Monday, March 9, 2009 - 4:25 PM

Realists understand that power is the primary currency in world affairs, and that great powers have the latitude to define interests broadly. As the United States has proved in recent years, especially strong powers are prone to fits of hubris, adopting unachievable goals and then pursuing them carelessly. When they do, realists warn, opponents usually bite back (see under: Iraq, Afghanistan).
Contrary to what some people think, realists aren’t cold, calculating machines who are indifferent to moral concerns. Rather, realists simply recognize that are often tradeoffs between our moral preferences and our other interests, and that moral precepts alone are an sufficient guide to foreign policy. Realists also worry that idealistic moral objectives too easily become crusades, thereby causing more human suffering than the ills they were meant to stop.
Finally, because the world is a competitive place, realists look for opportunities to divide adversaries and to discourage potential rivals from joining forces, based on the simple idea that it is better to face weak and/or divided opponents than a strong and unified opposition. Bismarck's diplomacy is an ideal model: after defeating France and unifying Germany in the Franco-Prussian war, Bismarck adopted a conservative, status-quo strategy that kept France isolated for the next twenty years. Not only did this make Germany safer, it also made Europe more tranquil.
So what are the hopeful signs? Here are a few straws in the wind:
1. Obama has put down a marker on Iraq, indicating that he will in fact carry though on his pledge to get all U.S. forces out by the end of 2011. By stating this commitment as clearly as he could (with one senior official ruling out a Korea-like long-term commitment), and by lining up a lot of prominent support for it, he has made it more difficult to renege even if the situation in Iraq becomes more violent as U.S. forces withdraw. Such a development would be unfortunate, even tragic, but as Andrew Sullivan noted, it is not a reason to stay. Obama is enough of a realist to know that if he doesn’t get us out of there, Bush's 2003 mistake will be a deadweight for his entire presidency.
2. There are now hints of a U.S. willingness to talk to “moderate” elements of the Taliban. This is realistic in two senses: First, it recognizes that the Taliban is not a unified, centralized movement with a single headquarters and a strong governing ideology; rather, it is a loose collection of groups with certain common beliefs but lots of internal divisions. Alignment and realignment of various tribes and factions is a recurring theme in Afghan history, and this approach reflects an awareness of that core principle. Second, it recognizes that the United States has no vital interest in determining who actually governs in Afghanistan, provided that the government does not let Afghan territory be used to organize attacks on U.S. soil (or other core interests). Co-opting any moderate elements can be won over will make our task easier; waging war on all of them at once merely reinforces their fragile unity. Reaching out to the moderates may not work, of course, but there’s little risk in trying and potentially much to gain.
3. Similarly, the new overture to Syria follows a similar logic. As I've argued before, a well-integrated Middle East strategy will try to coordinate our approaches to Syria, Iran, and the Israel-Palestinian conflict, to give potential spoilers less incentive to derail progress and give current obstacles incentives to rethink their positions. Keeping Syria isolated encourages them to stay close to Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, because they are the only cards Syria has to play. Reaching out to them does exactly the opposite; it gives them an incentive to distance itself from these actors in order to obtain things that are more important. The success of this initiative will ultimately depend on whether we can broker the long-delayed peace treaty with Israel (which will require Israel to return the Golan Heights), but these initial contacts are an encouraging first step.
4. Despite an embarrassing gaffe, the initial meeting between Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov seems to have gone well despite one obvious self-inflicted wound. Whose idea was to give Lavrov a mock "reset button" in the first place? This was a juvenile gesture ill-befitting a great power, and then screwing up the gag with an erroneous translation made the State Department look like a bunch of amateurs. Overall, the incident reminded me of the infamous bible-shaped cake that Ollie North took to Tehran during the Iran-contra scandal. But beyond the atmospherics, the actually meeting appears to have been both serious and cordial. And the administration's willingness to put missile defenses on the table shows that Obama and Co. are aware that this is a critical issue for Russia and could be the key to gaining Russian cooperation on more important items like Iran.
5. Finally, Secretary Clinton's Middle East trip was, as Marc Lynch, summarizes here, something of a "mixed bag." But given what we come to expect from visits by the previous secretary of state, even a mixed bag is a step forward. And as Gary Sick notes here (also courtesy of Marc’s blog), there are lots of signs on all sides of an emerging interest in -- horrors! -- "diplomacy" throughout the region. That's a realistic course for everyone to take at this point. And if I may beat a dead horse one more time, the big question is whether our future diplomatic strategy is well-coordinated or not. If it is, we could realize major gains; if not, we are going to make things worse.
So as I said, there are some encouraging hints of realism in the realm of foreign policy. But don’t get too happy yet. If Paul Krugman is right in today's Times, a sense of realism may still be lacking on the economic front, and that’s probably more important these days.
SAUL LOEB/AFP/Getty Images
EXPLORE:AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, ISRAEL/PALESTINE, OBAMA ADMINISTRATION, RUSSIA, STATE DEPARTMENT, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Bismarck, the Ottoman Empire, and Realism
From Bismarck, The Man and the Stateman, by AJP Taylor pp. 170-171:
The Eastern question took a new turn in February 1878. The Russians had defeated Turkey; their troops were at the gates of Constantinople. The British government determined to preserve the remains of the Ottoman empire. The British fleet passed the Straits. War between Russia and Great Britain seemed imminent -- a war in which Austria-Hungary was likely to be involved. Bismarck decided that he could no longer stand aside. He was indifferent to the fate of the Balkans; he could not be indifferent to the Balance of Power. Germany had nothing to gain from a general war, and much to lose; therefore she must act as peace-maker. On 19 February Bismarck announced in the Reichstag that Germany came forward not as arbitrator; but 'as an honest broker'. Bleichroeder, Bismarck's man of business, commented: 'There are no honest brokers.’ But in this case Bismarck was really concerned to settle the affair, not to earn a percentage. His action, far from being hostile to Russia, helped to save her from a disastrous war. The Russians imposed the treaty of San Stefano on the Turkish empire in March. Then, urged on partly by Bismarck's mediation but more by their own fear and weakness, they agreed to submit the treaty to a European congress. Bismarck tried to dodge further responsibility. He suggested that the congress should meet in Paris; and when this was rejected, offered the chairmanship of the congress to Waddington, the French representative. Bismark’s efforts were in vain. He had made Berlin the capital of Germany, and Germany the center of Europe. Now he had to pay the price for his success.
With ultimately severe negative consequences for the British Empire and probably as a result of a combination of greed, ideological fantasies, Zionist lobbying, and possibly Zionist espionage, the UK later abandoned the foreign policy realism of its commitment to the Ottoman Empire.
Here are my blog entries on the subject.
Realists think the world is a competitive place where states guard their own interests first and foremost. Realists generally assume that most states act more-or-less rationally most of the time, although they are aware that states can get sidetracked by imperfect information, ideological fixations, domestic politics, the delusions of particular leaders, etc. That's one reason why realists favor energetic diplomacy, so that potential rivals can learn more about the other side’s interests and motivations and gain a clearer sense of the consequences of different courses of action.
Yes realists(?! Professor means Salvare Apparentias people) think(/loop) around the bankrupted concept of "state" in fact the theory is something like the following, our Professor is lazy to show all the axioms of his "realist(?!)" theory:
The Salvare Apparentias Theory of FP (SATFP).
1. There exist states.
2. A State composed of a nation, a national leadership, national interests and power (economic, military, population, land, etc? ..(any others? pls feel free to add, it is the Blog's theory, not mine).
3. There exists a competitive arena where states acts as they do.
4. There exists no central authority in that arena that can enforce moral or legal constraints.
5. States commit morally dubious acts (dubious according to what? The Blog knows) (see axiom 4)(Why this is here? Didn't the Blog declare that SATFP is essencially amoral?)
6. A State's foreign and defense policy reflects national interest of the state.
7. A State can take deterrent action against other State(s) if the Leadership of the State decides so. (see axiom 11 & 12).
8. A State seeks to increase her national interests when her existence is threatened.
9. A State's power is a potential threat to other states. A state is by definition paranoid of other states.
10. States to increase their National Interests, to decrease potential threat of other States, to assimilate them and to dominate them, impose their Constitutions to other States. (But of course this degenerates all constitutions to a mono-constitution which prepares the Competetive Arena to the favour of the State whose Constitution became the one and only dominant Constitution to pave the ground for so called Globalization - Global Dominance - Ein STAAT, ein LAND (the GLOBE), ein FUERER und ein VOLK where there exists NO THREATt, NO COMPETITIVE ARENA, NO WORRIES and bsst of all NO NEED TO FP - a Paradise on Earth if you believe;->>)
11. A State talks sweet but carries her power peeping under her cloak to deterre the potential threats of other states. (McCain the Presidential Candidate 2008)
12. Powerful States to rule or protect or increase their National Interests divide less powerful states ad infinitum.
13. A State can suspend her constitution if the National Intersts dictates so. Soley the Leadership decides whether the National Intersts dictates that or not and their decision is final, cannot be challenged based on the articles of the Constitution of the State. In such cases the leadership for the sake of the National Interests is not required to disclose the reasons how they reached to a certain decision. When the National Interest of the State requires the constitution of the State becomes just a goddamned piece of paper (as Bush declared).
14. A State to keep her Internal Balance of Threat and National Interest and National Unity must centralize the power and not to share it with any Identifiable National Entity(ies).
15. A State keeps the power of making and implementing the laws solely to herself and does not share this power with any Identifiable National Entity(ies).
16. Salvare Apparentias Foreign Policy is the art of keeping the threats of states in Balance besides saving the foreign policy related phenomena. (How? By shuffling, dividing and mixing nations/races/cultures?!, subjecting them to prototype secularo-fascist laws to reduce their multiplicity to singularity? the Blog knows).
[So,when Professor talks about state don't get ideas, state is all about what is defined implicitely by means of above axioms of the SATFP. Now you can read and try to make sense what he is talking about based on state]
Professor says:
Realists understand that power is the primary currency in world affairs
No realist(?!) don't underst6and that, what rea;is(?!) understand is:
Realists understand that state power is the primary currency in world affairs
The theory recognises only state power and ignores others, for example it ignores the power of institutions like IL as accidential, should be banned, laws should be changed to dissolve their power, the power must exclusively withing the hands of the Monopoly (the State) otherwise it complicates the SATFP;->
And of course the rest of the articles are searching for solutions based on "state" ignoring all power scattered around by military interferences. Now they will collect them one by one to create monopolies under the banner of state to make them state power;->
Dream on Guys, dream on states, dream on two states, many states solutions around the world, but while dreaming don't forget to keep your state all together, you know un-Americans are started creaping around;->
Grand Sen~or
I have a lot of problems with your axioms, and if I get the time I will describe my issues, but because your list irritates me with incorrect Latin every time I read, I have to note that you probably mean ad uisiones seruandas or ad visiones servandas (in the common but anachronistic orthography) when you write salvare apparentias.
I have a lot of problems with your axioms
They are not my axioms, but if you have problems with them why don't you supply yours? I am not here to supply theories against the Blog's theory. I am here for conceptual investigations.In between I introduce some draft concepts to contrast the problems with the concepts used here. I have no problems with those axioms, all the problems belong to the bloggers who are day and night using them including yourself and Prof. Walt;-> I am just an observer here, when I observe that you are in trouble, I try to describe how you ended up in the trouble starting from the concepts you are using here. You see, I am sort of a philosopher. For me with a theory in use here to boast that you are realists is a joke and I am here to enjoy the joke;-> But in the mean time I am honest, that is why I call it "Salvare Apparentias" rather than "realist". Your keep calling it "realist" doesn't bother me, rather it adds more twist to the joke;->>
In reality you are all here to save (salvare) the state and I will keep showing you that it doesn't worth, it is waste of time and energy to do so, for it is not real.
list irritates me with incorrect Latin
It is not incorrect Latin, but all the same it irritates you;->
I suggest you to read:
To save the phenomena
Pierre Duhem
to save your irritation;->
But hey! I am glad to hear that you have no arguments to counter mine;->> But beleive me I would be happier if you could have some so that I can drop them out;->
I will describe my issues
before you do that, don't forget bringing along your State;->
Grand Sen~or.
Some one month ago there was a discussion on Obama's Grand Strategy. A lot of people were suggesting on this blog the arrival of a liberal internationalist Grand Strategy.
In contrast, I was reminding that Obama praises often Reinold Niebuhr. Hence, we had to expect quite a lot of realism.
I was right.
Phil Weiss discussed Niebuhr and Obama on his website in the entry What Would Reinhold Niebuhr (Obama's Guru) Say Re Israel/Palestine?.
At best I can only call Niebuhr as incoherent. With regard to Palestine he was simply a jerk and probably paid off by Zionists.
Full diplomatic ties with Iran and no name-calling vers. Hamas
What The United States need to do as soon as possible - in order to show that it is serious in changing its ways and means - is to establish full diplomatic relations with the great country of iran. It is downright childish and unbefitting a superpower to be so worked out just because around 50 officials - among them several CIA employees - were held hostage for 444 days - without one single hair being curled on any of their heads.
The Iranians just knew that that the US was a formidable adversary and that they indeed had used the very same embassy * in preparations for the coup in 1953 - and this was enough for making - some of them - taking this step in the turmoil following the Revolution. If the United States will do itself a favour, it should swallow its pride that a diplomatic sanctuary was disrespected on this occasion, and instead acknowledge its great guilt - along with Great Britain, in its involvement in The Iranian Coup.
Actually it was the British who came up with the idea, and thus bears the greatest guilt. The Archieves in London concerning the matter are still closed - and without doubt the British Establishment are quite satisfied that it is WW2 that Winston Churchill is remembered for, not his role in the Coup, which took place in his second term as PM.
No name calling versus Hamas
By the same token, the US should as a matter of course refrain from the childish habit of branding Hamas - elcted in january 2006 in free and fair elections as the legal representatives of the Palestinian People, a 'terrorist organisation'. It is no more a terrorist organisation than were IRA or Irgun, which had Menachem Begin as their leader - or Stern, which had Yitzhak Shamir -- both of them later became Primeministers of Israel. It is an organisation that opposes that Israel has taken over Palestine, just as the Israeli organistions here mentioned were based on opposition to British rule in the same place. Yes indeed Hamas focusses only on one part, whereas Irgun and Stern attacked both the British and Arabs.
The Israel Lobby are behind
But guess which group of people with affiliations to which country are actively working against such policy-shifts? The same group of people belonging to the same sinister networks that got the US into the disastrous Iraq war, and whose collective efforts constitute the greatest security peril the world have seen since WW2.
_______________________________
*)Documentation
THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 2000:
SECRETS OF HISTORY: THE C.I.A. IN IRANHow a Plot Convulsed Iran in '53 (and in '79)
By James Risen
(compiled from a secret report, written in March 1954 by the C.I.A.'s chief coup planner, Donald Wilber, optained by NY)Chapter 3: THE COUP
First Few Days Look Disastrous
Pro-shah soldiers sent to arrest Dr. Mossadegh at his home were instead captured. The top military officer working with General Zahedi fled when he saw tanks and loyal government soldiers at army headquarters.
The next morning, the history states, the Tehran radio announced that a coup against the government had failed, and Dr. Mossadegh scrambled to strengthen his hold on the army and key installations. C.I.A. officers inside the embassy were flying blind; the history says they had "no way of knowing what was happening."
Mr. Roosevelt left the embassy and tracked down General Zahedi, who was in hiding north of Tehran. Surprisingly, the general was not ready to abandon the operation. The coup, the two men agreed, could still work, provided they could persuade the public that General Zahedi was the lawful prime minister.
The C.I.A. station in Tehran sent a message to The Associated Press in New York, asserting that "unofficial reports are current to the effect that leaders of the plot are armed with two decrees of the shah, one dismissing Mossadegh and the other appointing General Zahedi to replace him."
The C.I.A. and its agents also arranged for the decrees to be mentioned in some Tehran papers, the history says.
The propaganda initiative quickly bogged down. Many of the C.I.A.'s Iranian agents were under arrest or on the run. That afternoon, agency operatives prepared a statement from General Zahedi that they hoped to distribute publicly. But they could not find a printing press that was not being watched by forces loyal to the prime minister.
On Aug. 16, prospects of reviving the operation were dealt a seemingly a fatal blow when it was learned that the shah had bolted to Baghdad. C.I.A. headquarters cabled Tehran urging Mr. Roosevelt, the station chief, to leave immediately.
He did not agree, insisting that there was still "a slight remaining chance of success," if the shah would broadcast an address on the Baghdad radio and General Zahedi took an aggressive stand.
The first sign that the tide might turn came with reports that Iranian soldiers had broken up Tudeh, or Communist, groups, beating them and making them chant their support for the shah. "The station continued to feel that the project was not quite dead," the secret history recounts.
Meanwhile, Dr. Mossadegh had overreached, playing into the C.I.A.'s hands by dissolving Parliament after the coup.
On the morning of Aug. 17 the shah finally announced from Baghdad that he had signed the decrees — though he had by now delayed so long that plotters feared it was too late.
At this critical point Dr. Mossadegh let down his guard. Lulled by the shah's departure and the arrests of some officers involved in the coup, the government recalled most troops it had stationed around the city, believing that the danger had passed.
That night the C.I.A. arranged for General Zahedi and other key Iranian agents and army officers to be smuggled into the embassy compound "in the bottom of cars and in closed jeeps" for a "council of war."
What The United States need to do as soon as possible - in order to show that it is serious in changing its ways and means - is to establish full diplomatic relations with the great country of iran.
You're assuming the Iranians will go along with this. As you know, the last time we had an embassy there, it was overrun by a bunch of students and hooligans that the Iranian government then refused to remove. Seeing as how attacks on the embassy (and the very concept of rules of diplomacy) aren't limited to US embassies in Tehran, I can understand why the US would be rather reluctant to do this without some explicit guarantees from the Iranian government on its security.
50 officials - among them several CIA employees - were held hostage for 444 days - without one single hair being curled on any of their heads.
You mean aside from being fed poorly and held in confined environments for that whole time? And that's of course ignoring the fact that the Iranian action shat on the norms of diplomacy.
If the United States will do itself a favour, it should swallow its pride that a diplomatic sanctuary was disrespected on this occasion, and instead acknowledge its great guilt - along with Great Britain, in its involvement in The Iranian Coup.
We already have - it didn't exactly lead to any changes on the Iranian end. In any case, I'm not exactly that apologetic, seeing as how Mossadegh was increasingly quite unpopular at the time of his removal, was being targeted by multiple groups (including not just the Shah loyalists but the Islamists as well), and was going down fairly soon one way or the other. We stepped in to put our guy on the throne and in power - better that than the Islamists.
By the way, the Iranians are throwing stones from a glass house on this issue, considering how the Post-Revolution government went on to try and sponsor groups to overthrow the various Arab governments after its coming into power.
Peter Bergen has some interesting thoughts on negotiating with the Taliban here:
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/03/09/bergen.taliban/
The problem with American realists is that they too often do not know what is real. For example, do you really think that Obama can successfully manage the factional political dynamics of Afghanistan or Pakistan? Whenever, the counterinsurgent government tries to accommodate the insurgents, most of the factions within the government will attempt to make their own private arrangement, and in the end the Taliban, in the case of Afghanistan, will be far more unified than is the government. The government will fall apart and the Taliban will over-run the country.
Realistically speaking, the Afghan government is already so fractured and factionalized that they do not have the capacity to negotiate in the western sense. They must have a series of traditional broad based consensus building conferences (loya jirga). After that, it is inevitable that the U.S. will be left out in the cold unless we learn how to collaborate with the many factions and not try to simply split them apart as we do now by supporting the warlords. By supporting individual warlords, we are weakening the central government and becoming part, or victim, to their factions, and will have no place to go in a consensus building process.
In the final analysis, our goals must coincide with an Afghan consensus. I am worried that we do not have an idea what that consensus will be.
Thanky,
Bob Spencer
Professor Walt,
All of things you have described as realism are just diplomacy. Are you saying that foreign policies based on diplomacy, as opposed to the use of force, are necessarily realist?
Obama is a breath of fresh air. I agree that he needs to undertake efforts in a manner that enable him to keep his concentration.
The "short" campaign relative to the degree of stress of actually governing, actually bearing the responsibility for a nation and world in great distress.
Practical Realism: Fighting the ICC in Washington
[Until the ICC starts indicting Zionists, it simply has no credibility.]
Please forward and announce!
The first blog entry in the list at the end contains an interview with Columbia Professor Mahmood Mamdani. His insights are particularly valuable to help understand the (Zionist-orchestrated) threat to foreign policy realism that the indictment of Bashir represents.
EMERGENCY PROTEST!! HANDS OFF SUDAN!!
A rally and press conference to denounce the ICC arrest warrent of Sudan's President Omar Al-Bashir will take place Wednesday, March 11, 2009 at 1:00 pm in front of the Embassy of Sudan, 2210 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, DC 2008.
The African Union, the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement all stand in solidarity with the Sudanese government against this immoral western attempt at regime change that does nothing to help the peace process in Darfur. Concerned citizens of the U.S. plan to show their support for Sudan as well.
For more information contact Hodari Abdul-Ali of the Give Peace A Chance Coalition at 301-728-8949 or Akbar Muhammad of the Youth4Africa Foundation at 314-422-4338.
Sudan and Darfur Blog Entry List
It sounds that the talks may not just be a sign of realism. Why not use constructivism to understand all these talks, or even liberalism? hehe
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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