Two things:

contacts between the PLO and pro-peace members of the American Jewish community eventually led Yasser Arafat to accept the UN resolutions 242 and 338 (the key resolutions governing the peace process) in December 1988, thereby taking a key step towards acceptance of Israel's existence.

Looking at things realistically in hindsight, it is hard to tell whether Arafat accepted the resolutions or simply said he did. This is not an academic point, in that it is not improbable that we see Hamas follow the same model.

'I doubt they can be convinced to accept Israel if we eschew contact and therefore we should talk to them' is a simple minded analysis and policy recommendation. What are the chances of Hamas never accepting Israel regardless of what we do, and what are the potential negative repercussions of talking to them? For instance, can they work more harm to potential long term peace prospects if we allow them to play a double game over a period of years or even decades?

...though former President Jimmy Carter, who has met with several Hamas leaders in a private capacity, believes it is

Has Carter (or you, for that matter) ever believed otherwise in any situation? If not, citing a guy with only one setting in an appeal to authority isn't all that compelling.

This deserved its own post...

Talking doesn't mean surrendering our core commitments -- let alone "selling Israel down the river," as some may fear -- it simply means recognizing that no lasting peace is possible without Hamas on board.

Wouldn't it be better to know exactly what we are dealing with, and to let them know exactly where we stand, than to continue sticking our heads in the sand and hoping they are going to go away?

You are talking about un-Americans I guess and hope Professor, before you go to the Deserts of ME to pull you head out you start pulling it out from New York deserts;->>

You are right Professor the IL is not going to go away and others will emerge so wouldn't it be better to know exactly what you aredealing with - SPEEs?

Forget thinking in term of State think in terms of SPEEs.

I would say as usual "Don't talk before you change your constitution, you would be talking to the air;->"

BTW, you call them un-American and they call you anti-Semite, who is right/wrong Mate?!When are you going to call each other terrorists;->>Or are you reserving it to others/barbarians?!

Grand Sen~or.

I was a consistent critic of your article and book (less so) when it came out.

I get that your reasoning was that the Israel Lobby stood in the way of other discussion that needed to be candid and open, in order to define appropriately responsive policy positions in a changing world.

The majority of criticism of that work from the middle -> right Jewish press was from fears that the title and component theses would be used by genuinely racist forces for malevolent purposes. Most that heard of the book, heard of it from others.

The literally hateful right (David Duke, etc) that endorsed the article, identified the familiar fascist inferences of "Jews control the media", "Jews control money", "Jews have the unaccountable ear of leaders". They found fairly direct examples of those theses in the article.

The anti-Zionist left that endorsed the article (and book), identified a slap to Israel, and were gleeful that prominent realist academics would appear to endorse the removal Israeli power, if not the removal of Israel itself.

My read of the article was that it was incomplete on the very complex and very unknown and even unknowable history, materially incomplete, and written and publicly presented in an often polemic style.

The polemic style and some of the periodically expressed anger of you and Dr Mearsheimer in defending the article and book on speaking tours, contributed to the guess that the article and book was ugly, rather than informative.

The irony that your recommendations would functionally enhance the stability and recognition of Israel was lost on both the left and the right, and also on the fearful responses.

So, now that there is some headroom, with the new administration, that can lead to a clearer and more mutually helpful policy discussion re: Middle East, I'd like to thank you for your work, perseverance, and sobriety in continuing to advocate for balanced and reasonable policy solutions, rather than react to your critics (including me).

You write that "...no lasting peace is possible without Hamas on board."

It is the opposite PEACE IS IMPOSSIBLE WITH HAMAS.

Hamas is very clear and unwavering on this point. They will accept temporary lulls but the goal cannot be modified. Hamas have stated numerous times that Israel is part of the Islamic Waqf, no one can negotiate a partition or surrender any part of the Waqf.

The Hamas charter can't simply be dismissed as political hyperbole or excess rhetoric that can be separated from Hamas on a pragmatic level. It is the core of who they are, not a starting position to negotiate.

A Hamas that renounces violence (read Jihad), accepts Israel or even more minimally accepts Jews, or other minorities as people with equal rights ceases to be Hamas. The Brotherhood already is a leader in persecuting and initiating violence against Christians in Jordan or Coptic people in Egypt. It simply is who they are. Non Muslims are Dhimi, this is an intrinsic religious belief and one that can not be negotiated.

Also you fail as do so many others in persisting to see Hamas as a nationalist organisation limited to the conflict with Israel.

Hamas is not a nationalist organisation. They don't fly Palestine flags and there is a reason for that.

Hamas is part of the larger Islamic Brotherhood ultimately inseparable from the Jordanian and Egyptian Islamic Brotherhood. They have made clear that they want to return to old borders of Caliphate.

Hamas is a threat not just for Israel or moderate Palestinians but to Egypt and Jordan, US regional allies, in near term as both are struggling to contain local branches.

The swing to the right in recent Israeli elections is a mandate to deal hard with Hamas it is not a mandate for settlements or a rejection of peace as some in the new government would like to believe.

Inclusion of Hamas into the PA will be a disaster for the peace process and give the future Israeli government an excuse, frankly a valid one, to distance and even to eventually completely disengage itself from the peace process. How can that be good?

It will be difficult enough task, but not impossible, for the US to keep the emerging Israeli government in the present peace negotiations. Including Hamas, on Hamas' terms and at the same time pursuing a more assertive peace process is not feasible.

How will US prestige and influence be enhanced by sabotaging the 'roadmap', the peace process and further weakening Fatah by enabling their opposition?

Although a renunciation of violence by Hamas may be enough for Europe and the US to start to engage with them. Resolution 242 is land for peace not land for a temporary lull.

The only thing Hamas will understand from engagement is the same thing that Hizbollah and Syria have concluded, the West has no resolve.

The notion that engagement will lead to co-opting them is without any foundation. This has been the argument for engagement with Syria over the last 30 years. The engagement was predicated on the notion it would separate Syria from Iran and further that Syria would stop meddling in Lebanon, or assisting Hizbollah.

Syria is closer to Iran now than they have ever been and continues to get closer. Syria continues to do as they see fit in Lebanon and of course allows unfettered assistance and rearming of Hizbollah.

Trying to draw a parallel between engaging Hamas in the present and the PLO post fall of the Soviet empire is a false analogy, disingenuous at minimum.

Following the fall of the USSR the US was seen in the Middle East as the unchallenged Superpower. Recent events in the Middle East simply no longer allow that perception. The US is seen as in retreat and increasingly unable to contain or influence events. Radicalism is in the ascendancy.

Everyone in the region is counting the days till Iran has the bomb, nobody here believes otherwise. If you could read the Arab media you would see the hysteria. They have no confidence that the US will stop it or how much the US can even be counted on to protect them. They are now arguing among themselves how to proceed individually, or increase regional co-operation, should the US be shown the way out of the Gulf? Things that were unutterable even a few years ago.

The PLO entered into Oslo as the US was seen as the dominant power and was able to extract concessions from the PLO. The US does not have any such ability with Hamas. Hamas will see engagement as a validation of refusing to make concessions and this will only reinforce the perception of US and Western weakness and further weaken Fatah, remember them? the US ally/partner in the Palestine, who made these now meaningless and unnecessary concessions.

If you argue that engagement will lead to moderation by Hamas you need to detail such an policy and explain the mechanics. You can't simply present it as a desired goal based on a myopic hope. Also both Mr. Cohen and you need to explain what you believe should be the consequences to Hamas should they fail to make the desired concessions.

I have conversed with Roger Cohen in the past and so can say with some authority he really doesn't know much about the Middle East. Much like Steve Walt, Roger Cohen keeps trying to reconstruct the Middle East in a way that conforms to his own personal understanding, not the one that is dictated by local history and culture.

George W. Bush made the problem worse on his watch, refusing to engage in the peace process

This isn't really true; the "Road Map", for example, emerged in 2003 under Bush's watch if I recall correctly. It is true that Bush was rather less than willing to pressure Israel to accept it, but what can you do?

Hamas is very clear and unwavering on this point. They will accept temporary lulls but the goal cannot be modified. Hamas have stated numerous times that Israel is part of the Islamic Waqf, no one can negotiate a partition or surrender any part of the Waqf.

They've also said that if they could get a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with East Jerusalem, they'd agree to a 25-30 year truce so that the next generation could make the final decision (and from what I've read, they're holding out on the recognition thing until they actually have an agreement of sorts in place, sort of like what Netanyahu would like to do from the Israeli end). They're a complex organization with various interests, even though fighting the Israelis is the primary one.

Syria is closer to Iran now than they have ever been and continues to get closer. Syria continues to do as they see fit in Lebanon and of course allows unfettered assistance and rearming of Hizbollah.

Syria used to more or less say that if Israel would give them back the Golan Heights, they'd recognize Israel. It's not quite that simple anymore, but that's the major sticking issue for them.

One thing to keep in mind is that ending terrorist groups is not always a matter of negotiations - certain groups do ignore ceasefires and continue to make unreasonable demands. Witness the Tamil Tigers.

...the aim of encouraging a Hamas-Fatah reconciliation. Need I add that this is the only realistic approach to take?

How about good old divide-and-rule? Or in this case, divide-and-contain. That seems the most realistic (and realist) option, in a situation where peace is virtually impossible in the foreseeable future.

...provided that they are willing to renounce violence...

Hamas' renouncing violence would be a security disaster for Israel. (I'm assuming that no one is so naive to think that Hamas would actually cease violence after renouncing it.) The PLO renounced violence about a zillion times during the Oslo process in 1993-96, remember? Arafat would either order or green-light a terrorist attack; Israel would respond; the US would jump in; Israel would be pressured to make some substantial concession, and in return Arafat would agree to "renounce violence." Repeat. By the way, this is one reason Palestinian support for Hamas was a lot lower in the early 1990s: Fatah itself was an active player in the armed struggle.

And now you want to repeat the "renouncing violence" game with Hamas. Wonderful. It was a Fatah member (don't remember his name) who said that you can't trust Hamas hudna with Israel - Hamas will cancel it on the pretext of the slightest technical violation.

Now, none of this means that we shouldn't talk to Hamas. I couldn't care less about the Protocols stuff in their charter or about a hypothetical moral hazard. It just means that you should go in with your eyes open, not expecting the leopard to change his spots. Even when he says that he has. Come on, let's get realistic.