Global News : Passport : Ricks : Drezner : Walt : Rothkopf : Lynch
The Cable : The AfPak Blog : Net Effect : Shadow Govt. : Madam Secretary : The Call
Iran, arms races, and war
One of the arguments that is often invoked to justify a hardline approach to Iran's nuclear program is the fear of a "regional arms race." In this view, if Iran were to get the bomb, neighboring states like Saudi Arabia and Egypt might be forced to get them too, with presumably harmful effects on regional stability. (For a recent invocation of this line of thinking, see Michael Slackman's article in the New York Times today).
One obviously cannot rule out such a possibility out, but there are good reasons not to accept this particular justification uncritically. To begin with, the real danger is not a regional arms race per se, it is the possibility that an arms race might lead to conflict in a critical region (or make it easier for terrorists to steal a weapon). By themselves, arms races just waste money, which is obviously not a good thing but not necessarily a disaster in strategic terms. So the question is two-fold: Would an arms race actually occur if Iran went nuclear, and would it then have dangerous effects on regional stability?
Here the evidence is mixed. With respect the first question, history suggests that one state's acquisition of nuclear weapons does not necessarily produce an immediate flock of imitators. The Soviet Union did get nuclear weapons because the United States had them, and one could argue that Soviet acquisition (and the desire to retain the trappings of great power status) played a role in the British and French decisions to go nuclear in the 1950s. China's decision to get a minimum deterrent of its own undoubtedly reflected their concerns about U.S. (and later, Soviet) power, although Mao seems to have been as worried by the other great powers’ conventional capabilities as by their nuclear arsenals. And it's clear that Pakistan's nuclear program was an obvious response to India's nuclear program. So we obviously cannot rule out the possibility that an Iranian bomb would encourage others to follow suit.
But the overall record on this point is far from clear. There are between 40 and 60 states with the technological capacity and economic wherewithal to build a nuclear bomb, and the vast majority of them have decided not to do so, even when there were other nuclear powers in their neighborhood. A few states have started down that road and then turned back, sometimes in the face of international pressure (Libya, Brazil, Argentina), and sometimes mostly on their own (Sweden, South Africa). Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons in the 1960s did spark some interest in the Arab world, but only Saddam Hussein got really serious about it (and even he gave up trying for nukes in the 1990s). Libya had a semi-serious nuclear program too, but it was hardly a crash program and Ghaddafi eventually abandoned it as well. Iran’s own nuclear program (which began under the Shah) reflected broader security concerns and the Shah's own desire for status, and doesn't appear to have been a direct response to anyone else's bomb. North Korea’s entry into the nuclear club hasn't led South Korea, Japan, or anyone else to start a new nuclear weapons program yet. In short, people have been forecasting the rapid proliferation of nuclear weapons ever since the nuclear age began, but all of those forecasts have been overly pessimistic.
The key point to remember is that a decision to build a bomb involves some complex cost-benefit calculations, and Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapon would not necessarily lead any of its neighbors to decide that their best course is to follow suit. One reason they might hold back is simply the recognition that getting a bomb would not enhance Iran's influence as much as is sometimes claimed. China did not suddenly become a more influential power when it tested a bomb in 1964; its rise to true great power status came when it began to modernize its economy in the l980s. Getting a bomb may have reinforced Israel's "existential security" (which is why Ben Gurion wanted one), but having a couple of hundred nuclear weapons doesn’t enable them to blackmail the Palestinians or the other Arab states into doing whatever Jerusalem wants. Similarly, North Korea has hardly any influence in world affairs despite its recent entry into the nuclear club; the only thing that that Pyongyang can do with its weapon is discourage others from putting too much pressure on them. Americans really should understand this: we have several thousand nuclear weapons and we have a tough enough time getting other states -- even rather weak ones -- to do what we want. The same would be true for a nuclear Iran: it could not blackmail anyone because the threat would not be credible, and even nearby states might find it easier to adjust to than we sometimes think .
By the way, this same logic may also help convince Iran that it doesn't need to go all the way to full acquisition of a nuclear capability. It won't buy them much influence, but it still might encourage some of their neighbors to follow suit. Ironically, that situation might decrease Iran’s regional influence over time. Iran is the most populous state in the Gulf region, and it has enormous economic potential. If the mullahs ever get their act together, Iran’s conventional capabilities would overshadow the other states in the region. And if that's the case, crossing the nuclear threshold might lead others to look for a cheap way to counter that. Thus, from Iran's own point of view, staying on this side of the nuclear threshold (but having the capacity to go nuclear quickly if need be), might be the optimal strategy, particularly if they were less worried about an imminent Israeli or U.S. attack.
Next, would a Middle Eastern arms race lead to war? There is a vast academic literature on the general relationship between arms races and war, and the results are at best inconclusive. The empirical results are highly sensitive to the model specification and other definitional questions, and the best short answer is that the effect is highly conditional: arms races may raise the danger of war in some circumstances, but make war less likely in others.
And what about nuclear arms races? Here too, there is a heated academic debate. On one side are those who believe the slow spread of nuclear arsenals might actually be stabilizing (or at least not destabilizing), essentially because the logic of deterrence would kick in, make war too dangerous, and also induce greater overall caution short of war. Other scholars question this optimistic appraisal, and argue that new nuclear states might have trouble establishing stable deterrent relationships and would also create a greater risk of nuclear leakage to terrorists.
I lean toward the former view, but it’s clearly not an open-and-shut case. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the spread of nuclear weapons has generally been stabilizing so far; in the sense that no one has launched a major war of aggression against a nuclear power at any time in the past. (The Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel in the 1973 October War is not an exception, by the way, as it was clearly a "limited aims" attack focused on regaining territory captured by Israel in 1967, and not an attempt to conquer Israel itself). The Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan is probably the most serious counter-example, but even that dispute remained at a fairly low level and fear of nuclear escalation probably played some role in allowing cooler heads to prevail.
There are plenty of good reasons to try to prevent Iran from going nuclear, which is why one hopes that the talks in Geneva will make progress. But the sometimes apocalyptic visions of what an Iranian bomb might mean rest on worst-case arguments about which one should maintain a healthy skepticism. And for other reasons to be skeptical about the current effort to mobilize for war, see Juan Cole's "top ten things you know about Iran that are not true," here.
FABRICE COFFRINI/AFP/Getty Images
- Middle East | Diplomacy | Iran | Nukes
Advertisement
FOREIGN POLICY is published by the Slate Group,
a division of Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC.
All contents ©2009 Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC. All rights reserved.
“The pessimist complains about the wind; the optimist expects it to change; the realist adjusts the sails.”
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Relations at Harvard University.
Daily Reads
Affiliations
Recent Writings
Head in the sand
As always Mr. Walt gets it so wrong. He tries to make it look like it is only a possible scenario.
The race has already started Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Morocco Algeria, Jordan, Quatar have all announced and commenced undertakings to build Nuclear facilities, signing contracts for construction etc. And while some of these countries such as Morocco will no doubt actually use the facilities for the intended purpose of the others are we are supposed to seriously believe they are just for peaceful research?... because we all know the contributions of these countries to modern technology.
Just last Spring the IAEA announced finding weapons grade uranium in Egypt which already has 2 sites. The IAEA also found traces of processed uranium at the suspect Syrian facility Israel bombed in 2007.
However in all fairness to Syria they are not motivated by any concern for an Iranian bomb and in fact are widely believed to co-operating with Iran in the development of such.
Of course there is also the conventional arms build up, but again Mr. Walt appears to be in the school of "What me worry?"
All serious analysts MUST take a very hard look at Jordan, Saudia Arabia, Algeria and Egypt all face Islamic insurgencies and the long term stability of regimes is far from predictable. Mr. Walt seems to proceed on an assumption that the status quo of all these countries is immutable.
Mr. Walt conclusions of the 1973 war are of course flawed, he is far to charitable suggesting it was a war of "limited aims" or arguing the rationality Egypt and Syria, they chose war over negotiations. Sadat said he needed the war to prove to the Army there was no military option.
This is a region where 'face' has far more currency than rationality. I personally am not of the view that Saddam's Iraq was irrational per se. It is a good example though of nature of the region resorting to brutal force where it can bring advantage and not backing down when confronted with superior force arguably an irrational act.
The casual use of Chemical weapons by both Iraq and Iran (should we mention child soldiers?) is instructive of the strategies many of these regimes will use in future conflicts. Iran is already arming Hizbollah with chemical weapons. Does anybody really doubt another round between Israel and Hizbollah?
I don't know why Walt gets it
I don't know why Walt gets it so wrong... I mean he used to write good books...now he just appears naive...talk about academic standards - but then Foreignpolicy.com has been an eye-opener for all of us. And no, I am sorry, it has nothing to do with the technology of blogging...although yes, writing all the time is a chore, vs writing once a month.
On Algeria
Algeria did indeed engage in a clandestine nuclear program in the early 90s with the technical support from China but soon retracted after the international community (the US) found out about it... more information can be found here:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb228/index.htm
Peace
http://analitikis.wordpress.com
Sagan was right
Waltz operates from theory-building assumptions about the international system that assumes away organizations and states make mistakes. Sagan is more focused on what and who actually use nuclear weapons, and how. Choose Sagan, Dr. Walt, not Waltz.
Nonetheless, it is worth
The spread of nuclear weapons as stabilizing?
The reason there are so few examples of countries attacking nuclear armed states is that, for one, there are so few of them, and for two, all nuclear states but one (Israel, which is not large but which does have a powerful conventional military) are large states with powerful conventional forces. These states don't find themselves on the receiving end of "major wars of aggression" too often.
In the two counter examples it can be seen that the spread of nuclear arms will make conflicts more likely, not less. In both instances countries attacked a nuclear armed power either when they thought they had an otherwise overwhelming advantage (surprise and numbers in the case of the Arabs in 1973) or they had cover of their own nuclear weapons (in the case of India-Pakistan).
A "thought experiment" of the kind that Walt is so fond:
If Egypt or Syria had nuclear weapons, would they have been more or less likely to attack, and more or less likely to have expanded their aims?
If Pakisastan didn't have nuclear weapons to balance out India's, would they still have instigated the Kargil conflict?
another reason is conflict Idealogical not existential
Another reason Walt's assumptions of Nuclear deterrence and stability regarding the contemporary powers completely fails is that the conflicts are\were ideological and to a lesser extent territorial. None of the above countries has seriously contested their adversaries actual right to exist.
This is not the case in the Middle East, or for that matter here in the comment section, where Israel's very right to exist is routinely not just questioned but many advocating and acting to end that existence.
Anyone wanna guess how many
Anyone wanna guess how many countries have border disputes around here (on earth?)? 10? 40? 50?
How about nearly all of them!?
Why this schlemiel claims sound IR theory don't work no more, and nukes gonna make us all safer, is besides me.
Saudi Wahabia don't even have a fixed border with its southern n-bours.
I just can't believe how naive Walt is.
But I know why.
He isn't naive. He's doing this schpeel because he knows that if he admits that we are all right on pushing Iran to adhere to its NPT obligations, his anti-AIPAC schtick is masticated.
Done for. Chewed up and out. Fourth strike and you're exposed as the anti-semite. Ok, so your married to a Jew. So am I. Does it make a difference? She is still clueless on politics!
Nah - really. Walt is doing the flaschinet with a parrot on his epaulet saying "aint no harm in nukes"
What part of "balance of power" don't you get?
I mean for Jeshua's sake you're the one who penned "perception theory"!!!
I'll sell ya a "perception." Some time ago Walt published his anti-AIPAC screed in Chas Freeman's journal - financed by Wahabia mullah, (and dough from Oil companies that give it as a tithe to doing business in countries boycotting Israel and who Commerce designates as violators of a variety of WTO agreements (to which these raggers - short for "rag-heads" - kill me please) signed on. Of course this doesn't keep any of our DoD money from leaving these crooks territory, nor prevent us from doing serious business with GE, ITT, Bechtel scum!). Now this Walt lends a hand to every Israel hating thug no matter how many skulls marked on his bayonet.
I may be wrong here - but it seems this fella has sold himself to someone. He don't like the Israelis, but he sure love's the raggers/A-rabs. If I didn't know any better, I'd say you one hell of a Mevlevi!
Good luck with your Sena, dzin.
***
On that nasty note - I'd like to add - Einstein thought everyone aught to have a nuke - and voila - perpetual world peace.
Just goes to prove, that even genius can be stupid.
zionist liar
Einstein never said that
Professor Walt's analogy to
Professor Walt's analogy to Russia and China make no sense. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia. If each had nuclear weapons would the Soviets have invaded them? Would they have liked to have nuclear weapons to prevent those invasions, of course. Would China have invaded Tibet if Tibet's secular population had developed nuclear weapons? Will Quwait and Saudi Arabia be afraid of a nuclear armed Iran invading their oil rich areas that border Iran after Professor Walt's desired immediate withdrawl from Iraq?
Another problem with Iran getting nukes will be its ability to sponsor terrorism with impunity. Will the United States declare a full scale war on nuclear power if Iran decides to blow up a few Synagogues in the US as it did in Argentina? Will the US strike at a nuclear Iran if it creates Hezbollah II in Iraq or Saudi Arabia which effectively take over the Shiite oil rich parts of those countries (again, after Professor Walt's desired immediate withdrawl). Will the US strike Iran if it creates Hamas II in Afghanistan? Will the American left and Professor Walt again blame all the bombing and terrorist activities on the "Israeli occupation?" Will they again suggest negotiations as the only solution?
Pure nonsense. Reading this
Pure nonsense.
Reading this will destroy brain cells.
Seriously.
Newsflash: Nuclear Arms Race in Mideast Was Started by Israel
Newsflash: Nuclear Arms Race in Mideast Was Started by Israel!
Yes, really.
Maybe Iran is not suicidal.
Maybe Iran sees that neighbors on either side of it have been attacked by the US.
Maybe Iran sees that Israel has attacked 3 of its neighbors in 3 years: Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria. Before that Iraq too.
Maybe, just maybe, Iran also feels threatened.
Maybe Iran has greater reason to fear the *actions* of the US and Israel, than Israel has to fear the words of Mr. Ahmedinejad.
Maybe Iranians noticed Israel committed war crimes.
Maybe the implications of a nuclear armed Iran will not be so dire:
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docUploaded/McNair70.pdf
Maybe, just maybe, the Hidden Imam will return at the End of Days.
That will be one party I’d like to be at.
Just remember: The Nuclear Arms Race in Mideast Was Started by Israel!
Before the United Nations Security Council slaps even more sanctions on Iran, they should enforce their own resolution #487 which "[c]alls upon Israel urgently to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards."
Can Ahmadinejad make aliya?
Good point sirmix. And can we pass up The Telegraph's finding that Ahmadinejad's grandpa was Jewish? Does that make Ahmadinejad a self-hating Jew? Can he now make aliya?
After all, the Russians become Israelis with just one nominally "Jewish" grandparent. And haven't we hears stories ad infinitum about the persecuted Jews in Iran? And it appears there are quire a few Iranians and other Arabs with an erstwhile Jewish grandparent. Can they all start making aliah now? Is this the route to a one-state solution? Ahh the implications are endless!
htp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/6256173/Mahmoud-Ahmadinejad-revealed-
Goldstone Report
the following grave breaches of the
Fourth Geneva Convention were committed by Israeli forces in Gaza: willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and extensive destruction of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly."
Read more at:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sharmine-narwani/netanyahus-shame-and-the_b_305808.html