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Quotation for the day
Corruption now 'dominates and paralyzes the society,' David Halberstam observed. American officials perceived the problems but they could not find solutions. ... The Embassy pressed the government to remove officials known to be corrupt, but with little result. 'You fight like hell to get someone removed and most times you fail and you just make it worse,' a frustrated American explained to Halberstam. 'And then on occasions when you win, why hell, they give you someone just as bad.' The United States found to its chagrin that as its commitment increased its leverage diminished. Concern with corruption and inefficiency was always balanced by fear that tough action might alienate the government or bring about its collapse. Lodge and Westmoreland were inclined to accept the situation and deal with other problems."
Source: George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States in Vietnam, 1950-1975., 1st. ed., pp. 162-63. The Halberstam quotations are from his article, "Return to Vietnam," Harpers (December 1967).
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“The pessimist complains about the wind; the optimist expects it to change; the realist adjusts the sails.”
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Relations at Harvard University.
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We may a bit more leverage
We may a bit more leverage now. Anyone who knows the American side of the Vietnam war should also know that the U.S might not stay for very long, leaving a dictator to the mercy of the insurgents.
It is very typical of the
It is very typical of the American failure to understand other societies to imagine that the US can, through threats, leverage, whatever, "eliminate corruption" or even "fight corruption" today in Afghanistan, any more than in Vietnam in the 1970s (when Lodge and Westmoreland were certainly right about this point if nothing else). This is how many societies around the world are still organized -- political power is used first and foremost to accumulate wealth, which is then used to stay in power. Of course, it's an awful system which has disastrous consequences for normal people (even if I sometimes think that America, or say, Italy, are not so different). But it is a coherent way of organizing the political structure of a society, and you can't change that sort of thing except on a generational timescale. You can't just lean on Karzai and imagine that everything (or anything) will change. Part of the reason we should get the hell out of there.
This is a bit off topic...
and I'm sure most of the wonks that follow Prof. Walt's posts already know this, but I came across some interesting info that may be related to the AfPak debate.
Apparently the leading institute behind the White House and Congressional strategic thinking on AfPak is the Center for American Progress.
I'm not too too savvy on how the policy process works when it comes to foreign affairs, but I'll cite for instance the introduction of the original Senate Bill (s.962) for Pak Aid by John Kerry back on 5/4/2009, which was "Held at the desk" as of 6/25/2009.
On 5/27/2009 the "Meeting the Challenges in Pakistan" report was released by the Center for American Progress. Sections of this report seem to have been taken (verbatim in some instances) and incorporated into the final bill (S.1707/H.R.3642) that was re-introduced as of 9/24/09, and became law as of the 15th of last month.
John Podesta is the current President at C.A.P, and he also was a co-chairman of the Obama transition team.
I suppose we know where to look for early signs of where policy will be headed in the near future.
* apologies in advance if the "Thomas" system isn't working. It's a bit fickle at times.
Not noticing who the Afghans are
Virtually all foreign debate about Afghanistan seems to be about which citizens should be shot at -- bombing's in disfavor after nearly eight years of it -- and killed, and which should be protected and helped. Slicing into this miasma comes this week's official Afghan estimate that about nine million of those citizens live on less than sixty-six cents a day -- which means in practical effect, they rely on foreign food aid to some degree.
There were only seven million starving Afghans being helped with foreign food aid in November 2001, when the Coalition arrived. So we see that in Afghanistan, war continues hell, while in the US, it's mostly only a topic for discussion and debate.
your buddy meirsheimer has a
your buddy meirsheimer has a good oped in FP today on this.
Sounds familiar...
Both regarding Afghanistan, and Iraq, and in some ways the US. Says something sad about humanity, I guess...
A Huge Difference.
There is a huge difference, with all due respect, between fighting against one corrupt official or another, and trying to press for their replacement; albeit unsuccessfully at times, and, supporting and subsidising knowingly, one politician or another, under the dictum of "he is an S.O.B, but he is our S.O.B".
khairi janbek.paris/france
compare and contrast
Eh---So, how does Afghan corruption compare to say, the financial oligarchy takeover of the US government http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200905/imf-advice ---or compared to the military lobby’s influence?
Perhaps we are faced with a different kind of corruption in Afghanistan that is motivated by building political alliances as much or probably more than greed. It’s different from our own even though it is at a much less financial scale.
When you start studying comparative corruption, it opens an area of comparative cultures and opens the eyes to condemn the others less and become more introspective about ourselves.
Bob Spencer