Realism on the rack

Can anyone resolve this apparent contradiction for me? Prof. Walt writes, "realism doesn't take a normative or ethical position," and then later he writes, "[r]ealism emphasizes that foreign and defense policy should advance the national interest..." (my emphasis).

Doesn't the latter quote say that realism does take a normative position, especially in the context of the sentence which precedes it? Note that it's not tautological that states should act according to the national interest or raison d'état or whatever you want to call it: as I understand it, before the 16th century that idea would have been considered blasphemous. So why isn't realism being normative when it says that states should act "realistically"?

I agree with the above. Professor Walt described in the first few paragraphs the reason why analytical realism cannot take a moral stance against waterboarding. A 'realist case against waterboarding', entailing what countries should do (even pragmatic stances, as opposed to ethical ones, regarding the way things should be are still definitively 'normative') would require a 'normative realist' stance, which is not the same as the analytical realism he described. For Prof. Walt to conflate analytical realism and normative realism is a gross oversight and certainly would confuse those readers without formal study of international relations theory. 'Normative' has nothing to do with ethical vs. pragmatic and everything to do with analysis vs. prescription.

Just my two cents as a student of History at the University of Edinburgh. I defer my lack of expertise to the professor.

I would submit that this argument by Professor Walt is not realist at all. He writes:

"Relying on waterboarding and other forms of torture also makes the United States look hypocritical; if we are willing to violate our professed principles in this realm, can others count on anything we say in other areas? Torturing people also gives our enemies a powerful rhetorical argument to use against us and makes us seem more like them, which in turn makes it harder for us to rally others to our side."

This emphasis on the impact of perceptions, reputation, etc., is in stark contrast to realist theory. Daryl Press' more traditional realist work points out that the idea reputations "matter" in international politics is overblown. More importantly, realists think that material power drives the world. If it is material power that drives global politics, shouldn't states make decisions on the basis of their material interests in a given situation, not touchy-feely things like "rhetorical arguments"?

Professor Walt -- could you please explain how an argument focused on the impact of rhetoric and reputation is a realist argument? Except in that you are making a pragmatic argument, but realism and pragmatism are not the same thing.

stephen’s balance of threat theory could be instructive here

With all due respect, the question of how states determine whether one actor is a threat or another actor is a threat is something that can only be answered outside the confines of realism. If you have two states that have relatively equal material power and a third party views one as a threat but another not as a threat, that means there is something else besides realist variables driving the train.

I am unsure why you feel realism is ill equipped to gauge threats. Balance of threat theory goes a long way to assessing just that. I brought it up because it draws a distinction between traditional concepts of power on the one hand and capabilities and intent on the other (reflecting a classical/neo realist split). In other words it provides a realist explanation for the dynamic between power and behavior. The idea here being that where states were comfortable bandwagoning with the US post WWII, they could be more resistant in the future. While out of bounds of its original purpose, as addressed, we can see how realism might inform the political opinion that torture or extraordinary rendition affects the way states interact with the US. Potentially challenging or limiting its maneuvering room, which could weigh on its overall power down the road.

Grand Sen---read Walt’s books!! Start at the beginning- I really appreciate how they blend.

The problem here is that Realism is divided between those who think it is a normative theory and those who think it is a positive theory. Morgenthau and Carr, for example, both have highly developed theories about the relationship between politics and morality. Realism is not as monolithic as many seem to think. You can only define something that is without history, and Realism has not only one history, but multiple histories (where to begin? where to end?), therefore, it cannot be defined in axiomatic terms. It can be presented in such terms, but any number of objections could be raised to any attempt to do so.

A like statement:

"Realism is a positive theory of international politics, not a normative theory, and it is essentially amoral", therefore does not apply to Realism, but rather Stephen Walt's interpretation of Realism, which in effect proceeds from his epistemological commitments, all of which is fine, but brings him into immediate conflict with other Realists such as Morgenthau and Carr.