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Diary of a traveling blogger
Rounding up my first day at the International Studies Association annual meetings, in beautiful midtown Manhattan:
Began by chairing a panel on the forthcoming book Balance Sheet: The Iraq War and U.S. National Security, edited by John Duffield of Georgia State and Peter Dombrowski of the Naval War College. This collection will be out from Stanford University Press in June, and is an excellent attempt to conduct a scholarly assessment of the war’s impact on U.S. security interests. There are chapters by Steve Simon on the war on terror, Mike O’Hanlon on military readiness, Joe Cirincione on proliferation, Greg Gause on the Middle East region, and Clay Ramsay on public opinion. The editors sum it up in their conclusion and also attempt to wrestle with the obvious counter-factuals: what would have happened if we hadn’t gone in? Or if we had sent more troops from the beginning? Or if Saddam had ‘fessed up, or if the inspectors had continued longer? etc. The basic verdict is that the war has been bad for overall U.S. security interests, but the picture painted is not as consistently grim as some of you might think.
The book is important because Iraq remains a political football, and you can bet that Democrats and Republicans will continue to debate both the original decision and the subsequent conduct of the war, and will do so in an explicitly partisan fashion. The belief that Iraq is a disaster helped propel Obama to the Oval Office, but you can already see the neoconservative architects of the war preparing their own “stab in the back theory.” The core of this version is the argument that “the surge worked, and victory is at hand.” So if anything bad happens subsequently, it is all Obama’s fault (or so the argument will run).
That's why a book this is valuable: academic scholars don’t have pick a side in this fight; their comparative advantage lies in providing as even-handed and fair-minded an assessment as they can. And that’s what this book tries to do. Not the last word on the subject, perhaps, but an important contribution.
Then on to another panel on unipolarity, with several excellent papers. One highlight was University of Chicago Ph.D. student Nuno Monteiro’s paper “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful.” His basic argument is that the dominant state in a unipolar system (i.e., the unipole) will be tempted to try to maintain or improve its advantage, and especially to prevent weak states from acquiring a nuclear deterrent, which the weak state could use to constrain the unipolar's actions. Accordingly, the logic of unipolarity will tend to provoke conflicts between the unipolar and any lesser powers who refuse to accept its dominance.
It’s a very creative argument, although one can raise at least two questions. First, if Monteiro’s logic is correct, why didn’t the United States do more to stop North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran from getting a nuclear capability? We did fight a war with Iraq to prevent that from happening, but the argument suggests the U.S. should have fought these other states too. Second, if we have been in a unipolar world for the past fifteen years or so, what are the implications of the economic meltdown? Will economic constraints undermine America's dominant position, and drive us back to multipolarity?
A second highlight was Todd Sechsers’s paper “Goliath’s Curse: Asymmetric Power and Effectiveness of Coercive Threats.” Using a simple bargaining model, Sechser (from the University of Virginia) argues that great powers often fail to get their way when they issue coercive threats (which is surprising at first glance), and that this problem may in fact get worse the more powerful they are. The basic logic here concerns reputation: weak states will worry about giving in to a great power’s demands (even when the demands are fairly minor), because they will fear that the great power will just demand more later. So they resist now, to enhance their reputation for being stubborn and to convince the great power to leave them alone in the future. The core of the problem is that a very powerful state can’t make a credible commitment of restraint; it can’t reassure the weak state that it really, truly, wants just a modest concession, one that the weak state might be willing to grant if it were confident that this would be the only demand. And the bigger and stronger the coercing state is, the harder it is for that state to reassure the weak power that its aims are actually limited.
Sechser illustrates his model with a nice case study of Finland’s refusal to bow to Soviet demands in 1940, a refusal that triggered the Russo-Finnish war. But I kept thinking about the United States and Serbia in 1998-99 and the United States and Iran today. In the latter case, we have issued demands that we think are actually quite reasonable, and we’ve also said we will provide some positive benefits if we get a deal. But what if Iran is still worried that we really do have more ambitious goals (such as regime changfe) and that we will take advantage of any concessions they might make and up our demands later? If that is their view, then making relatively modest demands and offering generous incentives may not work. Paradoxically, his paper implies that we might have a better chance of cutting a deal with Iran if our position in the region were somewhat weaker, because Tehran would be less worried about the long-term implications of giving up its nuclear program. It also implies that great powers like the United States have to think about how they can provide credible reassurances to weak states, as a way of making them more willing to cut a deal.
I've oversimplified both these papers considerably; nonetheless, it was reassuring to see several scholarly projects that are directly relevant to current policy issues. If you know the ISA, this is not something one can always count on at these meetings.
Tomorrow’s highlight: a panel offering a posthumous award to Samuel Huntington for his contributions to international studies. It is a shame that Sam won’t be here to receive it himself, though I’m sure he would have been embarrassed by all the fuss.
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The Gordion Knot
All those arguments are based on the given concept of "state". It also obviously assumes that this unipolar institution/political-structure will be a state. therefore, it will behave like a state and dominate other states.
But if you remove the concept "state" then you may release the environment for unipolar political structure above SPEE structures which itself is not an SPEE so she has no interest to dominate. Besides it has no competitor, remember it was unipolar. When I have just written this sentence I have also discovered the paradox of the above argument: It starts with "unipolar" I guess an entity with no competitor, then it picks up, creates competitors to re-porove her unipolarity;-> Mis/guided by S. P. Huntington;->
It sounds like you've grown up too quickly, you don't know what to do with yourself, hormon fed or something;->
Excuse me Professor but this sounds like a joke to me;->
Thank you Professor.
Now I will carry on reading further.
I've read the rest of the message. My above argument applies the rest as well. If I try to express it according to the existing pseudo concept "state": Unipolarity should be considered as an abstraction to the state of States. It shouldn't be used as you use the concept "state". In other words there is no unipolar-state, there is a unipolar political structure born out of States. In fact this unipolarity requires the shift of the concept "state" to SPEE.
This argument is not compatible with the following axiom of the SATFP, you can't prove this according to the SATFP:
5. States commit morally dubious acts (dubious according to what? The Blog knows) (see axiom 4)(Why this is here? Didn't the Blog declare that SATFP is essencially amoral?)
In other words as long as the US as a "State" she will never be able to provide credible reassurances to any state. This is so according to the axiomas of the SATFP and the concept of "State" which is defined by them implicitly.
Professor! Please while states do not trust their identifiable socio-politico-economic entities how can they provide credible reassurances to other states?
That is the knot - the Gordion Knot Professor!
Again what I am trying to say here is a unipolar political structure has to strip off/break the shell of being a State, she matamorphoses to a new political entity. She is no more a State, therefore she has to return all the power that help her to metamorphose to this new entity (unipolar-political-structure(UPS)) to the real owners. Only then she can talk about "credible reassurances to states" meaningfully and convincingly. In that case the SATFP will become crippled to explain the activities of this new political entity UPS. In parctice UPS will have a constitution which will basically defines an SPEE as a socio-politico-economic entity who has all the rights to make her own laws and implement them to her own members with the restriction that she has no right to impose her laws to other SPEEs. With some other restrictions to help identify SPEEs etc. I won't go into the detail of it at this stage. I introduced it to show that UPS has categorically different a Meta-Constitution from SPEEs' constitutions.
Thank you Professor to keep us updated.
GrandSen~or.
"I've oversimplified both
"I've oversimplified both these papers considerably; nonetheless, it was reassuring to see several scholarly projects that are directly relevant to current policy issues. If you know the ISA, this is not something one can always count on at these meetings."
Yep. Especially from Europe, it is amazing to see how many irrelevant pieces are produced by constructivists/marxists/english schoolers and so forth.
Are you kidding? If I have to
Are you kidding? If I have to go to another panel where the answer is .9 I'm going to hang myself (or at least the quant-fetshing grad student that thinks this is some kind of answer.)
The right and left dialogue
The author states: "That's why a book this is valuable: academic scholars don’t have pick a side in this fight; their comparative advantage lies in providing as even-handed and fair-minded an assessment as they can. And that’s what this book tries to do."
I think the situation today very much is within the realms described by Michael Oakeshot and his modes. Some Republicans and moderates will read this book in the light you express. The far right perceives the Universities to be an arm of the liberal left. They do not recognize "scientific" findings which have methods imposed to assure that opinion removed as much as possible from their findings.
Hence, they have their own news systems and are starting their own universities to generate and articulate their own view.
This articles assumes the same underlying assumptions by both Republicans and Democrats. The more I listen to those speaking for the far religious right, the more certain I am that they are not in the "Science" mode and have developed their own, for I cannot see them in a truly "Christian" "Religion" mode either.
what is so creative about Montiero?
I honestly don't get what people think is interesting or creative in Montiero's work. it's just Hegemonic Stability Theory described in terms of polarity.
And yet he got an offer at Yale. Says a lot about the discipline and it's hiring processes.
Thomas Donelly????
Thomas Donelly????
On the Sechser paper
.. as Stephen describes it:
That is simple excuse for bad U.S. behavior in the international realm.
China seems to be able to make credible commitments. The U.S. can not do so any longer because the world (smaller states) have learned that the U.S. breaks an international commitment as soon as it sees a short term advantage in doing so.
Look at Russia and Bush I promise not to extend NATO. Look at the Algier accord and continued interference within Iran. Look at ...
In the short term such breaking of international commitments may bring some advantage. In the long term it does not because no one will ever trust you.
China understands that, the U.S. does not. The problem may lay within the very short term incentive U.S. legislators have. Has anyone tested such a thesis?
China seems to be able to
China's behaving homely today doesn't change the theoretical nature of "state".
Remember according to the SATFP:
5. States commit morally dubious acts
that is what we call "state".
Like the US, China also do not trust her identifiable SPEEs (ISPEEs). When the occasion comes, she hurshly silences them, denying any power to them. (Well the US has tamed/assimilated enough her ISPEEs, so she doesn't need to show her teeth that frequently;->). How can another state seriously believe that such a state's commitments are credible?
Yeah you are right "seems to be";-)
That you can explain according to the SATFP;-)
BTW, have you watched Obama signing 787 billion dollar bill. He can't trust to distribute it to ISPEEs but doesn't mind trusting it to his Wise Monopoly Operators - welcome back communism;->.
This money belongs to ISPEEs, it should be given back to them, they would know the best way to use it for their economic/cultural/social/political interests not the wise guys at the Ivory Tower (White House);->
This is tried by the USSR,
didn't work,
can't you use intellect?!
But hey, look at the bright side; maybe in short term this helps your subjects to be more dependent to the Monopoly and learn to make sacrifices from their creativity and get used to mediocrity;->
Grand Sen~or
"China seems to be able to
"China seems to be able to make credible commitments."
You are trying to apply an axiomatic system to real life. Of course the axioms break down.
States aren't required to commit morally dubious acts. It's just, whoever decides for them often sees short-term advantages that appear to override the long-term advantages of refraining. This applies particularly in democracies -- why pass up an opportunity now so that the guy who wins some later election will have an easier time? And anyway in the long run we're all dead.
Chinese governments have a tradition of keeping agreements; it's a sign of weakness not to. They have a tradition of creating dynasties that last awhile, and their historians teach them that this stability is a good thing for them and should be encouraged.
China also do not trust her identifiable SPEEs (ISPEEs). When the occasion comes, she hurshly silences them, denying any power to them.
They do fine with groups that support the government. It's only the ones that they think promote dissention that they mistreat. It doesn't help that the communist government is officially atheist and feels some need to strike at religious groups that appear to attack the government just by existing. This is a flaw in their system.
But the way they treat rebellious groups inside their own territory doesn't say much about how well they keep their agreements with other states. Of course, if your state becomes so weak it turns into a rebellious group inside chinese borders, in that case this experience does apply.
You are trying to apply an (updated)
What do you think you do?
Applying/using Ordinary Language (OL) to explain Nuclear Physics (International Politics)?
I think you need to know more about axiomatic systems.
Axioms don't break down, but an axiomatic system becomes useless in language activities in certain areas, if it doesn't help to communicate about certain aspect of phenomena. Then temporarily the axiomatic system users fall back to Ordinary Language (OL). But they don't linger around there too long, they invent new grammatical tools to systemetize their communication, this might be another axiomatic system or modufucation of the existing one to cater the communication needs of the axiomatic system users.
BTW, tha axiomatic system I am frequently talking in relation to is not invented by me. It is invented by this Blog. I have just put it in writing and asked the Blog to correct it, modify, recompose it if they see it is necessary.
If you don't like it, then bring your axiomatic system and let us talk about it and compare it with what we have. Otherwise, really we wouldn't know what you are talking about, because when we say "State" we mean "state" according to the SATFP. We don't know what you mean by "state".
Bring your axiomatic system Mate! So that we also know what you mean when you utter "state".
Don't be scared that we will steal it;->
Saying that I am not the Greek God from whom you steal knowledge, like Prof. Walt once said "foreigners get trained in the US has access to our knowledge", I don't know what is wrong with that, unless the US is another Greek God, for me it is completely the opposite; if someone steals my knowledge, I get rich;-> Maybe you Guys have to check out your knowledge, it looks like you don't have the right knowledge such that you are scared that if someone takes it from you, you will be impoverished/vulnerable like a Greek God;->
is not enough for credibility, because according to the SATFP
5. States commit morally dubious acts
so, Chinese tradition is not going to change this axiom.
How convenient;->
I am talking about Identifiable-Socio-Politico-Economic-Entities (ISPEEs). China is a mono constitution State like the US. China doesn't recognize the rights of ISPEEs to make their own laws and implement them to their members, like the US and other mono-Constitution States. For example the US doesn't recognize the Jews to make their own laws and implement them to their own members, then what the Jews do, set up an IL to suppoert another SPEE to practice their laws. But when you look at that SPEE it is just another copy of the US with mono-conctitution which in turn doesn't allow Muslims to practice their laws;->
It is comedy all the way;->>
I really enjoy being here, because I feel like I am at The Comédie-Française.
So, you see you can be happy that China is not alone what she is practicing;->
Thank you Mate!
Keep firing!
Grand Sen~or
On a second thought; wasn't it you who said:
And I said you are right " seems to " and you can explain this accodring to the SATFP?
I don't know what you want Mate!
I am really getting confused here as you see;->
Even yourself couldn't say:
but you said:
.
Or have you changed your mind since then?
"You are trying to apply an
"You are trying to apply an axiomatic system to real life. Of course the axioms break down."
What do you think you do?
I try to revise my assumptions as needed. I see you doing that too.
"Chinese governments have a tradition of keeping agreements"
is not enough for credibility, because according to the SATFP 5. States commit morally dubious acts so, Chinese tradition is not going to change this axiom.
You express it as an axiom, as if it's dependable. Like, come up with a morally dubious act and you can be sure that every state will commit it at every opportunity. And if a state has a choice between two morally dubious alternatives, you can depend on the state to choose the one that is more dubious.
But the choice is made on other grounds than morality. Grounds like national interest, or the private interest of the individuals who get to make the choice, or sometimes accident. (For example, when the guy who makes the choice has a hangover and just wishes everything would go away until he feels better.)
You can't depend on states to perform morally dubious acts. It's just that you can't depend on them not to, either.
Chinese rulers are taught to think longer-term than most. They learn a 2600 year history in which a series of dynasties rose and fell, with lessons about each fall. The times between dynasties are presented as bad times, with lots of fighting and destruction and no laws. All the old chinese governments had a certain similarity except for the last one before this, run by mongols who took awhile to settle into the traditional role, and the current one which is communist but which is beginning to fit into tradition too.
Here is a famous chinese children's story. The king of Chin was facing two smaller states, Yu and Guo. Chin sent gifts of jade and horses to Yu, asking for permission to attack Guo through Yu. Yu agreed, after some argument among themselves. (The argument *against* included the aphorism "Lips gone, teeth cold" which implied that even a weak ally like Guo could be valuable, that Yu and Guo depended on each other for their mutual survival. The argument *for* noted that they might never get another chance for a peace agreement with Chin.) The surprise attack through Yu was a great success and Guo fell easily. On the way home the Chin army also took Yu. They collected the jade and the horses and took them back to the Chin king, who joked, "The jade is just as it was before but the horses' teeth are a bit longer!"
After this story became widespread, other nations hesitated to trust Chin's peace treaties and the wars became harder. Chin finally faced a war against every other nation in china together, but won and became the first real totalitarian chinese empire.
Your word is more valuable than the advantage you get from breaking it once. The time to break it is either when you are so strong it doesn't matter whether anyone trusts you, or when you are so desperate you cannot think past the short term.
Not to say you can't drive a hard bargain, but it's better to keep your bargains after you make them. There was a time that the communist chinese government didn't keep their agreements with capitalists. They were weak and desperate. The kuomintang also didn't keep their agreements, being likewise weak and desperate. They have been getting past that; we'll see how well it lasts.
China is a mono constitution State like the US. China doesn't recognize the rights of ISPEEs to make their own laws and implement them to their members, like the US and other mono-Constitution States. For example the US doesn't recognize the Jews to make their own laws and implement them to their own members, then what the Jews do, set up an IL to suppoert another SPEE to practice their laws.
That isn't exactly so. Jews or anybody else can sign legal agreements requiring them to settle their mutual disputes through binding arbitration or whatever approach they agree on, other than the US court system. And the US court system will usually uphold those agreements. The problem comes when someone thinks they'd get a better deal from the US courts and claims they signed under duress etc and then the US courts come into it after all, deciding whether or not to intervene.
We allow the amish to practice their own customs and their own laws. And Dunkards and others. We do intervene when it looks like sexual child abuse, polygamy with very young women, etc. But people who want their own laws can have them, provided their community is large enough and it doesn't disgust the larger public in basic ways.
I try to revise my
well then supply your axioms. When I revise the axioms of the Blog, I do it openly and post it here. But I can't see your axioms and I can't see them revised. Honestly, I don't know what you mean by "state". But I clearly know what the blog means by "state" according to the SATFP. If your "state" is different than the "state" of the SATFP, bring us your theory to understand what you mean. You can't keep changing the rules of the game without announcing it. So, rather than keep repeating yourself bring us your theory, or admit that you are not talking according to a theory, you are arguing using Ordinary Language. Even than I have all the right to ask you "what do you mean by "state"?". Yhe Blog is not going to change the concept of "state" according to the SATFP just because "Chinese rulers are taught to think longer-term", are you trying to offer a change to the axiom 5 as follows:
5. States commit morally dubious acts except the States of which their leadership are taught to think longer-term.
leaving other axioms as it is?
Offer this to the Bloggers let's see what they will say.
I really don't care if you change itlike that or not, but if most of the Bloggers don't buy it for you introduced some new terms like "taught to think longer-term" which needs more clarification about how you would decide whether they are taught for longer-term or not, how long is longer term, how many of the members of the leadership has to be trained like that etc.etc.
I am not talking about contracts prepared according to the laws the Monopoly made. I am talking about the right to make laws and the right to implement them to the members. Jews do not have such right, if they did you would have a multi-law legal system. Please read your constitution.
You may start from here:
[Amendment of ARTICLE ONE]
CONGRESS shall make no LAW respecting an ESTABLISHMENT of RELIGION...
(the Constitution of THE USA)
(key-words: Congress, law, establishment, religion)
I think it is time to make this Amendment more picturesque:->
[Further Amendment of ARTICLE ONE]
CONGRESS shall make no LAW respecting an ESTABLISHMENT of RELIGION -
except of its own as it shall be ESTABLISHED by LAW made by CONGRESS....
(the Constitution of THE USA)
(key-words: Congress, law, establishment, religion)
and please keep in mind that "religion" also means and used as "law" in the Scriptures.
Thank you,
Grand Sen~or
Honestly, I don't know what
Honestly, I don't know what you mean by "state". But I clearly know what the blog means by "state" according to the SATFP. If your "state" is different than the "state" of the SATFP, bring us your theory to understand what you mean. You can't keep changing the rules of the game without announcing it.
This isn't mathematics, where you can actually define everything. People have an idea what the words mean and they see it better when they see how other people use the words. That's how it works outside of pure math.
But OK. To my way of thinking, a "state" is something that some group of people chooses to be loyal to. Their loyalty is what defines the state. They have some limited loyalty to each other because of their shared loyalty to the abstraction.
A "government" is a group of people who operate together by rules they have learned, to coerce other people, and the group that forms the government is loyal to a "state" and meets limited opposition from loyalists in that "state" because of that loyalty. Somehow the government represents the state in the eyes of loyalists, and the government acts for the state and gets a degree of loyalty when it does.
Many of the loyalists regard international relations the way they'd think of their city's football team. They want their government to look good compared to other governments, and they want their state to look good, and if there's a competition they want their side to win. They'll sometimes want competition so they can enjoy winning or groan in defeat, if for no other reason.
Governments can do whatever they want within wide limits, provided the loyal public doesn't notice much. When the public notices, the government wants to look good, according to whatever that public cares about.
They do whatever they want? But what do they want? It depends. Old tired leaders want things to be orderly and reasonably predictable. Young energetic leaders usually want excitement and they want to win a contest. Given a challenge from outside everybody wants to win and look good. Many people who aren't at the top of the hierarchy wants to rise in the hierarchy, which involves some sort of recognizable success. Success in foreign policy varies -- successful cooperation can break down at any time and those who created the cooperation may be blamed if it doesn't last. But warding off a threat is a success regardless whether the threat comes back later.
Governments don't actually make decisions. Individual peopla make decisions, and committees act at random depending on the interaction of the individual people on the committees. So the individual people sometimes make decisions based on what they think is good for them personally, and sometimes they make them based on their concept of their loyalty to the state, and sometimes they get disorganised and make choices at random. After each decision they look for ways to explain it. When they explain it to the public they explain it in terms of the public morality that the public says they believe in. When they explain it to each other they explain it in terms of geopolitics, a more cynical set of explanations that would sort of make sense if states were amoral individual human beings who care only about increasing their own power and decreasing that of each other person they interact with.
But remember that the explanations are explanations and not reasons. It's like that with individual human beings too. One of the most important choices people make is buying a house. The way most people do that is they look at houses and they fall in love with one of them. Something about a smell, or the way the light falls on it in the early afternoon. After they choose, then they make up logical reasons why it's a good house to buy. But the reasons that sound good are things they created so they could say things that sound good. Those reasons weren't why they chose as they did, those are *excuses*. Same with the official reasons why we go to war etc. The actual reasons are intangibles. Two sections in the CIA are having a turf war and the head of one of them thinks his section will do better if he shades the report a particular way. Two army generals are having a turf war and one of them thinks his position is improved if he estimates a quick victory. The vice president had a fight with his wife and he's cheered up by the thought of stuff getting blown up. Suddenly we are going to war. We come up with moral excuses to tell the public and geopolitical excuses to tell each other.
People generally have the idea this stuff is supposed to make sense. But it doesn't particularly make sense. To a large extent things happen at random, and people then try to make sense out of it afterward.
This is why it took so much concentrated effort by a whole lot of smart people to avoid a globale thermonuclear war that nobody wanted in the first place. The way things were set up, it was just too easy to start the war unintentionally, when everybody made their own choices and the result was that nations behaved at random.
I need to go, maybe more later.
This isn't mathematics,
Of course it is not mathematics, it is a theoretical science. Mathematics supply grammatical structures we theoretical scientists adopt them if we find them useful for to develop a theory based language to communicate effectively with fellow scientists during our scientific activities. Here in this Blog FP scientists are doing the same. Those guys don't trust "people have an idea what the words mean" they formalize it so that people have clear knowledge when they use terms according to the theory they decide to use. In that way they don't keep arguing what they mean with such and such a term. They may have different interpretations of the terms but this is also part of the game as long as the models they setup are consistent with the theory.
You see even yourself when you start talking about your terms you reveal the elements of your theory, but maybe because you don't know how to formalize your theory, or your theory is not finalized yet you have loosely connected terms in your theory development stage. But even that development stage if you roughly start to formalize your theory as a draft that would help you a lot in your developing your theory. Your puting down your terms is a good start to put together your theory. And if you put your theory in contrast to another theory, let's say the SATFP which is widely used here then people would easily and clearly see the differences and similarities between your theory (and explanations based on your theory) and theirs. That would help to develop more useful theories and the development of the science. Try to abstract your terms and formalize your theory, that would really help you and others a lot in your communicating your way of dealing with the phenomena. Ifyour theory is more useful to understand the phenomena then it may be preferred to others.
You are right, in their choice of a theory people may behave as you have descibed, I call those kind of theories "Salvare Apparentias = Saving the Phenomena" theories. That is why I called the SATFP SalvareApparentisTheory of FP. This theory is not concerned about the reality of the phenomena, but it is concerned how the phenomena be saved/justified/marketed-as-reality. It is very useful that is why it is used extensively and easy to sell as reality like it is done here.
Regards,
Grand Sen~or
Just don't get it
And what about India??? It's very important, don't you think?
What's creative about it? Isn't it a simple restatement of Mearsheimer's argument in Tragedy of Great Power Politics???
It seems to me Monteiro is another "Diet Offensive Realist", as Chris Layne would say. His is an argument full of very important mistakes. It's alright to argu that the world is going to return to multipolarity (as J.J. said in Tragedy) but another very different is to say that Unipolarity is war-prone "per se". Polarity means nothing without some actor's input (preferences) into it. A purely structuralist analysis of unipolarity is proven to be very poor indeed. (Wohlforth's and Brooks' new book World Out of Balance is a good critique of this, I believe. And it has a full panel in the ISA Conf. too!!!).
thoughts on the unipolarity thesis
I'm not yet familiar with Monteiro's work, but I think most of the critiques made here (the comments and the original post) seem off the mark:
1. Prof. Walt's point that the economic crisis might lead back to multipolarity might be true, but it seems to be off point. From your brief summary of Monteiro's argument, the thesis seems to be about a hegemon's behavior in unipolarity, not about its ability to control exogenous shocks in the system that weaken the hegemon and change the system's polarity.
2. The comment that it's just hegemonic stability theory is wrong... as the paper seems to be about unipolarity being more warlike, and with a lot of smaller states discontent and attempting to challenge the hegemon, it sounds like the opposite of HST (or at least not consistent with HST's basic premises).
3. The 'diet offensive realist' comment isn't so much an attack on this unipolarity argument as it is a critique of systemic/structural arguments overall. Actually, it's not even really a critique, but just an assertion that we need to take unit-level factors like preferences into account. This is just a competing worldview or theoretical perspective, not an argument.
4. On the same post (the last one, before mine, I think), I'm not sure that this unipolarity argument is actually at odds with the Wohlforth and Brooks book. As I understand it, the purpose of their book is to show why unipolarity (and specifically American primacy today) is likely to last for a long time into the future despite what a whole host of IR theories tell us. If this is the case, then an argument about a unipole working to prevent others from being able to challenge it would actually complement the B and W argument rather than compete with it.
5. Walt's comment about the US letting others get nukes is the best critique I can see on here thus far, but may be premature and needs to be examined. Iran getting a nuke is not at all guaranteed, and US leaders might also believe that Israel would likely do the dirty work for them on this one. All signs point to the US and China preventing N Korea from getting a reliable nuke that could actually reach US shores. On both Iran and N Korea, I do not think we've yet reached that critical point where US leaders have to decide between 'let them have a nuke' or 'attack them', so the argument's true test may still be to come...
Pakistan, though... I don't know. Maybe we screwed up with India, and then figured the region would actually be safer, and each state weaker, if Pakistan had the bomb too? I don't know. I'd like to see Monteiro's criteria for falsifying the argument.
I DO, however, agree with and echo the sentiments of those who are least initially skeptical about the project's creativity and originality. I think not so much to Mearsheimer (Tragedy), but to power transition-like arguments. Specifically, it sounds like Monteiro could be subsumed by a lot of what Dale Copeland argues in The Origins of Major War-- the current top dog does what it can to stay on top, which includes adopting hard-line policies and eventually often even preventive war against those other powers that are rising relative to it.
But because it's a U of Chicago PhD who has impressed Prof Walt, I'm guessing that there are good responses to some of these critiques, and some nuances to the project that we haven't seen here. Looking forward to reading it!
the thesis seems to be about
Let us see if we can relate this to the SATFP using its terms:
Salvare Apparentias Theory of FP (SATFP).
The name of the theory will become : The Salvare Apparentias Theory of the Hegemon State (SATHS).
1. There exist states.
This will become: There exists the State.
2. A State composed of a nation, a national leadership, national interests and power (economic, military, population, land, etc? ..(any others? pls feel free to add, it is the Blog's theory, not mine).
This will become: The State composed of a nation, a national leadership, national interests and power (economic, military, population, land, etc? ..(any others? pls feel free to add, it is the Blog's theory, not mine).
3. There exists a competitive arena where states acts as they do.
This will become : The State acts as she does.
4. There exists no central authority in that arena that can enforce moral or legal constraints.
This will become : The Central Authority is established by the State.
5. States commit morally dubious acts (dubious according to what? The Blog knows) (see axiom 4)(Why this is here? Didn't the Blog declare that SATFP is essencially amoral?)
This will become : The State commits morally dubious acts.
6. A State's foreign and defense policy reflects national interest of the state.
This will become : The State's internal and security policy reflects her interest.
7. A State can take deterrent action against other State(s) if the Leadership of the State decides so. (see axiom 11 & 12).
This will become : The State can take deterrent actions against her subjects.
8. A State seeks to increase her national interests when her existence is threatened.
This will become : The State seeks to increase her national interests when her existance is threatened by her subjects.
9. A State's power is a potential threat to other states. A state is by definition paranoid of other states.
This wil become : The subjects power is a potential threat to the State. The State is paranoid by definition of her subjects.
10. States to increase their National Interests, to decrease potential threat of other States, to assimilate them and to dominate them, impose their Constitutions to other States. (But of course this degenerates all constitutions to a mono-constitution which prepares the Competetive Arena to the favour of the State whose Constitution became the one and only dominant Constitution to pave the ground for so called Globalization - Global Dominance - Ein STAAT, ein LAND (the GLOBE), ein FUERER und ein VOLK where there exists NO THREATt, NO COMPETITIVE ARENA, NO WORRIES and best of all NO NEED TO FP - a Paradise on Earth if you believe;->>)
This will become : The State to increase her National Interests, to decrease potential threat of her subjects, to assimilate them and to dominate them, imposes her Monolithic Constitution to her subjects.
11. A State talks sweet but carries her power peeping under her cloak to deterre the potential threats of other states. (McCain the Presidential Candidate 2008)
This will become : The State talks sweet but carries her power peeping under her cloak to deterre the potential threats of her subjects.
12. Powerful States to rule or protect or increase their National Interests divide less powerful states ad infinitum.
We don't need this any more;->
13. A State can suspend her constitution if the National Intersts dictates so. Soley the Leadership decides whether the National Intersts dictates that or not and their decision is final, cannot be challenged based on the articles of the Constitution of the State. In such cases the leadership for the sake of the National Interests is not required to disclose the reasons how they reached to a certain decision.
This will become : The State can suspend her constitution if the National Intersts dictates so. Soley the Leadership decides whether the National Intersts dictates that or not and their decision is final, cannot be challenged based on the articles of the Constitution of the State. In such cases the leadership for the sake of the National Interests is not required to disclose the reasons how they reached to a certain decision.
14. A State to keep her Internal Balance of Threat and National Interest and National Unity must centralize the power and not to share it with any Identifiable National Entity(ies).
This is will become : The State to keep her Internal Balance of Threat and National Interest and National Unity must keep her power centralized and must not share it with any Identifiable National Entity(ies).
15. A State keeps the power of making and implementing the laws solely to herself and does not share this power with any Identifiable National Entity(ies).
This will stay the same.
16. Salvare Apparentias Foreign Policy is the art of keeping the threats of states in Balance besides saving the foreign policy related phenomena. (How? By shuffling, dividing and mixing nations/races/cultures?!, subjecting them to prototype secularo-fascist laws to reduce their multiplicity to singularity? the Blog knows).
This will become : Salvare Apparentias Hegemon State Policy is the art of keeping the threats of subjects in Balance besides saving the State policy related phenomena.
please feel free to correct, update, recompose if you wish.
Thanks,
Grand Sen~or
Labels, labels!...
First of all, Wohlforth's & Brooks' book IS about how and why unipolarity will last. And so, it depicts a hegemon that will try to do its best to mantain its position in the system. On this we concur. Nevertheless, W & B argue that in order to best achieve this goal the hegemon should not always punish the "emerging power" but also sometimes "accomodate" it into the system to keep it in a second rank, accepting the hegemon's predominance. The power of the U.S. is soooo huge, they say, that actual efficient balancing will form pretty much later (rather than sooner). Here, the argument differs with mere Power Transition Theory and/or Copeland's thesis because it does not expect ONLY conflict between the Hegemon and it followers. There's also room for peace... so the system can linger.
That being said, though, one of the biggest scenarios the hegemon should avoid provoking is a general counter-balancing coalition by means of "shooting everyone" whenever it chooses, simply because it can! W & B don't preach for a reckless hegemon nor think such a type of behavior is going to make unipolarity last very long. In this regard, so, India's incorporation to the nuclear club could be best understood as a pragmatic move, due to an ultimate objective of remaning "number one."
Second, the "Diet Offensive Realism" thing IS a critique. That it is a methodological one does not diminish it or take it down into another categorization, doesn't it? And such a serious critique it is that it could turn Monteiro's argument on its back. For instance, only if Monteiro relies exclusively on a "mersheimerian" style of Realism (i.e., raw structural realism), can Stephen Walt's (very powerful) critique on the nuclear proliferation issue be held true. In other words, that the system IS unipolar does not tell us much about HOW this unipole would behave. It will inform us who are the most (or THE most) relevant actors in the system, but not much more since its a "material structure" meassured in weapons, GDP and nukes. Thus, any meaningful attempt to "explain" at least some aspect of the system will always depend on adding some assumptions, like the level of challenge posed by other powers as well as by the levels of perceived (in)security (mediated by geography, history, etc.), and so on. India is an emerging power... but the U.S. "allowed" it to have nuclear bombs. Brazil, Japan, and some others too are "emerging" but where are their nuclear deterrent blank-check by the U.S.? How can we explain this sort of variation if we are to rely simply on what the structure of the day seems to be?
To finish, I'm affraid Nuno Monteiro will never be able to explain these sorts of variation and changes "under unipolarity" if he only argues that the structure is enough to explain, analyse, and predict in IR. As stupid as it may sound, every structure NEED of its units in order to avoid what Waltz himself criticized as "Third Image Reductionism."
The Sechser paper and capabilities vs. intentions
Implicit in the argument of the paper is the question of whether states worry more about the material capabilities or the intentions of a potentially threatening state. The paper comes down on the side of capabilities because of the inherent difficulty really strong states face when attempting to signal that their coercive efforts are really only limited (assuming they are ultimately limited and not total of course) to weaker foes -- after all, as has been said, "leaders change or just change their minds" and smaller states know this. Prof. Walt seems to have found merit in the paper, but I wonder if he sees the argument as evidence working against his own previous research (see Origins of Alliances) that states worry more about intentions than capabilities?
You see even yourself when
You see even yourself when you start talking about your terms you reveal the elements of your theory, but maybe because you don't know how to formalize your theory, or your theory is not finalized yet you have loosely connected terms in your theory development stage. But even that development stage if you roughly start to formalize your theory as a draft that would help you a lot in your developing your theory. Your puting down your terms is a good start to put together your theory.
Here's an idea I first saw from Gregory Bateson's book, Steps Toward an Ecology of Mind. He said that when you're developing ideas it's good to give them short kind of vague names, preferably with germanic roots. After they're fully developed then they can have long names with latin roots. When you have a name that sounds like it's supposed to mean something specific then you and other people are likely to think it actually does have a definite precise meaning. And you may give it the *wrong* precise meaning prematurely, leading to lots of confusion. So as an anthropologist he'd start out by talking about things like the "stuff" of culture. He'd deliberately stay vague until things were ready to firm up.
"why they chose as they did, those are *excuses*."
.... It is very useful that is why it is used extensively and easy to sell as reality like it is done here.
But you present it as an axiomatic system, which it is not. When you need a system that can explain anything, you wind up with a system that can explain anything. Starting with axioms and logical chains of thought, you get only results that fit your axioms and not results that contradict them.
One way to fix that is to introduce axioms that contradict each other. Then to make whatever argument is needed, you start with whichever axioms happen to support your result. And if you allow indirect proofs then you can prove literally anything this way. You start with the conclusion you want to *discredit*, and show that if it is true then you get a contradiction. And you can always do that no matter where you start, because you have two axioms that do contradict each other.
In recent days, every time I give an example of a government that appears not to be acting in a despicable way on some topic, you respond with your axiom that says it isn't possible for governments to do anything that someone might call moral. This is a mis-use of the axiom.
The way that axiom is supposed to be used, is that when you're explaining something despicable that the US government has done, you point out that states do this sort of thing and we mustn't expect them not to. This shows which side you're on, it shows that you are an elite geopolitical thinker and not one of the masses of moral people. It does not convince moral americans, who believe their government should do good things and not bad things. But the idea is that they don't understand government, and don't need to understand government, that such things should be left to experts like you who know how the world works and who see that there's nothing wrong with the US government doing terrible things. The argument can also be used when our allies do terrible things, of course.
But when foreign nations we don't need to defend do something wrong, then we don't trot out the "states do bad things" axiom. We say they are awful and their awfulness justifies whatever it is we were going to do about them anyway.
And we don't use that axiom when a state does something we don't think is bad. Why bother?
This whole morality thing only applies to a few nations anyway. I vividly remember listening to an iranian guy, who told a story about an iranian wrestler who won the gold medal at the olympics. He went home in triumph, all of iran was excited for him, and the Shah had him killed. The reasoning was that anybody who was more popular than the Shah was a danger to the Shah. The guy telling the story presented this without any moral lesson, it was strictly a practical lesson. This is what kings are like. Don't get too popular or you are in danger. There was no hint that kings ought to behave morally, you don't decide what a king ought to do. He decides what you ought to do. That's what it means to be king. He will do what he needs to do to stay king, and judging him for it is beside the point.
I've gotten a similar sense listening to chinese people talk about their politics. I think it might be different for people who grow up in empires. They don't have a sense that the government is supposed to be all moral. Their government doesn't *represent* them, it rules them. THey don't have the right to tell the government what to do, the government tells them what to do. It's a different mindset.