Tuesday, August 18, 2009 - 9:48 PM

At an appearance before the Veterans of Foreign Wars yesterday, President Obama defended U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, calling it a "war of necessity." He claimed that "our new strategy has a clear mission and defined goals -- to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and its extremist allies," and he declared that “If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even larger safe haven from which al Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans. So this is not only a war worth fighting. This is fundamental to the defense of our people.”
This is a significant statement. In effect, the president was acknowledging that the only strategic rationale for an increased commitment in Afghanistan is the fear that if the Taliban isn't defeated in Afghanistan, they will eventually allow al Qaeda to re-establish itself there, which would then enable it to mount increasingly threatening attacks on the United States.
This is the kind of assertion that often leads foreign policy insiders to nod their heads in agreement, but it shouldn't be accepted uncritically. Here are a few reasons why the "safe haven" argument ought to be viewed with some skepticism.
First, this argument tends to lump the various groups we are contending with together, and it suggests that all of them are equally committed to attacking the United States. In fact, most of the people we are fighting in Afghanistan aren't dedicated jihadis seeking to overthrow Arab monarchies, establish a Muslim caliphate, or mount attacks on U.S. soil. Their agenda is focused on local affairs, such as what they regard as the political disempowerment of Pashtuns and illegitimate foreign interference in their country. Moreover, the Taliban itself is more of a loose coalition of different groups than a tightly unified and hierarchical organization, which is why some experts believe we ought to be doing more to divide the movement and "flip" the moderate elements to our side. Unfortunately, the "safe haven" argument wrongly suggests that the Taliban care as much about attacking America as bin Laden does.
Second, while it is true that Mullah Omar gave Osama bin Laden a sanctuary both before and after 9/11, it is by no means clear that they would give him free rein to attack the United States again. Protecting al Qaeda back in 2001 brought no end of trouble to Mullah Omar and his associates, and if they were lucky enough to regain power, it is hard to believe they would give us a reason to come back in force.
Third, it is hardly obvious that Afghan territory provides an ideal "safe haven" for mounting attacks on the United States. The 9/11 plot was organized out of Hamburg, not Kabul or Kandahar, but nobody is proposing that we send troops to Germany to make sure there aren't "safe havens" operating there. In fact, if al Qaeda has to hide out somewhere, I’d rather they were in a remote, impoverished, land-locked and isolated area from which it is hard to do almost anything. The "bases" or "training camps" they could organize in Pakistan or Afghanistan might be useful for organizing a Mumbai-style attack, but they would not be particularly valuable if you were trying to do a replay of 9/11 (not many flight schools there), or if you were trying to build a weapon of mass destruction. And in a post-9/11 environment, it wouldn’t be easy for a group of al Qaeda operatives bent on a Mumbia-style operation get all the way to the United States. One cannot rule this sort of thing out, of course, but does that unlikely danger justify an open-ended commitment that is going to cost us more than $60 billion next year?
Fourth, in the unlikely event that a new Taliban government did give al Qaeda carte blanche to prepare attacks on the United States or its allies, the United States isn't going to sit around and allow them to go about their business undisturbed. The Clinton administration wasn't sure it was a good idea to go after al Qaeda's training camps back in the 1990s (though they eventually did, albeit somewhat half-heartedly), but that was before 9/11. We know more now and the U.S. government is hardly going to be bashful about attacking such camps in the future. (Remember: we are already doing that in Pakistan, with the tacit approval of the Pakistani government). Put differently, having a Taliban government in Kabul would hardly make Afghanistan a "safe haven" today or in the future, because the United States has lots of weapons it can use against al Qaeda that don’t require a large U.S. military presence on the ground.
Fifth, as well-informed critics have already observed, the primary motivation for extremist organizations like the Taliban and Al Qaeda is their opposition to what they regard as unwarranted outside interference in their own societies. Increasing the U.S. military presence and engaging in various forms of social engineering is as likely to reinforce such motivations as it is to eliminate them. Obama is hoping that a different strategy will eventually undercut support for the Taliban and strengthen the central government, but it is still an open question whether more American involvement will have positive or negative effects. If we are in fact making things worse, then we may be encouraging precisely the outcome we are trying to avoid.
Sixth, one might also take comfort from the Soviet experience. When the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the mujaheddin didn't "follow them home." Were the United States to withdraw from Aghanistan and the Taliban to regain power (or end up sharing power, which is more likely), going after the United States won't even be on their "to do" list.
One can of course make a moral argument for an extended commitment in Afghanistan, but that's not the argument Obama made (and it probably wouldn't sell very well here at home). For a realist, the "safe haven" argument is the only possible rationale for a large military commitment in Afghanistan. But the case is actually quite dubious, and somebody in the administration really ought to take a hard look at it. I doubt anyone will, however, because Obama is now committed, and his administration is filled with "can-do" types who never saw an international problem they didn't think the United States could fix.I sure hope they're right and I'm wrong, but I also wish that I didn’t have that feeling quite as often as I seem to these days.
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Put simply; our presence in Afghanistan allows us to prevent the establishment of pipelines which would otherwise which would otherwise carry oil and gas though the region to China and Russia, and it also allows our robber barons to fill their pockets with our tax dollars and by exploiting what resources Afghanistan has. Claims of noble intentions are just propaganda used to sucker the public along for the ride.
I would like to know how often Rahm Emanuel attends meetings in the National Security Council , and how talkative, assertive and persuassive he is; is he in fact running the show, or is he cunning enough to have Hillary Clinton -- and perhaps a few others -- making his points? [Being the lobbys man in The White House, he further shields himself from criticism, by the fact that it was actually he (and Axelrod) who picked Obama. That fact shields them both from some criticism, and this is all cunningly worked out and planned from the outset]
There is no doubt that this argument about safe haven is dreamt up by The Israel lobby. The arguments they use to convince the public are always constructed in such a way, that on the face of it they seem plausible. But if you dive down into the substance -- as Walt and others have done -- they do not hold, and can easily be teared apart. However the lobby relies on, that very few are able to do that, because it does involve some brainwork to do it.
But Walts counter-argument that this commitment will cost The United States 60 billion dollars next year, certainly also is something that the public can relate to, and I only wish that this information is communicated out more broadly
In response to the first comment
Really? If the only reason we're in Afghanistan is to prevent pipelines to China and Russia, then shouldn't we be in Burma right now as well preventing the gas and oil pipeline routing north to Yunnan? And where were we when the Altai-Xinjiang pipeline was built? What about ESPO? But you're right of course, China would much prefer to deal with the Taliban when constructing pipelines--especially given its problems with the Uighurs and the East Turkistan movement.
If anything, the Chinese would prefer to deal with the US in a consortium pipeline deal through Afghanistan than it would the Taliban. Plus I think a pipeline from Gwadar to Xinjiang through Pakistan is more feasible for the Chinese to consider in the medium-term than one through Afghanistan.
There is a lot more to this issue than energy.
did you forget about the cold civil war?
there's a powerful faction of israeli americans who think they can achieve "benevolent global hegemony" by restricting chinese access to persian gulf/central asian energy.
your point about burma is invalid because burmese oil and gas reserves are tiny compared to those in the persian gulf/central asian regions.
your point about the ESPO is just one more reason the neocons are so bent on achieving nuke first strike capability on russia and china.
and no matter how much the chinese would prefer to deal with sane americans, sane americans seem to be in short supply.
Oil for the Burmese pipelines is planned to be supplied from the Persian Gulf, there's no way CNPC could fill a 400,000 bbl/d capacity with Burmese supplies. The point for the Chinese is to avoid Malacca and to shorten the distance Gulf oil has to travel to western cities like Kunming (much closer to Burma than to Shanghai). It's very valid and a much more feasible option than an Afghanistan route.
I don't get your point on ESPO... in any case though it is primarily supplying Japan with a spur to Daqing in Manchuria. The Japanese essentially won out on that deal... and I still don't see what nukes and neocons have to do with it.
"Sane americans are in short supply." I think sane people are in short supply, but my point was the Chinese would rather deal with American energy companies in a pipeline consortium through Afghanistan than they would with the Taliban, whom they suspect of harboring and training Uighur separatists. In this case, border security for Xinjiang is a much more relevant issue to Beijing than another pipeline route.
You really need to put away the conspiracy theories and look at the issues here.
do you think exxon is the front for an alliance...
of big oil companies, and exxon's alliance with the AEI is evidence of big oil's commitment to western what-passes-for-civilization in the neocons' "clash of civilizations"?
do you think the unrest in tibet and xinjiang is evidence of neocon attempts to cause color revolutions that will restrict chinese access to energy?
Really? If the only reason we're in Afghanistan is to prevent pipelines...
Not "only" by any means, and I listed two other notable reasons in my previous comments. As for your specific disputes; the first mistakenly assumes omnipotence, and the second exceptionalism. In regard to pipelines in Afghanistan, I recommend looking into the history of Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline plan and asking yourself; how that would not have be competed by now were it not for our invasion of the region, and what other plans would already be following it?
Besides, invading and occupying Afghanistan was always a flagrantly ham-handed means of accomplishing the primary objective of neutralising Al Qaeda. A few special forces units and perhaps some infantry to clean up is all the boots needed on the ground to wipe out a ragtag band of terrorists. Granted, we expanded our goals to dismantling the Taliban, even though there is no solid evidence of them having any hand in 9/11, and neither of bin Laden for that matter. Now we are stuck task which we never committed the resources to accomplish, much diverted to the farce in Iraq.
So here we are, still pouring our tax dollars into the robber barons making the bombs to the boots and everything in-between, setting them up to plunder Afghanistan's mineral deposits, and holding control over the pipeline deals. I am left to guess your refusal to see as much when I alluded to it previously is simply motivated by revulsion, and I assure you I find the scene disgusting too. However, some people see it as a gravy train, and they are the ones we have long allowed to run the show.
The Trans Afghanistan Pipeline Program was intended to transport natural gas from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and maybe (though doubtfully) onward to India. Yet your original comment seemed to allude to a pipeline from the gulf through to Russia and Xinjiang, which would make little economic sense, at least in the near and medium-terms (look at the geography of route it would take and the finances of CNPC, who would be the most likely Chinese party to such a deal-it just doesn't make sense whether the US is there or not). I would ask you to take a look at how these deals are made and actually talk to the people in the industry making them. There's no secret session of "robber barons" dictating pipeline routes. Even if a line to China were to be built, it would likely be as part of a consortium of Western, Russian, and Chinese companies.
You are right about one thing though, my response was motivated by revulsion--revulsion that people buy so deeply into overly broad, simplistic explanations for how foreign policy is made based on poorly articulated conspiracy theories.
Had the Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline been successful between Turkmenistan and Pakistan, there is no reason to doubt it would have extended to India and beyond, and it only makes sense that more projects would have followed that lead. Also, I never suggested the robber barons were particularly secretive, or unwilling to work though consortium.
Anyway, I notice you are still avoiding the other reasons I mentioned in my previous comments. Granted, I suppose you find that necessary to lend your argument the illusion of weight, seeing as how you are apparently incapable of proposing a more reasonable explanation for how we have come to be in this situation.
This is a good commentary, especially your reminder about how 9/11 was planned in Europe, not in Afghanistan.
Assuming al Queda has finite resources, however, isn't a counter argument that tying them down in Afpak might prevent them from focusing their resources on planning attacks from Europe (or wherever)? Arguably Iraq played this strategic role for some time. And would those who argue for withdrawal be also willing to advocate more stringent security measures, for example, for people who enter this country from places like Hamburg? If you're going to give al Queda carte blanche (your distinction between allowing al Queda not to plan attacks on the US is silly, because we won't know about this until they actually attack us) in Afghanistan, then there would have to be a trade-off in terms of both domestic security measures and border control. Would you be willing to make this trade-off, especially considering the nature of our CYA bureaucracy, it would almost certainly overreact in restricting freedoms?
motive, means, opportunity, character and prior convictions, who are the most likely suspects for 9/11?
The real benefit of a safe haven
This isn't about current or future safe havens, which Mr. Walt has ably shown wouldn't provide protection anymore.
However, I don't think the Hamburg or flight school angles quite get what the Afghanistan camps provided al Qaeda. They were essentially a sorting facility. Thousands of Muslims passed through Pakistan and Afghanistan during the Taliban era. The leadership could "interview" them by indoctrinating them in takfiri beliefs and see how they responded. Then they only had to pick a handful of capable people to create the core of the planes mission. Finding the "muscle" was probably quite easy, as the qualifying factor seems to rest mainly on being Saudi.
Here's a question: Would the planes operation have succeeded on the first try without the 3 from the Hamburg cell showing up in Afghanistan together?
It would be extremely hard, if not impossible to set up a similar sorting program today. Al Qaeda is not dumb, so it is unlikely that they even would seek such a safe haven. It wouldn't do them much good.
Would the planes' operation have succeeded on the first try...
...if an avionics technician had inadvertently installed a sleeper GPS flight path into the airliners' nav system?
First, this argument tends to lump the various groups we are contending with together, and it suggests that all of them are equally committed to attacking the United States. In fact, most of the people we are fighting in Afghanistan aren't dedicated jihadis seeking to overthrow Arab monarchies, establish a Muslim caliphate, or mount attacks on U.S. soil. Their agenda is focused on local affairs, such as what they regard as the political disempowerment of Pashtuns and illegitimate foreign interference in their country. Moreover, the Taliban itself is more of a loose coalition of different groups than a tightly unified and hierarchical organization, which is why some experts believe we ought to be doing more to divide the movement and "flip" the moderate elements to our side. Unfortunately, the "safe haven" argument wrongly suggests that the Taliban care as much about attacking America as bin Laden does
Usually, the argument is that since the defeat of the Taliban government, the Taliban have become virtually one and the same with the jihadis who keep coming into the FATA for training.
As for "flipping", you should read some of what Ahmed Rashid has written on the Taliban. He's extremely pessimistic about the possibility of flipping "moderate" elements of the Taliban to the US, in part because most of the moderate leaders are dead.
Third, it is hardly obvious that Afghan territory provides an ideal "safe haven" for mounting attacks on the United States. The 9/11 plot was organized out of Hamburg, not Kabul or Kandahar, but nobody is proposing that we send troops to Germany to make sure there aren't "safe havens" operating there. In fact, if al Qaeda has to hide out somewhere, I’d rather they were in a remote, impoverished, land-locked and isolated area from which it is hard to do almost anything. The "bases" or "training camps" they could organize in Pakistan or Afghanistan might be useful for organizing a Mumbai-style attack, but they would not be particularly valuable if you were trying to do a replay of 9/11 (not many flight schools there), or if you were trying to build a weapon of mass destruction. And in a post-9/11 environment, it wouldn’t be easy for a group of al Qaeda operatives bent on a Mumbia-style operation get all the way to the United States. One cannot rule this sort of thing out, of course, but does that unlikely danger justify an open-ended commitment that is going to cost us more than $60 billion next year?
That's a double-edged sword, since the same terrain also makes it extremely difficult to retaliate against them when they do pull off a successful attack planned in the FATA.
Moreover, there are arguably "channels", some of them dating back to the fight against the Soviets, for funnelling foreign fighters into the area for training, and getting them back out. That helps facilitate this type of thing, in the way that family and other networks between certain locations in Mexico and certain ones in the United States facilitate immigration.
Fourth, in the unlikely event that a new Taliban government did give al Qaeda carte blanche to prepare attacks on the United States or its allies, the United States isn't going to sit around and allow them to go about their business undisturbed. The Clinton administration wasn't sure it was a good idea to go after al Qaeda's training camps back in the 1990s (though they eventually did, albeit somewhat half-heartedly), but that was before 9/11. We know more now and the U.S. government is hardly going to be bashful about attacking such camps in the future.
Where are we going to strike from? Cruise missiles can be launched from carriers (as we did last time), but Reaper drones (a major part of the current response against the border area) only have a combat radius of 1,878 miles, which may not be enough.
Just as importantly, where are we hitting? This is an area where getting on-the-ground intelligence is very difficult (the US supposedly only started getting good intel on the border area in the past two or so years), and it's very difficult to get that intel if you're only going to be in the area for a short-time, at best. What that effectively means is that we'll be relying on largely Pakistani intel, and dependent on good relations with them.
Fifth, as well-informed critics have already observed, the primary motivation for extremist organizations like the Taliban and Al Qaeda is their opposition to what they regard as unwarranted outside interference in their own societies. Increasing the U.S. military presence and engaging in various forms of social engineering is as likely to reinforce such motivations as it is to eliminate them. Obama is hoping that a different strategy will eventually undercut support for the Taliban and strengthen the central government, but it is still an open question whether more American involvement will have positive or negative effects. If we are in fact making things worse, then we may be encouraging precisely the outcome we are trying to avoid.
That might work in the Taliban's case (they largely only care about Afghanistan, and partially about Pakistan), but it won't work in the case of Al-Qaeda. These guys have a very broad idea of what they consider "interference" in the Islamic World.
Sixth, one might also take comfort from the Soviet experience. When the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the mujaheddin didn't "follow them home." Were the United States to withdraw from Aghanistan and the Taliban to regain power (or end up sharing power, which is more likely), going after the United States won't even be on their "to do" list.
That's probably true in the case of the Taliban.
Peter Bergen, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/19/how_realistic_is_walt_s_realism
as do so many other commentators reveal Mr. Walt's poor analysis and complete failure to comprehend a region of the world he devotes no small amount of his time to. And while it's entirely reasonable to have an opinion about a war your country is fighting, Mr. Walt's opinion despite his academic credentials in reality displays no more substance than a mediocre high school student who has googled a few pages.
I suppose in the 'Realist' world there is little or no place for morality only legitimate pursuit of national objectives.
However I would point out that there is a moral obligation that the US owes Afghanistan that seems to be completely overlooked by all commentators no matter what side of the argument they advocate.
It was the US that systematically destabilised Afghanistan. It was the US that invited Saudia Arabia into the region for co-operation to challenge then Soviet hegemony over central Asia by deliberately introducing the most radical elements of Wahabi/Salafist Islam to challenge the Soviets.
It was the deliberate policy of the Carter administration to introduce and recruit Radical Islamic forces to destabilise Afghanistan drawing the Soviet Union into a quagmire. It was the Brzezinski policy adopted by Carter to further export fundamentalist (Salafist/Wahabi) Islam to Central Asia to further destabilise the Soviet Union. More than a Million Afghanis have died as a direct result of the war the US initiated.
Zbigniew Brzezinski was the architect of that policy which saw the world through strictly 2 dimensional cold war tunnel vision. Here was his answer in 1998 admitting to the deliberate destabilisation.
Le Nouvel Observateur, Paris, 15-21 January 1998 Q: And neither do you regret having supported the Islamic fundamentalism, having given arms and advice to future terrorists?
Brzezinski: What is most important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?
Le Nouvel Observateur, Paris, 15-21 January 1998 Q: Some stirred-up Moslems? But it has been said and repeated Islamic fundamentalism represents a world menace today.
Brzezinski: Nonsense! It is said that the West had a global policy in regard to Islam. That is stupid. There isn't a global Islam. Look at Islam in a rational manner and without demagoguery or emotion. It is the leading religion of the world with 1.5 billion followers. But what is there in common among Saudi Arabian fundamentalism, moderate Morocco, Pakistan militarism, Egyptian pro-Western or Central Asian secularism? Nothing more than what unites the Christian countries. (Remember this is 1998 and not all has unfolded)
Full interview http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BRZ110A.html
It was this same tunnel vision whereby the Carter presidency deliberately decided not to support the Shah and accept a revival of the old Islamic Republic because they would be anti communist, believing that is all that mattered.
Fast forward, the US is now deeply mired in 2 wars both of which can be directly traced back to policies of Carter and Brzezinski.
If the US had not pulled the rug on the Shah there would have been no Iran/Iraq war, No Gulf War 1 or 2, No Iranian support for Syria or Hizbollah, No Iranian support for the most extreme irredentist elements in the Arab world, such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, interesting side bar you remember them, they got chased out of Egypt settling into Afghanistan renamed themselves Al Quaeda. And interestingly enough New York where they first started trying to blow up the World Trade Towers in 1993.
Further no 1982 attack on US forces in Lebanon. No sleazy US military assistance to Iraq and most importantly there would have been a strong US ally in Central Asia unlike the candidate Brzezinski and Carter chose to go with, General Zia and Pakistan.
If the US had not destabilised Afghanistan it would not have become a Taliban state hosting foreign extremists that developed into Al Quaeda.
Brzezinski and President Carter enlisted Saudi Arabia to build a string of Jihadi Madrasas in Pakistan catering to students from Central Asia to destabilise the Soviet influence. Neither Brzezinski or President Carter seem to reflect for a moment that Saudi Arabia is a much worst police state than the former Soviet empire with far greater contempt for liberal western values.
The list is longer but I think the uninformed can start to grasp the enormity of these failed short term policies.
Although Islamic extremism was already a well developed ideology and a growing threat, and we can't know how we would be dealing with that threat today, it is most certain the US would not be in Iraq now or 1991 or NATO bogged down in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.
Again, more than a Million Afghanis have died as a direct result of the war the US initiated in Afghanistan. Surely the US owes something to the Afghan people and how that debt could be settled might be a better starting point in the debate.
When you keep tripping over everything in a china shop...
...you owe it to the owners to get the hell out and let them send you the bill. That would be the moral thing to do. instead, we are just pitting warlords against each other while attempting to micromanage a tiny square on Brzezinski's Grand Chessboard to milk it for all it is worth.
I mostly agree with that, but all the more reason Walt is correct. I have been saying this sense we first began the invasion of Afghanistan. This is in every sense, a war of choice, and a poorly executed one at that. The strategic logic for an open ended commitment is not particularly compelling, and it seems as though our presence there is instead harming our national security. You have insulted Dr. Walt, but really seem to agree with him. He in fact notes that the only real argument (albeit one that Obama did not make) was the moral argument (which is the one you made). So do you think that is an argument that will past muster in Congress? There is no vital national interest at stake in Afghanistan. It will likely cost us hundreds or thousands more American lives and billions more dollars. It will damage our image throughout the region, and likely create new enemies as well. I find it hard to justify your position in light of the negative effects just described. The situation is looking more and more like a lose lose situation. The Afghans won't get a real Western style democracy that is secure in the short term, and we will not increase our security, the opposite more than likely.
So, in short, calling Dr. Walt a high schooler is a poor way to say, "yes I agree, but I feel like we should help the Afghans because we have been idiots in the past."
If the idea is to stop China from getting gas should we go invade Australia because they just signed a historic $50AUD billion for Exxons share of the Gorgon Gas project. Makes perfect sense to invade an ally to stop China from getting gas. Heaven forbid more deals go through from Australia's massive north west shelf gas haven.
...we didn't have such an ally issue with Afghanistan, and didn't have to commit nearly as much of our resources to the task.
maybe exxon is losing faith in the neocon project...
lee raymond, ex-CEO of exxon, was dumped as vice-chairman of the AEI's board in january of 2009, as far as i can tell.
raymond was named vice-chairman of the AEI board in december 2002, again, as far as i can tell... the problem being, the AEI seems to be disappearing pages that nail things down, or at least removing the dates from the pages.
by way of compensation, however, The Honorable Richard B. Cheney seems to have appeared his honorable self on the AEI board.
maybe, seeing as how exxon's been so firmly allied with the AEI neocons ---especially in global warming denial--- it could be that exxon's doing a duck dive, seeing as how the gorgon project wont start producing until 2015, which gives lots of time for a new "new pearl harbor" or equivalent to happen, at which point all bets on everything are off.
we can hope for the best, which would be that exxon is coming to its senses and is ditching the neocons.
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for a chronology of how exxon came to be allied with the neocons, see for the record
Your comment about Hamburg makes me wonder how much of the problem is a people problem as compared to a territorial problem. If we have an important people problem, then why do we continually have a mind-set that the military should be in control of the solution? After all, the warlords and poppy merchants are interlaced with the Taliban; so if we offer deals and leadership that pulls them more into the global mainstream, the Taliban will die a natural death.
This brings me to the conclusion that we do not know how to offer leadership or make deals, so we use the ultimate red herring, the military, to go act like we are dealing with the problem.
What’s more, if we remove the military aspects, we could have an interesting discussion about our interests in Central Asia.
Bob Spencer
Al Qaeda fights for the Caliphate.
They will keep fighting until they get it or are destroyed.
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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