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Will we need a "Plan B" in Afghanistan?
President-elect Barack Obama has repeatedly said that he will focus more effort on the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. Current plans call for an additional 20,000-30,000 troops to be sent to Afghanistan next year, and Secretary of State Robert Gates wants to double the size of the Afghan army and intensify U.S. training efforts. Fred Kaplan at Slate reports that "we finally have a strategy," though he wisely cautions "that may not be enough."
Here's why I'm worried, too. Take a look at the recent RAND Corporation study of U.S.-led peacekeeping operations, which contains in-depth case studies of the occupations of Germany, Japan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, Somalia, and Afghanistan. The success stories (Germany, Japan, Bosnia, and Kosovo) all featured a far more intensive commitment of men and resources than anyone is talking about in Afghanistan. In Germany, we had 100 U.S. troops for every 1000 people in the local population; in Kosovo and Bosnia, we started off with roughly 20 NATO soldiers per 1,000 locals. Somalia and Japan began with about five soldiers per 1,000 locals and then drew down (Somalia was a failure; Japan an obvious success).
By contrast, the post-conflict occupation of Afghanistan began with 14,000 U.S. and allied troops for a country with a population of nearly 30 million. That works out to well under 1 peacekeeper for every 1,000 Afghans. There are now about 63,000 U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan and the planned reinforcements will bring that total up to somewhere around 90,000 next year. But for a country that now contains over 32 million people, that's still fewer than three soldiers per 1,000 population. To get to the force levels achieved in tiny Kosovo -- which is only 11,000 square kilometers as opposed to Afghanistan's total land area of roughly 650,000 sq. km. -- the United States and NATO would need to put over 600,000 troops in the field. And nobody is proposing to make that sort of commitment, even if we could. Afghanistan has also received much lower amounts of aid per capita than the successful postwar occupations.
Of course, rules of thumb like these should be used with caution, as the context of different occupations varies considerably. One could argue that the insurgency we are fighting is confined to certain areas of the country, so counting the whole population overstates the problem. Adding the Afghan Army into the mix can bring the force-to-population ratios up to a more encouraging level, particularly if the army proves to be loyal and if efforts to expand it succeed. One could also argue that smaller amounts of aid per capita can still have a disproportionately large impact, because Afghanis are already so poor and it doesn't take much outside help to make a big difference. Supporters might also argue that the tactical success of the "surge" in Iraq shows that additional troops deployed in the right way can have big positive effects.
On the other hand, the difficult nature of Afghan terrain and the lack of a well-developed transportation network means that higher ground force-to-population ratios are needed to achieve lasting stability. That problem is compounded by the porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which gives Taliban and al Qaeda insurgents a safe haven from most of the NATO contingent. Moreover, the lack of local infrastructure makes it harder to deliver aid cheaply and thus reduces the amount of money that actually touches the lives of ordinary Afghanis. Finally, Afghan tribes and warlords have a long history of alignment and realignment, which means that the cohesion of the "national" Army and the loyalty of tribal forces may not be something on which we can rely. And as my new colleague Rory Stewart points out here, adding more troops in the past has "had a negative political impact on the conservative and nationalistic communities of the Pashtun south and allowed Taliban propaganda to portray us as a foreign military occupation."
Add all this together, and it's easy to see why the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, General Bantz Craddock, said last week that the United States and NATO will have to keep a large force in Afghanistan for "at least ten years," and maintain a presence there for "decades." But Craddock's implicit recommendation should not be accepted uncritically: saying the United States should stay there for "decades" begs the question of whether it is in our interest to commit lots of blood and treasure toward the creation of a unified Afghan state. And that's a question of national interest and overall grand strategy, not just a matter of military operations or counter-insurgency tactics.
Bottom line: there is a very real possibility that escalating our commitment in Afghanistan will not succeed, which means we will need a Plan B. I hope we won't, but I also hope somebody in the Obama administration starts working on one now, so that we don’t have to improvise one on the fly. Proposals welcome.
SHAH MARAI/AFP/Getty Images
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“The pessimist complains about the wind; the optimist expects it to change; the realist adjusts the sails.”
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Relations at Harvard University.
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South Asia and the national interest
The question that needs answering w/r/t the relationship of Afghanistan to US national interests: is there a way to prevent state failure in Pakistan while reducing American commitment (of troops, money, and national attention) to Afghanistan? It seems clear that this is impossible. Some question exists, obviously, as to whether or not our present efforts are contributing to stability in the region, or if so, whether such conditions will continue to obtain.
The fundamental security risk for the US in South Asia is the dissolution of the Pakistani state, or the cooptation of that government by extremist elements that plausibly erode the rationality of the state's international behavior. The only way to avoid this is to keep helping (or convincing?) Pakistan to deal with the challenges arising from its ungoverned and under-governed areas. Honest observers will acknowledge that this includes Afghanistan.
How does this happen? I don't have the answers. But it plainly doesn't if we reduce our involvement to the occasional Hellfire shot from a Predator.
C
What about Pakistan?
Anyone who argues that spending decades and billions in Afghanistan isn't worth the hassle need only look to the nuclear armed Pakistan on its border. I think the fate of those two countries will be intrinsically bound together for the coming decades. An unstable Afghanistan will mean an even more unstable Pakistan for obvious reasons. Pakistan can't control it's borders, and having true lawlessness all over its neighbor will only inflame this situation. I've never been a fan of the domino theory, but this is one case in which I see it happening. If Afghanistan falls to anarchy, so might Pakistan and their nucs, which could be disastrous for everyone.
Notice how the ratio is
Notice how the ratio is higher in the permissive environments of Germany, Japan, Kosovo and Bosnia where either the government had formally surrendered or a peace agreement had been brokered between the major factions on the ground. The question then is do Somalia, Afghanistan etc. constitute a lower priority or is it simply risk aversion.
Once you try to solve political problems...
Once you try to solve political problems, usually conceptual problems with weapons, then you will need more weapons, weapons up to WMD. So, no wonder "plans call for an additional 20,000-30,000 troops to be sent to Afghanistan next year". I see no problem there to be solved by means of military might, same in ME. It is really waste of taxpayers resources. I think the funds channelled to military operations should be diverted to re-writing of the Constitution and developing a usefull FP Theory.
Perhaps as Stephen pointed out as an axiom to his Realist Theory of FP:
"there exists no central authority that can enforce moral or legal constraints"
why _not_ create one?
I have a sort of draft constitution for such a central authority, but I am afraid it needs a lot of shuffling of the existing constitutions of existing states of Stephen's Realist Theory of FP.
After we sort out the axioms of the Realist Theory of FP, I was intending to ask Stephen "what would be your proposed constitution for such a Central Authority - realistically?".
Thanks your time Stephen.
Grand Sen~or
BTW, if I was Chief of Staff of the USA Armed Forces I would refuse such plans of solving political problems by military force, because this displays that politicians don't know how to do their job or they don't bother moving their asses to solve the problems themselves and dumping them to me while I have no means and not even authorised to deal with them politically (if you know what I mean);->>
hehhe I can hear someone saying "Steve! didn't I tell get off with hash homie!"
We could try focusing on the
We could try focusing on the major cities (Kandahar, Kabul, etc), monitoring them and cleaning up the corruption while promoting government reform, and securing their supply lines. Then slowly expand outward, training new Afghan soldiers as we go, bribing local chieftains, and so forth. The idea would be to slowly push the Taliban into the periphery, away from the greater part of the population, and give the population in the non-Taliban areas the ability to fight back if the Taliban try anything.
You could air-strike Taliban bases in Afghanistan, but aggressively going after them offensively would be secondary to securing as much of the population as possible, piece by piece if necessary (better a central government in Afghanistan governing, say, 65% of the population, than none).
Oh Boy! You Guys have Global
Oh Boy!
You Guys have Global Problems and geared up to solve all the problems of the World - have you also got enough resources?
You Guys are there to promote "democracy" but you cannot trust people there, you have to re-new those people, why don't you plant some American Indians there, natives are _not_ good enough for you, for democracy, they have to be like you to deserve it, they _have to_ have a constitution similar to yours, they have to be re-trained at your schools, according to your curriculums, they have to be assimilated to your way of life, otherwise you have to do it yourselves by Jupiter;->>
I tell you what, your problems will grow exponencially as the time goes by and you will never be happy;->>
Off goes hedonism;->>
If you go like that Taliban is going to cause you tuberculosis;->>
As I suggested before, make an appointment with your shrinker before asking advice from FP experts.
"bribe the local chieftains"??!! - that would help, if you are that desperate;->> Is that what you did to Kaddafi?!
You can always buy the hash from them to keep them happy and give it to me free of charge - the hash homie - to get me off.
Stephen! I really love this blog Mate!
Please don't get me off from it;->
Grand Sen~or
We could try focusing on the
We could try focusing on the major cities (Kandahar, Kabul, etc), monitoring them and cleaning up the corruption while promoting government reform, and securing their supply lines. Then slowly expand outward, training new Afghan soldiers as we go, bribing local chieftains, and so forth. ....
You could air-strike Taliban bases in Afghanistan,....
How different is this from the USSR plan, when they were attempting the same goals?
Presumably the US wouldn't
Presumably the US wouldn't have to deal with a rival power shipping in over a billion dollars a year in state-of-the-art weaponry and training in collusion with several of the local Middle East powers.
People seem to have this image of Afghans somehow being Fundamentally Unconquerable. This masks the fact that they were getting their asses kicked by both the Soviets and Soviet-backed Afghan Communists until the US and others started running a major program against said antagonists.
Presumably the US wouldn't
Presumably the US wouldn't have to deal with a rival power shipping in over a billion dollars a year in state-of-the-art weaponry and training in collusion with several of the local Middle East powers.
Ah. Presumption.
People seem to have this image of Afghans somehow being Fundamentally Unconquerable. This masks the fact that they were getting their asses kicked by both the Soviets and Soviet-backed Afghan Communists until the US and others started running a major program against said antagonists.
It was costing the soviets a lot to do that. All the afghan resistance had to do was survive, and they'd pin down a whole lot of soviet troops for an indefinite time. The russians had to destroy them, and they were failing at that even before we got involved.
"Nobody in military history has showed much profit fighting irregular troops over broken ground." Algis Budrys, The Falling Torch
Ah. Presumption. I notice
I notice that you've done this several times in threads, where you question something without actually providing a real reason or argument as to why the opposite would be true.
Are you seriously doubting that the role of over a billion dollars a year in state-of-the-art weaponry to the Afghans (plus ISI support from Pakistan) was significant in the Afghans' ultimate victory?
They were failing to do that, and had lost control of the greater part of the countryside before US military aid started arriving in force. Had the US not intervened with Pakistani assistance, most of the mujahideen would have been slaughtered by the USSR and its local Afghani partners over time, as what was happening.
Hardly. They (by which I meet the mujahideen and the Afghans in rebellion in general) were getting slaughtered and taking horrific losses.
Are you seriously doubting
Are you seriously doubting that the role of over a billion dollars a year in state-of-the-art weaponry to the Afghans (plus ISI support from Pakistan) was significant in the Afghans' ultimate victory?
No. I think the soviets were failing to destroy them before, in a perpetual effort that cost too much. But the afghans didn't particularly have what it took to "win". Just to keep requiring too many resources.
"All the afghan resistance had to do was survive, and they'd pin down a whole lot of soviet troops for an indefinite time."
They were failing to do that, and had lost control of the greater part of the countryside before US military aid started arriving in force.
Agreed that they'd lost control of the greater part of the countryside. But it cost the russians to keep that contryside depopulated.
Had the US not intervened with Pakistani assistance, most of the mujahideen would have been slaughtered by the USSR and its local Afghani partners over time, as what was happening.
I don't have solid numbers on that. Do you? I had the strong impression that a whole lot of people had gone to safety in iran, pakistan etc and kept sending men back to fight while families kept going back to try to survive. How long would they kept that up? I believe that I don't know and neither do you. But -- these were the same people we're fighting now, a generation later. If they aren't getting used to this sort of thing by now, how long will it take?
The russians hadn't defeat them when we intervened. What would it take for us to defeat them? Will it take full-scale ethnic cleansing, as the russians were attempting?
Agreed that they'd lost
But by how much? At least from what I've read, it didn't really become the total fiasco with major losses of men and equipment for the Soviets that it ultimately became until after the US started giving the Mujahideen the weaponry to really fight back.
That's not really true for the most part, with some exceptions (like Bin Laden and his group). Most of the mujahideen tended to be family men and the like - as you mentioned, a lot of them had families in exile in Pakistan and the like.
The Taliban (the main group we're fighting), on the other hand, was originally composed of FATA Pakistanis and some young Afghanis who were trained and educated in the madrassahs in Waziristan. They were predominantly unmarried, fanatical young men - most were not mujahideen members.
No doubt the Taliban has been able to recruit Afghans since then, but that groups had two different cores.
The Russians were doing it with the support of the local Communist puppet government, so I'd hesitate to call it ethnic cleansing.
I think Brett is on the right
I think Brett is on the right track and Econ is completely accurate in stating that the futures of Afghanistan and Pakistan are intrinsically connected. It just makes sense to protect and stabilize the main cities, especially Kabul and much more difficult, Kandahar. The US is on board with this plan as the first brigade of new troops was stationed around Kabul. Another key issue is the presidential election this spring, as Karzai attempts to remain in control. The US should put pressure on Karzai to clean up some of the major corruption he is apart of and start showing results to his citizens in terms of social services.
Another element of this conflict will probably displease Mr. Walt. The US has put its chips in a fight to bring democracy and certain liberal rights to the people of Afghanistan. Though it is not our fault that the Taliban and other past Afghan leaders treated their citizens like dirt or worse, we have brought freedom to millions of the country's citizens and should do what we can to protect this. The bravery of the group of school girls, assaulted with acid by Taliban jerkfaces, in their continual drive to get an education could not be done without US security and support. Though Walt is correct in arguing that the US must be aware of strategic failure in region, and prepare for all possible outcomes, there is also a moral element to this conflict that must be acknowledged.
Theory and practice
Econ is completely accurate in stating that the futures of Afghanistan and Pakistan are intrinsically connected.
Afghanistan and pakistan are connected like west virginia and virginia are connected. It isn't a big deal.
It just makes sense to protect and stabilize the main cities, especially Kabul and much more difficult, Kandahar.
It makes sense to do that because that's about the most we can realistically try for. It didn't work in vietnam, or rather it partly worked. The cities were reasonably safe until we had to pull out, apart from the single Tet offensive. It partly worked for the russians in afghanistan -- the cities were reasonably safe until the russians had to pull out, apart from a few rockets and such that we gave the afghans.
Another key issue is the presidential election this spring, as Karzai attempts to remain in control.
Unimportant. Somebody who accepts the US presence will win the election. It doesn't much matter who. Somebody new who can disavow Karzai's actions might be better, but Karzai would be OK too.
The US has put its chips in a fight to bring democracy and certain liberal rights to the people of Afghanistan.
The russians tried to bring socialism, with about as much success. Afghanistan already had a sort of rough democracy. One gun, one vote. Leaders negotiated based on relative strength, proximity, and how vital the interests were to each side. Occasionally they couldn't reach agreement and fought, which provided an expensive way to recount the votes. (This is one of the strengths of paper democracy, that there's less destruction. The USA has had only one major democratic failure in over 200 years, the civil war that killed over a million americans and brought tremendous property destruction. Usually we negotiate our differences.)
I think a lot of afghans consider our "certain liberal rights" about the way we'd consider a foreign army that occupied us trying to bring us socialism. Sure, in theory it's a more advanced society with better benefits for everybody, but we don't want it.
Though Walt is correct in arguing that the US must be aware of strategic failure in region, and prepare for all possible outcomes, there is also a moral element to this conflict that must be acknowledged.
The scoutmaster asked his boy scouts about their good deeds for the week. One patrol announced that they all helped an old lady across the street. "That's good, but why did it take eight of you to do the good deed?" "Because she didn't want to go."
So wrong
You seem to lack an even cursorily knowledge on the history of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan has been manipulating Afghanistan since it has been created. The Pakistanis, specifically the ISI (intelligence) have been THE major player in the country for the past 30 years. Why do you think we give so much military aid to Pakistan J? One important part of it is to make sure they are working in our interests in regards to Afghanistan.
In that same vein, you could not be more wrong in terms of your analysis of Afghan politics in the past. Again, you should actually read a book about the subject (I recommend Ghost Wars by Steve Coll).
My final critique is in regards of the imposition of socialism and equating it to our democratizing efforts. The difference is pretty clear: under Soviet style socialism, there is no chance of representation, no chance to change. The democracy in place is able to do that. If a majority of those Afghans do indeed see our liberties, which are really the freedom of choice and freewill, are a occupying army they can vote it out. Indeed, the fact that the country is an "Islamic Republic" with "Islamic courts" seems to shoot down your argument. Your argument reeks of cultural elitism and anthropological racism, saying that these people can never change and find peace.
Bam Bam
As modern sport scribe Stuart Scott once said 'Booyaa!!!' Though you raised some solid caveats to my analysis and policy prescriptions, I am in agreement with Econ here that your view of the Afghan political system and the differences between the Soviet invasion and forced political system and the NATO military presence and US democracy promotion. The Soviets 'introduced' socialism into Afghanistan by killing/displacing over 2 million Afghans with rolling tanks for a near ten year period. They forced in a Communist Party authoritarian leader while though he is obviously 'US approved' Karzai did win an free and fair election is has to earn his reelection this fall, a process that will hopefully breed accountability. Finally, Econ is absolutely correct in his assertion of elements of cultural relativism in your argument as I think most Afghan citizens, especially young girls, believe they deserve freedoms of speech, religion, etc and a future worth looking forward to, not fearing.
.... the differences between
.... the differences between the Soviet invasion and forced political system and the NATO military presence and US democracy promotion. The Soviets 'introduced' socialism into Afghanistan by killing/displacing over 2 million Afghans with rolling tanks for a near ten year period.
If we stay for ten years how many will we kill or displace? Of course, we're bombing the displaced in pakistan too.
They forced in a Communist Party authoritarian leader while though he is obviously 'US approved' Karzai did win an free and fair election is has to earn his reelection this fall, a process that will hopefully breed accountability.
Ah, will afghans look at it as a choice between two bad US-approved puppets? A significant number of americans look at american elections that way. I ran into that in 2008 trying to get people to vote. Also 2006, 2004, 2002, and 2000. It's gotten less in recent years, a lot of people who said there was really no difference between Bush and Gore in 2000 changed their minds by 2004. I'm afraid some of them will decide there isn't much difference between Bush and Obama when they get to see the difference in action.
Incidentally, I want to ask your support for IRV. (Or one of the similar schemes -- there isn't that much difference among them and they're all far better than what we've got.) Vote for as many candidates as you want, in order. If your first candidate loses then your vote goes to the second on your list and so on. So you can vote for as many third party candidates as you like and your vote will still count if they all lose, provided you also voted for the second-worst candidate.
How much difference is there between having one party pick a candidate they think most voters will vote for, versus two parties who each pick a candidate they think will win? I can see that in theory it might look like a giant difference, but in practice it may amount to very little. Better with IRV.
You're overconfident, dude.
You seem to lack an even cursorily knowledge on the history of both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
I believe I've been exposed to much of the same propaganda you have. I just don't believe it as much. You are far too confident in your knowledge. "It isn't what we don't know that gets us. It's what we know that ain't so."
Pakistan has been manipulating Afghanistan since it has been created. The Pakistanis, specifically the ISI (intelligence) have been THE major player in the country for the past 30 years.
They've been the main outsiders supplying munitions and money since we stopped. To my way of thinking the major players are afghans, but I can see it your way. Presumably their aid in arms and money to Taliban made a big difference to Taliban control of afghanistan, and if we could have persuaded pakistan to drop that support even without an invasion it would have made a big difference to their continued control -- maybe enough that they'd lose power in a big part of the country.
But it isn't certain we could eliminate ISI support to Taliban without US people on the ground monitoring it.
In that same vein, you could not be more wrong in terms of your analysis of Afghan politics in the past. Again, you should actually read a book about the subject (I recommend Ghost Wars by Steve Coll).
He's pretty good at presenting it from a US perspective, and he demonstrates where many of the american misperceptions came from. Would you care to recommend something from a pakistani perspective, and maybe one or more afghan perspectives?
My final critique is in regards of the imposition of socialism and equating it to our democratizing efforts. The difference is pretty clear:
[snip rant claiming that democracy is better than socialism]
Watch out about believing your own propaganda. Blowback can get you bad.
I tend to agree with you about what's best for everybody, but the trouble is that we need to convince afghans about that. You can say that the little girls would like a liberal society, and I think they might, but to actually create that you have to take things in order. You only get democracy when the guys with the guns believe in democracy. In the USA, they do. Lots of places they don't.
Your argument reeks of cultural elitism and anthropological racism, saying that these people can never change and find peace.
In england it started out as democracy for warlords, and it gradually spread to democracy for the whole nobility, and in 700 years it got to the point they had democracy for unarmed grandmothers. It might go a lot faster in afghanistan assuming they want to go there. But truly they're better off to start out with democracy for warlords, or possibly democracy for fighters, and then spread democracy from there. It doesn't usually work to skip development steps.
Afghanistan and pakistan are
You mean aside from the fact that the local pashtun tribes in that area of Afghanistan and Waziristan in Pakistan are related (and frequently move across the borders), that the Taliban was trained in said border area of Pakistan connected to Afghanistan, and that the Taliban is using that area to cross over into Afghanistan from Pakistan?
What makes you think that is the case? It's not as if it is somehow impossible to pacify rural rebellions - countries have done exactly that throughout history (look up Thailand's successful battle against a communist insurgency hiding out in the rural areas).
Karzai is seen by most Afghans as coddling the ridiculous amounts of corruption by Afghani state officials. Getting someone new in would go a long way towards creating greater Afghan support for their government.
"Afghanistan and pakistan are
"Afghanistan and pakistan are connected like west virginia and virginia are connected. It isn't a big deal."
You mean aside from the fact that the local pashtun tribes in that area of Afghanistan and Waziristan in Pakistan are related (and frequently move across the borders),
True for virginia and west virginia too, including many of my own relatives.
that the Taliban was trained in said border area of Pakistan connected to Afghanistan, and that the Taliban is using that area to cross over into Afghanistan from Pakistan?
Well, that's different. It would likely be true if we were having a big armed revolt in west virginia. Luckily, we aren't.
It's not as if it is somehow impossible to pacify rural rebellions - countries have done exactly that throughout history (look up Thailand's successful battle against a communist insurgency hiding out in the rural areas).
Well, if that's doable why not do it? Why settle for controlling the cities and let the countryside go hang? Go out there and control the whole thing all at once.
"Karzai would be OK too."
Karzai is seen by most Afghans as coddling the ridiculous amounts of corruption by Afghani state officials. Getting someone new in would go a long way towards creating greater Afghan support for their government.
There's the corruption issue, and there's the issue that he looks like a US puppet, and there's the issue that he's pretty much powerless. I guess somebody new would get the benefit of the doubt for awhile, but how long would it take before he also looked like a corrupt, powerless puppet? Not long. I doubt it would make much difference.
You know what would get Karzai (or whoever) a lot of respect in afghanistan? Put the UN forces under his command. Or at least the US forces. They go where he tells them and fight who he says. Bomb who he says to bomb and don't bomb anybody unless he agrees. He'd get a lot of support if people knew he could keep them from being bombed.
And if he could send some of the troops home and instead get the amount of money they cost -- if he got to decide how many troops he wanted versus cash -- he'd wind up the most respected leader afghanistan has ever had. Unless he was some kind of fool.
But of course we wouldn't ever put US troops under afghan command. You wouldn't want it, I wouldn't want it, the US military wouldn't want it, the US public wouldn't stand for it. US troops in afghanistan attack who they want and bomb who they want, and the top guy in afghanistan can't stop them. Karzai is a supreme leader for whom there's a degree of doubt whether he can hold his own capital without the support of foreign troops who aren't in his chain of command.
So, is it possible that the corruption charges are a sort of code? How firm are afghans on the concept that top government officials shouldn't get to spend the government's money? In the USA we have the idea that's supposed to be carefully hidden; if we find out about the details we feel like our elected officials have been far too sloppy. (Except our black population tends to be more accepting, they don't get upset about a reasonable amount of graft. So black politicians tend to go to far less trouble to cover their tracks and they get unfairly attacked by white politicians, police, and media for it.)
When afghans say Karzai's government is too corrupt, are they really saying they don't like that their government is powerless? But instead they politely say something we can understand as a criticism that has nothing to do with us....
That's the thing, I suppose.
That's the thing, I suppose. If we can clean up the cities to some extent, get most of the Afghan population (including the cities) doing well and secure, and build-up the Afghan military's strength and capability to protect said areas, then time is on our side. Simply having a more peaceful, successful area next to wretched, sparsely populated Taliban-held wasteland will bait away a lot of their fighters, and bribes from the US can help some more.
Of course, this will require the US to really play an active, prominent role in stabilizing and protecting the population. We also really need to get the command structure for NATO troops in Afghanistan worked out.
Local and Global Politics
It is worth mentioning that there is a fairly large Pashtun community in Massachusetts.
Pashtuns really do not need Taliban propaganda to view the US as running a foreign military occupation.
The Pashtuns just combine their experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan with their American knowledge base.
I just spent a few days in explaining Jewish political economy to a group of American Pashtuns.
Professors Walt & Mearsheimer addressed CAIR last year if I am not mistaken. Did they notice how many Pashtuns were in the audience?
I have the following key principle on my blog:
I note the following globalization extension:
When Zionists slaughter Palestinians in Gaza, not only does it affect the US in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but it also has an effect on the Muslims here.
Likewise when sociopathic Jews like Charles Jacobs, Ruth Wisse, Larry Summers or Alan Dershowitz spew bile in the Boston area and attack the local Boston-area Muslim community, which contains a good number of Pashtuns, not only does it have effects throughout the Muslim world, but there are particularly strong repercussions in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
[I note that my blog seems to be quite popular among English readers in these regions and that many popular blog entries have been translated into local languages for people that would not normally have a great deal of interest in the politics and sociology of the American Jewish community.]
What do you think the trial and conviction of the Holy Land Foundation tells Pashtuns? I have studied the trial. It was engineered by a seditious conspiracy of Jewish Zionists whose goal amounts to a conspiracy against the rights of Muslim Americans.
In short, Pashtuns are quite aware that the USA is being subverted by Zionist Jewish conspiracy and racketeering.
If we Americans want to convince Pashtuns that they are not subject to a foreign occupation orchestrated by the Israel lobby, we have to clean up our act here.
It's really easy. I put the program into 100 words in response to a challenge from Alternet. (See Saving America in 100 Words.)
I look fairly carefully at the statistics on my blog on a regional basis. In the last month, in the heartland of the USA, the three most popular blog entries in addition to the above have been:
Lots of Americans and not just Muslims are becoming truly annoyed with Jewish American Zionists and with the American Jewish community in general. I know I am, and I actually understand the mitigating circumstances.
I think you guys have quite a
I think you guys have quite a distorted view of Jews. The reality is Jews, Christians and Muslims believe in the same God and the scriptures revealed by that God. So, rather than trying to dig each others grave, they should create a common front against their common enemy : Secularo-fascism which dictates her laws to all of them, to assimilate and reduce them to secularo-fascists like themselves. To achieve this of course they will create every opportunity of enmity among them, to keep them busy to fight each other while they enjoy ruling over them.
Wake up Guys! Before you go to war, clearly identify your enemies, otherwise it will really be waste of energy;->>
You can start by reading your constitution, see if it has any similarity to the laws Christians,Jews and Muslims supposed to practice. They are not Christian Laws, they are not Jewsish Laws, they are not Muslim laws, thay are not Apache laws, they are Roman laws. What do the Jews have to do with the Roman Laws?!
Hey maybe I am making a wrong assumption here asuming that you are not secularo-fascist himself;->>
Grand Sen~or
Will we need a "Plan B" in Afghanistan?
The extra troops etc *are* Plan B. Plan A already failed.
You're asking about Plan C.
Suppose it turns out that the war is inevitably underfunded, but the goals are high. We try to do with 300,000 troops a job that really requires a million. Our supply lines through russia and turkmenistan and pakistan suffer unexpected delays, and our supply by air is endangered by scarce local fuel given oil at $220/barrel after another dollar devaluation. Our lack of lingusts leave us relying on too many translators of dubious allegiance, and the afghan government is evaporating although the afghan army is eager for training and supplies....
If things really start to slip how do we bug out without getting our rear guard slaughtered?
J. Thomas 9:36
This is a fantasy. What exactly is the job that requires a million troops? When is it that you imagine that we'll commit even 100K, never mind the 300K that you project?
This isn't Iran. "...getting our rear guard slaughtered"? Is this a flashback? Brydon in 1842? Be real.
This is a fantasy. What
This is a fantasy. What exactly is the job that requires a million troops? When is it that you imagine that we'll commit even 100K, never mind the 300K that you project?
Actually, I doubt we could supply 300K troops in afghanistan. So what will we do when we find out that the number we have there isn't enough? Obama has taken the first step. He says the number of troops we have in afghanistan isn't enough so he'll send more. What will he do when that isn't enough either? Three obvious possibilities -- give up and pull out, try to make do with the same number, or bring in more up to the point we can't bring in more. And then?
This isn't Iran. "...getting our rear guard slaughtered"? Is this a flashback? Brydon in 1842? Be real.
You're still thinking 2008. It isn't really possible to look ahead to 2011, things are changing too fast and we can't be sure which changes will come fastest. But we have to try.
If you think the end of 2011 will look a lot like the end of 2008, you're fantasizing. But what will it be? Maybe with a good strategy we can have a quick victory and be mostly pulled out by then? Or we'll accept less than victory and pull out? Or we'll be hanging in there paying for the war with a fast-depreciating currency? Or perhaps our economy will rebound and we'll be rich, and can easily afford all the military adventures we want?
It seems plain that there are
It seems plain that there are three options for the future disposition of US forces in Afghanistan: 1) some form of "victory" is accomplished, resulting in the continued presence of some number (whether roughly the same as now, 30-50k, or a reduced force on the order of the circa-2010 Iraq commitment) of troops in order to secure gains, continue to train Afghan security forces, and hedge against problems originating in Pakistan; 2) objectives are not met, the mission remains ill-defined, situation vis-a-vis Pakistan is still unclear and unresolved, and the American political-military leadership and/or the American public will no longer tolerate the expense of lives or money to sustain our involvement; or 3) conditions remain similar to now, or get worse, and the US pledges to remain involved until such time as ________ is accomplished (which is not yet), necessitating the involvement of perhaps as many troops as were in Iraq during the peak of that war (150k-ish). I can't see a circumstance where 200k or 300k or more troops are mobilized simply because I don't think it's possible at this point or any point in the near future.
So yeah, those are basically the options you outline here. None of which include "a million troops," "supply lines through Russia and Turkmenistan," "endangered" airlift resultant from high oil prices, or most especially, "getting our rear guard slaughtered" as if this is the Peninsular War. In short, the futurism you practiced in your 0936 post yesterday was the purest science fiction.
It seems plain that there are
It seems plain that there are three options for the future disposition of US forces in Afghanistan:
[snip three somewhat-plausible possibilities]
So yeah, those are basically the options you outline here. None of which include "a million troops,"
I never said we'd have a million troops, I said we might need a million troops and try to make do with fewer.
"supply lines through Russia and Turkmenistan,"
You figure that won't happen? Whyever not? Currently a big fraction of it goes through pakistan which is getting less tenable by the month. And the rest of it goes through unreliable former USSR provinces. There was a recent story that we're negotiating to send supplies through russia, which looks to me like a far better idea than the remaining alternative, namely iran.
"endangered" airlift resultant from high oil prices,
Do you have any basis to predict oil prices three years ahead? If not, this possibility needs to be considered.
or most especially, "getting our rear guard slaughtered" as if this is the Peninsular War.
Your #2 or #3 could lead to that, if we try to keep our troops there and find we can't suppy them adequately. Admit it.
In short, the futurism you practiced in your 0936 post yesterday was the purest science fiction.
How could it be otherwise? Given the uncertainties of the world economy, predicting 4 years ahead now is kind of like predicting 40 years ahead in 1910. In 1910 who would have predicted two world wars, the dominance of aircraft carriers, blitzkrieg, nukes, communist rule of russia and china, etc?
I figure the technology won't change nearly as fast in 4 years as it did then in 40 years, but there's certainly room for one or two big surprises. The end of aircraft carrier dominance might become visible in this time, or it might not. The age of heavy armor might already be over -- what good is it to use 5 gallons/mile to sit in a relatively slow-moving unmistakable prime target? Will our electronics dominate or will EMP be important after all? Or will somebody else's electronics dominate ours? Etc.
Meanwhile the fuel equation is changing. Our carriers and subs don't need petroleum fuel except for the aircraft; everything else we have uses lots of it. Can we afford to project force that way? If not like that, how?
These days if you try to predict 4 years ahead you're doing science fiction whether your predictions seem banal or not.
agree
if the Obama administration keeps on harping about Afghanistan being their #1 target in the misnamed "war on terror", we can be looking at Vietnam War #2.
agree
if the Obama administration keeps on harping about Afghanistan being their #1 target in the misnamed "war on terror", we can be looking at Vietnam War #2.
we should turn over what would have cost us if we escalate to the afganistan government to rebuild the country we broke. then just leave. sky will not fall. just as the same should be done in iraq.
none of these countries has any ability nor intention to harm us militarily. it is not in their interests.
After WW2 those 1000 Germans
After WW2 those 1000 Germans had few able bodied men of military age (25% were dead) among them.
A Demographic Theory of War
Population, power, and the 'slightly weird' ideas of Gunnar Heinsohn
It would be insane to stay 'decades'.
I don't think Obama's advisors really care about Afghanistan all that much so a (de facto) withdrawal from there is actually quite likely.