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Posted By Stephen M. Walt
Friday, April 24, 2009 - 5:02 PM
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The New York Times reports that Obama administration officials are increasingly worried about the Pakistani government's willingness to mount an effective defense against the Taliban. Although the Pakistani military is large and fairly well-equipped, it remains focused on defending the state against long-time rival India and is not well-prepared for a counter-insurgency campaign. Given that Pakistan reportedly has sixty or more nuclear weapons, the possibility of complete government collapse at some point in the future needs to be taken seriously, though other dangers may in fact be more likely.
I don't know enough about the situation to offer firm answers on what we should do, but here are some questions and comments.
1. First, why is there so much disagreement about Pakistan's prospects among knowledgeable experts?
Juan Cole is no Pollyanna and knows a lot more about Pakistan than I do, and he’s still relatively sanguine at the prospect of Pakistan turning into a failed state, in part because he believes the army will hold together. By contrast, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (who presumably has some knowledgeable people advising her) recently said that extremist elements in Pakistan pose "a mortal threat to the security and safety of our country and the world." Counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen, now an informal White House advisor, offers a similarly grim prognosis, saying "We have to face the fact that if Pakistan collapses it will dwarf anything we have seen so far in whatever we're calling the war on terror now."
This disagreement partly reflects the inherent difficulty of anticipating revolutionary situations. As Timur Kuran and Susanne Lohmann explained some years ago, revolutionary upheavals (and state collapse) are hard to predict because individual political preferences are a form of private information and the citizenry's willingness to abandon the government and/or join the rebels depends a lot on their subjective estimate of the costs and risks of each choice. If enough people become convinced the rebels will win, they will stop supporting the government and may even switch sides, thereby create a self-reinforcing snowball of revolutionary momentum. Similar dynamics may determine whether the armed forces hang together or gradually disintegrate. As we saw in Iran in 1979 or in Eastern Europe in 1989, seemingly impregnable authoritarian governments sometimes come unglued quite quickly. At other times, however, apparently fragile regimes manage to stagger on for decades, because key institutions hold and the revolutionary bandwagon never gains sufficient momentum.
The dispute may also reflect different views on what the real danger is. Even if the Pakistani state doesn't fall, anti-Americanism and Taliban influence may continue to grow within the Pakistani population and within key institutions -- including the military -- thereby creating serious problems even if the country as a whole is not a "failed state."
In any case, this is a disagreement with enormous implications, and I’d like to know who’s got the better case here.
2. Will India Help?
If Americans are worried about Pakistan turning into a failed state, Indians ought to really concerned. How would you like a Talibanized Pakistan armed with nuclear weapons on your border? So instead of its traditional goal of trying to weaken Pakistan, you'd think India would be going to considerable lengths to shore up the Zadari government. Pakistan's military isn't strong enough to pose a conventional threat to India, and New Delhi ought to be looking for ways to allow Pakistan's armed forces to reorient their attention away from India and towards the real danger. This wouldn't a concession on India's part; it would be a smart strategy. But it would also require a level of foresight that few governments manage to display, so I ain't optimistic.
3. The Big Question: What is the best way to protect Pakistan's nuclear arsenal?
For Americans, the greatest concern regarding Pakistan's future is the possibility that its nuclear arsenal might fall into the hands of anti-American terrorists who might try to use one against the United States itself. I assume U.S. intelligence has gone to considerable lengths to figure out where Pakistan's warheads might be and that we have contingency plans for trying to secure them in the event of a state collapse. But any attempt to grab them by surprise, stealth or force would be a high-risk affair, and might trigger a very hostile reaction from within Pakistan itself. As one U.S. official said back in 2007, "it could be very messy." Another official involved in efforts to war game the U.S. response to this nightmare situation has admitted that "most of them don't end well." Moreover, the more that the Pakistani military worries about this possibility, the greater the risk that they move the warheads preemptively or take other actions to preclude that possibility.
In a perfect world, the United States would quietly establish connections to key figures within Pakistan's armed forces and work out arrangements for the U.S. (or conceivably some third party) to airlift the weapons out if it looked like bad guys might get their hands on them. Unfortunately, rising anti-Americanism in Pakistan is probably making it harder for key officials to maintain close ties with the U.S. military or U.S. intelligence, and has made the generals in charge of their nuclear arsenal more reluctant to cooperate with us on issues of nuclear security. Indeed, given that the head of Pakistan's nuclear program, General Khalid Kidwai, has declared that their security arrangements are "foolproof," it's likely that some Pakistani leaders see us as a greater threat to their nuclear arsenal than the Taliban. As David Sanger of the Times has reported, "Pakistani officials are understandably suspicious that the real intent of the American program [to help improve nuclear security] is to gather the information needed to snatch, or neutralize, the country's arsenal."
And if I haven't scared you enough, the real danger may not be state failure and a subsequent Taliban takeover. The more likely danger could be a progressive radicalization of the Pakistani military and the possibility of an "inside job," (i.e., the seizure of some part of the arsenal by anti-American radicals within the Pakistani armed forces). A less immediate but still serious danger would be infiltration of the nuclear program by scientists sympathetic to radical forces, and the dissemination of information to them. So if our real concern is Pakistan's nuclear arsenal -- and it ought to be -- then we need to reverse the rising tide of anti-Americanism within Pakistan more generally.
And that's my last question: If nuclear security is our main concern, does the current emphasis on targeting suspected al Qaeda or Taliban leaders with Predators and Reapers really make strategic sense, if it inevitably leads to significant civilian deaths and reinforces anti-Americanism among the Pakistani population and possibly the armed forces as well?
INDRANIL MUKHERJEE/AFP/Getty Images
Regarding your point 2, I think the answer is a "yes". Or a "yes, but..."
The decision by the Indian government not to retaliate against Pakistan after the Mumbai attacks - when it would have been very popular politically within India - was in large part driven by an attempt to reduce Pakistan's insecurities vis-a-vis India. Rather surprisingly, this is not widely acknowledged. Similarly, the Indians have been less active than they otherwise would be in Afghanistan, even though many Pakistanis still believe that there is a large Indian intelligence presence there aimed at supporting the Taliban and destabilizing Pakistan generally:
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/02/16/can_the_intel_community_defuse_india_pakistan_tensions
In terms of "shoring up the Zardari government," India's hands are to a great degree bound. Any intervention by India in Pakistani domestic politics, or any sense of intervention is likely to prove counterproductive, tainting the parties that India would otherwise support. Nor does India have all that much influence in Islamabad.
It is significant that the recent New York Times story, and other recent reports, show a growing convergence in Washington on Pakistan, which aligns increasingly with New Delhi's viewpoint. Not coincidentally, Pakistani insecurity is fueled more and more by American actions - such as the drone attacks in the border regiosn - than by anything India is doing.
Isn't the key question why Pakistan still has it military largely on the borders with India while it sends it paramilitary out to get their butts kicked by the Taliban? You'd think that once the Taliban get close enough to the capital the military might decide they're a more pressing problem?
Or maybe it's a ploy by the military to show the civilian government who's really in charge? Maybe setting up for a return to rule by the generals? So, maybe this all could have been avoided if we'd just ignored Obama and left Musharuff in charge?
Edit: And speak of the devil, look who is offering to return to power...
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/5208848/Former-Pakistani-president-Pervez-Musharraf-offers-to-return-to-power-in-Pakistan.html
And that's my last question: If nuclear security is our main concern, does the current emphasis on targeting suspected al Qaeda or Taliban leaders with Predators and Reapers really make strategic sense, if it inevitably leads to significant civilian deaths and reinforces anti-Americanism among the Pakistani population and possibly the armed forces as well?
Professor, this is a very, very good question to ask, but whom are you asking it?!
While you were worried about the collapse of Paki-State, I have been discussing about your constitution with J.Thomas, one of your Blogger. This morning I woke up with the following cleared picture about the US:
1. The Constitution of the US became detached from the reality of rapidly changing environment.
2. Because of that the Constitution became useless and made redundant by the State, in fact Bush already declared it redundant by saying "a goddamned piece of paper".
3. Now the US is not an open State(imagined society) anymore. Even the intellectuals like yourself cannot communicate with the State openly and effectively and cannot predict what the State is going to to in the immediate future. Your above question will end up in deaf ears (unless it is filtered through some Lobbies).
4. It is the State's turn to be declared redundant.
If I were in your boots, I would really worried about the collapse of the State and revolutionary forces mushrooming up there overnight in th US.
BTW, your evaluation of the Paki-State situation ignores foreign powers other than India around there. Also what about stripping Indian/Israeli/Chinese/etc. WMDs while you started with the Paki's out there;->
At the moment the US is a Lobby State as you identified it, but a serious failure of this Lobby State will bring you face to face with no-State. Then only Jupiter knows how you are going to protect you own WMDs.
Professor, what I am trying to say is the same thing I said from the very beginning: Invent a TE based on a different Constitution, your compatriots desperately need it.
Grand Sen~or.
note: on the Af-Pak side it looks like Taliban is aiming at the corrupt State of Pakis in a similar scenario happened in Iran. If I were the US I wouldn't repeat the same mistake done on Iran. I would come out of the region to let Taliban go as far as they can then re-establish the balance with the winner, like the US trying to come to terms with Iran today;-> In other words Taliban is Pakis internal affair they have to deal with it with their own resources with no support what so ever from the EUS.
WMDs changes hands, so what? you will be on the side of the winner in any case.
As far as point #1 is concerned:
- I believe the situation is not as grim as regards Pak as some people would have us believe. The key player to keep an eye on is the Pak army. Irrespective of what sort of musical chair is played out in Islamabad, the real power centre is the army. And so far, (a) its officers/soldiers have not revolted against the higher ups in a fit of puritanical zeal(b) it has not been called in to fight the Taliban in Buner, hence the real hammer has not been applied. Only if/when the army shows signs of caving in is there a very real threat to the state. In fact, it might be in the army's interest that Zardari hesitates, brings the situation to a boil and then have no option but to call in the army. Domestically, it will shore up the army's image after the Musharraf days and justify its role in the country.
- As regards India, I agree with dj83 that it has limited influence inside Pakistan. And it will not come to the aid of Zardari (nor will the Pak army allow that to happen). India knows that the US has too much at stake when it comes to Pak, and is obsessed with the WMD Qs. Hence, a Taliban Pakistan with WMDs is not a likely scenario at all. Yes, India nonetheless does see a danger in a Taliban Pakistan to the extent that infiltration across Kashmir will spike and the Taliban govt. will actively sponsor such ends. For India, the threat is more unconventional/asymmetrical as compared to being conventional (nukes in the hands of the Taliban representing Pakistan). A Taliban govt. would be a danger to China too, hence it could open up areas for the two Asian powers to see eye to eye on something.
Conclusion: the scenario in the region is certainly dangerous but not a 'mortal' one. As regards the USA's appeal to Pak to not see India as an existential threat - very valid.
As regards the USA's appeal to Pak to not see India as an existential threat - very valid.
"very valid" according to what theory?
Well, the SATFP doesn't say so:
here is axiom 9
9. A State's power is a potential threat to other states. A state is by definition paranoid of other states.
I suggest you also read other axioms of the SATFP and if you think you have a better theory to justify your statement above then bring your theory.
Grand Sen~or.
House Armed Services Committee Hearing yesterday
Prof:
The HASC had a hearing on this w/
video and testimonies here:
http://armedservices.house.gov/hearing_information.shtml
Kindly read the one by the counter-insurgency expert Dr. Kilcullen:
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/FC042309/Kilcullen_Testimony042309.pdf
He mentioned during Q&A that he believes -- IF we don't change anything -- a 75% chance Pakistan will fail.
The main thing he suggests is giving aid to the POLICE, not the ARMY in Pakistan.
He also suggests calling of the damn drones: yes, you get 12 Al-Queda guys who are replaced in 1 week, and you get a lot of negative angry reaction from 100s of millions of Pakistanis and muslims. Cost vs. benefit??
My view is that we have a problem in Pakistan because we chased the taliban out of Afghanistan.
We should leave Afganistan, let the taliban filter back out of Pakistan there, as outlined in Foreign Affairs:
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/64932
Should we "win" in Afghanistan at the cost of losing Pakistan? That would be stupid.
Get out of Afghanistan and Pakistan will stabilize as the Taliban will go back to where they came from.
But, alas, we have done tons of stupid things. (Supporting Mubarak, Israel, Saudis etc etc.)
Have a great weekend!
What is the best way to protect Pakistan's nuclear arsenal?
The best way to protect Pakistan's nukes is for NATO to leave Afghanistan -- swallow its pride and admit it lost. This way Taliban can be kicked out of Pakistan, back into Afghanistan from whence they came.
In the longer run, for the love of GOD, stop supporting Mubarak and Saudis and UAE who send their radicals to play in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Kindly read:
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/64932
Which state do you want to lose? Pakistan or Afghanistan? You cannot win in both without another 500,000 NATO troops.
This way Taliban can be kicked out of Pakistan, back into Afghanistan from whence they came.
Yeah but Taliban doesn't think so, their eye is now changed from Af to the corrupt State of Pakis and they are moving south rather than north. For a realist the reasonable move would be to be on the winners' side to re-establish the balance there. Don't commit the same mistake that is done on Iran. I would let Taliban go as far as they can to test Pakis then decide whom to deal with - with the winner.
Grand Sen~or.
Which state do you want to lose? Pakistan or Afghanistan?
Clint, why don't you ask this question to the Lobby?!;->
Grand Sen~or.
Could the recent alarm from the state-department have anything to do with trying to send our allies signals that we need more help fro them for our Af-Pak policy to work?
"Help us or else we are all doomed"
Juan Cole's specialty is 19th century Iran. He may be an astute layman, but he is far far from a Pakistan expert.
Three questions about Pakistan
With regard to question # 1, I believe the alarm raised by Ms. Hillary Clinton is valid for a number of reasons. Though Pakistan army is well-equipped, large but it has been trained to fight in the plains and has no proper training for counterinsurgency operations.
Then, “dying for a right cause or an infidel” characterizes martyrdom philosophy of the Pakistan army. There is also the obsession of military establishment of Pakistan with India as enemy #1 and so its support of non-state actors. The doctrine of strategic depth emanates from this fear. I believe Pakistan army also suffers from the trauma of separation of East Pakistan where partly army operations against secessionist groups fuelled popular resentment against military-bureaucratic elite of West Pakistan. The civilian institutions are weak, dysfunctional and corrupt. Pakistan is also socially stratified, ethnically divided and now religiously polarized society.
So, in face of these facts, diplomats and policy makers, who raise an alarm on the rise of Taliban, are perhaps right. The factors narrated above reportedly forced government to sign peace deal in Swat. Army was losing its men. There were also reports of desertions in the Pakistan army as army personnel found it hard to fight against their own countrymen. There is also talk in the media that the army could have trounced Taliban in Swat by allying itself with anti-Taliban groups. But, on the contrary, while it stood on the sidelines, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Movement of Pakistan Taliban) butchered and killed local militias and Barelvis( during British colonial rule of India ,Muslim hardliners were divided into two groups: Deobandis who were for rigorous and puritan Islam and Barelvis who worshipped saints and were less rigorous in the interpretation of Islam)Thus, the conduct of army raises suspicions.
Awami National Party, the civilian government of North West Frontier Province, is the avowed secular party. But ANP supported the peace deal with Taliban as its entire leadership was threatened by Taliban militants. Mr. Asfand Yar Wali, the chairman of ANP, now resides in Islamabad as his ancestral house was bombed by the militants. Similarly, many ANP leaders and workers were kidnapped and often shot by the militants. Therefore, the party that got votes in the elections to end religious extremism has ended up signing peace deal with the militants.
Taliban are also agile and seemingly shrewd planners. They gradually creep into new settlements; disarm the local militias; exploit local class and sectarian resentments; and band with local extremist religious leadership. Then, after fortifying their positions, they find ways to finance their operations which are mostly kidnappings for ransom and occupying property of wealthier people of that settlement through force. They did this in Swat. And recently are employing the same tactics in Buner, a district closer to Swat.
We should not shrug off the statements of Senator Kerry that “Pakistan is in peril” and that of Secretary of State that “Taliban poses mortal threat to Pakistan”. Diplomats and should not just sit around and predict that Pakistan’s army can hold itself together. After all, East Pakistan also ceded in spite of large army. But, then luckily or unluckily (whichever side you are) India separated both portions. Now, the militants have the befit of geographic contiguity.
And regarding question# 3, though the scenario painted can provide a plot of a good thriller, the need is to stem the tide of Anti-Americanism by understanding the forces feeding it. Pakistanis suffer from split personality disorder: they love Americans and they hate Americans. They hate Gitmo, Abu Gharaib, and drone attacks. But they also love symbols, sights and sounds of USA. And their latest love story is President Obama. Let’s see how long the love lasts.
Three questions about Pakistan
With regard to question # 1, I believe the alarm raised by Ms. Hillary Clinton is valid for a number of reasons. Though Pakistan army is well-equipped, large but it has been trained to fight in the plains and has no proper training for counterinsurgency operations.
Then, “dying for a right cause or an infidel” characterizes martyrdom philosophy of the Pakistan army. There is also the obsession of military establishment of Pakistan with India as enemy #1 and so its support of non-state actors. The doctrine of strategic depth emanates from this fear. I believe Pakistan army also suffers from the trauma of separation of East Pakistan where partly army operations against secessionist groups fuelled popular resentment against military-bureaucratic elite of West Pakistan. The civilian institutions are weak, dysfunctional and corrupt. Pakistan is also socially stratified, ethnically divided and now religiously polarized society.
So, in face of these facts, diplomats and policy makers, who raise an alarm on the rise of Taliban, are perhaps right. The factors narrated above reportedly forced government to sign peace deal in Swat. Army was losing its men. There were also reports of desertions in the Pakistan army as army personnel found it hard to fight against their own countrymen. There is also talk in the media that the army could have trounced Taliban in Swat by allying itself with anti-Taliban groups. But, on the contrary, while it stood on the sidelines, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Movement of Pakistan Taliban) butchered and killed local militias and Barelvis( during British colonial rule of India ,Muslim hardliners were divided into two groups: Deobandis who were for rigorous and puritan Islam and Barelvis who worshipped saints and were less rigorous in the interpretation of Islam)Thus, the conduct of army raises suspicions.
Awami National Party, the civilian government of North West Frontier Province, is the avowed secular party. But ANP supported the peace deal with Taliban as its entire leadership was threatened by Taliban militants. Mr. Asfand Yar Wali, the chairman of ANP, now resides in Islamabad as his ancestral house was bombed by the militants. Similarly, many ANP leaders and workers were kidnapped and often shot by the militants. Therefore, the party that got votes in the elections to end religious extremism has ended up signing peace deal with the militants.
Taliban are also agile and seemingly shrewd planners. They gradually creep into new settlements; disarm the local militias; exploit local class and sectarian resentments; and band with local extremist religious leadership. Then, after fortifying their positions, they find ways to finance their operations which are mostly kidnappings for ransom and occupying property of wealthier people of that settlement through force. They did this in Swat. And recently are employing the same tactics in Buner, a district closer to Swat.
We should not shrug off the statements of Senator Kerry that “Pakistan is in peril” and that of Secretary of State that “Taliban poses mortal threat to Pakistan”. Diplomats and should not just sit around and predict that Pakistan’s army can hold itself together. After all, East Pakistan also ceded in spite of large army. But, then luckily or unluckily (whichever side you are) India separated both portions. Now, the militants have the befit of geographic contiguity.
And regarding question# 3, though the scenario painted can provide a plot of a good thriller, the need is to stem the tide of Anti-Americanism by understanding the forces feeding it. Pakistanis suffer from split personality disorder: they love Americans and they hate Americans. They hate Gitmo, Abu Gharaib, and drone attacks. But they also love symbols, sights and sounds of USA. And their latest love story is President Obama. Let’s see how long the love lasts.
I agree with the official US position that India doesn't constitute an existential threat to Pakistan in the sense that India doesn't wish to actively engineer the demise of Pakistan as an international actor. Even if it wished to do so, in terms of overruning its territory, the presence of nuclear deterrenece would prevent that. Indian decision makers indirectly acknowledge this factor. Hence India's decision not to cross the LoC in 1999 and cause a vivisection of Pakistan. India cannot do a 1971 to Pakistan. This assessment, my friend is based on a realist take. Also, India is reconciled to the existence of Pakistan as a neighbour. Yes, India is a threat to Pakistan - to its regional aspirations and its influence but not in existential terms. India is not an existential threat to Pak in the way the Arab states were to Israel in the 1950s and 60s. That's the imort of the US admin now.
I hope you appreciate these nuances.
'Pakis' is a derogatory term - avoid it. I am surprised your stupendous theoretical knowledge doesn't inform you of it
But they also love symbols, sights and sounds of USA. And their latest love story is President Obama. Let’s see how long the love lasts.
What is "love" and "hate" to do with IR?
We have a theory in circulation here to explain IR. Are you proposing a new theory where "love/hate" are terms of your theory?
Bring your theory!
The reality on the gound in that region concist of the following:
There exists a corrupt state which doesn't functions as a State any more.
This corrupt State has WMDs in her possession.
This corrupt State is challenged by an armed group legally establishing herself within the jurisdiction of the corrupt State.
This challenging group may legally inherit WMDs by taking over the corrupt State.
The corrupt State has historic relations with the EUS.
What must be the stand of the EUS to protect her National Interest in such a development?
My advice is : Do not take sides, especially do not take the side of the corrupt State.
This is a typical case where possessing WMDs doesn't help to solve the political problem. A similar case is the Israel-Palestine issue. Do not be on the side of Israel just because they have the WMDs. Like Pakistan Israel is also falling out of the standards(?!) of the Imaginary State;->
I mean within the standards(?!) of the Imaginary State, Palestinians are going to inherit the WMDs;->>
Don't support corrupt States, they collapse on you;->
Grand Sen~or.
I was referring to the thesis of Prof. Walt that the rising tide of Anti-Americanism needs to be stemmed so as to obviate the possibility of WMDs falling into the hands of terrorists.
Anti-Americanism can be turned around by properly understanding the dynamics feeding these sentiments. In the recent past, Bush administration’s unwavering support of President Mushraff- a military dictator- and the policies pursued in the wake of war on terror, such as abductions of citizens of Pakistan and their deportation to foreign prisons for interrogations, caused Anti-American sentiments in Pakistan. The point was that people of Pakistan harbor Anti-American sentiments for some genuine reasons and as per se don’t dislike Americans. They like American movies, American universities, American newspapers and magazines and, most recently, President Obama’s ascendancy on the USA’s political horizon has increased their fascination with the American model of democracy.
The threat of militancy in Pakistan can only be met by serious and realistic evaluation of factors contributing to its rise. And that requires engagement with civilian as well as military leaderships and going beyond the labels of “corrupt state” and “failed state”.
We need rational solutions. One possible solution to prevent radicalization of Pakistan army is by forging closer relations between US and Pakistan military establishments. Of course, that can be done by training middle- level military leadership of Pakistan in US military academies.
If enough people become convinced the rebels will win, they will stop supporting the government and may even switch sides, thereby create a self-reinforcing snowball of revolutionary momentum.
One thing to remember with this type of discussion is the Pakistani secular elite, who largely control the cities and form most of the governing elites. Don't under-estimate their power and capabilities - this is, in part, why I don't think Pakistan itself will collapse.
What I think is more likely is that Pakistan will fragment again, just like how it fragmented back in the 1970s when "East Pakistan" (now Bangladesh) successfully revolted. The FATA and NWFP are largely Pashtun areas, as compared to the Punjabis and Sindhis that make up most of the population of Pakistan.
I could easily see a situation in which most of the NWFP, Balochistan, and the FATA all essentially break off from Pakistani central government control and end up under the wing of the Taliban. That would leave a rump Pakistani state in Sindh and Punjab constantly fighting off Taliban raids near its borders, as well as domestic Islamists within, a state that would be heavily dependent on foreign aid. Islamabad would be screwed under this situation, since it is right on the border area between the NWFP and the Punjab, and while the Taliban probably can't take control of it outright, they could make it highly dangerous for the people in it.
So instead of its traditional goal of trying to weaken Pakistan, you'd think India would be going to considerable lengths to shore up the Zadari government.
What can they do? The Pakistani government, as always, doesn't trust them.
New Delhi ought to be looking for ways to allow Pakistan's armed forces to reorient their attention away from India and towards the real danger. This wouldn't a concession on India's part; it would be a smart strategy.
This, by and large, won't happen for one reason: Kashmir. The Pakistanis won't re-orient away from India as long as Kashmir is in contestation, and the Indians aren't going to give it up (not least of which is because there are lots of Hindus there, too). Don't expect much foreign help on that issue as well, since the Indians bristle at any foreign attempts to "mediate" the Kashmir dispute (as Daniel Larison described it, it would be like China trying to mediate a settlement between the US and Mexico over a contested New Mexico).
n a perfect world, the United States would quietly establish connections to key figures within Pakistan's armed forces and work out arrangements for the U.S. (or conceivably some third party) to airlift the weapons out if it looked like bad guys might get their hands on them.
That might be the case, but keep in mind that the Pakistani military is suspicious that the US will seize their nukes, then get the hell out of dodge and abandon Pakistan to its fate.
I assume that everyone has read Kaplan's excellent article The Revenge of Geography which gives a nice overview of this area. The United States bears a fair bit of blame for the current state of Pakistan, but ultimately, the country is a wholly artificial creation. Islam lacks the cohesion to bind it. It's a place that is crying out of for land reform, but we have instead strengthened a thoroughly corrupt military. The idea that the military can't fight the insurgents is silly -these insurgents are trained by the military. It just makes good tactical sense to roll over and play "failed state".
And about getting India involved? "Forget it,Jake. It's Chinatown".
By the way, prof. Walt, I hope that the picture above is not intended to accompany the Pakistan story/argument. The picture has been clearly taken in India. The people in the background are wearing Maharashtra police uniforms (along with the caps); I would guess that they are Mumbai police constables (and I would guess that it is the CRPF or central reserve police force of India in the foreground)
Maybe Professor foresee ( a premonition ) a united PAK-IND-AF in that region safe-guarding WMDs in one hand;->>
Why not just imagine a new nation with corresponding imagined State, nothing holds Powerful States like the US to divide or unite other minor powered States.
You see in the first place if they didn't divide to rule, they wouldn't have this problem to rule today;->>
That reminds me to update the following axiom of the SATFP as;->
12. Powerful States to rule or protect or increase their National Interests divide/unite less powerful states ad infinitum/universal.
Grand Sen~or.
Pakistan is more a mystery than a problem
The basic problem with Pakistan is that the political leadership lack a clear stragey to deal with the challenge at hand. To be more precise they even diagree on what the challenge is: is it Islamic fundamentalism or violent terrorism; is it Sharia or Sharia implemented by extremists; is it peace deals with militants or drone attacks aganist them. We have not been able to suggest a proper solution for Pakistan because discrepancy exists on what the problem is.
http://thetrajectory.com/blogs/?p=444
I believe truly, being a Pakistani, that these militants, who were at peace living in oblivion in Swat and Malakand area one decade ago, are being backed by the foreign powers to destabilize Pakistan. Most of those writers, writing frequently on Talibans and Pakistan, have hardly visited the Swat valley and FATA to get to the bottom of the matter. The best way of collecting pieces of information is to read the newspapers and talk to someone in the US Security Establishment whose mindset is already anti-Pakistan.
I believe that the creeping Talibanisation is being backed by India and Afghanistan. The other part of the conspiracy is to hype the clamour of nukes falling in the hands of rogues; this is what the foreign media is doing (sorry to write this).
One must take into consideration the statement of Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State, that the US contributed along with Pakistan to create Talibs (to win the proxy war against Russia, but left Pakistan alone. This statement made four days ago is enough to prove that the US is also responsible for this mess of Talibans.
As far as the question about India is concerned, our intelligence agencies have proofs of India`s involvement into worsening the situation in Pakistan; like the Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) used in the attack on the Sri Lankan team in Lahore, Punjab, was Indian manufactured. Because this RPG is owned by the US, NATO, Israel and India and the terrorists organization in Pakistan do not have this weapon. Pakistani security establishment needs not to change their view against India, the way the US wants,New Delhi is a nettled friend of Pakistan which wants to win the proxy war against Pakistan.
If the US wants to safe Pakistan, it should pressure India to close the safe houses of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the premier intelligence agency of New Delhi, alongside the border of Afghanistan with Pakistan, from where it launches Talibs in Pakistan. If there are Indo-Pak confidence building measures on terrorists, both the countries can live in peace and hence the US will not be worried.
I will explain further if some one asks, but one must read the problems in deep details to get to the root of the problems instead of giving lopsided view of Talibs and Pakistan.
Thanks.
To J. Thomas in particular,
Watch this video from an intellectually honest Pakistani journalist:
http://www.cnn.com/video/?/video/world/2009/04/19/gps.ahmed.rashid.intv.cnn
And Holbrooke
http://www.cnn.com/video/?/video/bestoftv/2009/04/19/gps.richard.holbrooke.int.cnn
It's obvious that when it comes to fighting the Taliban, the Pakistanis have a new strategy:
only one side fights at a time.
It's quite obvious to anyone who knows anything about these guys that they negotiate by pointing a gun to their head. Like their role models, the NoKoreans, who, when the aid runs low, threaten to restart their nuclear activities or fire off a few ***dongs across the Pacific, these guys, the Pakistanis, create a panic about Taliban takeover.
The current crisis is obviously being stage-managed by the army for several objectives:
1) Scare the world into coughing up more baksheesh, i.e, aid.
2) Tell the world, esp. US, that democracy will not prevent the hoi-polloi from taking over. Only the army can guarantee security. This was Musharaffs strategy : apres-moi, le deluge...
3) Scare the crap out of the "mainstream" Pakistanis in big Punjabi and Sindhi cities. At the end they need the army to fight the barbarians at the gate.
4) Build up their own "good Taliban" forces. In dem parts, the talibunnies switch sides faster than the pakistani army surrenders or skiis downhill. Who is this Sufi Mohammed? Muslim Khan? Never heard of them before. Obvious plants by the Army and ISI to lure away the "bad Taliban", like Mehsud, who seems to have turned against the state. On top of that, they have made ominous pronouncements about civilian lawyers being "un-islamic" if they don't work for the sharia courts. My feeling is that what happened to the shia doctors over the past 20 years (random killings) is about happen to lawyers. That will end any agitation from them, provide revenge for the army, and pave the way for another military coup with American and urban Pakistani blessings.
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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