Tuesday, December 1, 2009 - 5:29 PM
Readers of this blog know that I think the war in Afghanistan is misguided, and I am disappointed that President Obama is about to make what I regard as a major strategic blunder. That said, here are the 5 questions that I'll be thinking about when I listen to his remarks this evening.
1. Why does he believe that 30,000 more troops will lead to success in Afghanistan, given that the ratio of foreign troops relative to the local population will still be much smaller than the number required for successful military occupations?
2. Even staunch advocates of the war concede that our task is "daunting," and several independent studies and reports -- including General McChrystal's own assessment -- maintain that the United States will have to stay in Afghanistan for at least five to ten years, at a cost of billions of dollars per year. Will the president say this explicitly, or will he try to convince us that these reports are wrong and that it won't take nearly that long or cost nearly that much?
3. How will this new escalation in Afghanistan deal with al Qaeda's "safe havens" in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere?
4. What domestic programs or military expenditures will be cut in order to pay for this escalation? Alternatively, what new revenue sources is Obama planning to exploit in order to fund an expanded war? (I don't really expect him to answer this question, but its one we should all be asking.)
5. How long is he giving the Afghan government to get its act together? Does he set a firm deadline or just some sort of vague benchmark. If the Karzai government cannot or will not reform itself, will Obama explicitly promise the American people that he will disengage? And if he does make such a promise, doesn't that mean that this is not a "war of necessity" after all?
DAVID FURST/AFP/Getty Images
Just in the Vein of Testing Wits.
In the vein of testing wits, one would say 1) the number 30,000 or so, must be seen by the US president as more than equal to the 100,000 Soviet troops which could not do the job in Afghanistan. 2) From the characteristics observed of the US President, he will appear as the dresser in his speech; now that the boat tilted towards sending troops, he will rush to the other side, and dress the balance, by giving a time frame. I guess he can always dip in the pockets of his wealthy Arab friends. He did say to them "Salam 3aleikum". 3) The Afghanisatn surge will have no effect on any of the other safe havens of al Qaeda. To think otherwise, is really a joke. But it doesn't mean it shouldn't be tried to justify in those terms. 4) I suppose Americans know infinitely more than I do in this department. I can't even hazard a guess. 5) I think the US president should call the war by its name; a war of revenge. But I guess he will have to portray it as vital to US strategic interests, but not so vital as to remain bogged there ad infinitum. I would say he will certainly call on Mr. Karzai to reform, but he knows that the word reform, is anathema to the Afghan president. However why not?, call for reforms, it sounds good and gives the Amercian public the impression, that President Karzai can actually run his country in the near future.
khairi janbek.paris/france
1. There must be some logistical calculation which led to 34,000 troops plus the 5,000 from NATO. Perhaps it jives well with the proposed COIN stages of securing population centers during winter and then launching a post-Winter (April?) offensive in the south and east?
2. If the President veers off the conventional 10 year path then it may have serious political and strategic ramifications. One can only surmise that his own deputy level staff at the Pentagon and State Department are almost unanimous in forseeing another 10 year committment broken down with immediate, intermediary and long term goals. The best summation of this three-tiered approach is included in CAPs "Sustainable Afghanistan" report, the authors of which are quite popular with this administration.
3. I expect the President to brush by this point as there really is no tangible way of guaranteeing that Al Qaeda won't ever use remote or lawless parts of Afghanistan in the future. It's just a logistical impossibility to guarantee against this possibility and anything not in keeping with that understanding would be a bold-faced lie on his part. Other than that, the escalation can only help if we have committed partners in the Pak Army in squeezing FATA from the East while our troops push in from the West. Such a committment is doubtful for many reasons. The escalatinn doesn't really have any tangible assets in it for Yemen or Somalia.
4. Yeah, he won't answer that. And a war sur-tax is terribly unpopular.
5. What will "getting its act toghether" look like? Its a pretty arbitrary out that can be used to justify a withdrawl or cut in funding. Perfect for the fickle, but not really reassuring to the Afghans. We need to define and spell out what we want to see, otherwise nothing much will happen.
Do you really think Bergen is awesome?
I saw your comment on Bergen's article before T-day, but haven't had a chance to post my own comment on how sucky Bergen is. But before I do that, I have to ask, was that sarcasm?
Nah man I really do think he's a decent journalist. No one is perfect, and I assume he probably got some flak for denying there was ever a CIA-Bin Laden link, but his points made sense.
As for the article from a few days ago summarizing his testimony, I think it deserves respect. It was mature, and fact based, and he didn't make any controvserial claims about Muslim 'fifth columns' in the west.
In fact he went out of his way to pose a sensible hypothesis about small pockets of Muslim discontent in the West living as minorities.
I think his take on a lot of issues is in line with reality.
It's interesting that GOOD, a progressive-on-almost-everything magazine for 21st century do-good yuppies, is giving a platform for a pro-war Truman Security Project man. Link to post by Michael Lieberman, which mentions and critiques Mr Walt.
It's not a big surprise given how GOOD editors themselves cheered the attack on Gaza (1, 2) at the start of the year. But this instance re:Afghanistan would be significant if they don't give space for an opposing view.
I hope he's honest and talks up to us
1. There is no independent, logical justification of 34,000 troops. The Petraeus/McChrystal/Neo-con report gave the middle Goldilocks option of 40,000, called medium-risk whatever that means, but didn't tie different strategies to the other troop number options. 40,000 is just a feasible number, more closely correlated to our troop availability than anything else.
2. Realism is required from leaders. If he doesn't explicitly state it will be hard to get out short of 10 years, he fails.
3. I don't care if he skips this one. Only Pakistan worries me, but not for an al-Qaeda safe haven.
4. Again realism, the war must be pay for. I hope he at least mentions the cost of the war. Congress should take the lead in proposing the war surcharge, which is a great idea.
5. My biggest hope is that he backs away from the war of necessity idea. He won't outright repudiate it, but he should say circumstances have changed and it is not necessary to prop up an utterly and unchangeable corrupt government.
CAPTCHA: his orating
I think two questions need to be added. Professor Walt has alluded to them in the previous weeks. They are:
1.) What can we define as "success" in Afghanistan? As it stands, no coherent and/or attainable "success" has been given.
Ronald Reagan's Sec. of Defense Caspar Weinberger gave a speech entitled "The Uses of Military Power". In it, he outlined six key factors that must be analyzed.
A) The U.S. should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagment or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.
B)IF we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning.
C)If we DO decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. AND HOW our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives.
D)The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed-- their size, composition and disposition-- must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.
E)Before the the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress... We cannot fight a battle with Congress at home while asking our troops to win a war overseas or, as in the case of Vietnam (and Iraq and Afghanistan), not to win, but just be there.
F) The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort!
2.) Will leaving Afghanistan "ruin America's credibility"? We left Vietnam and still won the Cold War. Reagan left Lebanon, yet during the 1990's the U.S. still held a seat at the negotiating table on I-P.
"No one starts a war -- or rather, no one in his senses out to do so-- without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he intends to conduct it" Clausewitz
Clausewitz Must be Turning in His Grave.
Thousands of US troops are supposedly going to Afghanistan, where there is a civil war going on, between a dispicable corrupt regime, and equally dispicable former regime which is aspiring to be ruling once again.
For all intents and purposes, the US has taken the side of the dispicably corrupt regime against, the equally dispicable zealots. Al Qaeda is still in Afghanistan?. This is news.
khairi janbek.paris/france
The "Weinberger Doctrine" is idiotic. It amounts to an attempt to disassociate war and politics, by framing war not as an extension of politics, but rather as what happens when political discourse fails. As such, it constitutes a weird mix of pacifism (don't use force) with militarism (use all force available). It makes sense in an American cultural context, but as a guide to the strategic use of military force it is awful.
The Weinberger Doctrine advocates a strong understanding of the limits of our power. I agree with you that war is an extension of politics and that Wienberger generally views war and the use of power as the inevitable option for failed political discourses. However, his six points are a good starting point for analyzing our potential ability to win in any given conflict.
Your analysis of the "weird mix of pacifism with militarism" is a bit off in my view (I am no expert). In my view, what Weinberger offers is an attempt to justify massive force, if and when we decide to commit forces. Thus, the use of force should not be our first option and we should not under-fund or under-deploy our troops (much of what happened in Iraq 2003). If we are willing to commit troops to a given conflict we must send all of them with the supplies needed as well as achievable, clearly defined objectives.
Again, my understanding is that Wienberger attempted to outline the limits of our ability to project power. Finally, when the decision to use force has been made, we must fully commit ourselves.
War is murder when it's not self-defense
The US war against some elements in Afghanistan is immoral. It is killing people deliberately, and quite indiscriminately, far more indiscriminately than allowed of police agencies in western countries.
Like all immoral actions, the criminal has rationalizations, or something that passes for a thought process. The original intent is corrupt-- to take, to seize, by force and to kill people for these materialistic goals. The immoral person always creates rationalizations for themselves.
We spend far too much time on surface-level discussion, and on facts that don't have a bearing on this immoral behavior. We ought instead examine the long pattern by U.S. of very large aggressions against the Vietnamese, the Koreans, the Iraqis and many other countries who certainly did NOT attack the U.S.
Nothing has changed in U.S. political economy or moral consciousness since the last two megadeath wars. Why would you expect this war to be any differnt? It is a venal and criminal and immoral assembly of interests in the domestic economy and politics, collaborating to commit this crime against humanity.
I've counted at least 6 different cadets in the audience that are flat-out sleeping through this speech.
OK, time to judge how accurate the predictions were.
This is what the CIA station cheif in Kabul thinks about Af/Pak:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/graham-e-fuller/global-viewpoint-obamas-p_b_201355.html
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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