Monday, November 9, 2009 - 3:12 PM

I first saw the Berlin Wall in March 1976, when I arrived for a semester's study at Stanford's overseas program there. As an international relations major interested in security affairs, I wanted to see the Cold War "up close and personal," and what better place to do it than the divided city that was the site of numerous Soviet-American confrontations?
It was an education, especially for a rather naive kid from California who had never been outside the United States. Foreigners could visit East Berlin relatively easily by then, yet crossing at Checkpoint Charlie was always a somewhat forbidding experience. The lines to cross were often long and tedious, the border guards sullen and arbitrary, and I always seemed to be the person they wanted to take into the back room for an extra search and a lot of questions.
The Wall itself was an ugly thing: a concrete scar across a once-great city, complete with barbed wire, guard towers, and checkpoints. It was both an iconic symbol of division but also something very real and tangible. It divided families, stifled dreams, and sometimes killed people. Some 5,000 people reportedly tried to get across the Wall while it stood, and a hundred or more died in the attempt.
Like other barriers that divide human beings, the Wall was also a confession of failure. Had the communist vision been a success, there would have been no need for Wall to keep people in. It was an education in itself to live in West Berlin and to visit the East; whatever the failings of liberal capitalism might be, it was palpably superior to life on the Other Side. West Berlin seemed a bit like Oz -- a vibrant, lively, and decidedly materialistic city, filled with cafes, stores, students, dogs (and a lot of elderly people too), but East Berlin was a bit like Dorothy's black-and-white Kansas: drab, monochromatic, and obviously much poorer. And by most accounts, East Germany worked better than the rest of the Soviet empire did.
What lessons do I draw from the Wall, its history, and its eventual destruction? Here are five.
First, although the Wall was an affront to human freedom, it also made a signal contribution to global stability. Berlin had been a flash point for international politics in 1948, 1958, and again in 1961, largely because Germany's fate remained uncertain so long as the DDR continued to lose people to the economic miracle in the West. As Marc Trachtenberg pointed out some years ago, the erection of the Wall completed the Cold War division of Europe and dampened security competition there significantly.
The second lesson is that containment worked. The Wall eventually came down because the Soviet Union collapsed without a superpower war, and Eastern Europe was liberated peacefully. As Kennan had foreseen, the Western system was in fact superior to the communist order on numerous dimensions, which meant that patient forbearance made more sense than a strategy of "rollback" or preventive war. We might have brought the wall down sooner by starting a big war, but fortunately leaders on both sides understood how foolish that would have been. There's a lesson there for those trigger-happy folks who think preventive action is the best way to deal with threats, even dangers that far less ominous than the Soviet Union was.
Third, if containment worked, the fall of the Berlin Wall was a vivid reminder that empires don't. The history of the 20th century is littered with the corpses of the Ottoman, Russian, Austro-Hungarian, British, French, Dutch, and Soviet empires -- none of whom could withstand the corrosive solvent of modern nationalism. Once the desire for national self-determination had the opportunity to express itself, the Soviet empire collapsed with remarkable swiftness.
Fourth, the destruction of the Wall-and indeed, the collapse of the entire Soviet order-teaches that revolutionary upheavals are nearly impossible to forecast with any precision. As Timur Kuran and others have shown, an individual's willingness to rebel is a form of private information that cannot be reliably known in advance, especially in an authoritarian society where repression is a real possibility. As a result, seemingly minor events can suddenly induce rapid contagion effects that even the participants themselves did not anticipate. Although a few observers recognized that the Soviet order was in trouble, hardly anyone believed it could collapse as quickly as it did or that Germany would reunify in a few years. The real lesson, however, is that although dramatic political change does occur from time to time, it rarely does so accordingly to anyone's timetable. The moral: Don't base your policy towards an adversary on the assumption that its rulers are on their last legs. Maybe they are, but maybe not, and nobody really knows.
Fifth and last, the fall of the Wall highlights the critical role of the individual in history. I'm a big believer in the importance of large structural forces -- the changing distribution of power, economic growth rates, demographic trends, and even evolving normative understandings -- but history sometimes turns on an individuals's ideas and initiatives. As I see it, it wasn't Reagan's saying "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall" that led to it being broken into a million pieces (and then sold off, in a wonderful symbol of capitalist triumph), it was the fact that Gorbachev listened and was already thinking along similar lines. Had Andropov or Chernenko been younger or in better health, the Wall would have remained standing well into the 1990s, and we would not be celebrating anything today.
So as we congratulate ourselves for winning the Cold War and congratulate Germans on the destruction of a hated symbol of division, let us also reserve a word of thanks for those on the other side who also helped make that destruction possible.
GERARD MALIE/AFP/Getty Images
The obvious lesson is that weakness is provocative; after all, it was Kennedy and Fulbright was inspired the wall, and, in fact, the wall was originally Fulbright's idea (who says Senators can't cause trouble?), at least he was the first here to publicly float the idea of a Berlin wall. Of course, the wall was erected because Kennedy and Fulbright believed that if the Soviets didn't feel threatened, they would open up and we would all get along. While eventually, Kennedy realized his error, it was this display of weakness that led to the Cuban Missile Crisis and placed the world on the edge of nuclear annihilation.
Throughout the 1950s, the E.German authorities mulled over building a wall to isolate W.Berlin. Almost 3.5 million Germans moved from the East to the West (1949-1961) causing great alarm especially with the brain-drain of highly qualified professionals.
The Soviets were not eager to advise on building such a wall as they were not ready to provoke a war with the USA. This was clearly apparent, when in 1958 Kruschev threatened the western powers to leave West Berlin or risk a war, and subsequently backed down immediately after President Kennedy declared in his speech, that the US is prepared to go to war over West Berlin.
Ironically, this Kennedy July famous speech, was the sign needed for the Soviets to back the building of a wall to isolate W.Berlin, because there was no committment in the speech whatsoever, to the status of E.Berlin. Almost a day after the Speech, "Operation Rose" to build the wall took effect.
khairi janbek.paris/france
Of course Prof.Walt is a renouned intellectual and pedagogue, therefore, the lessons he derives from the experience of the "Wall" are based on the power of the idea. For myself, whom is neither an intellectual nor anything more than a layman, the most important lesson would be, 'if you are a dictator, running a one-party state, do not mess around with ideas like "Perestroika"'.
khairi janbek.paris/france
True, but by that philosophy you run the risk of turning your looming power into a dinosaur of a state. Some states can make the transition to politically authoritarian yet economically more liberal*, some can't. I think the past eighteen years makes perfectly clear what happens when they can't.
On Mr. Walt's number three: I simply have to disagree. To me the nation-state is simply the most widespread political model of the present. Given that so much of known human history has an imperial model I think that we will see more in the future.
Of course then you have the problem of how to define an empire. My professor gave a loose description of an area of land dominated by one state with a single executive figure that is dominated by one group and all other groups are told that they cannot become part of that group. That description does have the flaw of failing the test with the Roman empire (auxiliaries and their families could become citizens) but so far I haven't been able to find a better one.
*Of course that doesn't mean that they have embraced free market theory, simply that they have moved away from planned economies.
Towards the end of the Cold War, the world had around 80 liberal democracies. Now there are over 140 liberal democracies. However, in the absence of any viable alternative to the nation-state, I think it is likely to endure for a very long time yet.
The real challenge to liberal-democracy, is not the "Emporium" system, rather the immulation of the successful systems of Russian authoritarian democracy, and Chinese authoriatarian management of economic development. The asterix of your good self is a good example.
khairi janbek.paris/france
An authoritarian economy isn't exclusive to China. Most of Asia developed under a centrally-planned economy, a majority of them pro-West and (later on) democratic.
But many moved on while China refuses to budge. In addition, there is no telling how many of the world's liberal democracies may revert to authoritarian democratic systems in the future.
khairi janbek.paris/france
"But many moved on while China refuses to budge."
No they haven't. The majority of Asian nations still follow a command economy. It's just that when times are good they loosened control on their markets, but when times are bad they tighten them again. Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and almost all other Asian Tigers do this, not just China.
I think you are confusing authoritarian economic models with authoritarian political models.
Steve,
off-topic but did you see Tel Aviv professor Sholmo Sand's work on the zionist myth. It is all over the place in Israel, but it is truth that dare not speak its name in the US -- as per usual.
Check:
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/966952.html
"the author attempts to prove that the Jews now living in Israel and other places in the world are not at all descendants of the ancient people who inhabited the Kingdom of Judea during the First and Second Temple period. Their origins, according to him, are in varied peoples that converted to Judaism during the course of history, in different corners of the Mediterranean Basin and the adjacent regions."
You may be interested in his website:
http://inventionofthejewishpeople.com/
I guess he must be another anti-Semetic Jew! ;)
Sshhhhhht! Don't mention the (Israeli Apartheid) Wall!!
The fall of the Berlin wall shows that walls no longer work. But the zionist-controlled media have carefully omitted drawing the obvious parallel; this will not help in the longer run. Zionist racism, the most violent racism in the world, cannot rely on the traditional means - control of mainstream media and politicians - for survival.
A populist rebellion of the serfs is under way.
Is Dr. Walt sure about this? Empires don't work compared to what?
Of the empires he lists here, all but the Soviet empire endured for centuries, and all but the Soviet empire dissolved under the pressure of war with other empires. No anti-imperialist force in modern history ever did as much damage to empire in the world as the German Army. Even in the Soviet case, empire would have been preserved easily if nationalism was the only thing it had to worry about.
Moreover, what has replaced empire since World War II as a means of governance has been an improvement only intermittently. The politically correct term for post-imperial governance is "self-determination," which has two unfortunate characteristics. The first is that oppression by a native tyrant can be crueler and more durable than rule by a foreign one. Saddam Hussein represented self-determination; so did the Cuban and North Vietnamese police states; so does Bashir's Sudan and Mugabe's Zimbabwe (and for that matter apartheid-era South Africa). Then, too, quarrels over who is going to do the self-determining, if they lack an external referee able to impose a solution, can drag on for decades at stupendous cost in blood and treasure: Sri Lanka, El Salvador, Congo.
The second is harder to see at any moment in time. The fact of change is a great challenge to governance anywhere. It is arguably a much greater challenge in small, independent communities trying to fend for themselves in a turbulent economic and political environment over which their leaders cannot exercise more than a minimal amount of control. A Kenya or Ghana that became independent in a world that allowed them political stability and relative prosperity struggled to maintain either when the world changed.
I mention this questionable aspect of Dr. Walt's argument by way of drawing attention to one glaring omission from his list of lessons. This, of course, involves Communism: atheistic, godless Communism, the ideology dedicated to placing all political power in the hands of the state, the ideology of the purges and the Soviet gulag. When the Berlin Wall came down, one lesson above all was taught with crystal clarity: Communism failed, like the Naziism with which it had so much in common. When the Cold War ended, Communism lost and the forces of freedom won. History eventually imposes its judgement on an ideology so irredeemably evil. The cause of civilization would be ill-served if we ever let Walt's lessons or any others obscure that one.
I think that England and France were not happy when the wall collapsed in 1989. The French president Francois Miterrand and the British Prime Minister Tatcher did not want a resurgent Germany in continental Europe. They in fact did all they could to prevent the collapse of the East. For a resurgent Germany would bring bad memories and would undermine the French and British interests.
The collapse of the wall has brought a lot of changes in Europe, a strong Germany has helped the EU to absorb the newly liberated area from Eastern Europe. It has also diminished the possibility of war with Russia.
I don't know about your good self's contention, that they did all they could to keep the wall, but certainly, they were caught with their pants down; so to speak, when the wall collapsed.
khairi janbek.paris/france
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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