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WAR OF IDEAS
Has the U.S. Reached Peak Car?
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KILLER APPS
Cyberspies Are Using PRISM for Spearphishing
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PASSPORT
Remembering Michael Hastings
Posted By Stephen M. Walt
Monday, July 27, 2009 - 5:53 PM
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Since Barack Obama became president back in January, his administration has launched a dizzying array of foreign policy initiatives. They've "pushed the reset button" with Russia, gotten serious about a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians, and doubled down in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Obama has extended an open-hand to Iran, made a major speech to the Muslim world, pressed ahead on climate change, and talked about major reductions in nuclear arsenals. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Vice President Joe Biden added a few more items to the agenda just last week, suggesting that the United States might extend a security umbrella in the Middle East should Iran develop nuclear weapons, reaffirming U.S. security commitments in South and South-east Asia, and cozying up (a bit gingerly) to controversial Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili. And Clinton’s earlier speech to the Council on Foreign Relations made it clear that she thinks that nothing much is going to get done without active U.S. involvement (while noting that the United States couldn’t do it all alone).
On the one hand, these initiatives (and Obama's own charisma) have gone some distance toward repairing America's tarnished international image. A recent survey by the Pew Global Attitudes Project showed a significant improvement in America's image around the world, and especially among U.S. allies in Europe. Chalk one up for a democratic system: holding regular elections does allow a country to get rid of incompetent leaders and hope for something better.
But the fact that more people around the world have a "favorable" impression of the United States does not mean that their governments are going to roll over and give Washington whatever it wants. Indeed, there are already signs that Obama’s ambitious agenda is facing significant resistance. India and China are not on board with Obama's proposals for a climate change agreement, which means that the entire project is in jeopardy. The Afghan and Pakistani governments are expressing reservations about U.S. strategy in Central Asia, and the past record suggests that neither government will play straight with Washington when dealing with the jihadi issue. North Korea remains defiant and Iran shows no sign of succumbing to Obama's charm offensive. Israel is digging in its heels on settlements and America's Arab friends are reluctant to begin normalizing relations with Israel in the absence of genuine (as opposed to rhetorical) progress towards a two-state solution. Even the Europeans stiffed the administration on its proposals for coordinating responses to the economic crisis, and key NATO allies are doing less in Afghanistan even as the United States does more. Trouble spots like Somalia or Sudan remain as intractable as ever, and I haven't even mentioned drug violence in Mexico or anti-Americanism in other parts of Latin America.
Moreover, trying to advance the ball on so many different fronts simultaneously carries its own risks. In particular, it provides governments that are opposed to some or all of Washington's agenda with an obvious way to respond: they can "just say no." In Taming American Power, I labeled this strategy "balking," (a term suggested to me by Seyom Brown) and I argued that it was a common way for weak states to prevent a dominant power from imposing its will. In a world where the United States remains significantly stronger than any other power, few states want to get into a direct test of strength with Washington. But American power is not so vast that it can simply snap its fingers and expect everyone to do its bidding.
Why? Because exercising leverage is itself costly, and the more you do in one area, the more latitude that opponents somewhere else are likely to have. There are still only 24 hours in a day, and the White House can't devote equal attention and political capital to every issue. So states that don’t want to do what Obama wants can delay, dither, obfuscate, drag their feet, or just say no, knowing that the United States doesn’t have the resources, attention span, staying power, or political will to force their compliance now or monitor it afterwards.
An even better tactic (perfected by a number of close U.S. allies) is to pretend to comply with American wishes while blithely going ahead with their own agendas. So NATO allies promise to increase their defense efforts but never manage to do much; Israel promises to stop building settlements but somehow the number of illegal settlers keeps growing, the Palestinians pledge to reform but make progress at a glacial pace, Pakistan suppresses jihadis with one hand and subsidizes them with the other, Iran agrees to negotiate but continues to enrich, China says it will crack down on copyright violations but the problem remains pervasive, and so on.
In On War, Carl von Clausewitz famously described what he termed the "friction" of warfare; the accumulated set of minor obstacles and accidents that made even the simplest of objectives difficult to achieve. The same problem can arise in foreign policy: even when everything is simple, "the simplest things are very difficult." States that oppose what the United States is trying to do have lots of ways of increasing that friction without triggering an actual crisis. In other words, Obama's foreign policy may fail not because he loses some dramatic confrontation, but simply because a whole array of weaker actors manage to grind him down. In this scenario he doesn't get vanquished, just "nibbled to death by ducks."
Obama took office with energy, a new vision, an experienced team, and lengthy "to-do" list. But one can already sense the forward motion slowing, which will encourage opponents to dig their heels in deeper and throw more obstacles in his path. If the administration keeps trying to do everything at once, there is a real danger that their actual foreign policy achievements will be quite modest. The sooner they decide which goals they think they can actually bring off, and focus their energies there, the more likely they are to succeed. And a few tangible successes now might actually make the other items on their agenda easier to accomplish later on.
Mark Wilson/Getty Images
opponents are within USG -- a thousand cuts
At least a 100 cuts -- one for each senator.
e.g. After the F-22 victory for the Admin., the military-industrial-congressional complex wants to have its way with Missile defense and RRW -- even though these are technically stupid initiatives that only serve contractors and senate rep's bringing $ to states:
http://www.boston.com/news/local/connecticut/articles/2009/07/27/senate_warns_against_concessions_on_nuclear_treaty/
Senate warns against concessions on nuclear treaty
By Jim Abrams, Associated Press Writer | July 27, 2009
WASHINGTON --The Senate is making it clear to the Obama administration that it will look askance at concessions, particularly on missile defense, that the United States might make to conclude a new nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia.
In several resolutions included in a defense budget bill passed late Thursday, the Senate went on record endorsing a missile defense system being considered for Eastern Europe that Russia detests, and warning against any arms treaty with Russia that puts limits on that system.
President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, meeting in Moscow earlier this month, set a goal of reducing strategic warheads by about a third, to a range of 1,500 to 1,675. The intent would be to come up with a nuclear arms reduction pact to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which expires Dec. 5.
But treaties must be ratified by 67 senators or two-thirds of those present, giving the Senate's 40 Republicans, with their traditional advocacy of a strong nuclear deterrent, rare leverage.
Sens. Jon Kyl, R-Ariz., and Jeff Sessions, R-Ala., won voice approval Thursday of a nonbinding "sense of the Senate" resolution that the START follow-on treaty not include limits on ballistic missile defense, space capabilities or advanced conventional weapons. It also called on the president to report on the administration's plans to enhance the safety, security and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons.
On another voice vote, the Senate endorsed a resolution by Sessions and Sen. Joe Lieberman, I-Conn., expressing support for a ground-based midcourse missile defense (GMD) system in Poland and the Czech Republic. Alternative sites should be considered only if they are equally capable of protecting the United States and Europe from future long-range Iranian missiles, it said.
Lieberman said the resolutions "are our way of sending a message both to the administration and to the Russians." He said he is open to options other than Poland and the Czech Republic as sites for a missile defense system, including missile defense cooperation with Russia, but "not at the cost of in any way diminishing our security."
Obama has made no final decision on proceeding with the Poland-Czech plan, proposed during the George W. Bush administration. Russian leaders say deployment of a missile defense system in Eastern Europe is a direct threat to their country. They suggested that progress on an arms agreement could hinge on the U.S. giving up its missile defense plan.
Sessions said he was concerned the administration was pursuing alternatives to the Poland-Czech proposal "as part of a grand strategy to reset relations with Russia and conclude a follow-on to the START nuclear reduction agreement."
He said he was baffled by Russian "bluster."
"Perhaps this is a way they think they can extract concessions from the United States as a bargaining chip," Sessions said.
Conservatives would not be overly concerned about the numbers in a new arms reduction treaty if the administration doesn't look like it is abandoning missile defense and other areas such as weapons development, said Stephen Flanagan, an international security specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Another factor is that the urgency Cold War arms talks had no longer exists, said Gary Schmitt, director of advanced strategic studies at the American Enterprise Institute.
"The Obama administration can overestimate how much momentum there is for doing anything in this area," Schmitt said.
Schmitt said senators will question any treaty that comes to them before the Pentagon completes a congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review. That report on nuclear threats and deterrent capabilities is due by the end of 2010.
"There are chances of ratification," said Ariel Cohen, senior research fellow and Russia expert at the Heritage Foundation, "provided the administration does not capitulate" on the European defense system.
In 1999, during the Clinton administration, the Senate rejected the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty after its supporters couldn't muster even a simple majority.
Senators contended the treaty, which the United States informally abides by, lacked adequate means of verification. Obama has expressed interest in trying to get it ratified by the Senate.
On the one hand, these initiatives (and Obama's own charisma) have gone some distance toward repairing America's tarnished international image. A recent survey by the Pew Global Attitudes Project showed a significant improvement in America's image around the world, and especially among U.S. allies in Europe. Chalk one up for a democratic system: holding regular elections does allow a country to get rid of incompetent leaders and hope for something better.
This is a tendentious statement and implies that U.S allies in Europe like us based on our leaders' competency. This is obviously not the case. The fact is, our leaders should be acting in our interests, which will sometimes cause the Europeans to not like us.
A realist should be analyzing the merits of specific policies, not making broad generalizations based on how the Europeans feel.
You mean, like cutting off all funding for Israel?
What has Israel done for me lately worth $5billion/year?
In other words, Obama badly needs at least one foreign policy success, because, despite a lot of hype, every one of his initiatives has so far been a failure, other than in getting Western Europeans to like us better, and therefore making it more pleasant for US liberals to go on their summer holidays.
These failures, combined with the millions of jobs lost under his administration so far, have pushed his approval ratings under 50% and will almost certainly combine to make him into a Carter clone unless things change drastically.
e.g. After the F-22 victory for the Admin., the military-industrial-congressional complex wants to have its way with Missile defense and RRW -- even though these are technically stupid initiatives that only serve contractors and senate rep's bringing $ to states:
A number of the Missile Defense technologies have actually done quite well in testing - the Aegis system, for example, has had a number of good hits.
As for the Reliable Replacement Warhead, something like it is an inevitability. Nuclear warheads don't last forever, and the current ones are at least 20 years old.
Sens. Jon Kyl, R-Ariz., and Jeff Sessions, R-Ala., won voice approval Thursday of a nonbinding "sense of the Senate" resolution that the START follow-on treaty not include limits on ballistic missile defense, space capabilities or advanced conventional weapons.
Good. I don't see why our technical capabilities for response should be inhibited just because the Russians made a poor choice in choosing to build the next generation of ICBMs rather than refurbishing their SSBN fleet or building a new fleet of strategic bombers.
They suggested that progress on an arms agreement could hinge on the U.S. giving up its missile defense plan.
That's what they're saying now. They keep fluctuating back and forth between that and a position where they say, "We're not going to trade for something for a nuclear drawdown".
Missile defense has not had one realistic test with countermeasures in a surprise setting.
It is not ready for primetime. Test it first. REALISTICALLY.
Here is what many Nobel Laureates have to say -- I'll go with them:
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/scientists-letter-to-obama.pdf
Missile defense, like the F-22, will be hard to kill as it yields a lot of $$$$ for contractors and for the Pentagon. (Can you say “Raytheon”?) But it is an absolute technical and political boondoggle — make no mistake.
Aegis is OK technically -- but not against countermeasures.
Unfortunately, our pork-friendly senate will make sure taxpayer money keeps flowing to Raytheon and other contractors and military establishments in various other states.
Minimum wage earners are being taxed so that Raytheon fat-cats can sell us a system that does not work and has never been tested realistically — and even if it did it would do diddly-squat for a truck or boat nuke.
The real danger of missile defense is that our future political leaders may actually think it works and implement provocative policies which, even if they don’t invite a real test of the system, may result in some asymmetrical responses for which a missile defense is totally ineffective.
A leaky missile defense system — and all such defenses will be leaky at some level — would likely encourage Iran to build even more missiles and nukes (to be sure that some got through the ineffective “defense”) and to perfect other method of delivering the warhead (e.g. via boat, truck, from a ship via a SRBM, or via a cruise missile…etc…).
Missile defense is subject to the “Fallacy of the Last Move.”
Now, the untested RRW plan is plain stupid.
I do not buy the argument for making new (supposedly "more reliable") nuclear warheads - allegedly without ever testing them.
First off, there is nothing wrong with the current warheads. Hello? They are safe, secure, and reliable, and experts and relevant government agencies agree that their nuclear components will be just fine for the next roughly 70 years.
In fact, the preoccupation with reliability misses the point: The inherently psychological deterrent value of massively destructive nuclear weapons is not proportional to their reliability, which is about 98 percent for the current warheads. Since it's being advertised that the new warheads would be fielded without testing, how will we ever know their true reliability? In fact, for this reason, in the eyes of an adversary, untested new warheads may even hold marginally less deterrent value than the current tested ones.
Yet if the proposed new warheads have to be tested, they would break the worldwide moratorium on testing, making it more difficult to stop other nations from doing the same. As far as US security is concerned, the proposed program to develop new nuclear warheads is a lose-lose proposition.
Let's put it this way: Would you fly on an airliner that had never had a test flight, even though its aerodynamics may be well understood? So why would you -- or more importantly our enemies -- believe untested new weapons would work better than the tested ones we have?
On the other hand, if the proposed RRWs are eventually tested, it will be more difficult to stop other adversarial nations from doing the same. Either way, the RRW program is detrimental to U.S. security vis-à-vis proliferation and deterrence calculus.
Missile defense has not had one realistic test with countermeasures in a surprise setting.
Bullshit.
Here is what many Nobel Laureates have to say -- I'll go with them:
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/scientists-letter-to-obama.pdf
Who cares what a bunch of nobel laureates say about the program? Were they involved?
Missile defense, like the F-22, will be hard to kill as it yields a lot of $$$$ for contractors and for the Pentagon. (Can you say “Raytheon”?) But it is an absolute technical and political boondoggle — make no mistake.
I'm not the one making the mistake. That would be you.
Aegis is OK technically -- but not against countermeasures.
Wrong. And I notice you've been rather evasive on what these "counter-measures" are.
The truth is that discrimination systems have been outpacing counter-measures for a while now. The modern SAMs, for example, aren't fooled by anything short of towed decoys these days, and that's changing.
A leaky missile defense system — and all such defenses will be leaky at some level — would likely encourage Iran to build even more missiles and nukes (to be sure that some got through the ineffective “defense”) and to perfect other method of delivering the warhead (e.g. via boat, truck, from a ship via a SRBM, or via a cruise missile…etc…).
Once you build the basic facilities, it is relatively easy to rapidly scale up the number of interceptors available for use. That's part of the reason why Obama's slash in funding for GBI was so idiotic - the facilities had already been largely built, but now they were going to sit empty.
Besides, ABM isn't just for stopping a full-spectrum attack; it's designed to prevent accidental attacks as well. Meaning that if, say, the Chinese or Russians were to accidently fire an ICBM at the US, the US could shoot it down and wait to see if they followed up, rather than simply responding to the destruction of a US city.
As for "other methods", that's the point - the destroy the viability of long-range missiles as a delivery mechanism for nuclear warheads. Missile technology has gotten far too cheap and widespread, and greatly weakening it with ABM pushes the ball back into the US's court (since we can afford to build fleets of bombers and SSBNs).
First off, there is nothing wrong with the current warheads. Hello? They are safe, secure, and reliable, and experts and relevant government agencies agree that their nuclear components will be just fine for the next roughly 70 years.
Name one who will say that the whole warhead is viable for 70 years (and I'm not talking about the nuclear material in the warhead - I'm talking about the warhead itself). If you quote the Center for Defense Information I'll laugh my ass off.
Since it's being advertised that the new warheads would be fielded without testing, how will we ever know their true reliability?
All the more reason for allowing under-ground nuclear testing (and preventing the ratification of that idiotic Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty).
who cares what a bunch of Nobel laureates say....
"who cares what a bunch of Nobel laureates say..."
Nice....hahahahaha!!
Well, I would imagine a lot more people
than care what you say.
THAT is for sure.
Don't know hat Countermeasures are? -- of course not, you must have drunk the missile defense kool-aid:
http://www.aps.org/policy/reports/popa-reports/nmd.cfm
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/missile_defense/technical_issues/countermeasures-video-a.html
How about tumbling warheads and the stupid Euro "shield"?
http://www.thebulletin.org/files/064002009.pdf
"Name one who will say that the whole warhead is viable for 70 years..."
hmmmmmmm...let us see...how about the NNSA and the JASON group dumbass?
http://www.nukewatch.org/facts/nwd/JASON_ReportPuAging.pdf
Get a life man.
If you are ignorant of technical details, might I suggest you STFU?
It is fine to think technology can save you from everything -- especially if you are not a scientist or engineer, as some of us are.
"who cares what a bunch of Nobel laureates say..."
Nice....hahahahaha!!
Well, I would imagine a lot more people
than care what you say.
Hey dumbshit, if I quote a Nobel Prize winner in Economics on whether or not String Theory is accurate, wouldn't I be just as full of shit as you are now?
http://www.aps.org/policy/reports/popa-reports/nmd.cfm
Do you even read your own links? That report said nothing about whether or not counter-measures were effective - it was all about how they wanted flexibility in examining the technical aspects of Nuclear Missile Defense, and that they wanted the reports on Boost-Intercept to be declassified.
http://www.nukewatch.org/facts/nwd/JASON_ReportPuAging.pdf
Hey fuckwit, did you actually read that report before citing it from god-know-where? It talks about the aging of the plutonium (which I'm not disputing), not about the aging and viability of the warheads. Try again.
Get a life man.
That's pretty rich coming from someone who always seems to have the time to bust out ten million posts (several of them cookie-cutter essays) whenever Walt brings up Israel.
Physicists are smarter than you
remember who got to the bottom of the challenger disaster? Richard Feynman -- a theoretical physicist.
Dumbass
remember who got to the bottom of the challenger disaster? Richard Feynman -- a theoretical physicist.
Dumbass
Did you forget the part about how Feynman was part of a commission that received a whole host of reports on the problem, including from the rocket people at Thiokol who came up with the engines? Do you have any proof, any at all, that these guys were involved in anything similar?
dont forget the cold civil war in america...
the govt isnt a monolith that's being nibbled at only by foreign ducks... maybe there are factions within the government itself that are working against each other.
that's where asimov and his theory of government by psychohistorians (the foundation books) fell down: asimov didnt take it far enough... (i admit i could never read asimov's books... that is, read them a dozen times apiece... i must have read some of his stuff, but it was such a chore that i didnt live inside the books for weeks at a time)
donald kingsbury wrote a peculiar book that took the idea of psychohistory farther, and the main point, that asimov apparently overlooked, is that factions will develop within the guild of psychohistorians, and these factions will begin counterpredicting each other and nullify each others' predictions and covert actions.
what develops is stagnation, gridlock, decay, "cold civil war" and eventually, overt rebellion.
Asimov's "Foundation" novels — the most famous science-fiction trilogy between "Lord of the Rings" and "Star Wars" — described a new science of social behavior called psychohistory. Mixing psychology with math, psychohistory hijacked the methods of physics to precisely predict the future course of human events.
Today, Asimov's vision is no longer wholly fiction. His psychohistory exists in a loose confederation of research enterprises seeking equations that capture patterns in human behavior. These enterprises go by different names and treat different aspects of the issue. But they all share a goal of better understanding the present in order to foresee the future, and possibly help shape it.
Asimov's ‘Foundation’ theories on society move from fiction to academia Jewish World Review July 16, 2004
so aumann gets a nobel prize for his game theory (are aumann's crays behind the constant stream of lies that are supposedly intended to preserve israel by suckering america into fighting israel's wars?) three days after elbaradei gets the nobel peace prize for sticking to his guns despite the overwhelming volume of lies pumped out by the zionist media... lies that eventually got america into war with iraq.
anyhow, due to whatever factors, the israeli american AEI/PNAC psychohistorians' project is not turning out so pretty good... so the psychohistorians have to junk their computers and go back to the drawing board, and revert back to "might makes right"... which requires abandoning even the pretense of morals...
and here we are, bereft of "benevolent global hegemony"... which is probably, at the root, bill kristol's euphemism for the global guild of psychohistorians who, in the best of all possible neocon worlds, would be covertly running everything.
thank goodness these wars will enhance the fallback position: looting.
the basic ideas of government by psychohistory...
1. you must have a reasonably truthful account of history... these accounts of history will be used to test and calibrate mathematical expressions that are developed to predict and manipulate human behavior... aka, "future history".
2. you need sophisticated mathematical descriptions of human behavior.
3. if your history is truthful and your math is sophisticated enough, you can predict trends in mass human behavior, although you will still be unable to predict behavior of individual humans.
4. you can spot unwanted trends in mass human behavior hundreds of years before they become problems, and head them off with a minimum and undetectable application of force.
5. your predictions and even the guild of psychohistorians itself must be kept secret, lest the resistance counterpredict and nullify your predictions.
6. the public will be fed lies tailored to produce the desired response.
.
so given the value of truthful accounts of history, it's probable that there are historians that know the whole story of, for instance, 9/11.
the chance of the truth being acknowledged by any of the responsible parties approaches zero.
anyhow, it seems likely that many of the ducks...
doing the nibbling are americans who despise the neocons and their works.
The following scientists and engineers say Missile defense is untested and unwise -- yet we are still considering it!:
see the full letter:
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/scientists-letter-to-obama.pdf
John Ahearne #
Lecturer in Public Policy Studies, Duke University
Philip W. Anderson *
Joseph Henry Professor of Physics Emeritus, Princeton University
Nobel Laureate in Physics
Lewis M. Branscomb #
Aetna Professor in Public Policy and Corporate Management, Emeritus; Harvard University, John F.
Kennedy School of Government
Val L. Fitch * +
Professor of Physics, Princeton University
Nobel Laureate in Physics
Jerome I. Friedman * +
Institute Professor and Professor of Physics, MIT
Nobel Laureate in Physics
Richard L. Garwin * #
Adjunct Professor of Physics, Columbia University
National Medal of Science Laureate
Sheldon Lee Glashow *
Arthur G.B. Metcalf Professor of the Sciences, Boston University
Nobel Laureate in Physics
Kurt Gottfried
Professor of Physics Emeritus, Cornell University
David J. Gross * #
Professor of Physics, University of California, Santa Barbara
Nobel Laureate in Physics
David Hammer
J. Carlton Ward Professor of Nuclear Energy Engineering, Cornell University
Ernest Henley * +
Professor of Physics Emeritus, University of Washington
Daniel Kleppner + #
Lester Wolfe Professor of Physics, Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Leon Lederman *
Professor of Science, Illinois Institute of Technology
Nobel Laureate in Physics
Douglas D. Osheroff *
Professor of Physics and Applied Physics, Stanford University
Nobel Laureate in Physics
Norman F. Ramsey * + #
Higgins Professor of Physics, Emeritus, Harvard University
Nobel Laureate in Physics
Myriam Sarachik * +
Distinguished Professor of Physics, City College of the City University of New York
Andrew M. Sessler * +
Director Emeritus, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
George Trilling * +
Senior Faculty Physicist, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Steven Weinberg *
Jack S. Josey - Welch Foundation Chair in Science and Professor of Physics, University of Texas at
Austin
Nobel Laureate in Physics
Robert Wilson * #
Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics
Nobel Laureate in Physics
_________
* Member, National Academy of Sciences
# Member, National Academy of Engineering
+ Past President, American Physical Society
I can point out several of those, particularly physicists, who haven't actually worked on Missile Defense. Can you name any of them who have?
Dumbass, read my response above...and get a technical education.
Dumbass, read my response above...and get a technical education.
Presumably someone with a technical education would have enough literacy to read their own goddamn links.
I don't particularly give a shit about your appeal to authority. Why don't you show why I should give a shit about whether a bunch of Nobel Prize winners (including physicists) is relevant towards the viability of Missile Defense? Did they actually do a study on it, or did they just sign a petition that ended up being passed their way? Considering that it has a couple professors whose specialty is in "public policy" (whatever the fuck that means), I'm inclined to believe the latter.
I actually don't care whether you give a shit or not actually.
I just think your asinine posts are a useful foil for me to show my fellow citizens that any arguments for RRW and MDA are crap, and that they would reduce the security of the US.
Keep going buddy -- I mean dumbass -- you are doing really well in showing why RRW and MDA are stupid like their advocates.
I loved your quoting the test in which an interceptor was never even launched -- priceless. I could not have found that myself.
xoxoxoxox
I actually don't care whether you give a shit or not actually.
That's pretty fucking funny, considering that you bother to keep responding to my posts. And you tell me to get a life?
I loved your quoting the test in which an interceptor was never even launched -- priceless. I could not have found that myself.
Somehow, I'm not shocked that you missed the fucking point of the test - which showed that the detection system was being tested against counter-measures, and was able to discern against them.
Of course, why would I be shocked that a dumbass who confuses the life of the plutonium with that of the warhead would fail to understand such a simple point?
Keep it going. I find this quite amusing.
conflict of interest -- hello?
Yes, we should get people who are working on missile defense and getting paid $$$$$$$$$$ up the wazzoooo by US taxpayers to tell us if they think what they are doing is smart or whether they prefer virtuous and ethically-correct unemployment instead.
Another good idea, Dumbass.
I'm sure people who are working on missile defense are unbiased about how wonderful it is.
Read this from an expert:
http://www.thebulletin.org/files/064002009.pdf
Missile "Defense"[sic] is a hoax
Missile defense has not had one realistic test with countermeasures in a surprise setting.
Not one.
Never.
Anyone who disagrees please give me the name/date of the test.
Here's one example. Not that I expect that to satisfy you - you'll probably insist that it next show perfect interception rates as well as a "surprise setting" (whatever the fuck that means in terms of testing).
hahahahaha!
nice -- you made my point:
"No interceptor missile was fired in the test at the Pacific Missile Range Facility at Hawaii, which only involved the system's array of radar and optical sensors."
woohoo! some test!
go dumbass!
ice -- you made my point:
"No interceptor missile was fired in the test at the Pacific Missile Range Facility at Hawaii, which only involved the system's array of radar and optical sensors."
woohoo! some test!
Hey fuckwit, did you miss the part about the test being that of pitting their detection and discernment systems against counter-measures, and succeeding? You asked for a test against counter-measures, and I gave you one.
Of course, as I said, I don't expect you to simply concede the point, but it's good that you actually read the article to some degree. That puts my evaluation of your reading comprehension somewhere below that of a fifth grader, and above that of a recent illegal immigrant.
I'm sure Iran is quivering knowing that our MDA alleges that it can discern its own countermeasures without an actual test with an interceptor to test the real problem: the hand-off end-game discernment on the kill-vehicle.
This needs to be a red-team blue-team surprise test.
Let's see how that goes.
RRW is not needed -- current Pu pits have a lifetime >85 years:
http://www.nukewatch.org/facts/nwd/JASON_ReportPuAging.pdf
Hey asshole, that's talking about the plutonium in the warhead, not the lifetime of the warhead itself.
It is talking of the aging of Pu pit.
i.e. The physics-package of the warhead is fine for 1 century.
RRW would redesign the Physics package without ever testing it -- riiiiiight. A stupid idea which would REDUCE the credibility of our deterrent.
In case you are unaware (...it would clearly seem) we already have a warhead lifetime extension program (LEP) as well as a stockpile evaluation program (SEP) which has annually certified the warheads as being safe secure and reliable.
Use google before typing dumbass.
It is talking of the aging of Pu pit.
i.e. The physics-package of the warhead is fine for 1 century.
Go back and read your own goddamn report again - as I've mentioned, at least twice, it was talking about the aging of the plutonium. No mention on the aging of the components that make up the warhead.
Noted: you finally seem to listen in one of your later posts. Have a cookie.
Dumbass,
go to:
http://www.nukewatch.org/facts/nwd/JASON_ReportPuAging.pdf
and at the bottom of the page it says "pit lifetimes do not at present determine warhead lifetimes."
OK?
No redesign of the physics-package is needed.
The Pu pit of the weapon is A-OK.
If you want to learn more about the terms used I suggest you look at this URL before typing:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physics_package
We are already modifying other components of the warhead as needed at the NNSA. We do not need an RRW, that will be untested. It will HURT our deterrence.
Pu pits are fine -- no RRW needed
You obviously have no experience in nuclear engineering or physics.
We are already extending the life of the warheads -- the point is that Pu pits are fine so no new redesign of the physics-package is needed. At all.
We are already doing what you think we should be doing, dumbass.
By extending the “life,” or time that a weapon can safely and reliably remain in the stockpile without having to be replaced or removed, of a current weapon, NNSA is able to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent without producing new weapons or conducting new underground nuclear tests.
Not all weapons and types are the same. NNSA must develop individual life extension programs, sometimes referred to as LEPs, for each weapon type and develop specific solutions to extend the lifetime of each particular warhead or bomb. This includes identifying and correcting potential technical issues with each weapon, and then refurbishing and replacing certain components as necessary. Life extension efforts are intended to extend the lifetime of a warhead or warhead component for an additional 20 to 30 years.
Each facility in NNSA’s nuclear weapons complex contributes to the life extension process. The majority of the physical work on the warhead and bombs is carried out at the Pantex Plant and Y-12 National Security Complex. The Pantex Plant does assembly and disassembly of the warheads and bombs while the Y-12 National Security Complex manufactures, assembles, and disassembles certain key components. The Kansas City Plant’s main mission is to manufacture and procure non-nuclear key components.
The design laboratories – Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories – assess the health of the current stockpile, design the components and systems for the life extension program warheads and bombs, and certify the life extended models when they enter the stockpile.
The Nevada Test Site provides facilities and expertise for experiments used to assess the health of the current stockpile systems and to evaluate proposed component designs for life extension programs.
The Savannah River Site provides tritium gas, an essential and limited life material used in modern warheads.
B61 Life Extension Program
The B61 life extension program extended the life of the B61 Mods 7 and 11 for an additional 20 years by refurbishing the canned subassembly and replacing the associated seals, foam supports, cables and connectors, washers, o-rings, and limited life components.
W76 Life Extension Program
The W76 life extension program will extend the life of the W76 warhead, used in the Navy’s Trident Strategic Weapons System, for an additional 30 years by refurbishing the nuclear explosive package, the arming, firing, and fusing system, the gas transfer system, and associated cables, elastomers, valves, pads, cushions, foam supports, telemetries, and other miscellaneous parts.
We are already extending the life of the warheads -- the point is that Pu pits are fine so no new redesign of the physics-package is needed. At all.
It's good to know that you're finally getting to the fucking point, and realizing that I was talking about the warhead, not the plutonium.
By extending the “life,” or time that a weapon can safely and reliably remain in the stockpile without having to be replaced or removed, of a current weapon, NNSA is able to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent without producing new weapons or conducting new underground nuclear tests.
It's good to know that your google skills are intact.
B61 Life Extension Program
The B61 life extension program extended the life of the B61 Mods 7 and 11 for an additional 20 years by refurbishing the canned subassembly and replacing the associated seals, foam supports, cables and connectors, washers, o-rings, and limited life components.
Good. That said, there are other reasons for replacing the old warheads.
The point about testing is noted. I also think that deploying a new set of warheads without testing, and pretending that they've somehow got it down pat, is a joke - which is why I think the US should perform underground testing again.
W76 Life Extension Program
The W76 life extension program will extend the life of the W76 warhead, used in the Navy’s Trident Strategic Weapons System, for an additional 30 years by refurbishing the nuclear explosive package, the arming, firing, and fusing system, the gas transfer system, and associated cables, elastomers, valves, pads, cushions, foam supports, telemetries, and other miscellaneous parts.
Good. Now, if only you had actually pulled this out at the beginning, instead of dancing the fuck around claiming that the aging of the plutonium was the issue I was talking about rather than that of the warhead components themselves.
"...which is why I think the US should perform underground testing again."
great -- good luck with that. Perhaps it will happen in the United States of Brett.
J Thomas -- thank you.
You hit the nail on the head.
Sorry I don't tolerate fools like Brett as well as you do!
But I don't like my taxes being wasted, be it on Israel, RRW or NMD. These are huge wastes.
I'll go with the experts quoted below that RRW is not needed.
I think we can safely dismiss the views of anyone who dismisses the views of experts and noble laureates. And someone who is unversed in even basic nuclear physics to know the difference between Pu material and the actual pit assembly in the physics-package of the warhead.
Good day gentlemen!
MDA waste of $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
see the video on how US government is wasting your $$$$$$$:
http://stream.realimpact.net/rihurl.ram?file=realimpact/ucs/sdi_animation/ucs_mds.smi
from:
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/missile_defense/technical_issues/countermeasures-video-a.html
Gentlemen,
I am unfamiliar with the missile defense program (though honestly doubtful of its efficacy), I have, however, worked for >decade within our nuclear weapons complex. (No longer, however)
I generally agree with the view that there is nothing wrong with the current warheads and that the programs we have in place now are sufficient for their upkeep indefinitely. We _already_ do a lot of upkeep on our warheads. Further, the delivery vehicles are considerably more unreliable than the warheads we designed. So one must address the weakest link in the weapons _system_ : that weakest link is not, by far, the warheads.
Another colleague has weighed in already publicly so let me just quote him (Robert Peurifoy, the former vice president of technical support at Sandia National Laboratories):
"The present nuclear weapon stockpile contains eight or so nuclear weapon types. That population has enjoyed perhaps 100 successful yield tests. These weapons have benefited from a test base of perhaps 1,000 yield tests conducted during the 40 or so years when nuclear testing was allowed. Is DoD really willing to replace tested devices with untested devices?"
Quoted in "Nuclear Warheads: The Reliable Replacement
Warhead Program and the Life Extension Program" CRS report from 2007.
I agree with him. I hope this may be helpful to all in this discussion.
SirM,
thanks for your input on RRW -- here is technical report on missile defense that I can offer you in return.
Unlike some other readers of this blog, it would appear you can handle long-division ;) so this may help you decide whether or not to support NMD:
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/cm_all.pdf
I hope you will weigh in when you've had a chance to read it.
Thanks for the info 'sir mixxalot'!
Missile Defense expensive hoax to rob taxpayers to pay Raytheon
Missile defense has not had one realistic test with countermeasures in a surprise setting.
Not one.
Never.
Anyone who disagrees please give me the name/date of the test.
but this isn't one of your best. Not that it doesn't diagnose or at least anticipate a real problem. But what's the alternative? Most of these matters really are pressing, and strong arguments seem always to abound that the apparently second-order concerns really should be put in the fist tier.
And if there's no alternative to the ducks, then what's a way to keep them at bay, or to summon the energy to deal aggressively with them all in the right time frame? Is the bottom line of the post merely that this administration, like all administrations, must set priorities? It's a very fine point, but it hardly takes an eminent IR scholar to point that out... But I guess if it was on your mind, then I shouldn't begrudge you making a good, simple point.
How to make American system of government work in global times?
America’s system of government was tailored to domestic politics: checks and balances from representatives responsible to states. It is ill-suited to foreign adventurism, especially when much of foreign policy is held hostage to corporate/foreign/defense lobbying interests bringing pork to states. (As well as a deliberately ignorant citizenry as illustrated by some posters on this website, like Brett.)
How to fix that? I don't know.
The Founding Fathers always looked down on a big military: eg. James Madison:
Of all the enemies to public liberty war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes; and armies, and debts, and taxes are the known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few. In war, too, the discretionary power of the Executive is extended; its influence in dealing out offices, honors, and emoluments is multiplied; and all the means of seducing the minds, are added to those of subduing the force, of the people…. [There is also an] inequality of fortunes, and the opportunities of fraud, growing out of a state of war, and … degeneracy of manners and of morals…. No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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