Why is Afghanistan so hard? It's not difficult to think of reasons: 1) the long-standing
divisions among the various tribal/ethnic groups that make up Afghan society, 2)
the mountainous, inhospitable terrain, 3) lack of infrastructure, 4) weak
governmental institutions and little history of centralized authority, 5) the destructive
effects of many years of warfare, 6) endemic corruption, 7) traditional
hostility to foreign occupation, etc. ... Given all that, it is hardly surprising that outside efforts to rebuild
the country and establish a legitimate central government have thus far failed
to accomplish very much.
If that weren't enough, our efforts there are also hampered
by some inherent strategic
contradictions. In particular,
most of the things the United States might do to improve the situation tend to
make other aspects of the problem worse. Even if we make progress on one dimension, it tends to set us back in
some other way. Here are
five reasons why running harder seems to leave us in the same place.
1. If the U.S. does
more, others do less.
The
United States didn't want NATO's help when it first went into Afghanistan in
2002. As one U.S. official put it
at the time, "the more allies you have, the more permissions you have to
get." Those days are long past,
however, and the Obama administration would love to get more help from its
allies. Unfortunately,
working
with lots of allies creates obvious coordination
problems (e.g., the recent airstrike at German instigation that killed
a number of Afghan civilians), and public support for the war is
visibly waning in Europe (as it is
in the United States). Even worse,
there is a basic contradiction between the Obama administration's decision to
increase US force levels and its desire to get greater allied assistance. As the well-known theory of collective
goods tells us, the more we do, the more that other states will be tempted to
"free-ride," leaving Uncle Sam holding the bag.
2. The more money we
put in, the more corrupt Afghanistan will become.
Afghanistan has two main industries: opium growing and
international assistance. It also has an endemic problem with corruption. Even if various forms of external
assistance do accomplish some worthy tasks, it also tends to reinforce the
other dysfunctional behaviors that have plagued the Karzai regime since its
inception. In short, even
well-intentioned and admirable efforts to help the Afghan people in concrete
ways may not leave us in a better position overall.
3. If we keep telling the Afghans that we are "here
to stay," they may believe us.And some of them won't like it.
We are often told that we need to persuade the Afghan
people that we will stay long enough to "finish the job," and that we aren't
going to leave precipitously. But
anything we do to convince them that we intend to stay for a long
time inevitably makes us look like a foreign occupier with ulterior
motives. Thus, efforts to make our
commitment look more credible also makes it look more sinister to some Afghans,
and make it easier for the Taliban to recruit sympathizers.
4. The more prestige
we commit, the less leverage we have.
This is an old story: increasing the U.S. commitment makes us more
dependent on whoever we are currently backing (whether in Afghanistan or
Pakistan), which in turn gives us less leverage over their conduct. Increasing troop levels makes us more
dependent on supply lines through Pakistan, which makes it harder to press the
Pakistani government to go after al Qaeda or undertake other reforms. Doubling down in Afghanistan also ties
us more firmly to the Karzai government, despite the reliable reports of
widespread fraud in the recent election.
Once we decide that a client regime "cannot be allowed to fail,"
our ability to influence its conduct evaporates quickly. Once again, trying to do more achieves
less than we expect.
5. The paradox of
publicity.
President Obama has defended his policies by declaring it a "war
of necessity," thereby highlighting the importance of the conflict. That's a necessary step in a democracy,
but it inevitably draws more public attention to the conflict and places a
premium on showing significant progress within a reasonable amount of
time. After eight years, public
support is going to wane if clear positive signs aren't forthcoming, which
means the Taliban can play for time and tailor their efforts toward U.S. public
opinion.
It's possible that clever leadership can overcome or mitigate each of these tensions, but it won't be easy. And these (and other) contradictions
might help us understand why the current effort in Afghanistan is likely to
fail, even if we devote a lot more resources to it and even if the people in
charge do their best.
Any political science prof who can turn out such clear and lively prose during his morning coffee break must have a great wife and kids as well as a 150 IQ.
But that means he must know the answer to his important question....or simply is being coy. Right?
Right!
Surely he must know that we are there for one major reason (and a number of minor ones).
Robert Kagan, that fine Israeli-American, and Soldier of Fortune (he teaches the cadets at West Point!) wrote a small piece with a headline that was more or less:
OBMA'S COURAGE ON AFGHANISTAN.... in which Kagan poured champagne over the embarrassed president for being "gutsy" etc. (We all know the vileness of either the Lobby's praise or smears.)
In other words, " The Tribe giveth and the Tribe taketh away, blessed by the name of the Tribe."
If Obama will move against Iran, perhaps Kagan and the Lobby will let the USA and Europe bring home their young boys, most of whom don't want to be Soldiers of Fortune.
In truth, the Tribe will fight until the death (or physical/ mental breakdown) of the last American soldier.
Note the Israeli rules of engagement for the Gaza massacre: shoot at anything that moves, small or large. (410 kids died and twice that number were injured.)
The IDF lost 10 to the 1,500 Gazans--some of the Israelis through friendly fire.
(In another massacre exactly 70 years ago this week in Poland, the Germans' score was much poorer: of the 100,000 dead, 20,000 of Wehrmacht were killed.)
(But the poor, unsupported Nazis did not have a Lobby in the USA.
You can find a headline from Kagan or his ilk that mentions any topic Walt would ever write about, but that should not give you the opportunity to grandstand on Israel. And try to write a comment without mentioning Nazis. It is possible.
What exactly are we trying to do? I admit that whatever it is, it will be hard, but aren't you putting the cart before the horse?
Other thoughts:
Can we directly combine Afghanistan's two main industries and cut out the corrupt middlemen? Use our massive spending (many times Afghan GDP) to buy the opium crop directly from the farmers? Has anyone in the establishment raised this option, even tongue-in-cheek?
"makes us look like a foreign occupier with ulterior motives" whoops, too late.
I think you could strengthen the conclusion - we will fail in Afghanistan, and not only because we don't know what we're trying to achieve.
Good points all around. Here are some numbers that support your argument: http://weblogs.sun-sentinel.com/news/opinion/theslant/blog/2009/09/the_afghanistan_war_how_do_we.html
I have just been re-reading George McDonald Fraser's 'Flashman' about the first AfBrit War (1839-42) for the umpteenth time.
A British army of 16,000 retreating troops and camp followers was reduced to just one man who rode into Jalalabad from Kabul.
His picture is at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Remnants_of_an_army.jpg
It doesn't take much imagination to change the horse to a Hummer.
I hope Dr Walt might use this painting to illustrate one of his perceptive analyses of the current Afghan situation, which is a dead loser whichever way you look at it.
Yes, and our artful dodger Flashman, was also at Custer's last stand at the Little Big Horn and looked around him and said, "this is no place for Harry Flashman!"
We aren't the British of the 1800's nor are we the Soviets of the 1980's. However, it may be a deadend, but that not entirely clear just yet. What's important will be to know when and if that has become a reality; own-up to it immediately, and leave.
But leave with the whole world knowing we at least tried. We haven't really tried yet, only wasted time, resouces and blood.
An excellent point. Technology has come a long way since the earlier Brit-Af wars. Especially the drones seem to be making a real difference.
Apart from all the various current strategic reasons why the US should fight and win in Af, one beneficial side-effect would be to kill off the "graveyard of empires" meme.
This would be a good thing in and of itself. Plus, it will solidify the advantage of settled civilizations against unconventional warfare. In the days of Chengiz Khan, settled civilizations had no adequate defence against highly motivated horseback infantry. Now our limiting condition seems to be guerilla warfare in rough terrain. I'd like to see that erased as well.
Ah, but the Great Khan would also send emissaries out, and those that capitulated immediately and agreed to live under the Khan's rule, were incorporated into his empire.
"Thou soared like an eagle above, but now has stumbled like a colt. Oh, my Khan."
General Petreus feels we cannot leave. We must change some things, but we cannot leave. He and a few others would certainly be in the know on how to proceed in Afghanistan. I trust him to do the right thing. These kinds of problems exist in all wars and there are people that know more than we do about how to handle them. For that reason, we must listen to the Generals on the ground. How long do we give them to make progress? I don't know. It looked bleak in Iraq but things changed eventually. Let's give our leaders more time. casino
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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