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Time to start working on Plan B
If I were President Obama (now there's a scary thought!), I'd ask some smart people on my foreign policy team to start thinking hard about "Plan B." What's Plan B? It's the strategy that he's going to need when it becomes clear that his initial foreign policy initiatives didn't work. Obama's election and speechifying has done a lot to repair America's image around the world -- at least in the short term -- in part because that image had nowhere to go but up. But as just about everyone commented when he got the Nobel Peace Prize last week, his foreign policy record to date is long on promises but short on tangible achievements. Indeed, odds are that the first term will end without his achieving any of his major foreign policy goals.
To be more specific, I'd bet that all of the following statements are true in 2012.
1. There won't be a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians, and Israel will still be occupying the West Bank and controlling the Gaza Strip. More and more people are going to conclude that "two states for two peoples" is no longer possible, and that great Cairo speech will increasingly look like hollow rhetoric.
2. The United States will still have tens of thousands of troops in Afghanistan. Victory will not be within sight.
3. Substantial U.S. personnel will remain in Iraq (relabeled as "training missions"), and the political situation will remain fragile at best.
4. The clerical regime in Iran will still be in power, will still be enriching nuclear material, will still insist on its right to control the full nuclear fuel cycle, and will still be deeply suspicious of the United States. Iran won't have an actual nuclear weapon by then, but it will be closer to being able to make one if it wishes.
5. There won't be a new climate change agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol.
6. Little progress will have been made toward reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world. The United States and Russia may complete a new strategic arms agreement by then, but both states will still have thousands of nuclear warheads in their stockpiles. None of the nine current nuclear weapons states will have disarmed, and I wouldn't be surprised if the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is still unratified three years from now.
Other achievements that we won't see include the balancing of the federal budget, a major revamping of global financial architecture, reform of the U.N. Security Council, a significant increase in the size of the State Department or the foreign aid budget, or the completion of new trade round. I'm not even sure we will have closed Gitmo or ended "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" by then.
Assuming he wins re-election, therefore, President Obama is going to be looking at a foreign policy "to do" list with remarkably few boxes checked off. And somebody ought to start thinking about this possibility now, because wise statecraft ought to anticipate the circumstances one is going to face a few years hence, instead of focusing solely on what's in the in-box today.
So what's Plan B? I'm still wrestling with that issue myself, but here's a quick sketch of some of the fundamental ideas. Plan B begins by recognizing that the United States remains the most secure great power in modern history and that most of damage we have suffered recently has come from scaring ourselves into foolish foreign adventures. It means rejecting the belief -- common to both neoconservatives and liberal internationalists -- that virtually every global problem requires an American solution and "American leadership." It acknowledges that social engineering in complex traditional societies is something we don't know how to do and probably can't learn, but it takes comfort from the fact that it is also a task that we don't have to do. It accepts that there are a few bad guys out there that do need to be confronted, captured, and sometimes killed, but understands that the more force we use and the heavier our footprint is, the more resistance we will ultimately face. And yes, Plan B understands that sometimes bad things will happen to Americans, and there is nothing we can do to completely eliminate all foreign dangers. Get used to it.
Plan B means playing "hard to get" more often, so that other states don't take us for granted and so that they bear a greater share of common burdens. It means exploiting balances of power and playing divide-and-conquer, instead of trying to impose a preponderance of U.S. power on every corner of the globe. It prizes the individual freedoms that are the core of American democracy -- freedoms that are threatened by a steady diet of foreign wars -- and it recognizes that other societies will have to find their own way toward more pluralist and participatory forms of government, and at their own pace. It seeks to maintain armed forces that are second to none but eschews squandering lives or money on peripheral wars that are neither vital nor winnable. It rejects "special relationships" with any other state, if by that one means relationships where we support other states even when they do foolish things that are not in our interest (or theirs).
And Plan B proceeds from the belief that other states will be more likely to follow America's lead if they look at us and like what they see. America used to dazzle the world by offering up a vision of opportunity, equality, energy and competence that was unimaginable elsewhere. The danger now is that America is increasingly seen as a land of crumbling infrastructure, mountainous debt, uninsured millions, fraying public institutions, and xenophobic media buffoons. Over the longer term, getting our house in order back home will to a lot more to shore up our global position than conducting endless foot patrols through the Afghan countryside.
Postscript: Some smart observers -- such as Andrew Sullivan at the Atlantic -- have a more favorable view of Obama's performance to date. They discern a trademark style in Obama's cautious and reflective approach to most policy issues: he sets forth general goals, waits to see how others react, gauges the limits of the possible, and then decides on a course of action. There's probably something to this view, and surely the patient examination of alternative policy options makes more sense than relying on one's "gut instincts" and then stubbornly refusing to admit the possibility of error.
Whether one relies on calm deliberation or a president's entrails, however, the proof of any approach to policymaking is its ability to deliver tangible results. And here the jury is still out. My concern is that Obama has yet to use American power -- in either its hard and soft forms -- in ways designed to shape the calculations and actions of both allies and adversaries. Where Bush erroneously believed that the United States could simply dictate to the rest of the world, thus far Obama seems unwilling to wield American power against stubborn opponents or withhold U.S. support from recalcitrant allies. His speeches are a valuable tool, but ultimately others need to know that there is resolve and purpose and tangible actions behind them. Sometimes foreign policy is like community organizing -- i.e., you're trying to herd diverse groups to work together for a common goal and your task is to overcome suspicions so that the common ground can be seized. But at other times it's more like a gang war. And when it's the latter, you have to take names, draw lines, and use the power at one's disposal to get the outcomes you want.
Think about it this way: how many foreign leaders are now grateful because the United States has backed them and their prospects are improving, and how many governments are now worried because the United States is successfully using its power to undermine or thwart them and force them to rethink their positions?
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“The pessimist complains about the wind; the optimist expects it to change; the realist adjusts the sails.”
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Relations at Harvard University.
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Iran and Iraq still up for grabs
Dr. Walt, it seems like you are suggesting a total U.S. withdrawal from Iraq come 2012. If this is the case, I fear that President Obama would severely jeopardize the entire U.S. mission. Nine years after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and three years after the worst insurgent violence the region has seen since the Cold War, even a staunch anti-war candidate like Barack Obama would not sacrifice American success in Iraq for political points. In fact, three years down the line, who knows if he will possess the political will to enact such a decision. Presidents in wartime usually alter their policies, contingent on tactics and military recommendations (as we are now witnessing in Afghanistan). If Iraq once again turns into a bloodbath, Obama may be forced to engage in the very same debate he is currently experiencing with respect to Afghanistan.
Iran is another case in point. Your prediction is probably correct; the Islamic Republic will most likely remain in power for the forseeable future. The part of your Iranian prediction that I do take issue with is the process of uranium enrichment. You argue that Tehran will continue developing its nuclear program, despite international sanctions and worldwide condemnation. And who could oppose this conclusion, given Iran's consistent use of covert sabotage against the IAEA...not to mention the Islamic Republic's aggressive attempt to turn back the clock to the glory days of the Persian Empire.
While respectable, who is to say that the Israeli Government may not decide to launch a unilateral preemptive strike on Iran's nuclear facilities in the next couple of years? Granted, I completely object to this use of force; Tehran would certainly retaliate with Hezbollah and Hamas attacks, and would more likely than not strike U.S. ships in the Persian Gulf (not to mention making things even more difficult for American troops in Afghanistan).
Yet, whereas Americans view the military option as reprehensible and destabilizing, Israeli elites view with admiration as the best possible solution to the nuclear problem. The fact that the Israeli public is generally drifting towards a more confrontational tone does not help the situation either.
These two issues- Iran and Iraq- may still be up for debate. On the other subjects you refer to, such as the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and nonproliferation, I am in wholehearted agreement. I only question whether President Obama will have the resolve to enact your notion of a "Plan B." For politicians in general, it is often difficult to replace international liberalism with realism. In a way, it goes against the fabric of American tradition; for decades, Americans have viewed themselves as the protector and exporter of democratic transparency.
http://depetris.wordpress.com
First off,
you're tacitly assuming that the steadily worsening US domestic scene, including a shrinking economy and growing unemployment, will have no effect on foreign policy. But it is bound to, isn't it? National power has many components, and is difficult to measure, but certainly domestic strengths (and weaknesses, in the negative) are important.
This is the key point. And
This is the key point.
And keep in mind, there's something of a feedback loop here; for example, it's generally recognized that the dollar is the reserve currency largely due to the Pax Americana, but if the dollar is supplanted/weakened enough it becomes harder to maintain the Pax Americana, which, in turn, makes the dollar less attractive as the reserve currency, and so on.
I like the way Jo Comerford puts it:
http://www.commondreams.org/view/2009/10/20-0
A few steps
As many observers have noted, the NeoCons are still very powerful (claiming the Middle East as there own policy playground), so I recognize that President Obama faces an uphill battle. However, two things happened recently that have given me a little comfort:
1) The Bush Administration had the temerity to declare the head of government of a NATO partner, Spain's Zapatero as persona non grata. This disgrace (made all the worse by the dozens of Spaniards who died in Iraq and Afghanistan) has been remedied by Mr. Zapatero's official visit to Washington.
2) On the subject of Sudan, Obama has retired hawk Jendayi Frazer from the diplomatic corps (gone to U of Pittsburgh I think) and is engaging Sudan on Darfur by offering incentives.
Raw power
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/07/04/050704fa_fact
Quote:
David Steiner, a New Jersey real-estate developer who was then serving as aipac’s president, was caught on tape boasting that he had “cut a deal” with the Administration of George H. W. Bush to provide more aid to Israel. Steiner also said that he was “negotiating” with the incoming Clinton Administration over the appointment of a pro-Israel Secretary of State. “We have a dozen people in his”—Clinton’s—“headquarters . . . and they are all going to get big jobs,” Steiner said. Soon after the tape’s existence was disclosed, Steiner resigned his post. I asked Rosen if aipac suffered a loss of influence after the Steiner affair. A half smile appeared on his face, and he pushed a napkin across the table. “You see this napkin?” he said. “In twenty-four hours, we could have the signatures of seventy senators on this napkin.”
Plan B could be Plan A, if
Plan B could be Plan A, if Obama was not so ready to compromise on his vision from the get-go.
He should act presidential and lead us to achieve the vision he was elected to realize, not give in to every Tom, Dick and AIPAC that comes down the road.
Wait, what was Plan A?
Has the administration even articulated a plan A?
I think what Walt means by
I think what Walt means by plan A is whatever is happening now. That constitutes Plan A.
What I mean by plan A is what Obama was elected to do: his campaign rhetoric: close Gitmo, get out of Iraq, treat Israel and Palestinians equally, stop frickin' eavesdropping on my phone calls.
Everything most Americans kicked the Republicans out of office for: that is plan A, by and large.
Time for Paradigm B
1. Your assessment of US policy challenges are overly optimistic. You limit US entanglements in (South) Asia to those in Afghanistan. And you disregard the erosion of US economic power in the world that will accompany gradual demise of the US$ as the reserve currency. The erosion of economic power makes pursuit of all other domestic and foreign objectives more difficult, if not impossible.
2. Your plans A and B are cast within the same paradigm -- let us call it Paradigm A. In this paradigm, United States can and should try to attain and maintain 'full spectrum dominance' by any means at its disposals. Within Paradigm A, there is not much difference between Bush and Obama plans for South Asia, Iraq, Iran, Persian Gulf, Israel-Palestine, etc. The overall objective is to contain and suppress any emerging challenge to US power and dominance.
Paradigm B requires a multilateral framework to world problems. By fashioning such a framework, United States can have an enduring leading even dominant position in the world. In such a world, however, United States does not seek to dominate the world through military and economic might. The US will not try to micro-manage the world. In such a dynamic golobal order, emerging powers are accomodated, rather than contain. In such a world, the United States does not pick and choose which UNSC resolutions it wishes to adhere to, and which one does not. In such a world, all sovereign states are treated equitably; there is nor room for liberal interventionism; states than can be trusted with WMD and those that do not; a distinction is made between insurgents fighting against tyrany and terrorists, etc.
Not only that --
He doesn't address the obscene non-war Pentagon budget which includes the procurement of tremendously expensive airplanes and ships which have no use and/or are obsolete, along with the crews that man and maintain them, plus the 700+ military installations around the world, including the new military city being built in prosperous and heavily-armed South Korea.
1. Not only will Israel still
1. Not only will Israel still be occupying the West Bank and controlling the Gaza Strip, three years from now they'll still be blaming the Palestinians for some random crap that has nothing with moving peace talks forward.
Number 2's a safe bet. It's always hard to withdraw troops when you never had any tangible goals sending them in there in the first place. It's really easy for your naysayers to declare you a loser.
3. ditto #2.
4. I sure as hell hope whatever regime in Iran there is decides to continue towards nuclearizing. We can't exactly guarantee that we won't put another cowboy President in charge of our military. I'd do the same if I was them.
Number 5 may not be such a safe bet. I bet we get some sort of protocol in place in the next few years.
6. Come on Prof.! That's not even a fair bet. We're talking if the sky was to part and G-d himself was to command all of these things to be destroyed, you'd still have the current nine refusing to go against their realist instincts.
Climate change will not happen
I highly doubt that China and India- not to mention other developing economies that will thrive in the next three years- will blindly agree to a significant environmental protocol. In the past, as in the present, Chinese leaders have made it rather clear that a treaty designed to curtail national growth will be refused with the utmost passion. Beijing has been expanding its wealth and influence over the past thirty-years, nearly bolstering its economy by over 9 percent on an annual basis. And lets not forget that national wealth is usually a cataclysm for international power and hegemonic aspirations. Would China be so stupid as to throw three decades of success away, just for the "thumbs-up" approval of the United States?
In fact, China's opposition to the Kyoto Protocol is only the starting point. Many countries on the African continent have been fortunate enough to improve their desperate condition. African Governments are quickly raising the revenue that is most often associated with a brighter future; albeit at the expense of forest degradation and over-cropping. With some GDP rates on the continent doubling over the past year, and with some Africans actually starting to see the benefits of free-trade, the last thing the African population would want is a return to desolation. Unfortunately, the Kyoto Protocol would do just that.
On the other hand, if African Governments were able to improve their economic outlook without altering the natural landscape, the Kyoto Protocol would not be an issue. This, however, is a far stretch from the truth.
On a more symbolic note, the Kyoto Protocol would most likely be viewed by the developing world as yet another form of western intrusion. In particular, Africa and the Middle East- two regions that have historically been dominated by European colonialism- would not take kindly to new western demands. Leaders of the Third-World would simply use their earlier argument...the poor and underprivileged are paying for the environmental carelessness of Americans and Europeans.
Just because climate change is a soft-power concept does not mean that states will unquestionably accept the controversial tenants of Kyoto. For us Americans, it seems like a no brainer. For others, curbing CO2 emissions and placing quotas on corporations is suicidal for a prosperous future.
http://depetris.wordpress.com
In the past, as in the
I agree, and this is probably what will kill any international effort at seriously stopping climate change for the near future, since the Chinese also happen to be the world's biggest net emitter, and that's only going to grow. Ultimately, the atmosphere doesn't care where the CO2 comes from, whether it's an American SUV or a Chinese peasant burning wood.
That's what they're using now, although they're also using it with a touch of their usual demands - they claim that unless the Developed World funnels them adjustment money, they're going to be screwed by Developed World-initiated climate change.
Andrew Sullivan's
Andrew Sullivan's hyperventilations seem just as irrational now as during the runup to the Iraq war. Since when is he any sort of "smart observer"?
He gets credit for "switching sides"
Pun intended. If the center point in any debate is the best (a la David Broder), then anyone who jumps on both sides of the center is the wisest. Sullivan even created an award for the behavior named after Matt Kielbasas (spell check offered replacement for Ygeliasas).
We all were for Obama's Plan A
Professor Walt's hopes were similar to Obama's from what I've observed, that with relaxation of animosity and fixation, those that engaged the animosity and fixation would somehow loosen up themselves.
The US' opposition is the same as whom it was in 2008. Iran is still saber-rattling (now likely to escalate with the bombing of the Revolutionary Guards camp, and Iran blaming England and US for that). Hamas is still ambiguous re: Israel, and Netanyahu is still expansionist. Al Quaida still exists and still mobile.
And, the consequence of all of this is nuclear proliferation from those that do seem to regard nukes as an actual possible weapon to use, rather than as a firm taboo.
As a realist, objective changes really are what creates confidence.
There is less faith in international institutions whether the UN or US as world's police.
Was the world always as brutal as is reported now? Or, is this new?
To be more specific, I'd bet
I can definitely see that happening, although some niggling factors might speed it along (I suspect that we'll have the Third Intifada at some point between next year and 2012, when Hamas-Fatah talks fail for the fifty-millionth time, and the peace talks fall through . . . again). What interesting is that we're seeing some of this pessimism really creeping into the mainstream media - witness this Ethan Brommer analysis. He's not really saying anything that hasn't already been said, but still, it's not a good sign.
Then again, let's not lose all heart. While talks between Arafat and Rabin were on-going when he was elected, the actual Oslo Accords (in all their flawed, ultimately doomed glory) were not finally negotiated until 1994 - two years after Clinton was elected. These things take time unless someone is willing to be really brave - and that is nobody at this point. Not the Israelis, who don't trust the Palestinians and fear and despise a Hamas-like situation in the West Bank. Not the Palestinians, who are divided and angry. Not the US, which is trying to be an honest broker while a full backer of Israel. And certainly not the surrounding Arab states, who are all terrified of becoming Sadat Mk.II.
Assuming we get the troops there, I'm more optimistic than you are. While the place has been turbulent so long it's almost pathological (going on nearly three decades), it's important to remember that there actually is some sense of Afghan nationalism, and that the place isn't some Eternally Doomed Chaos Pool - there's a good article on how the country was more or less stable for decades under the monarchy in the twentieth century.
I personally doubt this one. The Iraqis seemed pretty insistent on the 2011 withdrawal, and there are major signs that the troops are packing up - witness the massive logistical effort to draw down. I suspect it will be an all-out situation with some very minor exceptions, simply because a Maliki government won't survive the next set of elections otherwise.
Probably not. Especially not with the major Developing Nations insisting on compensation payments.
I agree on the financial architecture point. The first such system grew up over decades around Great Britain, only to be wrecked by a combination of Britain's relative economic decline and World War I. The second system only emerged because the US was the overwhelming economic power among the Allies, and they could muscle everyone else into an agreement.
That type of cooperation isn't happening now, and I can't see it happening short of another Great Depression or War.
I strongly support this point. Of course, it's rather difficult to do in practice - the US is heavily tangled in alliances and agreements (de facto and de jure), and walking away from them causes loss in credibility. Moreover, the new media is only making the emotional impact of problems far away even worse; people can see pictures of a massacre on the other side of the world and scream "Do something!" or "Jihad!".
I don't entirely buy that - the Brits had a pretty major influence on the areas they colonized and conquered. I'd say it's more that we don't have the patience to do it, and probably never will - particularly since unlike the Brits, the Americans can't seem to openly support an empire over a long period of time.
That's possible - but keep in mind that extensive American power played a huge role in this type of thing. It wasn't because they admired the US that the dollar is the world's de facto currency, or that english is rapidly becoming the world's second language.
That said, we're likely to be much better of an example of democratic values if we didn't try to say that we're constantly supporting them even while we do the nasty stuff that states must occasionally do to ensure their position.
You're the only person I know
who is in any way optimistic about Afghanistan, that extremely poor isolated tribal artificial country which has been the downfall of so many armies and empires.
Unfortunately, there are plenty of "experts" who are optimistic
"The Paris of Central Asia" - wow, is that not saying much - is the angle in the NYT the other day. The worst that is said about Afghanistan is one guy who is "not 'incredibly optimistic' about Afghanistan after eight years of the current war." Well, thanks for that. Even Frederick Kagan gets to weigh in!
Even Roger Cohen is hawkish on Afghanistan, although at least he is not delusional.
The press is going down the exact same path with the Iraq War. Where are the dissenting voices? The administration and Kerry say no troops until there is a political settlement in Afghanistan and it's basically ignored.
In order to actually help the
In order to actually help the people of the US, some feelings are going to have to be hurt. First, Someone needs to break it to the Israeli settlers and their ultra right wing backers that they have been living in ( and creating) a nightmare that is now going to end completely whether they want it to or not. All US funding, military and not, should be made conditional upon the total cessation of settlements and their immediate removal except in the densest population concentrations directly on the border, and the than does NOT include those circling East Jerusalem or east Jerusalem itself. These people are in violation of International law and the US State Departments interpretation of it, and their behavior is totally unacceptable for an Ally of the US who recieve aid and diplomatic support.
Once the cash and dioplomatic cover stops, Netanyahu and his crew (like the ultra nationalist racist Lieberman will be out on their ears, and we will be presented with real politicians to deal with, or we will no longer be affiliated with the country. Either scenario would be a foreign policy win for the US, but only one is good for Israel.
The republicans must learn that mindless obstructionism is not acceptable and the Public option is inevitable, so they better start trying to figure out how to make it work at peak efficiency. The cowering (blue) dog democrats need to understand that they had better stand up for the American people at a time of historic opportunity and push a healthy public option through, or be branded as cowards who will soon need to seek other employment (where their current legislative action has ensured that their health care will be nightmarish in comparison to their current golden package.)
Just a thought: we should strip every congressman and senator of their health care, and let them find a good package on the open market, buying as individuals. If they are convinced that the current system is so great, they ought to step up and prove it.
Obama
Not that you care about the Constitution, since you think a non constitutional mandate to buy health insurance should be pushed on the American people... Obama is a Usurper to Presidency. He is not a Natural Born Citizen. His father was not a Citizen when Obama 2 was born. Even if he was born in the White House, he is not a Natural Born Citizen. He must be Born in the US to 2 Citizen Parents. Oh, I know, "Crazy birther", you'll say. Well I don't care where he was born, could have been the White House, in JFKs lap. He is not a Natural Born Citizen(which is the requirement, not American Citizen) because of a fact he has already admitted at Fight the Smears. AT BIRTH his citizenship was "governed" by the British Nationality Act of 1948. As a dual citizen AT BIRTH, he can never be a Natural Born Citizen. Just so you know, McCain, born in Colon, Panama, is not a Natural Born Citizen either. Anything Obama has signed will be null and void when this Treasonous Usurpation comes to light.
Prof. Walt /very briefly.
If the US treats those leaders whom it backs, with half the respect it awards those leaders whom it is trying to thwart, then perhaps there will be in the world more grateful leaders to the USA.
khairi janbek.paris/france
dave1995 said that "plans A
dave1995 said that "plans A and B are cast within the same paradigm". I agree. Among other things Walt says his Plan B "means exploiting balances of power and playing divide-and-conquer". He endorses the mentality that USA has "stubborn opponents", and he desires "to use American power -- in either its hard and soft forms -- in ways designed to shape the calculations and actions of ... [America's] adversaries."
That's the Bush paradigm all over again. It is a mentality that creates adversaries and wars. America doesn't have adversaries, except those created by the interventionist paradigm of its foreign policy establishment. That paradigm has largely been a failure, I'm pleased to say, and I'm confident it will keep on being a failure.