High Cost, Low Odds (from THE NATION)

What you say in the Nation essay makes sense to me

While I was reading it, something struck me. Does it make sense that being preoccupied with a difficult insurgency really has the effect of diverting our thinking time and our resources away from issues in the region that may actually matter? If we take each of these issues separately and assess them and then devise a strategy for each issue, we may then be able to assess the feasibility and costs of dealing with each issue. For example, how does the shifting factional alliances in Pakistan affect the security of the nukes? What about China’s ability to encroach into Pakistan’s economy and into Afghanistan’s natural resources? What about the drugs? What about the natural resources in the entire region that could serve to develop those economies and serve to help us? What about the very strong threat that organized crime allied with Russia’s organized crime will take control of a majority of the budding businesses in the entire region?

If we continue down the path that we are now following, we have very little chance that we will ever assess our interests or feasible strategies.

Bob Spencer

I have to disagree with you on several points here Mr. Walt, and to be honest some points of your reasoning confuse me a great deal.

To start you argue that the cost of 850 soldiers dead and thousands more wounded is too high. In Iraq over 4,000 soldiers have died and though I was unable to find a trustworthy number for injured there a fair estimate could be in the tens of thousands. In Vietnam over 58,000 soldiers died with perhaps over 150,000 injured. In the Soviet-Afghan war the Soviets had almost 15,000 dead with several hundred thousand wounded. In my opinion the United States has gotten so accustomed to winning wars quickly and with few casualties that any casualties suddenly become a sign of failure. Of course the United States has spent only eight years in Afghanistan compared to nine (from 1964 with the major escalation of the war to 1973) in Vietnam and the ten years the Soviets spent in Afghanistan, but it is absurd to think that we will somehow see an increase in casualties of ten thousand dead and tens of thousands wounded in just one more year.

On money I will agree with you in part. I do note that far more was spent on Iraq without crippling the United States, but I will accept that it can be argued that under the current situation the United States cannot afford to continue this war. However I would like to remind you that the U.S economy is worth over ten trillion dollars. Even if the government can't tap into all of that wealth efficiently taxes still provide a large treasury.

On Al Quaeda I am not convinced that the versions in Somalia, Nigeria, and Yemen should really be equated with the group currently in South Asia. Certainly they claim the same name and extol the virtues of the leadership, but their actions seem primarily national in nature. So far the Nigerian group does not seem to have felt any need to pull off a terrorist attack outside of Africa, and the Somali groups (who don't even use the name Al Quaeda) have focused their efforts on Somalia instead of attempting to spread their movement to Ethiopia, Eritrea, of Kenya.

Lastly the entire paragraph made on the likelihood of victory. For brevity's sake (this is already long enough) I won't paste the entire thing here, but it is the one that remarks on the odds of a victory. I suggest that you reread it carefully Mr. Walt, because glancing at it I see absolutely no difference between that paragraph and hundreds of ones written about Iraq between 2004 and 2007. Replace 'Taliban' with 'insurgents' or 'Al Quaeda', 'Pakistan' with 'Iran', and 'Karzai government' with 'al-Maliki', and I could put this in the Washington Post in 2005 with no difficulty.

For an alternative viewpoint on this issue, take a glance at Jim Arkedis' piece on foreign policy.com.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/23/got_safe_haven

Although Dr. Arkedis's thesis on Afghanistan refutes the one portrayed by Walt, it gives a much-needed exposure to the other side of the issue. Whether you are a supporter of a decreased U.S. presence in Afghanistan or an advocate of General Stanley McChrystal's counterinsurgency strategy, I think we can all agree on one thing: The Afghan debate is continuing to build up in significance within academia, government, and non-profit organizations. This could very well be one of the most crucial moments in contemporary American history.

With that being said, I personally believe that Dr. Walt is underestimating- once again- the inherent power of the Taliban Movement. In previous posts, I have argued that the Al'Qaeda (AQ) network has the capability to expand its operations in Afghanistan once U.S. troops leave. In fact, approaching the Afghan quagmire solely through the lens of counterterrorism fails to deal with the very same problems- poor governance, corruption, poverty, and the absence of impartial legal systems- that usually draws young Islamic men into the ranks of Jihad in the first place.

This, however, is for another debate. The point that I want to emphasize is Dr. Walt's assumption of Taliban behavior...namely that Mullah Omar and other Taliban officials want to limit AQ's reemergence in Afghanistan. This, of course, is assuming that Taliban militants would be able to reclaim their governing authority in Kabul and Kandahar (something that will unfortunately result from VP Biden's "offshore strategy").

Given the fact that the Taliban Government paid the overall price for AQ’s actions on September 11, it is understandable that Omar would want to rid Afghanistan from Al'Qaeda training camps. This is an obvious assumption, a statement that top academics have repeatedly argued over the past couple of weeks. Kicking out jihadists with global aspirations is perhaps the best policy choice for a second Taliban stint in Afghan politics.

The problem with this policy is whether the Taliban actually has the resources and manpower that could make this dream into a reality. At first glance, I have no reason to believe that this would be the case. Does the Taliban possess institutions that exclusively deal with the Afghan-Pakistani border? It is extremely hard to survey and capture terrorists for the technologically-sophisticated United States, let alone for a bunch of former insurgents that have had historic connections with Islamic jihadists.

What about the extent of Taliban rule? Previous Afghan Governments (such as the King of Afghanistan, the Afghan Communist administration, the Taliban, and Hamid Karzai) have failed to control 100 percent of the territory. In fact, most decisions are made at the local-level, through tribal councils and ethnic affiliations. Who is to say that the Pashtuns or the Tajiks would not take matters into their own hands, using Al'Qaeda as a proxy-force to undermine the effectiveness of Taliban rule? This is indeed possible, given the Pashtun's extreme desire for an independent state.

All of these possibilities need to be taken at face-value. Sure, a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan would be great! A reformed path along the lines of traditional counterterrorism would be nice as well. But, if Washington is truly mulling over this approach, they better start asking these kinds of questions.

Would South Asia be all that different with an "off-shore balancing policy," and if so, what benefits would the United States receive as a result? On a personal basis, I neglect to see anything all that substantial for U.S. interests, not to mention for the global counterterrorist campaign.

http://depetris.wordpress.com

If the US national interest calculation is so simple, whose national interest is really being served? Does stoking the flames of animosity toward the USA and Israel in South Asia really serve the national interest of the State of Israel?

The Israel Lobby explains the problem, for organized Israel advocacy is not merely a lobby but has created its own virtual imperial system, in which the US government plays the role of an intimidated and dependent client: What I said in Washington.

Following cash flows helps explain a lot. Several of the big players in Israel Lobby funding are profiting handsomely from the Afpak conflict.

If you have a doubt about the existence of a virtual imperial system of which the Israel Lobby is the public face, take a look at the political struggle in the Netherlands.

We can watch as the Netherlands is itself turned into a Lobby dependency right before our eyes: Wilders' Columbia Song and Dance.

BTW, Thomas Hegghammer, who is Harvard Kennedy School's resident specialist in Arab Jihadism was recently interviewed: Thomas Hegghammer al-Qaida Interview. The content may help evaluate the reality of some common claims about the Taliban and al-Qaeda.