Thursday, March 4, 2010 - 9:32 AM

Guest post by Sean Kay
Recently in Washington, D.C., a group of experts met as part of an ongoing review to develop a new "strategic concept" for the NATO allies to approve at a heads-of-state summit to be held in late 2010. Key speeches were presented by the NATO Secretary General Fogh Rassmussen, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. The result, however, has been an exercise in NATO "group think" with little relevance to real strategic thinking about America and its core national security interes.
This NATO review process is failing to account for three fundamental contradictions.
First, NATO Secretary General Rassmussen stated that: "We must face new challenges. Terrorism, proliferation, cyber security or even climate change will oblige us to seek new ways of operating. And in a time of financial and budget constraints, we need to maximize our efficiency within limited resources." However, all of these issues are challenges far better suited for the European Union (EU) and a special US-EU relationship to manage rather than NATO.
Second, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted that: "This Alliance has endured because of the skill of our diplomats, the strength of our soldiers, and - most importantly - the power of its founding principles." Yet, one of NATO's core founding principles was to create a circumstance in which Europe could stand on its own two feet. This is, effectively, NATO's last unfulfilled mission after the Cold War and it is now hindered by an institutional framework allowing Europeans to free-ride on American security provision.
Third, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated: "The demilitarization of Europe - where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it - has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st." The demilitarization of Europe, however, means that NATO has succeeded in its fundamental mission - that Europe no longer fights wars is a good thing. Moreover, Europe has no incentive to contribute to global security missions so long as America takes the lead. Europe has every incentive to free-ride on American power and NATO perpetuates that.
Secretary Gates did provide his audience with a dose of realism, noting that: "Right now, the alliance faces very serious, long-term, systemic problems." What he fails to appreciate, however, is that these problems are not going to be solved by berating European allies for pursuing obvious benefit to their national interests. Rather, the solution is to change the strategic dynamic by beginning to reduce American military commitments overseas and realigning - including cutting - defense spending to reflect new security realities.
Recently, Secretary of State Clinton testified to Congress that: We have to address this deficit and the debt of the U.S. as a matter of national security, not only as a matter of economics." Indeed, the most serious threat to America's geostrategic position in the world is its $12 trillion national debt. Yet, the United States has increased its commitment to Afghanistan, seems unlikely to be able to disengage from Iraq anytime soon, faces a growing confrontation with Iran, and is simultaneously increasing its defense spending. Meanwhile, the American public is in its most isolationist mood in decades. It is in this context that NATO's "group of experts" seeks to add missions to the alliance, rather than rethink the role of the alliance itself.
The Department of Defense recently published its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) which states rightly that the United States must "increasingly cooperate with key allies and partners if it is to sustain peace and security" (interestingly in a December 2009 draft version of the QDR, the language read "rely" on key allies). Yet the QDR and the new defense budget both show a United States seeking to hold onto a primacy in global security that is no longer sustainable. The QDR notes that the US seeks to prevent and deter conflict by: "Extending a global defense posture comprised of joint, ready forces forward stationed and rotationally deployed to prevail across all domains, prepositioned equipment and overseas facilities, and international agreements." This is not a strategy that reflects wise prioritization by a country $12 trillion in debt.
The QDR typically emphasizes NATO as part of this global presence - and understandably points to Afghanistan as an essential component of this global partnership in a transformed alliance. While it is increasingly said that Afghanistan is a crucial test for NATO - the reality is that NATO has already failed in Afghanistan. In his assessment from summer 2009, General Stanley McChrystal noted that the operational culture of the NATO mission in Afghanistan would have to be fundamentally transformed. This critical step, however, is not happening. While the Europeans are contributing, there is nothing inherent in the ISAF command structure that requires it to be a NATO-engaged coalition. In fact, Brussels currently has very little to do with operations in Afghanistan and Europeans might contribute more if their reputation in Afghanistan was more closely linked to the future of the European Union.
A strategic concept for NATO need not be very complicated. There are basically two missions left for the alliance.
First, NATO should be kept as a reserve capacity built around the traditional Article 5 mission of territorial collective defense as a hedge against future geopolitical rivalry at the global or regional level. This, however, need not require costly new initiatives to keep NATO busy, but rather should be seen as a reserve fund of alliance power - political in nature with operational doctrines available on the shelf. NATO should continue its process of reaching out to engage Russia and abandon its provocative and self-defeating discussion of further enlargement or "global NATO" operations which are not realistic or sustainable but which create strategic costs in the US-Russian relationship.
Second, NATO's staff should be given a clear mandate to work themselves out of a job - with their final mission being to hand over full lead responsibility for regional security to the European Union. The most fundamental missions of NATO are achieved - Europe is integrated, whole, and free. The challenge now is to ensure that this is sustained via the European Union. By jealously hanging onto an irrelevant dominance over European security policy, the United States hinders effective EU security integration and ironically damages America's own interests. If the United States can't hand over lead authority in Europe where can it?
Before committing to a strategic concept driven by NATO groupthink, President Obama should convene a policy review that brings into the process a broader range of strategic thinking than a self-motivated Washington-Brussels network which habitually seeks new missions, new budgets, and continues to drain the United States of scarce resources. Europe is not yet capable of standing alone - and these strategic shifts will not happen overnight. However, they certainly will never happen if the United States does not make the building of the European Union, not NATO, its primary strategic goal in the transatlantic security architecture. A fundamental and lasting alignment of the transatlantic security dynamic can be a vital legacy for President Obama - but it will require a much greater application of realism to the role of NATO than is currently being considered.
Sean Kay is Chair, International Studies and Professor at Ohio Wesleyan University. He is also a Mershon Associate at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Non-Resident Fellow at the Eisenhower Institute in Washington, D.C. He is the author of NATO and the Future of European Security and Global Security in the Twenty-first Century: The Quest for Power and the Search for Peace.
A very interesting, stimulating, piece by an old professor of mine. Thank you Dr. Walt for posting Dr. Kay's piece. I am sure it will generate a lot of discussion.
Dr. Kay is absolutely right when he talks about the U.S. role in Europe. France, Germany, Britain, Italy, and the Netherlands may have needed the United States as their primary defender in the past, but this relationship quickly changed once the Soviet Union collapsed in 1992. There is no existential threat that the continent is facing. Russia remains a problem on the eastern front, with Moscow attempting to influence its near-periphery. But this problem can be managed by a collectivist European response, not by thousands of scattered U.S. troops in Germany and Poland.
Europe is free and united, partly thanks to the United States and partly thanks to NATO. But that job is done now. NATO has lived up to its expectations, evident in Europe being one of the most free places on earth. Now Europe is facing more complicated challenges, which can only be fought (and eventually solved) by new institutions and frameworks.
NATO was built to contain the Soviet Union, not fight wars against insurgents in Afghanistan.
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Sean Kay is a good friend and long-time professional colleague. I understand the frustration that his analysis reflects, but I do not share his conclusions, and I have already communicated that reaction to him personally.
The first flaw in Sean's approach is what I see as excessive reliance on the role of the European Union. The EU is a very long ways (decades, not years) from becoming a cohesive international actor, in spite of some of the institutional trappings that it displays. I believe that the EU has much to offer in a more comprehensive approach to international security challenges, should it choose to use them. Many of the tools required for dealing with terrorism, failed states and WMD proliferation are non-military. The need in the future is for the United States an its allies to do a much better job of coordinating the military and non-military responses to security challenges.
Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has developed a variety of institutions and modes of cooperation to support a European Security and Defense Policy. However, these efforts have produced no new military capabilities. In fact, one could argue that the financial demands of European Monetary Union and the Euro have limited the funds available for defense improvements and operations.
Will the members of the EU somehow find the will to produce more effective defense efforts in the EU framework? I personally don't count on the EU states anytime soon relinquishing national control over important foreign and defense policy decisions and instruments. This is, I know, anecdotal evidence, but if the EU countries were serious about making the EU a key international actor, would they have replaced Javier Solana with Lady Ashton as the foreign and defense policy voice of the EU? This is not meant as a slam against Lady Ashton, simply a reflection of the fact that other choices were available that could have sent the signal that the EU countries wanted to take a more communitarian approach.
It is easy to beat up on NATO -- it has been a popular sport on both sides of the Atlantic both during and after the Cold War. I don't take that approach, perhaps because my expectations of the alliance are tempered by too many years of experience (working on NATO-related issues for the executive branch, then Congress, and now the academic and think-tank world for over 40 years).
That said, I still believe that it is in our security interests to try to develop as much cooperation with our NATO allies and partners as is possible, always recognizing that NATO is an alliance of sovereign democratic states, with all that this means (the Dutch issue begin the most recent reminder). For better or worse, NATO remains the symbol of the fact that we, the Canadians and the European allies do share some very basic values and interests, and are likely to continue to do so. I personally believe that we need to intensify cooperation on the non-military aspects of security, whether that happens under NATO's umbrella or some new framework for transatlantic cooperation.
All of this said, my support for the continued relevance of NATO does not mean I believe we can rely on the alliance as the sole instrument of our international security policy. Even during the Cold War, we did not do so. However, without a solid US-European alliance, our foreign and defense policy, and those of the Europeans, would be without an important point of reference. Replacing NATO with some kind of US-EU connection fails to meet most of the tests of American security interests, for the reasons cited above and for many others (leaving Canada as well as some key NATO allies out, treating the EU as an equal to the United States, which it is not, etc.)
And, by the way, the United States no longer is spending a fortune "defending" Europe. The Europeans do free-ride on many of our international security efforts, and we should continually press them for more/better contributions. But most of what we do militarily in Europe today is in support of defending against contemporary threats, not against possible future violations of European borders. Those NATO countries that still worry about Russian designs remain reassured by a continued link to the United States that is provided by the North Atlantic Treaty. But that reassurance, which they do not get from EU membership, costs the United States very little under current circumstances.
The theme of the article is that there is no need for NATO anymore - and that should be obvious to everyone on both sides of the Atlantic. Now - some of the posts here sound like they are still stuck in the Cold War and the Soviet Union has yet to collapse.
The notion that Europe "cannot defend itself" is rubbish. First of all, why is "what Europe needs for its security and defense" being defined in Washington? To put it another way, why should Americans draw up the measuring rod of what Europe needs in terms of defense?
Second, the EU has been developing its independence from NATO since the end of the Cold war with its own defense agency, EU battle groups, independent missions, and joint projects, such as the Eurofighter.
Lastly, why should Europeans give up their blood and treasure for American security interests?
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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