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Playing hard to get
Building on Robert Farley, Matt Yglesias has a smart post about the value of playing "hard to get" in American diplomacy. The basic idea is simple: the United States is very powerful and fairly secure, and so our allies usually need our support more than we need theirs. If we understand that fact, we gain a lot of leverage over their conduct by making it clear that our support depends on their cooperation. If we forget that fact, or we start obsessing about our own credibility and need to demonstrate "toughness," we lose that leverage and others start taking advantage of us.
Of course, I think this point is smart because I made the same argument in the conclusion of Taming American Power. Check out pp. 240-243. And I'm glad Robert and Matt are resurrecting this line of argument, because new ideas don't catch on unless people repeating them over and over and over ...
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Prof. Walt,
Worth linking to, as well, is your recent piece for The Nation, where you make a similar point:
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20091109/walt
Is that really a new idea?
Is that really a new idea? Because, living in a poor country, Ive always thought of things being that way. Poor countries are aware of this 24/7. Weird that this is not the case in the US.
Is that really a new idea?
It's probably because the US has some breathing space due to its power and wealth. Poor countries, and especially vulnerable poor countries, generally have to keep at least one eye on reality at all times.
Exactly!
Yes. The amazing thing is that the US is so inept when they try to deal politics in a poor country. Like you say, poor people have to alway keep an eye on reality. Life is continually like a village market with people looking to make the best deal for themselves. At the same time personal relations and friendships are more emotionally significant.
What really amazes me is the southern US politics are closer to that style, but when it comes to using those skills overseas, we seem to forget how things work.
But you get it exactly right. It's not a new idea in a most of the world, but Americans have not yet learned how it works.
Bob Spencer
True ...up to a point.
The proposition that the United States, being the most powerful country, is better off playing "hard to get" rather than demonstrating "toughness" in foreign policy is true, especially if the game being played is not "repeating".
Conducting foreign policy by demonstrating "toughness" is not a viable option for the lesser powers. For a "hyper-power", "toughness" in foreign policy may yield results in the short-run (i.e., one-time game), but is a sure recipe for 'death-with-a-thousand-cuts' in the long run (i.e., repeated games).
Foreign policy by playing "hard to get" is not an option for small and weak countries. Neither can such countries afford to view foreign policy as isolated, one-time games. A "hyper-power" can benefit by playing "hard to get" in foreign policy, especially if the game being played is not viewed as "repeating" by other players. For the "hyper-power", the benefits of "hard to get" must diminish over time. This is because when a "hyper-power" conducts its foreign policy as if they were isolated and unrelated games (e.g., by forming 'coalition-of-the-willing' to work for specific goals), the weaker players whose collaborations are sought by the "hyper power" will try "hard to get" to extract the maximum short-term leverage that they can.
The basic idea may be simple,
The basic idea may be simple, but you ought to know that the reality is not. The "simple" truth is that in many instances, we need the support of others for what we want. In those cases, the result of playing "hard to get" is failure since there may not be a natural constituency for our desired outcome.
Look at Iranian nukes for an example. If the US were playing 'hard to get' on this issue, what would have happened so far? The Russians and Chinese would be even less inclined to act, and the EU would remain comfortably complacent. Maybe the Israelis would be willing to make some concessions on something we care about like settlements, and maybe some of the Arab states would be seeking our support. All together, that sounds like a recipe for even less international pressure on Iran, and more chance that the Israelis would do something stupid like try to destroy the Iranian nuclear program.
There are alternatives
If the US govt were seeking alternatives to Iran other than "toughness," e.g., threats of bombing, sanctions, stationing a carrier off shore, those alternatives are not limited to abstaining from playing in the issue. The alternatives are playing "hard to get" but not unapproachable, e.g., "hey, let's make a deal, we have goods, you have a needy population, everyone makes out - but I'm not cheap. There are conditions."
The alternative to "hard to get" isn't "toughness"
I'm challenging the notion that the US should (or even can) play "hard to get" when we want something to happen. That isn't to say that the alternative is toughness. I'm not some neo-con nitwit who misunderstands Macchiavelli and thinks fear is where it's at. We clearly need a different approach than playing tough guy with our international opponents, but playing "hard to get" with our allies is most likely not going to get them to help us out on these issues.
If we forget that fact, or we
I suppose that's true, but I do have two quibbles-
1. It is based heavily on "ability to withdraw". Meaning that the US could withdraw from the agreement without taking a security, economic, etc hit. This may not always be the case; the costs of the US's withdrawal from NATO and Europe at the height of the Cold War probably would have been severe.
2. There are actually some cases where we do need a particular ally, and they may be difficult to bring around. If there is competition for that ally, or they are on the fence, then perceived US fecklessness and weakness actually can hurt our capabilities.
Of course, it's also important not to lose sight of the domestic component of foreign policy. A government that appears to surrender significant "face" may find itself out of power at home.
The idea's not new...
The idea's not new...it's just never caught on in the United States (Or many other hegemonic powers). Realists have made the argument for decades, but I guess creating leverage is just something that leaders think is either "appeasement" or political suicide.
On the bright side, since it's never been seriously considered (at least since Kissinger-Nixon), we realists can keep making the argument and it sounds inventive and novel every time.
Pop That Balloon
Isn't it a bit triumphalist to ignore the perception, particularly among East Asians, that Beijing is a hedge against the US. And, considering the Chinese and Russian vetoes on the UNSC, doesn't the US have to play this card selectively?
The US should sign a deal
The US should sign a deal with the Afghan Government so that we can have permanent (90-year) base near Kandahar. We should be able to act independent of the Afghan Government for that duration. All but 20'000 military personnel within this well equipped and a well-fortified base should be withdrawn.
Our mission should be to destroy the poppy fields, disarm and destroy the sworn enemies of the US through surgical attacks as targets present themselves. We can only assist the democratically elected Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan to establish their jurisdiction in those tribal regions. These two governments will have to police themselves and suppress their own insurgents.