Winners & Losers

Professional economists may be dismayed, but scholars and students of international politics should be delighted by the decision to award this year's Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences (aka the "Nobel Prize in Economics") to Elinor Ostrom of Indiana University.  She is not only the first woman to win the economics prize, she's also the first political scientist.  She holds a Ph.D. in the subject from UCLA and is a past president of the American Political Science Association.

Ostrom's main research is pretty far from my own concerns, but I did list her book Governing the Commons on one of my "top-ten" lists earlier this year.  She is primarily known for her work on institutional solutions to collective action problems, most notably in the area of resources and environment.  Via a combination of "soft" rational choice theory and careful empirical work, she shows that common resources can be shared and managed through various institutional mechanisms, but also shows that there is nothing inevitable about this outcome, due to familiar dilemmas of collective action (that's why we call them dilemmas!), and the complex interactions of humans, institutions, and larger ecosystems.

Ostrom (and the co-winner, organization theorist Oliver Williamson) join a group of recent winners chosen more for theoretical insight and real-world relevance than for mathematical scholasticism.  Others in this same group would include economic historians Douglass North and Robert Fogel, behavioral economist Daniel Kahneman, game theorist/strategist Thomas Schelling, and economist-philosopher Amartya Sen.  Scholars with an international orientation have been doing pretty well in recent years too: Schelling was awarded for game-theoretic work on international conflict, Paul Krugman for his work on international trade, and Sen's work on poverty and famines has clear international implications.  Kudos to the prize committee for their eclectic approach to the award--if only more economics departments thought this way.

One more thing: need I mention that Ostrom received the award for work she had already done, as opposed to some other Nobel Prize winners I can think of?

Photo: Indiana University via Getty Images

Everybody with a website has gone bananas over Obama getting this year's Nobel Peace Prize, so why shouldn't I add my two cents?   I'm here in Norway at the moment (from which the prize originates), so I want to make it abundantly clear that I had nothing to do with it.

As for my reaction, I'm with the many voices who think this is way, way premature, and also with those who think Obama's best move would have been to decline it gracefully, while saying he would be thrilled to be deserving at some later date.  The Nobel Committee might have felt dissed, but I believe he would have won enormous plaudits elsewhere. 

Why is the prize ill-chosen?  Because we all know that "talk is cheap," and thus far that's mostly what Obama has offered us.  We're getting out of Iraq (though maybe not completely), but George W. Bush had already signed the deal to do that before he left office.  We aren't getting out of Afghanistan any time soon. He's given a great speech in Cairo, and then whiffed on the follow-through towards Israeli-Palestinian peace. He's given another nice speech about eliminating nuclear weapons, but anyone want to bet on whether he delivers on that particular pledge? America's image is improved (except in the Middle East), but I can't think of a single conflict that has gone away (or even significantly decreased) since he took office. So far, his main tangible foreign policy achievment was getting the Olympic Committee to unite in rejecting Chicago's bid and awarding the games to Rio.

More importantly, this award risks discrediting the prize even more than some earlier choices.  We don't know what Obama will be forced (or will choose) to do in the rest of his presidency (which could last another 7+ years) and if he ends up escalating any existing conflicts or-heaven forbid-starting a new one, it will make a mockery of the whole idea of the prize. I wouldn't be surprised if this award doesn't generate more than a little resentment around the world, especially if U.S. foreign policy changes less than many people still hope it will.

Finally, the Peace Prize is awarded by the Norwegian Nobel Committee, and all the Norwegians I've talked to thus far think it was a bizarre decision. One Norwegian friend had a simple explanation: the chairman of the committee is Thorbjorn Jagland, a former president of the parliament who is apparently something of a running joke in Norwegian political circles and famous for boneheaded statements.   My Norwegian friend called this decision "typical."

In any case, I'm putting in for next year's peace prize now.  I haven't done anything to deserve it either, but what if I promise to write a great book or article in the next twelve months that will substantially contribute to world peace?  In fact, I'll even promise to retool as an economist and put a mathematical model in the piece, so that I'm eligible for two prizes, not one.  OK?

DANIEL SANNUM LAUTEN/AFP/Getty Images

Denmark is a lovely country and Air Force One is a very nice plane, so I hope Barack and Michelle enjoyed their little jaunt to Copenhagen. I said it was a mistake for Obama to go shilling for the City of Chicago even before we knew the results, and now of course I'm sure of it.

What I'd really like to know is which one of his aides told him that this was a good idea, and convinced him that his involvement would seal the deal.  Sending the President across the Atlantic to lobby in this fashion might make sense if you knew the vote would be close and were very confident that his intervention would be decisive, but it now looks like it wasn't a near thing at all. Don't these people know how to count noses in advance?  Chicago's bid got rejected in the first round, leaving the Leader of the Free World looking ineffectual. And that's just about the last thing you want a president to seem.

It's not a huge deal -- though you can count on the right-wing smear machine to be all over it -- but I hope somebody at the White House gets taken to the woodshed on this one. As I've said repeatedly, they are trying to do way too much, and have been forced to use Obama for too many small things. I hope they learn a lesson from this, and I sure hope the president does better with his next overseas sales pitch.

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Kyrgyzstan has reversed an earlier decision to end U.S. access to Manas air base, a valuable hub supplying U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Both Reuters and the New York Times describe this step as a "victory" for the United States and for the Obama administration.

In fact, it's a victory for the government of Kyrgryzstan, which had threatened to close the base earlier this year, shortly after Russia had offered them a $2 billion loan. Like a smart landlord in the midst of a housing shortage, Krygyzstan threatened to evict us if we didn't pay more rent. So the annual charge for using the base will rise from about $17 million to $60 million, and the United States also agreed to spend $36 million to expand the airport and additional millions on economic development and drug eradication programs.  

When Washington cares more about Central Asian security than Central Asian governments do, it will be child's play for them to charge us whatever they think the market will bear. Admittedly, it's small change when you consider the overall cost of the Afghan operation (over $200 billion in defense costs since 9/11 and currently running $2-3 billion per month, according to the Congressional Research Service). But when the federal budget is hemorrhaging red ink and state and local governments are slashing budgets and programs right and left, I don't see why succumbing to this sort of blackmail is a "victory" for us. Krygryzstan gets a bigger air base, and we get a less well-educated and less healthier population here, not to mention crummier public infrastructure. Maybe it's the best of several bad alternatives, but let's hold the high-fives.

VYACHESLAV OSELEDKO/AFP/Getty Images

A number of readers wrote in regarding my last post, which described French Open champion Roger Federer as having delivered most/all of his acceptance speech in English (even though he speaks French fluently). They report that I was dead wrong, and that most of his remarks were in French, save for the comments he directed at runner-up Robin Soderling (who spoke in English), and Andre Agassi (who was there to present the award).

Except for the announcer, I didn’t hear any French in the broadcast I watched, but NBC may skipped that portion of the coverage. It's also possible that I was refilling my coffee cup and returned to catch the English portion of his remarks. Mea culpa, and apologies to all for missing this one.

Speaking of French, I will be trying to resurrect my own rusty skills in that language over the next week. I'm visiting the The Graduate Institute in Geneva to participate in a thesis defense and give a colloquium, and then attending a conference on "Rising Powers Amidst International Turmoil: The United States and Europe Facing China and Russia" in Talloires, France. I'm told the hotels all have WiFi, so I'll be posting from the road as time permits.

Several people have recently asked me if the Obama administration's tough line towards Israel's settlements and its insistence on a two-state solution invalidates the arguments that John Mearsheimer and I made about the political influence of the "Israel lobby." Not surprisingly, a few critics have made similar points in print. For what it's worth, I think Obama's approach is largely consistent with the views we set forth in the book, and certainly with our overall aim in writing it.  

To review: in our book we argued that U.S. Middle East policy in recent decades has been strongly influenced by a loose coalition of individuals and groups which we termed the "Israel lobby." We pointed out that the lobby did not "control" U.S. Middle East policy (though it was a powerful influence), and we emphasized that the various groups that made up this loose coalition didn't agree on everything (such as the merits of a two-state solution). All of them have sought to encourage a "special relationship" between the U.S. and Israel, however, and all to maintain nearly-unconditional U.S. support. Absent their influence, we argued, U.S. policy in the region would be substantially (though not entirely) different.

Like plenty of other interest groups in the United States, the Israel lobby worked in legitimate ways within the American political system and successfully acted to shape public discourse about Israel in ways they believed would reinforce the special relationship. As a result, the entire subject had become something of a taboo issue, especially for anyone seeking a prominent career in American politics or in the U.S. foreign policy establishment.  

Finally, we saw this situation as increasingly harmful to U.S. and Israeli interests alike, and argued that a more normal relationship would be better for both countries. In particular, we hoped that a more open discussion of these issues would lead to a revision in U.S. policy, and that more moderate and sensible groups within the "pro-Israel" community would become more influential. We even expressed the hope that the more hardline groups might reconsider their policy positions. In short, our main concern was not the existence of a powerful pro-Israel lobby; it was the fact that the most influential groups within that "loose coalition" were advocating policies that were harmful to the U.S. and Israel alike.

This basic portrait of the lobby's activities and influence fit the historical record up through the 2008 Presidential election. What has happened since? After pandering to the lobby during the campaign (just as all major candidates do) and remaining studiously silent during the Chas. Freeman debacle, President Obama has taken several recent steps that signal a different approach. He has appointed a Middle East envoy (George Mitchell) with a reputation for evenhandedness. Obama wasn't available to meet with Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu during the AIPAC policy conference, so Netanyahu had to delay his trip. Obama has already spoken in one Muslim country (Turkey) and is about to give a major address to the Muslim world from Cairo, after first stopping off in Saudi Arabia, and isn't touching down in Israel on this tour.

Most importantly, he and other administration officials -- including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel -- have forcefully reiterated the Administration’s commitment to a genuine two-state solution and its opposition to Israel's settlements policy, including the fig leaf of "natural growth." That position was recently echoed by German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, which suggests that Obama's team has been quietly lining up EU support for their position.  Special envoy Mitchell reportedly drove that point home in his recent meeting with Israeli defense minister Ehud Barak, and there’s no question that Israeli leaders are feeling the heat.  And Obama himself has emphasized that "part of being a good friend is being honest," suggesting that he understands the pitfalls of unconditional U.S. support.

Do all these steps mean the lobby has lost all its power, and that our book was all wrong? Not hardly.

Let's start by recognizing that all Obama has done so far is lay down some rhetorical markers. That's not a trivial step, especially since he and his aides have used unusually direct language and haven’t waffled in the face of initial Israeli protests. If nothing else, these declarations make it harder for Obama to backtrack later on and mark a clear departure from Bush’s (failed) approach. But Obama has yet to put any real pressure on Israel, and he certainly hasn’t tried to make U.S. support (still over $3 billion/year) conditional on Israeli compliance. And the main bone of contention right now is simply whether Israel is willing to stop expanding settlements; we haven't even gotten to all the steps that will be necessary to make a viable Palestinian state possible.

Furthermore, we pointed out in our book that the lobby exerted more influence in Congress than on the Executive Branch, and we noted that several past Presidents (e.g., Jimmy Carter and George H. W. Bush) had been able to put limited pressure on Israel in recent decades. So mild Presidential pressure on Israel is hardly unprecedented. In the meantime, the situation on the Hill hasn't changed very much: a recent AIPAC-sponsored "Dear Colleague" letter telling Obama to privately coordinate his Mideast diplomacy with Israel (and proposing various conditions on the Palestinians) garnered 76 signatures in the Senate and 329 in the House.  And there are signs that Israel's supporters on the Hill are beginning to mobilize in more direct ways.

Nonetheless, there are also signs that AIPAC's control on the Hill may be diminishing too, Richard Silverstein has pointed out that two prominent progressive Democrats -- Barney Frank (D-MA) and Robert Filner (D-CA)--did not sign the AIPAC letter, and recent meetings between Netanyahu and several congressmen (including John Kerry of Massachusetts, who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations committee) included sharp exchanges over Israel’s settlements policy.  Most of the signatures on those two AIPAC letters were probably pro forma anyway, and they don’t seem to have had the chilling effect that AIPAC-sponsored missives had in previous eras. Thus far, Congressional pressure on Obama seems intended to moderate the Administration’s positions, but not derail its efforts entirely.

So where does this leave our arguments about the lobby's profound influence?

First, our main goal in writing our book was to encourage a more open discussion of this issue. We were describing the situation as it existed up through 2007 (when we finished the book), but we believed that if the taboo were challenged and a more open discourse emerged, more and more Americans would realize that the "status quo" lobby (e.g, AIPAC, the Christian Zionists, the neoconservatives, and groups like the Zionist Organization of America) were advocating policies that were bad for the United States and also bad for Israel itself. The good news is that a more open discussion has emerged in recent years, as illustrated by Jimmy Carter’s book Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid, by numerous commentators in the blogosphere like Ezra Klein, Phil Weiss, Andrew Sullivan, Richard Silverstein, Matt Yglesias, and others, and by clear-eyed columnists such as Roger Cohen. Jon Stewart's Daily Show has done its part too, with some pointed commentary on Gaza and at least one wickedly satirical look at AIPAC itself.

Second, partly because of this more open discourse, more and more people -- including Americans who care strongly about Israel's well-being -- have begun to realize that failure to achieve a two-state solution is jeopardizing Israel’s long-term future.  As we wrote in our book and as I’ve blogged about before, the only alternatives to a two-state solution are the ethnic cleansing of millions of Palestinians, the creation of a binational democracy, or some form of apartheid. That is why Ehud Olmert eventually came around to the two-state solution, and people who used to reject the idea of pressure have begun to see the light. Even Martin Indyk is starting to sound a little bit like us. In other words, what it means to be "pro-Israel" is being redefined, thereby creating space for Obama to move toward a more sensible U.S. policy.

Third, events in the region have reinforced this growing sense that a different course of action is needed. The 2006 war in Lebanon and the recent carnage in Gaza have underscored the futility of trying to solve these problems by force alone and cast doubt in Israel's efforts to portray itself as the eternal victim. More and more people are aware of the long-term demographic trends, and they also know that the Arab League has offered to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel once the Palestinians have a viable state of their own. Some people also realize that settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would remove an arrow from Iran’s quiver and make it easier to mobilize a united front against Iran should that become necessary. Of course, the election of the most right-wing government in Israel's history (and the appointment of Avigdor Lieberman as Foreign Minister) hasn’t made it any easier for defenders of the status quo either.  

Fourth, the behavior of some of Israel’s most fervent defenders may have helped open eyes and ears as well. In particular, the reflexive tendency to smear and marginalize critics of the "special relationship" by accusing them of being either anti-semites or "self-hating" Jews has become a self-discrediting enterprise, because the charge keeps getting directed at people for whom it is so obviously false. Condemning neo-Nazis and Holocaust deniers is a worthy enterprise, but smearing respected individuals such as Carter, Desmond Tutu, Tony Kushner, Tony Judt, or others is transparently bogus and intended solely to stifle intelligent discourse on a vital subject. And when defenders of any cause have to stoop to such tactics, it reveals that they are defending an increasingly weak case.

Finally, we argued in the conclusion of our book, part of the solution here was the emergence of a different sort of pro-Israel lobby, one that might be equally influential but in the service of smarter policies. There are encouraging signs on this front, and the increased prominence of groups such as J Street, the Israel Policy Forum, or Brit Tzedek v'Shalom are encouraging developments. There is no reason why groups like AIPAC cannot evolve too, and begin to use their considerable political acumen in the service of a more far-sighted approach.

People who think that the Israel lobby is some sort of secret Jewish conspiracy probably also believe that its influence could never be countered and that the groups within it are irredeemable. That is the essence of conspiracy theories -- and especially anti-Semitic ones--they impute dark and magical powers to some secret organization or cabal and portray it as evil, all-powerful, unchanging, and unstoppable. By contrast, those of us who see the lobby as a typical interest group engaged in the normal rough-and-tumble of democratic politics have recognized that its considerable influence (which no one seriously denies) could be mitigated or modified over time, especially once it became clear that the policies promoted by its most powerful components were in fact harmful to U.S. and Israeli interests alike. We wrote our book to contribute to that process, and while realists should probably never be too optimistic -- and especially about the Middle East -- it's hard for me not to see the recent turn in U.S. policy as encouraging. Now let's see what Obama says in Cairo.

MENAHEM KAHANA/AFP/Getty Images

FP colleague Laura Rozen has a nice rundown of the latest tea-leaf reading on the Harman affair. Needless to say, there's plenty we still don’t know about the whole business, and I'm not confident that the just-announced House Select Committee on Intelligence investigation will uncover anything juicy. But here are the two things I'd most like to know:

1. After saying she'd "waddle in" to the AIPAC trial business, did Harman actually do anything? She says no, but that's what you'd expect at this point. Nonetheless, it is entirely possible that she had second thoughts after the conversation and proceeded to do exactly nothing to help Rosen and Weissman. Let's see if the other shoe drops on this one. 

2. Who is Mr. X (the person on the other end of the line)? The object of the wiretap was presumably under investigation for being in cahoots with Israeli intelligence (i.e., they've been described in news stories as a "suspected Israeli agent," but Marc Ambinder also reported that the person in question was a U.S. citizen. So who was it? Inquiring minds want to know.

Here's an IR theory puzzle: Why do some seemingly powerful states exert relatively little influence on world politics, while other states with more modest capabilities cast a bigger shadow than one would expect? Although there is no consensus on how national power should be defined or measured, most IR scholars would probably agree that there is a substantial but not perfect correlation between national power and international influence. Indeed, one could imagine a simple regression, with "power" on the X-axis and "influence" on the Y-axis, and a diagonal line bisecting that space. I'd expect most states to array themselves pretty close to that line: as their power increased (measured in terms of GDP, population, military capability, resource endowments, etc.) one would expect to see a corresponding increase in their global influence.

But what about the outliers -- either the "overachievers" who swing a bigger bat than one would expect or the "underachievers" who wield less influence than their overall capabilities might provide? Here's my personal, decidedly un-scientific top five list in each category, followed by some thoughts on what might explain why some states punch above their weight and some potentially major powers cast a comparatively small shadow.

"OVER-ACHIEVERS" (in no particular order)

1.  Sweden.

With a population of only 9 million, one wouldn’t expect Sweden to cast much of a shadow, despite its advanced industrial economy. Yet for its size and population, Sweden has been a significant international player. Its welfare state and other social policies have been widely-studied and a model for others, and diplomats such as Dag Hammarskjold, Folke Bernadotte, and Olof Palme were all important international voices. Sweden still devotes a higher percentage of its GDP to foreign aid than any other country, and institutions such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute have amplified Sweden's visibility on major issues of arms control and disarmament. Awarding the Nobel Prizes probably doesn't hurt either.

2. North Korea.

With a small population (22 million), an obsolete military machine, a bankrupt ideology, and an economy that exposes its citizens to periodic famine, one wouldn’t expect North Korea to get much attention at all. Indeed, on most measures North Korea is an under-achiever (especially when compared with its neighbor to the south). But Pyongyang's leaders are past masters at commanding international attention, usually by threatening to do something undesirable (and then sometimes going ahead and doing it). North Korea is hardly an inspiring model for anyone, but it shows how sheer cussedness can enable a country to punch well above their weight.

3. Canada.

America’s northern neighbor has the world's second largest land mass but a relatively small population (only 32 million) and only modest military assets.  Yet Canada has been a consistent proponent of multilateralism, ranks ninth in the world as a provider of foreign aid, and has been an enthusiastic participant in international peacekeeping missions. Indeed, Canada has lost 117 soldiers fighting in Afghanistan, the highest per capita figure of any ISAF participant.

4. Israel.

For a country whose total population is less than that of New York City, Israel generates a lot more attention than one would expect. To be sure, some of this reflects Israel’s economic success (which includes advanced hi-tech sector and a significant arms industry) not to mention its nuclear arsenal and overall military power. And then there's the occupation and the violence that it has produced over the years. Regardless of one's views on that thorny subject, it's hard to argue that Israel doesn't exert a lot of influence on the global agenda, especially given its very modest size.

5. Singapore.

For a city-state with a population of only 4.4 million, which gained independence only in 1965, Singapore's international prominence marks it as an obvious outlier, even when one allows for its advanced economy and high per capita income. In addition to its economic achievements, Singapore has been a major force behind regional cooperation in Southeast Asia, an energetic promoter of institutions such as ASEAN, and its leaders have rarely been bashful about offering their views on major international issues.   

"UNDERACHIEVERS" (also in no particular order)

1. Japan.

Despite having the world's 2nd largest economy and the world's sixth largest defense budget, Japan performs a remarkably modest international role. As Richard Samuels of MIT recently pointed out in Newsweek, Japan sent warships to help defend against tSomali pirates only after China announced it was going to do so, and it has only 38 soldiers participating in UN peacekeeping missions. Increasingly, its leadership both at home and abroad seems paralyzed. Moreover, with a declining and rapidly aging population, Japan seems likely to become even less influential over time, despite its economic size and considerable national wealth.

2. India.

It is the world's most populous democracy, the dominant state in south Asia, the home country of a sizeable and successful global diaspora, and a nuclear power. Past Indian leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Indira Gandhi were major international figures. While far from being inconsequential, India has yet to exercise a global leadership role, or even to exert far-sighted and constructive influence over its immediate neighborhood. Moreover, a recent article in The Hindu deplores the deteriorating state of international studies in India, at precisely the same period when a rising China is taking the study of international relations very seriously.  

3. Germany.

Now reunified, with the world's 14th largest population and either the 3rd or fifth largest economy (depending on whether one uses straight GDP figures or purchasing power parity estimates). Germany is also the world's third largest exporter. While not entirely absent on the world stage, it is hardly exercising an influence commensurate with its latent capabilities. Even when Germany does get more actively involved (as they have in Afghanistan), they operate under highly restrictive rules of engagement that substantially undercut their effectiveness. A far cry from the Germany of Otto von Bismarck, or even the creative leadership of Konrad Adenauer and Willy Brandt.

4. Russia.

At first, I thought about putting Russia in the other category -- a large but relatively weak state that managed to exert more influence than its overall capabilities might suggest. But on reflection, I think Russia belongs here. Despite its geographic size, oil and gas resources, and relatively well-educated work force, as well as the inherited assets of permanent Security Council membership and a large nuclear arsenal, Russia today exerts less influence on the agenda of world politics than its overall capabilities might provide. Its political system is not a model for anyone; its culture is not a magnet, and its leaders are either unable or unwilling to play a constructive role in addressing the major problems that confront the world today. Instead, Moscow mostly plays a spoiler role, which is what former great power do when they cannot find a way to lead.

5. Brazil.

Yes, I've read about the BRICS, and how countries like Brazil are going to reshape the global balance of power in the 21st century. But the world's tenth largest economy (and fifth largest population) has yet to achieve an international role of similar stature. Brazil clearly wants a more prominent international position, as exemplified by its current efforts to win a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, its extensive diplomatic presence and active participation in existing international organizations.  President Lula da Silva has very high approval ratings (including the highest ratings in all of Latin America). But so far, these ambitions and capabilities have not been translated into as much direct influence as I'd expect.

So what explains why some states punch above their weight and others punch below it? This would be a great topic for a dissertation, but here are a few tentative thoughts. First, individual leadership matters. A leader like Charles De Gaulle, Lester Pearson, or Lee Kwan Yew can elevate a country's profile above its "natural" place, and a series of weak leaders can keep a country from reaching its true potential. Second, history can have a long-term impact on a country's overall influence: Britain and France occupy somewhat enhanced roles today because they were once great powers with extensive global empires and Sweden's tradition of international activism may even be a legacy of its former role as a great power several centuries ago. Third, the examples of Germany and Japan suggest that extreme misconduct in the past can suppress a state's willingness or ability to play a large international role for a very long time. And in these two cases, the legacy of World War II has been reinforced by decades of Cold War free-riding. Fourth, small states can leverage a relationship with a major power like the United States (as both Israel and Singapore have done) in order to maintain positions that would be harder to sustain on their own.  Lastly, relatively weak states may enhance their overall influence by occupying a specialized "niche" in the international environment, as neutral powers like Sweden or Switzerland have done.

I'm sure I missed some other good examples and possible explanations, so I hope readers will contribute suggestions or critiques of their own.

Ryan Pierse/Getty Images for DAGOC