Tuesday, March 3, 2009 - 5:11 PM

Some mildly good news: in a partially smart diplomatic move, the Obama administration has reportedly offered to trade the deployment of missile defenses in eastern Europe for active Russian support to convince Iran to give up its nuclear program. According to the NY Times story, the deal requires not just Russian support (presumably for more extensive economic sanctions), but rather depends on Iran "halting any efforts to build nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles."
This is a clever offer at first glance, because it gives up an expensive program that we don't need (missile defenses) in an attempt to get something we do want (better relations with Russia, and a deal with Iran on its nuclear program). Missile defense has been a costly chimera for decades, for two main reasons. First, any country sophisticated enough to put a nuclear warhead on a ballistic missile could probably develop low-cost countermeasures that would thwart our defenses. Second, any country that could develop missiles and a bomb small enough to mount on one wouldn't have much trouble smuggling a few weapons into Europe or the United States. This situation would actually be worse than a missile attack, because we might not even know where the attack had come from and thus would not be able to deter it by threatening retaliation. Spending billions on missile defenses is like locking the front door and leaving the back door wide open, with a sign inviting the burglars to come on in.
But the offer to Moscow has a down-side: it means that the fate of the missile defense program is actually in Iran's hands, not Moscow's, and the precise terms of the deal remain unclear. There's still no evidence that Iran actually has a nuclear weapons program (though obvious reasons to be suspicious) and little evidence that it will give up control of the full nuclear fuel cycle simply because the United States ramps up the diplomatic pressure or gets Russia and China to agree to stiffer sanctions. It's even less likely that Iran would give up its ballistic missile program. It might be possible to get a deal that addressed Iran’s regional security concerns (including our various efforts to foment regime change there) in exchange for tighter guarantees against their pursuit of an actual weapons capability, but that requires us to go in without big preconditions and without a lot of harsh rhetoric. Merely tightening the screws on Tehran hasn't worked in the past and is unlikely to work in the future. And if Russia does agree to help us, Iran still balks, and we go ahead and deploy the missile defenses in Eastern Europe anyway, Moscow is bound to feel betrayed.
Now for the bad news: Secretary of State Hillary Clinton apparently thinks diplomacy with Iran isn't going to work anyway. Perhaps she just misspoke (itself not a good sign), or perhaps this illustrates a point I've mentioned before: effective diplomacy requires lots of coordination, so that an initiative in one area isn't undermined by something you do or say somewhere else. Or maybe this incident suggests that the whole idea of talking to Iran is simply laying the diplomatic groundwork for a more direct military campaign later on. Thus far, the Obama administration hasn't strayed very far from the Bush administration's failed approach, which was in essence to tell Tehran "first, you do what we want, and then we'll talk to you about the things you care about." Obama does say we're willing to talk, but there's no sign that we are planning to make them a "yes-able" offer and his secretary of state apparently thinks direct diplomacy isn’t going to work.
This behavior is deeply puzzling, because a military strike on Iran is an unattractive option and we ought to be energetically looking for a diplomatic alternative. Beginning that process with a lot of tough talk and saying that we aren't expecting success doesn't strike me as a very promising way to start the process. Maybe it's just a coincidence that this sounds like the strategy new Iran point man Dennis Ross endorsed last summer, and not that different from the approach that the Israeli government is reportedly urging on Secretary Clinton during her visit to Jerusalem. As I've said before, if you think the debate on a military strike on Iran ended when Bush left office, think again.
And while we're on the subject of Iran, here's a thoughtful column by Roger Cohen, warning against the simplistic stereotyping that has come to dominate most American discourse about the Islamic Republic. Cohen is neither naïve about Iran nor an advocate of appeasing the likes of Ahmadinejad, yet his nuanced discussion immediately drew the usual hail of criticism from neoconservative pundits, with one of them suggesting that he be fired.
I have a different question: why are Cohen's commentaries confined to the Herald Tribune and the Times blog? Why doesn't Cohen have a regular column on the Times op-ed page, especially now that William Kristol is gone? Cohen's views are balanced, he writes well, and he is often willing to challenge prevailing orthodoxies, which is what a good columnist should do. If op-ed page editor Andrew Rosenthal wants to raise the level of discourse on his page he’d offer the guy a regular spot.
PIERRE-PHILIPPE MARCOU/AFP/Getty Images
EXPLORE:EASTERN EUROPE, MIDDLE EAST, DIPLOMACY, HILLARY, IRAN, MILITARY, NUKES, RUSSIA, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
And if Russia does agree to help us, Iran still balks, and we go ahead and deploy the missile defenses in Eastern Europe anyway, Moscow is bound to feel betrayed.
But Professor, you already said that Missile Defence Project is useless and waste of funds and political leverage/resources, why do you think that the State will still deploy? Have they got a Lotto strike that they don't know where to spend it;->>And you think that Russians don't smell this?! Oh I see maybe they will do that to create jobs;->>
Hey! if you can't sell missiles, you can always sell missile defence systems - think Iran & Russia as a business partner;->>
Remember you are selling those MDS's to eastern europeans to defend them against Iranian nuclear attacks;->>
On the other hand you are not going to Domyat to get rice on cost of losing bulghur you have at home - unless the IL dictates so;->
I am really wondering how long this Monopoly Beylik will last;->>
Grand Sen~or.
Some mildly good news: in a partially smart diplomatic move, the Obama administration has reportedly offered to trade the deployment of missile defenses in eastern Europe for active Russian support to convince Iran to give up its nuclear program. According to the NY Times story, the deal requires not just Russian support (presumably for more extensive economic sanctions), but rather depends on Iran "halting any efforts to build nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles."
Seeing as how Medvedev balked at the offer and denied support for any type of "swap", I don't see how this is good news. Check out Dan Drezner's post on the same issue.
This is a clever offer at first glance, because it gives up an expensive program that we don't need (missile defenses) in an attempt to get something we do want (better relations with Russia, and a deal with Iran on its nuclear program).
Too bad the Russians balked.
Missile defense has been a costly chimera for decades, for two main reasons. First, any country sophisticated enough to put a nuclear warhead on a ballistic missile could probably develop low-cost countermeasures that would thwart our defenses.
That's a common myth about Missile Defense - the actual interceptors are quite good at differentiating between decoys and actual warheads. The only way to build a decoy good enough to divert attention from it would be to basically build a dud warhead, and if that's the case, why not just make it a real one?
Second, any country that could develop missiles and a bomb small enough to mount on one wouldn't have much trouble smuggling a few weapons into Europe or the United States.
Building suitcase-sized nuclear bombs requires some seriously good nuclear tech - far beyond that of what Iran and even most of the rest of the nuclear powers have. They're also not in a hurry to give out the technology, seeing as how it could be used against them, and once you send out a guy with a suitcase nuke, getting caught would lead to some unpleasant repercussions.
This situation would actually be worse than a missile attack, because we might not even know where the attack had come from and thus would not be able to deter it by threatening retaliation.
Hardly. They can trace where the uranium and plutonium used in nuclear weapons come from back to the plant where it was processed.
So, let's say China sends a team with a suitcase nuke, and detonates it in San Francisco. Within hours, the US traces the plutonium back to a Chinese processing plant, and several Chinese cities then get reduced to ash.
Or maybe not, seeing as how the US is hardly the only country researching this stuff. China has been looking in missile defense, along with Japan, Israel, Russia (Russia, in fact, has had a ground-based system around Moscow for decades with a well over 90% intercept rate), and so forth. The cat is out of the bag, so to speak.
Spending billions on missile defenses is like locking the front door and leaving the back door wide open, with a sign inviting the burglars to come on in.
Quite the contrary (and I seriously suggest you talk to somebody who works on it). Missile defense is a great insurance policy against the kind of accidents that almost happened during the Cold War and led to a full exchange (there are at least eight incidents that we know of).
For example, let's say China accidently fires a missile that hits Los Angeles. If the US has missile defense, that missile gets shot down, then the US waits. If the Chinese immediately call up and apologize profusely, then no exchange takes places, the Chinese get a harsh scolding, and millions of lives are saved. On the contrary, do you think the US would hold back if LA was gone, even if the Chinese immediately apologized? At the very least, they'd demand blood.
It might be possible to get a deal that addressed Iran’s regional security concerns (including our various efforts to foment regime change there) in exchange for tighter guarantees against their pursuit of an actual weapons capability, but that requires us to go in without big preconditions and without a lot of harsh rhetoric.
It also means that you will have to make huge concessions to Iranian regional aspirations, because they are a rising regional power and extremely suspicious of the US government. Good luck getting that past our Arab allies (particularly the Saudis and Egyptians), much less Israel.
And if Russia does agree to help us, Iran still balks, and we go ahead and deploy the missile defenses in Eastern Europe anyway, Moscow is bound to feel betrayed
That's why it was a stupid idea (the "Iran sanctions for E.European missile defense" bargain) in the first place. It's dependent on too many actors, and on Iran ultimately giving up the program. We can only give thanks that Medvedev hopefully killed the idea for good with his denial of Obama's offer.
And while we're on the subject of Iran, here's a thoughtful column by Roger Cohen, warning against the simplistic stereotyping that has come to dominate most American discourse about the Islamic Republic. Cohen is neither naïve about Iran nor an advocate of appeasing the likes of Ahmadinejad, yet his nuanced discussion immediately drew the usual hail of criticism from neoconservative pundits, with one of them suggesting that he be fired.
It's not as if Cohen said anything surprising - it's hardly news that most of Iran is actually a pretty hospitable place by Middle East standards. The clerics and their supporters represent something on the order of 10-20% of the Iranian population - but unfortunately, they have all the weapons, control the security forces, and have a veto on the non-religious parts of the government.
In other words, his comments were nice but useless.
On the basis of what information can you say that an interceptor's ability to distinguish between decoys and warheads is "quite good"? MDA says it is, but a) they have an incentive to do so and b) wouldn't any info to the contrary be classified? Furthermore, saying that an interceptor can tell the difference between a warhead and a decoy is a bit deceptive, as a (now ubiquitous in defense parlance) "system of systems" is needed to do so. More sensors = more cost. I could ask the same question about your access to the effectiveness of Moscow's ABM system. Where are these numbers coming from?
As for the insurance policy analogy, wouldn't an Able Archer type scenario you refer to involve not one accidental missile launch, but multiple missiles? The insurance policy seems to be a better value the fewer ICBMs it has to stop, no?
Further, wouldn't a better insurance policy be one which avoids compelling current nuclear powers to increase their own penetrative ICBM capabilities?
I could ask the same question about your access to the effectiveness of Moscow's ABM system. Where are these numbers coming from?
I retract the "90%" figure, upon further research. Apparently they've been letting the A-135 slide a bit - the original had nuclear-tipped interceptors, for example.
Furthermore, it was never meant to totally stop all possible shots at Moscow - the US could overwhelm it. But at the very least, that forces the US to target more missiles at it than they'd want to.
Furthermore, saying that an interceptor can tell the difference between a warhead and a decoy is a bit deceptive, as a (now ubiquitous in defense parlance) "system of systems" is needed to do so.
So? I suppose if you want to be technical, the "system" can distinguish between the decoys and warheads and fire as such. Either way, the systems have the ability to discriminate among possible targets.
More sensors = more cost.
As long as it is reasonably effective . . .
On the basis of what information can you say that an interceptor's ability to distinguish between decoys and warheads is "quite good"? MDA says it is, but a) they have an incentive to do so and b) wouldn't any info to the contrary be classified?
I'm basically going off the information they've released on various tests, such as this. I don't know what to tell you if you think they've overly distorting the results, and yes, a lot of it is classified.
As for the insurance policy analogy, wouldn't an Able Archer type scenario you refer to involve not one accidental missile launch, but multiple missiles?
It obviously depends on how fearful and ready those with nukes are at the time. In the Able Archer scenario, the Soviets were already on guard and pretty wary of a potential attack, so the possibility for multiple missile attacks was there.
The insurance policy seems to be a better value the fewer ICBMs it has to stop, no?
That depends on whether you're building a system trying to stop all or most potential missile attacks (like a full-scale exchange with Russia), or trying to stop smaller amounts of potential attacks, like the presumed amount of nukes Iran would have if it goes nuclear.
Further, wouldn't a better insurance policy be one which avoids compelling current nuclear powers to increase their own penetrative ICBM capabilities?
We tried that, with the 1972 ABM Treaty. It wasn't exactly an astounding success; the Soviets went from 2,000 deployable warheads in 1972 to more than 12,000 by 1990.
Perhaps if ABM hadn't been allowed, the Soviets would have built even more. Or perhaps they would have emphasized their other strategic forces, such as the submarines and bombers.
" I suppose if you want to be technical, the "system" can distinguish between the decoys and warheads and fire as such. Either way, the systems have the ability to discriminate among possible targets."
I'm afraid that you are being over-optimistic about the capabilities of the current AM systems, especially when it comes to targeting and discrimination. So far, all the tests (that have been released) involved some measure of "co-operative" targets, ie ones that have been "painted" to make it easier to tell from chafe and/or decoys, or ones whose trajectories have been known, at least partially.
The issues of target discrimination are complicated not only by the need for highly specific signatures, but by the time it'd take to make such an unambiguous determination, which'd leave fractions of seconds for precise targeting. basically, the fire control systems required for an effective missile defense system are highly complex, and for a sophisticated adversary - such as Russia - would require such expenditures as to render them impractical. That has been common knowledge among defense establishments, which, of course, doesn't stop the government from embarking on costly procurements (which, more often than not, are really fancy ear-marks for selected districts).
This does not mean that some AM missile capability can't be effective against the odd single missile, such as a "rogue" country might shoot ("rogue" is defined politically, not functionally, of course). Which is why all current scenarios, eg, for AM placement in eastern europe, envision mostly such a scenario, even as they encourage the Russians to think otherwise (whether they do or don't is not for me to know).
Also, these considerations do not mean that the AM program - as a whole- has not been an effectives Job-creation program. Surely these days that is a laudable - if unstated - goal.
Also, these considerations do not mean that the AM program - as a whole- has not been an effectives Job-creation program. Surely these days that is a laudable - if unstated - goal.
This isn't just a US project; you have a number of other countries looking into this stuff, including Russia, China, Israel, Japan, and so forth. They obviously see some possibilities there.
but by the time it'd take to make such an unambiguous determination, which'd leave fractions of seconds for precise targeting.
You have more than a few seconds to track where a missile has been fired.
(which, more often than not, are really fancy ear-marks for selected districts).
I'd be more inclined to believe you were it not for the fact that it isn't just the US looking into this stuff - the Russians have been fooling around with this stuff since the 1960s.
Just because others look into a technology
does not mean it is a sound one. The Russians, the Chinese - and, of course, the israelis, have more than "looked into" various Anti-missile approaches. Israel has, in fact, a system that can counter rockets - as long as the weather co-operates and there are not too many of them. The Russians have put together and tested several prototypes themselves, which is how they found out the immense shortcomings of an anti-missile defense.
In fact, all of these entities found the anti-missile approaches to have such daunting challenges that it is far easier - and cheaper - to play the countermeasure game - build simply more war heads, fill up the warheads with more bomblets, and design better decoys.
That being the case, I do acknowledge that "shooting a bullet with a bullet" may be feasible, as long as there are rather few of them fired at any one time. However, I assure you the technical and logistic challenges become nearly insurmountable, the second one deviates from the most favorable conditions for their use. That is why one hears nowadays mostly about "tactical missions" - meaning scenarios of limited engagement.
Here's one great example for you: the ABL program, which seeks to install a weapon grade laser on board a modified aircraft. Billions have gone into that program and there have been some successes in the fire control system and laser development. Unfortunately, none of these successes add up to a single sensible mission - a perfect example of dealing with trees while ignoring the fact that they are part of forest.
I don't think the proposal puts the decision-making power in Iran's hands at all.
It is entirely within Russia's. Its more analagous to negotiations for a corporate takeover that stalls (due to inability to acquire financing), and a rival steps in quickly subverting the original deal.
With Iran is a good idea. Talking to Iran is good, but we must also say that the way they are doing now is simply irresponsible. The world should be very leery of a nuclear armed Iran. Hillary Clinton must make it very clear to the Iranians, and lay down some markers that tells Iran that while we are serious about talking to them, their behavior, especially when it comes to Iraq must change.
I would be very skeptical about Iran as well. The leaders of Iran have to make a decision. Do they keep going the way they are going, and further isolate themselves from the rest of the world, or do they set about changing course, drop their nuclear ambitions, and become a productive nation. We know one thing, the people want change, the ruling mullahs do not. Our foreign policy towards Iran must remain resolute and strong. We will talk to Iran, but first Iran must show that it is serious about going in a different direction.
and further isolate themselves from the rest of the world
Is it this kind of isolation you are talking about:
BBC NEWS, 8 September 2006: US blacklists major Iranian bank
The Bush administration has blacklisted one of Iran's biggest banks, alleging that it is used to transfer money to terrorist organisations.
The Treasury Department said it had cut state-owned Bank Saderat off from the US financial system entirely.The bank, although unable to deal directly in the US, was previously able to make transactions via a bank in another country.
The US is calling for UN sanctions on Iran over its nuclear programme.
There has been no official reaction to the news from either Bank Saderat or Iran.
'Funds moved'
Stuart Levey, the Treasury's under-secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, announced the action against Saderat during a speech to the American Enterprise Institute.
He said the bank had been blacklisted because "this bank, which has approximately 3,400 branch offices, is used by the government of Iran to transfer money to terrorist organisations."
"We will no longer allow a bank like Saderat to do business in the American financial system, even indirectly," he added.
According to Mr Levy, the bank had facilitated the transfer of hundreds of millions of dollars to the Lebanese militant group, Hezbollah, and what he called other terrorist organisations, every year.
Correspondents say the bank has played a major role connecting Iranian businesses with the outside world over the last few years.
Or this:
BBC NEWS, 13 June 2007: America's financial war on Iran
The United States is waging an undeclared financial war on Iran as part of efforts to persuade the Tehran government to abandon alleged plans to acquire nuclear weapons.
It is being run from an ornate, grey building located close to the White House in Washington - the headquarters of America's finance ministry, the Treasury Department.
"What we're trying to do is make it difficult for Iran to use the global financial system to pursue illicit conduct," explains Stuart Levey
Incident reflects sorry state of US Diplomacy
Everyone has the right to float ideas, and whom it concerns has the right to reject them. Rahm Emanuel or whatever member of the Israel Lobby inside the White House floated this one, has the right and Russia of course rejected it, as it has the right to do. But you are wrong to assume that Obama just goes forward with the shield after this. This would be perceived as too arrogant and unilateral and inflexible. Now is the time for Russia to float ideas, and the Americans to come up with new ideas, and perhaps a compromise of some sort will come out of it. All this is called diplomacy, and the United States (used) to have several, high-skilled and dedicated diplomats working 24/7 with just such issues. After 9/11 much of this prestine work have been curtailed and decades of their hard work in building Good-will for The United States all over the world have been wasted, so that they in many cased have to start from square one.
Time to open the Embassy in Tehran
What The United States should do as soon as possible is restoring full diplomatic ties with Iran. It is a discrace that they still do not have an embassy in this important country, when so much is at stake. They had an embassy in Moscow during the cold war, a country branded an 'Evil Empire', so of course they could - and should - have one in a country that until recently was part of an 'Axis-of Evil'. After all Diplomacy was invented to prevent misunderstandings that could lead to war. Ask yourself which group of people with links to which country and with not just influence but actual control over U.S. Foreign Policy allways have resisted normalisation of relations.
Reasons why this idea was made public
First of all it reflects the sorry state of the State Department (sorry for the pun), and that these policy initiatives apparently still are (half)-baked in The White House, and made public, instead of being conducted by skilled diplomats.It was made public because it is in the interest of The Israel Lobby to portray Russia as 1) a partner to Irans nuclear programme and 2) one that rejects a good proposal.
After all the proposed interceptor missiles in Poland and the radarstation in the Chech Republic were designed by neocons with ties to Israel to make Europeans feel as if they 'are in the same boat' as Israel. The strategic interests of this country - with an inhabitable surface area the size of Delaware and the adjacent Cecil County in Maryland - can briefly be described as a wish to get as many as possible to share its strategic interests. And if Europeans begins to fear Iranian missiles like Israelis does, this is useful in shaping opinions and preparing the ground for military offensives some day.
The plans have greatly offended Russias feelings. It was the very same area that Russians cleared for Nazis in 1944-45. If they had not done this, there would hardly have been any Jews left in Europe. It was the Realist James Baker who succeeded in getting the Russians to retreat from East Germany in negociations based on trust with his counterpart Eduard Shevardnaze, in what have been decribed as the first time in history that a Major Power have ceased territory voluntarily, without a single shot being fired.
To all this members of the Isreal Lobby replies: "Hey, the Russians, aren't they the ones that have restricted the activities and jailed representatives of our people [the oligarchs]? ["No one shall antagonise our people, not today when we hold so much power, and even control The Foreign Policy of the worlds remaining superpower"] Witness that Mearsheimer & Walt's book is called: "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy" - not "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Mid East Policy" as perhaps could be expected, implying that they control other areas as well, and it would be naive to think that everything that has got to do with Iranian missiles are not duly controlled.
Gauge for yourself
One of the advantages of the small, close-knit Israel Lobby community, is that it is possible for outsiders quickly to gauge its members moods and fears. You just need to open a newspaper in any City or talk with anyone with affiliations to said Lobby, and you will be aware that Ahmadinejad and Putin are considered 'baddies', because they have talked bad/acted bad against Jews. Actually Putin was elected precisely to deal with the Oligarchs accumulation of wealth, which was considered unfair by the public, themselves in many cases living on the bare minimum. The American variants of the phenomenen, Vanderbilt and Rockefeller were accepted, cause America was a new country with enough for everyone. Russia is old, and furthermore has had 70 years of Communism.
Intricacies of Transnational Jewish Politics
Policy wonks need to understand how Jewish social networks accrue and manage power. Chabad (Lubavitch), Putin, Russian Oligarchs may provide some sense of the system.
BTW, I consider Friedmanite Neoliberalism a form of Jewish politics in the same way Russian Marxism was. Anyone could join but the highest positions were reserved for Jews.
I describe the Jewish aspect of Friedmanite Neoliberalism in Judonia Rising:
Because Zionist Sorelianism has clear affinity with Friedman's ideas, the absence of the any discussion of the connections and interrelations between Friedmanism and Jabotinskianism by Naomi Klein in The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalis[11] is a glaring omission. While Jabotinskian Neoconservatism is for the most part a Jewish sect or special interest, Friedmanist Neoliberalism actively proselytizes itself to non-Jews as the true economic religion, whose high priesthood tends for the most part to consist of Jews. Non-Jews like Cheney, Rumsfeld, or Woolsey often come to accept Jabotinskian Neoconservative foreign policy ideas after indoctrination with Friedmanite Neolibeal market theory.
Not only is Klein completely misleading when she implies that Israel's love affair with disaster capitalism only begins after the expections of the Oslo Process proved illusory, but she failed to mention that the erasing of the native population from areas under Zionist control in 1947-8 (Holoexaleipsis[12] or Nakba) with concomitant seizure of practically all movable and immovable assets from Palestinian refugees is probably the earliest and purest example of massive Friedman-style transfer of wealth from the poor of the developing world to a Western elite (the Zionist political leadership) backed by a Western economic elite (mostly New York Jewish investment bankers and the Cousinhood of the wealthiest British Jews). The creation of the State of Israel on the shards of Arab Palestine is the Zionist version of the Shock Doctrine.
Klein neglects to mention that the hyper-wealthy US Zionist elite and Israeli government have been heavily involved directly and indirectly in manipulating the US economy in criminal violation of SEC regulations by stoking, financing, and picking winners in the homeland security investment bubble that she describes in Chapter 14 of her book.
the hyper-wealthy US Zionist elite and Israeli government have been heavily involved directly and indirectly in manipulating the US economy in criminal violation of SEC regulations by stoking, financing, and picking winners in the homeland security investment bubble that she describes in Chapter 14 of her book.
I don't understand why do you blame Jews, you Guys tied up your SPEEs via your Constitution in such a way that they can't move and defend themselves legally, but when the Zionists and others come in the cloak of secularism and slap them like in the films (airplane I,II) you get outraged;->>>
Keep talking Guys, while they are in business as usual.
Here open your ears and listen what they say:
(composed by Allen Green - a Blogger, I have added the "lobby", obviously he missed;->>) Enjoy it:->
So at the heart of this exchange, is the question of loyalties, and interests.
People like myself, maintain that Zionists are first and foremost American patriots. I'd even go so far as to assert, that we are the Ideal and Paramount American Patriots - since no one else seems to take so closely to heart the values of liberty, freedom, and democracy.
Israel is a democracy, it is thanks to us, not the USSR. That it is a democracy, is because we are Americans.
Islam is being pushed back - thanks to us, first and foremost. Everywhere where Democracy is fighting for its life, we sustain it, are at the forefront of the fight.
Who do we do this for?
If we were committed to a biblical vision of Israel, we'd have created a theocracy and instituted Hallakha. Instead, we promote Democracy in the Former Eastern bloc, in Islamic lands, in Latin America - in China. Why? It is far-fetched to say that the Democratic imperative is found in the Tanakh.
There is a reason why domestically, we are at the forefront of defending freedom of speech, of a critique of victim mentality, and anti-democratic values, of defending our right to criticize religion, etc. This reason is perhaps an exaggerated commitment to American values.
As for Israel Lobby - yes, we are tough in the ring - but we have to be, because we are outgunned, and outmaneuvered. We've got billions of oil moneys against us - pretending they don't exist. This is real money, coming from real states, aimed at first and foremost, undermining US values. They aren't aimed at simply changing US foreign policy, but ignoring the democratic imperative.
a very, very nice slap on the face (of the gentiles gently (meekly) calling them un-American), thanks Allen;->>
What are you complaining for?!
We can't hear you!
Grand Sen~or
I run an organization for Ethnic Ashkenazim Against Zionist Israel.
Among other things we debunk Zionist claims about Islam and Jews under Muslim rule.
I currently do not have anything up on the website about Iranian Jews, but the following blog entries may provide some useful background material to Cohen's article.
Did anyone see these photos from Hillary's meeting with Israeli President Peres? Looks like an engagement party!
http://www.repubblica.it/2006/05/gallerie/esteri/hillary-peres/8.html
Undiplomatic Secretary of State
Secretary of State Clinton has been on the job a short time and she is already showing her unpreparedness and ill-preparedness for the position making comments detrimental to human rights in China and saying things won't work out with Iran which is in sync with her "obliterate Iran" comment. Hopefully for our country this will not be a pattern.
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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