on the United States," and a 2004 DSB study on strategic communication concluded that "Muslims do not ‘hate our freedom," but rather they hate our policies."  It also observed that in the eyes of the Muslim world, the "American occupation of Aghanistan and Iraq has not led to democracy there, but only more chaos and suffering." The Pew Global Attitudes Survey reached a similar conclusion in 2002, observing that "antipathy toward the United States is shaped more by what it does in the international arena than by what it stands for politically and economically."

Of course, one can still debate whether a given policy is the right one or not; sometimes policies that are in the U.S. interest will annoy or anger other people. That's just life in the international system: conflicts of interest inevitably arise and foreign policy isn't a popularity contest. Given America's privileged position, however, one of our main foreign policy goals should be to try to minimize the amount of global irritation we face, and to go to some lengths to make sure we don't generate antipathy unnecessarily.

The key point to bear in mind is that there are real limits to America's ability to improve its global image simply by improved "messaging," "spin," or even by electing a black President. And there's an important lesson there for Obama, whose rise to power was elevated in good part by his remarkable communications skills. The lesson is that an eloquent, learned, and well-delivered speech-like the one he gave in Cairo--is just a first step, and the effects wear off quickly. To bring about genuine change, lofty rhetoric needs to be accompanied by policies that will actually address the legitimate concerns and grievances of his listeners.  You know the old line: talk is cheap. And here's another old saw: actions speak louder than words.

In the end, what will matter to people around the world is what the United States actually does with its vast power at its disposal. If it is seen as both competent and committed to morally defensible aims and broadly benevolent purposes, it is likely to be viewed as a positive force by most people (though the sheer magnitude of U.S. power will still make many nervous, and there will always be some who cannot be won over). If it is seen as bumbling, venal, cruel, or deeply hypocritical, however, then no amount of clever packaging is going to fool the world for long.

P.S.  Mullen's article is due to be released today in Joint Forces Quarterly.  It wasn't on-line when I was writing this, so my discussion is based solely on the Times story. I'll read the article as soon as it's available, and will let you know if my thinking changes after I read the whole thing.  

(Editor's note: Mullen's article is now available on ForeignPolicy.com)


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Edifice complex

Thu, 05/28/2009 - 11:55am

McClatchy News reports that the United States is planning to spend over $700 million dollars to build a major new embassy complex in Pakistan, while negotiating to purchase a five-star hotel to serve as the new consulate in Peshawar. These new facilities are intended to support the "surge" of diplomats and aid workers that the United States intends to deploy as part of President Obama's deepening involvement in Central Asia. The obvious comparison is to the huge U.S. embassy in Iraq (which cost nearly $600 million dollars and occupies on 104 acres (in downtown Baghdad), but I’m also reminded of the former U.S. embassy in Tehran, which was one of the largest U.S. facilities in the 1970s and was later occupied by Iranian students in the infamous 1980 hostage incident.

I'm all for providing U.S. officials with adequate facilities, but this idea merely underscores the inherent contradictions in the current U.S. approach. One of America's main problems in places like Pakistan and Afghanistan is the widespread popular belief that it is now addicted to interfering in these societies, usually in a heavy-handed and counter-productive way. In their eyes, Washington is constantly telling them which leaders to choose, which leaders should step down, which extremists to go after and how they should reorder their own societies to make them more compatible with our values. And oh yes, we also drop bombs and fire missiles into their territory, which we would regard as an act of war if anyone did it to us. Even when well-intentioned, these activities inevitably lend themselves to various conspiracy theories about America's "real" motives, and reinforce negative impressions of the United States. As of last year, only 19 percent of Pakistan’s population had a favorable view of the United States, and this hardly makes it easier to get meaningful cooperation on issues that we should (and do) care about, such as the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

Building a costly new embassy -- which will undoubtedly resemble a giant fortress -- is  not going to help win "hearts and minds" there, or allay concerns about our ambitions in that part of the world. And if we need a facility like that in order to execute our overall strategy, doesn’t that cast some doubt on the merits of the strategy itself?


Hints of Realism?

Mon, 03/09/2009 - 11:25am
 
On the foreign-policy front, there are some encouraging hints of realism emerging from the Obama administration. Realists think the world is a competitive place where states guard their own interests first and foremost. Realists generally assume that most states act more-or-less rationally most of the time, although they are aware that states can get sidetracked by imperfect information, ideological fixations, domestic politics, the delusions of particular leaders, etc. That's one reason why realists favor energetic diplomacy, so that potential rivals can learn more about the other side’s interests and motivations and gain a clearer sense of the consequences of different courses of action. Case in point: if we want to change Iran's behavior, it might help to talk to them.


Realists understand that power is the primary currency in world affairs, and that great powers have the latitude to define interests broadly. As the United States has proved in recent years, especially strong powers are prone to fits of hubris, adopting unachievable goals and then pursuing them carelessly. When they do, realists warn, opponents usually bite back (see under: Iraq, Afghanistan).

Contrary to what some people think, realists aren’t cold, calculating machines who are indifferent to moral concerns. Rather, realists simply recognize that are often tradeoffs between our moral preferences and our other interests, and that moral precepts alone are an sufficient guide to foreign policy. Realists also worry that idealistic moral objectives too easily become crusades, thereby causing more human suffering than the ills they were meant to stop.

Finally, because the world is a competitive place, realists look for opportunities to divide adversaries and to discourage potential rivals from joining forces, based on the simple idea that it is better to face weak and/or divided opponents than a strong and unified opposition. Bismarck's diplomacy is an ideal model: after defeating France and unifying Germany in the Franco-Prussian war, Bismarck adopted a conservative, status-quo strategy that kept France isolated for the next twenty years. Not only did this make Germany safer, it also made Europe more tranquil.

So what are the hopeful signs? Here are a few straws in the wind:

1. Obama has put down a marker on Iraq, indicating that he will in fact carry though on his pledge to get all U.S. forces out by the end of 2011. By stating this commitment as clearly as he could (with one senior official ruling out a Korea-like long-term commitment), and by lining up a lot of prominent support for it, he has made it more difficult to renege even if the situation in Iraq becomes more violent as U.S. forces withdraw. Such a development would be unfortunate, even tragic, but as Andrew Sullivan noted, it is not a reason to stay. Obama is enough of a realist to know that if he doesn’t get us out of there, Bush's 2003 mistake will be a deadweight for his entire presidency.

2. There are now hints of a U.S. willingness to talk to “moderate” elements of the Taliban. This is realistic in two senses: First, it recognizes that the Taliban is not a unified, centralized movement with a single headquarters and a strong governing ideology; rather, it is a loose collection of groups with certain common beliefs but lots of internal divisions. Alignment and realignment of various tribes and factions is a recurring theme in Afghan history, and this approach reflects an awareness of that core principle. Second, it recognizes that the United States has no vital interest in determining who actually governs in Afghanistan, provided that the government does not let Afghan territory be used to organize attacks on U.S. soil (or other core interests). Co-opting any moderate elements can be won over will make our task easier; waging war on all of them at once merely reinforces their fragile unity. Reaching out to the moderates may not work, of course, but there’s little risk in trying and potentially much to gain.

3. Similarly, the new overture to Syria follows a similar logic. As I've argued before, a well-integrated Middle East strategy will try to coordinate our approaches to Syria, Iran, and the Israel-Palestinian conflict, to give potential spoilers less incentive to derail progress and give current obstacles incentives to rethink their positions. Keeping Syria isolated encourages them to stay close to Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, because they are the only cards Syria has to play. Reaching out to them does exactly the opposite; it gives them an incentive to distance itself from these actors in order to obtain things that are more important. The success of this initiative will ultimately depend on whether we can broker the long-delayed peace treaty with Israel (which will require Israel to return the Golan Heights), but these initial contacts are an encouraging first step.

4. Despite an embarrassing gaffe, the initial meeting between Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov seems to have gone well despite one obvious self-inflicted wound. Whose idea was to give Lavrov a mock "reset button" in the first place? This was a juvenile gesture ill-befitting a great power, and then screwing up the gag with an erroneous translation made the State Department look like a bunch of amateurs. Overall, the incident reminded me of the infamous bible-shaped cake that Ollie North took to Tehran during the Iran-contra scandal. But beyond the atmospherics, the actually meeting appears to have been both serious and cordial. And the administration's willingness to put missile defenses on the table shows that Obama and Co. are aware that this is a critical issue for Russia and could be the key to gaining Russian cooperation on more important items like Iran.

5. Finally, Secretary Clinton's Middle East trip was, as Marc Lynch, summarizes here, something of a "mixed bag." But given what we come to expect from visits by the previous secretary of state, even a mixed bag is a step forward. And as Gary Sick notes here (also courtesy of Marc’s blog), there are lots of signs on all sides of an emerging interest in -- horrors! -- "diplomacy" throughout the region. That's a realistic course for everyone to take at this point. And if I may beat a dead horse one more time, the big question is whether our future diplomatic strategy is well-coordinated or not. If it is, we could realize major gains; if not, we are going to make things worse.

So as I said, there are some encouraging hints of realism in the realm of foreign policy. But don’t get too happy yet. If Paul Krugman is right in today's Times, a sense of realism may still be lacking on the economic front, and that’s probably more important these days.

SAUL LOEB/AFP/Getty Images


More for your In-Box

Wed, 03/04/2009 - 5:15pm

As we wait to see if Hillary Clinton has accomplished anything in her Middle East trip (I’m betting no), here are a couple of things to read:

Nathan Brown of George Washington University and the Carnegie Endowment says the two-state solution is at a dead end (a possibility I worried about here) and offers his “Plan B." He calls for a long-term ceasefire (i.e., five to ten years) to permit the rebuilding of Palestinian institutions, to press for moderation of Hamas’ demands, and to force Israel to choose between building settlements and making peace. I have my doubts about his proposal, which sounds like the Oslo process to me insofar as it leaves the final destination unclear and focuses on interim agreements. Like Oslo, this leaves too much latitude for spoilers on either side (including the new Israeli prime minister?). Nonetheless, Brown is surely right to begin thinking about where we go if the two-state solution really does become out of reach.

Writing in Tikkun, Jerome Slater provides a systematic critique of Israel’s conduct in its recent attacks on Gaza, and demolishes a lot of Israeli talking points. Doug Lieb of the American Jewish Committee has a response in the same issue, but you really owe it to yourself to read Slater’s fully documented version, available here.