Thursday, January 8, 2009 - 5:19 PM
I had been struck by how the economic meltdown led to a different sort of debate on domestic policy than it did on foreign policy. With respect to domestic issues, the crisis has produced a remarkable consensus on the need for dramatic action here at home, even if there some differences on exactly what ought to be done. So Wall Street gets a bailout, followed by the Big 3 automakers. A vast stimulus package is in the works. Almost everyone agrees that the financial industry needs smarter and tougher regulations. And more and more people now embrace serious health care reform. Taken together, these steps will drive the U.S. budget deficit into uncharted territory and keep it there for some time. When it comes to domestic policy, in short, the mandate for change has been obvious and mostly uncontested.
Yet when it comes to foreign policy, the economic crisis seemed to be barely noticeable, at least while Obama and McCain were still campaigning. One would think that an economic earthquake of these proportions would have produced a similar rethinking of America's global role. Instead, both Obama and McCain called for increased defense spending during the Presidential campaign -- even after the U.S. economy went into free-fall -- and confidently talked about doubling down in Afghanistan, addressing climate change, and tackling a whole array of other international problems.
It is therefore deeply refreshing to read Roger Altman's lead essay in the latest Foreign Affairs. Altman draws the obvious but still under-appreciated conclusion that when a country loses trillions of dollars in wealth in a short period, is in the grip of a serious recession, and has dim prospects for a rapid recovery, then this will inevitably impose certain constraints on how much weight it can swing abroad. The problem is even more severe when some of our key allies are similarly afflicted, and when some other significant powers are not going to be as adversely affected as we are. Altman is not in panic mode, and he's not arguing that the United States is now a pygmy on the world stage. Indeed, he makes it clear that "the United States will remain the most powerful nation on earth for a while longer." But let there be no mistake: "the crisis is an important geopolitical setback."
For a realist take on how we might respond, check out Barry Posen here. Posen's essay was written before the economy went south, but that unfortunate event makes his ideas even more relevant.
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He raises some good points, particularly about intelligence. It is perhaps interesting to note that if we had had a decent Intelligence set-up right now, we might not even be in Afghanistan, never mind Iraq - the US government would have nailed most or all of the future hijackers before they ever boarded the fateful planes, and the whole thing would have gone down as another prevented terrorism attack. A huge part of stopping terrorism is work down at home, and that means proper visa checks, monitoring of potentially hazardous materials, and monitoring the emergence of dangerous groups within the US.
I think he doesn't go far enough with a "defensive" strategy. If we were truly about shifting to a defensive posture, then we would focus on three things:
1)"Globalizing" America's fundamental resource needs, like oil and other materials. This means that we could, if necessary, substitute resources from one area for another, and the overall cost would be low enough that we wouldn't be tempted to play the traditional Great Power Resource Politics.
2)Re-aligning the military. Ironically, the "increase the army" reformers are going about this the wrong way. If you really wanted to shift the military and lower its major costs (Operations and Personnel), then what you would do is
-Maintain a state-of-the-art Navy. The Navy has been the backbone of America's security since the early 19th century, and it will continue to be as such as long as we have global needs for economic reasons. In the modern world, that means aircraft carriers. It's also one of those things that you can't easily build up to in a hurry if you need to anymore in the event of a Major War that it would be costly to stay out of (like World War 2).
-Maintain a state-of-the-art Air Force. Threats to the US don't necessarily come by ship - they can also come by plane (nuclear bombers and otherwise). An air force is important to stopping this, and it has the same issue as the Navy regarding a rapid build-up.
-Maintain a state-of-the-art nuclear arsenal, and build more nuclear bombers (get away from ICBMs, which are much less controllable and more and more easily shot down). Ultimately, deterrence of any conventional threat to the U.S. will come down to the threat of nuclear weapons (not to mention that effective nuke power can help prevent a Great Power War from arising). We could technically switch over to an Eisenhower-style "Massive Retaliation" posture, where we draw our strength mainly from the nuclear threat, but it's better to have the Navy and Air Force so that we can block a range of threats in-between (as well as intervene in any Great Power War, if necessary).
-Gut the active Army, by which I mean we cut its active strength drastically down. I'm not sure of the exact numbers, but the idea would be that we would keep the active Army small so as to discourage long-term interventions abroad (but not wipe out the espirit de corps). You would couple this with a much larger Army Reserve force.
The idea would be that if we ran into a war we couldn't avoid without great harm (like a World War 2 or even Korean War equivalent), then what we'd do is send in the active duty Army plus activate the Reserves. At the same time, you'd get production going on replacements for the spare parts and equipment you've been stockpiling (since it takes longer to produce this stuff, it's better to have a stockpile on hand), and start warming up the active-duty training and recruitment programs. That way, if the War was long enough, you could gradually shift out the Reserve troops for new active-duty troops, and the political issue with calling out tons of the reserves would act as a self-limiter.
-Keep the Marines. You need them mainly to serve as a rapid strike force (in case some crisis breaks out near at home and we need some short-term peacekeeping, like in Haiti back in the 1990s), and a "first landing" group (presumably, in this alignment, we wouldn't have a bunch of overseas bases to start the build-ups from) to seize landing area.
There, now how does that sound as a military force aligned to avoid interventions? It would probably be anathema to both Republicans (who like the idea of being able to intervene abroad), and Democrats (who want a military capable of doing a bunch of peace-keeping duties), but it would almost certainly save you some money on Operating Costs (the capital expenses would be high, but the operating costs - Operations and Personnel - would be lower).
3)Dampening most military ties except when they co-incide with the above. I'd keep the East Asia security agreements, particularly with Japan - it prevents an arms race in that area, and it doesn't require tons of U.S. personnel. It would basically be using the Navy as a deterrence method while protecting the trade routes and the like - good security in the area for what is increasingly central trade with that region in terms of our economy.
On the other hand, getting out of the Middle East as quickly as possible and severing or weakening ties that bind us to action (like oil) can only help us. We don't share a land border with that region, and our main tie - resources- would presumably be considerably dampened in this scenario. Let the Europeans/Russians/Chinese deal with this area - the Europeans have no choice since many of their immigrants hail from there, and the Russians and Chinese are next-door neighbors interested in stability. We have a relatively small Arabic or even Muslim population, who are generally on decent terms with the U.S. government(and would probably be on even greater terms if the U.S. distanced itself from Israel), and who most likely would not support the kind of crap that you see coming out of the European muslim populations in terms of home-grown terrorism groups.
Of course, like any real defensive-posture Grand Strategy, this would be rather cold-blooded in an age of rapid communications. We would basically have to stand aside and let some horrors ensue that might not otherwise come (although perhaps not - had we, for example, simply sold weapons to the Bosnian Serbs early on in a dispassionate, non-involved manner, the situation would have been more of a civil war than a series of atrocities), and work to distance ourselves from the consequences. It would probably lead to a lot of howling about the U.S. not taking an active role in things, but there you are.
There, now how does that sound as a military force aligned to avoid interventions?
How many big interventions have we planned? As you pointed out, WWII was hard to avoid. Since then we've mostly started small and temporary, and increased our participation as we needed to. Gulf War was an exception, we planned an intervention of overwhelming force; it took us a year to lay down the supplies and then a few weeks to do the war.
But vietnam just grew as we found out that smaller things didn't work, and so did afghanistan. Iraq was intentionally planned not to include an occupation and then an unplanned one was added on at the last minute. Etc.
We have reserves in iraq now. Having fewer active-duty and more reserves just means the unpleasant moment when you realise you have to use the reserves too comes sooner rather than later.
We never ever plan to have a big ten-year intervention. When it happens it's because our plans didn't work out. If we have smaller forces it doesn't mean fewer interventions, it means that a quick response that goes bad, goes bad when it's *smaller*.
But apart from the motive I agree with you that we should cut the size of the regular army and have larger reserves. We can't afford a large army just now, and if we need it large when we're more prosperous we can rebuild it then.
I'd keep the East Asia security agreements, particularly with Japan
Definitely, if we get to look at their new ECM technology. Probably not, if they get too close a look at ours.
On the other hand, getting out of the Middle East as quickly as possible and severing or weakening ties that bind us to action (like oil) can only help us.
It depends. Our modern military runs on gigantic quantities of oil products. It's a challenge to ship the amount of fuel we need to places that are distant from good sources. In the Gulf war the saudis supplied all we needed, and in iraq the kuwaitis sold us fuel and also we managed to extract some from iraqi oil. If we're going to run a fuel-intensive war, the middle east is the very best place.
Sure, that argument is like the one about looking for your keys where the light is good, but to the extent we need a war and we get to choose where to fight it, the middle east is our best site. Afghanistan is not a very good place to fight a big war, nor is pakistan or india or java.
We would basically have to stand aside and let some horrors ensue that might not otherwise come
If americans get a few years of $12/gallon gasoline and $25/pound steaks, we'll start to think that it isn't our job to make sure nothing bad happens anywhere in the world.
But apart from the motive I agree with you that we should cut the size of the regular army and have larger reserves. We can't afford a large army just now, and if we need it large when we're more prosperous we can rebuild it then.
That's part of the reason why I included it as part of a strategy to minimize all but the most important interventions. There would be a certain political and economic cost if you had to, say, call up 500,000 reservists rather than 500,000 active troops, and I think that would act as a self-limiter on interventions. But if the intervention was important enough, then you could get the ball rolling on training and recruiting active-duty forces, and slowly substitute them.
Definitely, if we get to look at their new ECM technology. Probably not, if they get too close a look at ours.
I just figured it would be a good idea because so many of our most important trade ties are coming from that area, it is a source of high-technology products, and it would be relatively easy to maintain deterrance (basically, all you'd have to do if China got too bolsterous is either blockade their coast or bomb their ports, which you can do from aircraft carriers). There is South Korea, but South Korea is at the point where their own military strength would probably be enough to deal with the North, as long as we continued to sell them supplies (and if you gave them nukes, it would make it even easier for them in terms of deterrence).
It depends. Our modern military runs on gigantic quantities of oil products. It's a challenge to ship the amount of fuel we need to places that are distant from good sources. In the Gulf war the saudis supplied all we needed, and in iraq the kuwaitis sold us fuel and also we managed to extract some from iraqi oil. If we're going to run a fuel-intensive war, the middle east is the very best place.
I hadn't thought about that. Of course, if you are switching to anything like the above, perhaps you could try push your bigger ships towards being nuclear-powered like the carriers, and build up a larger Strategic Oil Reserve in case a naval war broke out. You'd have to ship that oil around anyways if the wars were anywhere other than the Middle East, and part of the Defensive Alignment would be to specifically minimize any dependence on the Middle East.
Sure, that argument is like the one about looking for your keys where the light is good, but to the extent we need a war and we get to choose where to fight it, the middle east is our best site.
That's only if you continue to have local military bases and friendly countries to transport supplies and troops through (like the Khyber Pass in Pakistan, and Kuwait in Iraq, along with a large, active, mechanized army. If we switched our strategy to anything like the Defensive Alignment above, the areas that would become our battles of choice would be anywhere either where the US could follow-up a coastal landing, or do air strikes.
If americans get a few years of $12/gallon gasoline and $25/pound steaks, we'll start to think that it isn't our job to make sure nothing bad happens anywhere in the world.
True that.
There would be a certain political and economic cost if you had to, say, call up 500,000 reservists rather than 500,000 active troops, and I think that would act as a self-limiter on interventions.
Sometimes our interventions start small and get larger in stages as we find we must raise or fold. But limited regular army troops would inhibit interventions that start big.
Of course, if you are switching to anything like the above, perhaps you could try push your bigger ships towards being nuclear-powered like the carriers, and build up a larger Strategic Oil Reserve in case a naval war broke out.
Good ideas. I don't know enough to get a sense why the Wasp class hasn't been converted to nuclear. That's only 8 ships but they're fuel hogs and relatively slow. There may be good reasons not to.
...it is a source of high-technology products, and it would be relatively easy to maintain deterrance (basically, all you'd have to do if China got too bolsterous is either blockade their coast or bomb their ports, which you can do from aircraft carriers).
Japan is gradually getting over the idea that their army isn't really an army and their navy isn't really a navy and they're never going to fight anybody. As they get stronger they're going to think about what their interests are, and they might easily not want to be allied with the US boat anchor. There are stories that their ECM is much better than ours. If true, we can only stay in their neighborhood when they let us.
I'm concerned about your idea to blockade the chinese coast or bomb their ports. If we choose a limited war with china, can we be sure china will fight a limited war with us? Some ways it might be convenient to have a war with china -- we could just repudiate our debts to them, right? And freeze all their US accounts? Sweet. But once we're at war we stay at war until they agree to end it, right? That could turn out pretty expensive in the long run. Both nations would have a veto in the UN as long as they both stayed in the UN. And of course we wouldn't blockade them until our own economy was much less dependent on them. It's hard to think about. Easy to miss some little detail that might be vitally important.
If we switched our strategy to anything like the Defensive Alignment above, the areas that would become our battles of choice would be anywhere either where the US could follow-up a coastal landing, or do air strikes.
Or where a neighboring country welcomed us. Spend a year building temporary bases and moving supplies (or maybe quicker than that for a smaller force) and then fight. Or if we don't have other commitments, we could send ten or twelve carriers and move a whole lot of supplies at once. If the time ever comes that it's relatively easy and cheap to shoot down everybody's warplanes and our carriers become obsolete at their primary mission, they might still be valuable as fast floating warehouses. Even more storage space after you clear out the planes and the repair shops for the planes etc.
I think it's interesting that this post has gotten so few responses, and the two it did get were not particularly apposite.
Economic meltdown. We've been living for a long time with a trade imbalance -- we import more than we export, and we make up the difference with foreign debt. We've reduced our foreign debt somewhat by foreigners playing our stock market and losing money in big slumps, at the dot.com bust and more recently. We've reduced it somewhat by foreigners buying our mortgages and derivatives that then defaulted. But we still have a great big foreign debt and we have no idea how to sell stuff to foreigners to help even it out. No idea.
For awhile we said that our intellectual capital made the difference, that foreigners would have to pay us royalties on what they made because they used our ideas which were so much better than their ideas. This seems not to be bringing in enough money, though.
For awhile we said that our financial wizardry would bring in the money. We were so much better than anybody else at making useful financial instruments that we could make lots of money selling them. Foreigners didn't understand how to make them as well as we did, so they'd buy ours. But that market has shut down.
We have no idea how to make up the difference. We buy more than we sell, and we go deeper in debt. We need to spend a whole lot of money to revamp our military so it will be able to fight a modern army. The main modern army we have to consider is china. Depending on how you split up the budget items, it could be correctly said that every dollar we spend this year to improve our military (or to fight in the middle east) has to be borrowed from china.
"When we build a military that can conquer china, the chinese communists will loan us the money." Have I heard something like that before?
How long will this go on? How long can it go on? We talk as if the economy will have no effect on our military spending. We just keep the same old objectives and the same old planning and the same old schedules and carry on. Can we do that even if we want to?
Is there any reason to think the economy will improve quickly? Any reason to think we can do our military planning without taking the economy into account?
As they get stronger they're going to think about what their interests are, and they might easily not want to be allied with the US boat anchor.
There is that. Of course, as it is now, that seems somewhat distant - there is strong support for the "self-defense-only" article in the Japanese constitution among the Japanese people, and Japan's neighbors are very nervous at any sign of Japanese militarism. I personally wouldn't be too annoyed with it, as long as we maintained the naval ability to smack them down or at least make them pay if they tried to cut us off from trading over there.
I think the Japanese are more comfortable sitting behind the US military shield and simply throwing money around at international problems.
I'm concerned about your idea to blockade the chinese coast or bomb their ports. If we choose a limited war with china, can we be sure china will fight a limited war with us?
As long as we stuck to simply bombing the ports and blockading the costs (which would hurt the US a lot economically but absolutely devastate China), what could they realistically do? They could shoot down our planes, or try to break the blockade (a good deal of their naval strategy up until recently was about the latter), but as long as we maintained superiority in that area and didn't try anything so foolish as to escalate the situation to a land war, they'd have little to counter it aside from nukes. That's a no-go from their area except if the regime itself was under significant threat, and even then they'd be at a disadvantage - they have a much smaller number of much less accurate nuclear weapons than the United States, and the US is building missile defense.
"As they get stronger they're going to think about what their interests are, and they might easily not want to be allied with the US boat anchor."
There is that. Of course, as it is now, that seems somewhat distant
Agreed, distant. My problem is that these days the international stuff changes so fast that 3 years is a long time away.
As long as we stuck to simply bombing the ports and blockading the costs (which would hurt the US a lot economically but absolutely devastate China), what could they realistically do?
They could refuse to accept terms, and wait. Maybe we go home quick, and then they do whatever they can to wreck our economy while they build up their military.
Maybe we decide to tie up seven carriers indefinitely while we look for a good way out.
They're pretty good at not giving us a clear cause to attack. Maybe we could tell the world we're bombing their ports to promote democracy in china? And of course most of the trade that we cut off that isn't to us is to somebody else, not that much is internal to china. So we inconvenience a lot of others, maybe primarily our allies. Today it seems absurd that a big part of the world might impose an embargo against us. We're a democracy and they love us for our freedoms and all that. Things could change quickly, and we couldn't punish them for it while we needed seven carrier groups for china. And if they do start something like that they might not stop until we agree to a whole lot of nuclear disarmament. It seems peculiar that the world as a whole trusts the russians with nukes more than us, but the russians are careful not to threaten to nuke anybody, and we are not as careful that way.
On the other hand, if the global economy has already collapsed before we attack china maybe we can bomb their ports and not hurt anybody's trade much.
I guess I'm spreading FUD. When you present it like a done deal, like "what could they realistically do?" I shudder. We might get in a bind where we have no better choice than attack china and find out what happens, but the results aren't something I feel confident predicting.
Maybe we could tell the world we're bombing their ports to promote democracy in china?
I was assuming this would mainly be a defensive reaction, of sorts, like if the Chinese tried to make a grab for Taiwan. Or if they started providing actual military support to the North Korean government in a war with South Korea. Or if Japan actually does re-arm at some point in the naval arena (which was always their strongest point), and the Chinese and Japanese end up in a fight in the South China Sea that goes badly for the Chinese and creates a scenario where we need to stop China and force them into a ceasefire.
China has been pretty good about taiwan so far. I think they're playing go and not chess, they want taiwan intact and not taken off the board. As fuel gets more expensive taiwan will have less trade apart from china and US support will get more expensive. They can expect to eventually negotiate for taiwan without a fight.
Similarly, they get nothing good from another korean war.
If japan picks a naval fight with china and china does badly, why would we get involved? If japan does badly we'd want to intercede, I guess. But to the extent we could influence things wouldn't we try to prevent that war? Get both sides to agree to let trade pass freely, and get some sort of agreement between them about who patrols which water....
I don't see the traditional reasons for war here. Strategic resources? Strategic location? Religious conflict? Arms race that one side is about to lose? Disputed border? Push for a defensible border? Ethnic cleansing? Lebensraum? The main purpose in war with china on either side would be internal politics -- a dominant political faction might feel they benefit from an external war. Or accident. Say north korea had a revolt and was in turmoil, and one of the factions invited the southerners to come in and unify the country, and things progressed faster than china or the USA could track them.
So I suppose we'd want to not only blockade china but also do airstrikes on their oil pipelines?
What bothers me is that unless we could get a real victory, with an occupation and restructuring of their government and they know they're completely defeated, they'd come out of it intent on preparing for the next war. That is not a good outcome. Better not to fight unless the other outcomes are clearly worse.
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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