Wednesday, January 7, 2009 - 4:06 PM
Matt Yglesias says some nice things about my post on the defense budget, but points out that its odd for a realist to emphasize the role of domestic politics in sustaining inflated defense spending. I appreciate the kind words, but it's actually not that odd. Whenever realists like me criticize some aspect of U.S. foreign and defense policy -- and especially when we claim it is being adversely affected by domestic political factors of one sort or another -- somebody is bound to claim we are being inconsistent (and they usually do it a lot less gently than Matt did). After all, realists are supposed to believe that the balance of power is the driving force in shaping foreign policy, and that states always pursue their national interests. So if the United States is doing something that realists think is misguided, doesn’t the very act of voicing criticism invalidate the realists' own core beliefs?
Nice try, but nope. First, most theories of international relations (or foreign policy) are pretty crude instruments, and none of them explains everything that states do. I think realism tells you a lot about how states behave but it hardly explains everything. Second, the "national interest" is itself a contentious concept, which is why we have journals and blogs and talk shows where we can argue about it ad infinitum. Third, realism does tell you that really powerful countries have a larger margin for error and have the luxury of being able to indulge their ideological predilections. Really powerful countries -- e.g., the United States -- can also afford to waste vast resources on excessive military spending, and they can allow assorted special interest groups to wield disproportionate influence even when that imposes costs on the rest of society Just look at the farm bill, or our policy towards Cuba. This problem got worse when we won the Cold War, because the absence of a serious rival made Americans think they could do pretty much whatever they wanted without facing serious costs. Result: Iraq.
Realism also warns that even really powerful states will still pay a price if they lose sight of the national interest and start acting in foolish ways. GM could make crummy cars for a long time and stay in business, but eventually even they had to come begging for a handout. Similarly, the United States can make a lot of mistakes in foreign policy and squander a lot of blood and treasure on ill-considered escapades without jeopardizing its great power status overnight, but that doesn’t mean that doing so is a good idea.
The partial antidote to such follies is a more serious and sustained debate about our role in the world and the best way to protect our vital interests and way of life. Matt has already made his own contribution to that conversation; here are some other places where you can find some fresh ideas:
Andrew Bacevich, The Limits of Power.
Eugene Jarecki, The American Way of War.
Jeff Legro and Melvin Leffler, eds., To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine.
Project on Defense Alternatives, Forceful Engagement: Rethinking the Role of Military Power in American Global Policy.
John Hulsman and Anatol Lieven, Ethical Realism.
tolerance for ignoring the national interest
"Really powerful countries -- e.g., the United States -- can also afford to waste vast resources on excessive military spending, and they can allow assorted special interest groups to wield disproportionate influence even when that imposes costs on the rest of society Just look at the farm bill, or our policy towards Cuba."
And Israel?
Professor Walt:
You don't admit the dark underbelly of realism.
Which is that sometimes the most efficient way of advancing one's national interest leads to collusion, if not outright ownership, of disgusting human beings, or unjust states.
Under the realist doctrine, collusion with the mujahideen was perfectly sensible.
Under the realist doctrine, as long as Israel didn't make us look bad, sponsoring a state engaged in illegal occupation was perfectly sensible.
Under the realist doctrine, occupying Iraq only became bad when the costs - moral and financial - outweighed the benefits.
It seems to me that realism requires a constant shifting of one's allegiances depending on what is best for ourselves but this runs into problems in the real world when we realize that allegiances often come about through having to pretend that we care about certain principles.
If the "National Interest" is a contested and always debated issue that can't be decided by committee much less International Relations 'experts', what is the basis for saying Nations always pursue "the national interest", and how do these experts, "realist" or otherwise determine what the national interest is?
It would also appear, judging from what little I've read that so called 'realism' is a bizarre hybrid of a mode of belief that balance of power & national interest (yet undefined) are the driving factors behind the behavior of state internationally and a kind of advocacy FOR states to primarily consider balance of power and national interest (still undefined) when dealing internationally. Especially when certain states don't behave the way they were supposed to according to the realist view of the world. I'm open to some clarification on this.
I appreciate the alternative viewpoints. It's easily the most sensible stuff I've been exposed to on the subject. But "international relations" still makes mainstream economics look like a proven & rigorous science by comparison. And while the loftily titled "realism" seems to have more going for it than other creeds of the discipline, it still seems to be composed largely of hot air.
Curious that Yglesias would make such a basic error about IR-theory realism, Harvard man that he is. I noticed it myself just skimming Matt, and I'm just a midwestern state-school type. Matt was a philosophy major, which could explain a lot, but I was under the impression he took a good bit of politics (I think they call it it "Government" there). Did Prof. Walt never get a crack at Yglesias' brain? That would be unfortunate.
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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