Building on 2 blunders: the dubious case for counterinsurgency

One is positive that Prof Walt is aware of The US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, published in 2007 by Chicago Univ. Press. It is a rather helpful guide I find, despite the fact that it is a rather cumbersome volume, and full of technicalities. I remember noting at the time a few points, but there are a couple of points which I find interesting for this discussion.

Section 2-57 and I quote: President John F. Kennedy noted " You [the professional military] must know something about strategy and tactics...logistics, but also economics, and politics, and diplomacy and history. You must know everything you can about military power, and you must also understand, the limits of military power. You must understand that few of the important problems of our time...been finally solved by military power alone". No where is this insight more relevant than in COIN. Successful COIN efforts require unity of effort, in bringing all instruments of national power to bear. Civilian agencies can contribute direcly to the military operations, particularly by providing information.

Section 3-184 and I quote: What makes intelligence assessment for COIN so distinct and so challenging is the amount of socio-cultural information that must be gathered and understood. However, truly grasping the operational environment requires commanders and staffs to devote at least as much effort to understand the people they support, as they do to understand the enemy. All this information is essential to get at the root causes of the insurgency and determine the best ways to combat it.

Finally, and just an old wisdom " Essential though it is, the miltary action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom, to work safely with the population". David Galula; Counterinsurgency Warfare, 1964.

khairi janbek.paris/france

Even if we had gotten Bin Laden at Tora Bora, we were at that point in Afghanistan. The question is, would a better COIN policy have been more effective at preventing a return of the Taliban. The problem is that, by bribing corrupt Afghan warlords getting into Afghanistan, we had practically guaranteed the eventual failure of any COIN operation. There were multiple mistakes made, not simply a bad COIN policy. That said, I for one believe that a better COIN policy post invasion would have been beneficial; it just that the Bush administration wasn't interested in COIN initially and never put much emphasis on Afghanistan.

Looking forward, it seems that COIN should be part of military training; the probability that we will be involved in more of these regional wars/police actions is, in my opinion, is fairly high (whether we should be or not is another question). We should have military professional who are sensitized to this environment. I doubt, however, that it can be or will ever be a a major part of our global strategy; we will not be going around knocking off small nations and converting their societies to something more to our liking.

Counterinsurgency doesn't work if you were not the colonial power. Why? Because you need the "jaunis" and the "harkis": the French and Dutch can tell you all about it.

Obama needs at least 500,000 men to do what he wants to do in the Pashtun provinces. But such troops don't speak the language, hate the local religion and know nothing about the culture. Add that to the "Karzai Good Ole Boy System". Diem and Nhu all over again.

If we had captured or killed Osama bin Laden it wouldn't have changed much.
To start he is only one man. An important man and something of a figure to revere in militant Sunni circles perhaps, but Al Quaeda would survive without him.
Second, the Taliban was not reliant on Al Quaeda to fight then, and it is not now. Al Quaeda may be involved in training insurgents in the same way that a U.S soldier may be embedded to serve as a force multiplier, but that doesn't mean that if Al Quaeda didn't exist the insurgents wouldn't. Indeed we can see several differences of opinion between Al Quaeda leadership and Mullah Omar, such as on the United Nations.
Third, I do not believe that the end of Osama bin Laden would have prevented the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It is entirely possible that through interrogation of leading members Iraq's alleged involvement with Al Quaeda would have been discredited three years early, but that would not have stopped the invasion. I make this claim based on two things. The first is that many of the Republicans who signed a letter urging Mr. Clinton to oppose Iraq joined the Bush administration. The second is the fact that Mr. Bush (younger) seems to view the world in Manichean terms. Some of this can be attributed to playing to the crowd, but I suspect that he felt a need to do something grand.

On the Insurgency v. Commons debate, I don't understand why we can't do both. A destroyer can fight a naval battle just as easily as interdict pirate craft or terrorists. Also, given the fact that the U.S.S Cole has proven that terrorists can be a great threat to a vessel I think it criminally negligent to not prepare sailors for a range of potential threats.

Lastly, the idea that we should not prepare for a conflict based on the fact that it was a mistake seems to me to be a repeat of the arguments made after the Vietnam War. If we do not prepare for such things then we are forced to rely on our leaders to avoid any situation where they might face an insurgency, regardless of long term consequences of avoidance to the United States. Although this theory has not been tested yet, it is also being argued that as a result of the incredible might the U.S possesses potential enemies will invest more into asymmetric warfare instead of trying conventional tactics.

I think Walt doesn't go far enough. I agree with Bacevich, that Americans have bigger fish to fry, like re-examining war powers and the relationship between the regular and reserve forces. It doesn't really matter what the US military does as long as the average American has a bigger role to decide it.

I enjoy the fact that you regularly ask the larger questions which the more general "news" cycles ignore (here, not how to COIN better, but whether it is even desirable), but I thought you were going in other direction here. The point I expected you to make is that looking at this from the other side you could easily say we are fighting less (read: zero) great power wars exactly because we have focused defense strategy to deter them.

On the other hand what does "shifting" toward more COIN even mean? We aren't about to trade in our nukes for drones. So all it really means is "expand defense spending" on COIN. We certainly shouldn't be getting ourselves into the kind of massive mistakes of adventurism like Iraq, but preparing better counter terrorism operations (and executing them with minimum involvement in nation building)could potentially create higher deterrence for the kind of non-state threats that will likely continue to exist into the foreseeable future.

. . . of course, is our unconditional support of Israel, which underlies the rage we've earned in the Islamic world.

It's what's led to numerous secondary effects. For example, absent Israel, al Quaeda would probably be a fringe Saudi extremist group, with little appeal outside the extremist minorities in Mideast societies.

In addition to Osama's crew, there's the Muslim Brotherhood and other insurgent groups, all with the fate of the Palestinians as their opening gambit. See them metastasize in Somalia and Yemen.

We've done for the Mideast what the Versailles Treaty did for Adolph -- turned a cranky irritant into a major force.

If we think we have trouble "winning hearts and minds" in Afghanistan, wait until the full effects of Obama's cringing climbdown from his settlements policy will have throughout the Islamic world. And in particular when the explosions begin as the PA wallows in failure and Quisling-hood.

The Cairo speech was and is a perfect foil for demonstrating American insincerity and unfitness as "honest broker."

I have zero confidence that we will reverse this disastrous course.

Our legislature and executive are both intimidated and/or bought off by the Israeli lobby.

So the arms tap from America to Israel will stay wide open, there will be more incursions into Gaza and Lebanon, massive loss of life and inevitably Israel proper will become a battlefield once again. Congressional toadies will warble about defending democracy and continue to defend indefensible Israeli actions.

Our nation is a spectacle for ridicule.

Every place that Obama goes, foreign leaders know that major parts of American foreign policy are made, not by professionals sizing up US national interests, but by a domestic pressure group.

Couldn't agree more. There hasn't been an Osama statement that he has not discussed Palestine, going 'way back to a "Frontline" interview more than a decade ago.

Been watching reactions to Obama's trip to the Far East on France24 and AlJazeera, and most commentators waste no time in stating that Obama is the first US president to come to China in a weakened position from previous US presidents. Specifically, that China carries US' growing debt and the US needs China more that China does the US. Surely US policies re Israel have had a hand in this.

But never mind, the US is formulating its withdrawal from Afganistan. It's called "blame the Afganis": We have no reliable parter in Afganistan, there is endemic corruption, Karzai is incompetent, his brother is a thug, ad infinitum. I am reminded of the rapists excuses: The dress was provocative.

Of course any COIN strategy in Afghanistan is most likely to fail as Taliban has all the time in the world but NATO is going to pull out by 2011. There are only two ways Afghanistan can be stabilized to some degree, even with Karzai at the helm:
1. In place of 30-40,000 additional troops deploy 25,000 drones along the border with Pakistan. Majority of Taliban movement to & from from Pakistan can be curtailed as presence of Drones have proved to be nightmare for Taliban & Al-Qaeda.
2. Spend the millions of dollars saved (by not sending extra U.S troops to Afghanistan) by buying the poppy directly from the farmers through Karzai's brother and destroy them. This will deprive Taliban of funds and support among rural South. This will also make Europe safer and many war lords will have to find other means to maintain their private army.

Did anyone involved read Kipling?

Should we base our military strategy on the assumption that we execute every operation as planned? As most uniformed folks know, no plan ever survived first contact. That's why we plan for contingencies (most likely, most dangerous, etc.) and adjust planning accordingly if/once we encounter the unanticipated. In an era of decreasing resources and an increasingly adaptable, low-tech enemy, we must transform doctrinally to face tomorrow's most likely enemy (low-tech, violent, non-state actors) while remaining cognizant of tomorrow's most dangerous enemy (power-projecting, nuclear-armed/aspiring (rogue) states).

Gian Gentile versus John Nagl

The premise of the article is most clearly stated in the last sentence "The obvious question is: Does the United States really want to base its military strategy on two enormous blunders?"

I want to post the question: Were these really blunders? Based on real actions rather than mere words, it would be fairly easy to construct an argument to support that the Bush administration wanted the current results in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Our nation made a choice not to pursue Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We literally ignored him. Meanwhile Al Qaeda and the Taliban consolidated their power. The U.S. (both Clinton and Bush administrations) consciously ignored Saudi Arabia's support of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Saudi Arabia built literally thousands of schools and mosques to spread its particular brand of radical theocracy. It raised a generation of schoolchildren who are now fighting age.

In Iraq, we attack the country that we knew had no connection to the September 11 attacks. The Bush administration all but announced that the country would not be a democracy, as that would result in the Shiite majority having political control. Instead we have supported a non-democracy in which the Sunnis have far greater power than they otherwise would. We have permitted Saudi Arabia, again, to take the lead in supporting, training, and arming the Sunni fighters. Let us not forget the 2007 Pentagon study that showed that of American soldier fatalities, 45% were inflicted by Saudi Arabians.

It would be fairly easy to construct a detailed argument that the United States accepts that a Middle East with a dominant Saudi Arabia is better than a Middle East with many warring factions. The United States has a time-tested strategy of preferring stability under strong-arm radicals as opposed to instability under any other political structure. Stability is better for business.

No administration wants to lose, or to watch more soldiers die. However, every administration knows that foreign-policy gains come at the expense of dollars, bullets, and lives. As a result of the last eight years the United States is far more entrenched in the Middle East that was before. The military bases lost in Saudi Arabia will be replaced by far larger and far more geographically advantageous bases in Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States has control over far more oil and natural gas. These results are particularly striking when compared to the competitors of the United States, that is, Russia and China. I suspect Bush and Cheney believe that decades from now they will be hailed as brilliant strategists who were willing to sacrifice their short-term popularity for the long-term health of their nation.

“Professor”Walt’s thesis is so self-evidently retarded I’m surprised that even an on-line rag would publish it. Oh wait, “Foreign Policy” is a Jew-bashing, America-hating, socialist rag. That explains it.

Of course, we need to be able to fight an insurgency. If we lack the ability to fight an insurgency, then anytime we encounter one, we will, by necessity, have to surrender the field. Of course, America being defeated by an insurgency is exactly what America-hating traitor Walt wants, hence his counterproductive “policy”.

A counterinsurgency policy is not based on “2 blunders” as Walt puts it. Insurgencies have been part of warfare since the beginning of time and always will be. Every state must be prepared to deal with one. Saying, essentially, “well, we just won’t worry about that”, is the policy of a short-sighted moron with no sense of history (e.g., Stephen Walt).

The only “error” in failing to capture Bin Laden was in trusting the loyalty of the notoriously untrustworthy Afghan tribesmen. We should have made the investment in manpower to be able to do it ourselves. If Americans had captured Bin Laden, declared victory, and fled the scene, as you suggest, that would have only demonstrated weakness and emboldened our enemy. Al Qaeda would have set up shop in Afghanistan again, gained more converts and consolidated their power to an even greater extent by claiming to have driven off the infidels, and begun planning another series of 9/11 attacks. They also would have gone back to oppressing the Afghan people, especially the women. (Females were denied ANY medical treatment under Muslim rule.) I thought you libs cared about women’s rights? Oh that’s right! You only PRETEND to care about women when it’s politically convenient.

Who would care about a “safe haven” in Afghanistan if Bin Laden had been captured? Anyone who cares about protecting Americans, i.e., not you, “professor” Walt.

You are right about one thing, “professor”. We did invade Iraq when we shouldn’t have. We should have attacked in 1991 when we had our forces massed in Iraq and Saddam was at his weakest. The time between wars gave Saddam a chance to regroup and rebuild. The war was not unnecessary, though. It was mandated by U.N. Resolution 1441 and Iraq and the world are both much better off without Saddam Hussein and his murderous sons.

I see that you are a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution and a Resident associate at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace and so forth and lots of other useless activities, but I noticed that you don’t have any military service at all, which I anticipated given your ridiculous conclusions. Spending all that time in your ivory tower echo chamber hearing your colleagues voice the same ridiculous ideas seems to have convinced you that your “policies” make some sense. Maybe if you had some military or other real-world experience you’d know better than to embarrass yourself with foolish prattlings like this one.

Also, given your feelings toward Israel and Jewish people, why don’t you just title all your columns “I HATE THE JOOOWS!” It would be more honest.

Lots of love,
Rob Odell

1) Ad hominen attacks reflect poorly on you

2) If nothing else, Walt's co-author on The Israel Lobby DID serve in the military

A former of student of Walt's (and his co-author), and a Jew (and not the self-hating kind, so don't even try that one)

Rob Odell wrote:

"Of course, America being defeated by an insurgency is exactly what America-hating traitor Walt wants.... Also, given your feelings toward Israel and Jewish people, why don’t you just title all your columns “I HATE THE JOOOWS!”

From George Washington's Farewell Address:

"So likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils.... And it gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens (who devote themselves to the favorite nation), facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own country, without odium, sometimes even with popularity....

As avenues to foreign influence in innumerable ways, such attachments are particularly alarming to the truly enlightened and independent patriot.

Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government.... Real patriots who may resist the intrigues of the favorite are liable to become suspected and odious, while its tools and dupes usurp the applause and confidence of the people, to surrender their interests."

Rob Odell:

I would agree with small-unit tactics. I would disagree with global policy. Walt's ideas have been subjected to withering feedback (journal reviewers, other authors, his peers) his entire professional life. We don't necessarily require grand strategy makers to have served in uniform for a career; JFK and Reagan come to mind. Nor do they strike me as corporate types who lived in the "real" real world where their actions had consequences. They were politicos. Maybe they were subject to feedback mechanisms if they were wrong. Perhaps there's some truth to what you're saying in re: Walt versus (say) a Joe Nye. But at the level of grand strategy, were it not for a certain book, and certain peoples' reactions to it, I can easily imagine him having been S/P this administration.

As far as response time, this will be my last response. I do have other things to do.

Regards
Anon (a former student of W & M)

Clearly the US military can't defeat the Taliban. They've been trying for eight years and their leaders now say, often, that the Taliban is growing stronger day by day. So why should the government or the citizenry take much interest in what the military present as, really, their best hope of retaining control of a losing military campaign?

More pointedly, why should so much public opinion be paying the current groveling homage to the idea that what the military demands at present (through McChrystal) should be greeted by nothing other than instant compliance from the civilian government of the nation? Is this what the American peiople really want? Military dictatorship?

The military won in Afghanistan in its main stated aim of defeating al-Qaeda in that nation, and did so eight years ago come next week. Let's have a victory parade to commemorate this success and think more deeply about non-military solutions to problems that the military have not overcome and probably can't.

That victory of course has never been much honored because of its nature. Heeding the blabbermouth threats from George Bush in September and October 2001 -- al-Qaeda has radios, and is known to listen to them -- the terrorists packed up and left the country in the main before the Americans arrived.What US forces have been doing there since then is taking sides in an Afghan civil war.

Bush staffers devoted considerable energy in denying it, but much of what the US was doing in Iraq amounted to taking sides in a civil war, also. Not that that's what they wanted to do.