Moises Naim offers a characteristically outside-the-box
solution to the gridlock that is currently stifling global problem-solving.
Instead of pursuing the Holy Grail of multilateralism and giving all states an
equal voice in global deliberations, he suggests we "forget about trying to get
the planet's nearly 200 countries to agree." Instead, he writes, "we should
bring to the table the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the
largest possible impact on solving a particular problem." He dubs this new
approach "minilateralism."
Need I point out that this is a decidedly realist approach? Realists
have always emphasized the role of power and argued that the agenda of world
politics -- including the prospects for meaningful cooperation -- depends mostly
on the actions of the major powers. If they are on board, progress is at least
possible; if a sufficient number are opposed, prospects for cooperative
solutions are dim. This reality does not
mean that minor states have no influence at all; nor does it imply that the
great powers can simply dictate to the rest. It simply reminds us that powerful states exert more influence on
average than weaker states do, and obtaining their assent is a necessary and in some cases sufficient condition
for meaningful progress. You know the line: "the strong do what they can and
the weak suffer what they must."
And that's why "minilateralism" will work in some contexts
but not in others. In some issue-areas,
agreement among the major powers can lead to cooperative arrangements that weak
states must either accept if they wish to obtain the benefits of participation.
As Lloyd Gruber argued in his excellent book Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational
Institutions, strong states are sometimes able to force weaker states to
accept institutional arrangements that were less-than-optimal from the weaker
actors' point of view, because being in a sub-optimal arrangement was still preferable
to being entirely excluded. If the G20 established new rules governing global
trade and finance, for example, most states might be inclined to go along with
these rules even if they disagreed with certain aspects and resented being
excluded from the negotiating process, because remaining outside the framework
would leave them even worse off.
Unfortunately, "minilateralism" won't do much for us when
the most important powers disagree, and that list includes some pretty
significant issues. The main obstacle
to a global agreement on climate change isn't getting Palau, Thailand,
Luxembourg or Ecuador on board; the real problem is that the interests of some
of the world's largest economies (and biggest emitters of greenhouse gases) are
sharply at odds. To take the most obvious example, China and India both want
some sort of exclusion that will enable them to continue to develop
economically, but the U.S. Senate isn't going to approve a climate deal that imposes
stiff limits on the developed world but not on them. On this issue (and others),
going "minilateral" won't solve the problem.
Implicit in Moises's proposal is another important piece of
advice: states really ought to stop making lofty feel-good pledges that they
don't intend to keep. The failure of
ambitious multilateral agreements like the Millennium Declaration or the Kyoto
Protocol is regrettable in part because worthy goals aren't met, but also
because repeated failures of this sort undermine confidence in all global
institutions. Adopting less ambitious targets and actually achieving them will do
a lot more for humanity than symbolic declarations that soon fall by the
wayside. In short, Moises is reminding
us to be realistic, and who am I to disagree?
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