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Posted By Stephen M. Walt
Friday, March 5, 2010 - 7:56 PM
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In the run-up to the war in Iraq, a critical moment came when moderates and liberals joined forces with the neoconservatives who had been pushing for war since the late 1990s. The poster child for this process was Kenneth Pollack, whose pro-war book The Threatening Storm (written under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations) gave reluctant hawks a respectable fig-leaf for backing the invasion.
Is a similar process occurring today with respect to Iran? A possible sign of slippage is a recent Foreign Affairs article (and accompanying Washington Post op-ed) by James Lindsay and Ray Takeyh (also of the CFR). Lindsay and Takeyh are well-known centrists who now seem at least partly infected by some of the alarmism about Iran that the neoconservatives have been trumpeting for years. Although their two articles sound a somewhat skeptical note about preventive war-they admit that "a preventive attack might not end Iran's nuclear ambitions"-they recommend keeping all options "on the table" and in general depict the Islamic Republic as a looming threat to all that is Right and Proper. Their central lesson: the United States had better get serious about preparing for a military response to a wide array of possible Iranian actions.
Lindsay and Takeyh reach this conclusion by incorporating a series of worst-case assumptions and by employing the familiar alarmist rhetoric that has been a staple of hawkish commentary for decades. Despite some significant qualifications (some of which contradict their central point), the overall impression is ominous, and likely to strengthen the hand of those who are in favor of an ever-tougher approach to Tehran.
For starters, the very first line of their WaPo op-ed describes Iran as "relentlessly moving toward acquiring a nuclear weapons capability." They offer no concrete evidence that this is the case, however, and it is worth remembering that the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate which concluded Iran had no active nuclear weapons program has yet to be rescinded. Iran may be trying to build a working nuclear weapon, but there is as yet no clear sign that a definitive decision to go nuclear has been made. Of course, so long as Iran has the capacity to enrich uranium, it is by definition "moving toward" having the potential to build a weapon at some point in the future. Insofar as its nuclear program goes back decades, however, it doesn't seem to be moving very fast. Unfortunately, using words like "relentlessly" and portraying the decision to get a bomb as a done deal makes Tehran sound especially dangerous and further devalues any possibility of a diplomatic deal that might head off weaponization.
Next, they argue that Iran "views nuclear weapons as the means to regional preeminence" and warn that a nuclear shield "would give Iran freedom to project its power in the Middle East." They believe Iran "would not be subtle about brandishing the nuclear card" and predict it "would probably test U.S. resolve early." Indeed, they think America will face a "momentous credibility crisis" if it fails to stop Iran from getting the bomb, warning that "even close US allies would doubt Washington's security guarantees."
Are you scared yet? All these ominous claims might be true, but neither the Foreign Affairs article or the WaPo op-ed contain any evidence to back them up. But Lindsay and Takeyh are just getting started. They also think Iran might increase its support for Hezbollah and Hamas, do more to subvert the Gulf sheikhdoms, demand that these states evict U.S. troops, and maybe even give nuclear technology to other countries. And if that isn't enough, they invoke the old nightmare that Iran might "give fissile material to a terrorist group."
Of course, alert readers with good memories will notice that these are the same arguments that pro-war hawks made about Iraq. And though each of the warnings is hedged in various ways-i.e., they don't say Iran will do these things, only that it might-the cumulative effect of all these scary scenarios is to suggest that an Iranian bomb would be major turning point in world history (and not in a good way).
So what should the U.S. do in response? According to Lindsay and Takeyh, the United States needs to draw several lines in the sand: 1) no initiation of conventional warfare, 2) no use or transfer of nuclear weapons, material, or technologies, and 3) no stepped-up support for terrorist or subversive activities. If Iran does any of these things, the United States should be ready to respond "by any and all means necessary." If we aren't ready to retaliate, they write, "the damage created by Iran's going nuclear could become catastrophic.
Time to chill, guys. Iran is an important security issue, and the United States should take appropriate steps to maintain a balance of power in the region. Unfortunately, the drum-beat of alarmism that pervades their article-and even more in the op-ed version-is both misleading and possibly counterproductive.
First, their depiction of a swaggering Iran armed with nuclear weapons grossly overstates Iran's actual capabilities. According to the IISS Military Balance, Iran's military budget in 2008 was around $9.5 billion dollars (less than 2 percent of U.S. defense outlays) and Iran's actual capabilities reflects this paltry investment. It has no conventional power-projection capabilities, outdated air, naval and armored forces, and primitive electronic warfare capabilities. Iran's population and economic potential raise the possibility that it might one day be the dominant power in the Gulf, but it is nowhere near that capacity now. Getting a nuclear weapon won't change that fact, because nuclear weapons are only useful for deterrence and confer little positive leverage over others. (Lindsay and Takeyh acknowledge this latter point in the Foreign Affairs version, but if they genuinely believe this, then many of their other arguments are irrelevant).
Second, Lindsey and Takeyh misunderstand the sources of U.S. credibility. The United States has been actively engaged in Persian Gulf security for decades, because Persian Gulf oil is a vital U.S. national interest. That vital interest won't change no matter what happens in Iran, which is why our local allies can count on us to back them up. The reason is simple: it is in our own self-interest. And the good news is that Iran almost certainly knows this too.
Third, they overstate Iran's capacity to subvert or blackmail its neighbors. Iran's capacity to export its version of Islamic fundamentalism has declined steadily since the 1979 revolution (and it wasn't very great back then), and the regime is a far less attractive model today than it was under the more charismatic Ayatollah Khomeini. The brutal crackdown following the elections last summer has undoubtedly tarnished Tehran's appeal even more. Lindsay and Takeyh acknowledge this point as well in the long version of their article, but they fail to draw the obvious conclusion: if Iran cannot subvert its neighbors, then the danger it poses is modest and their article didn't need to be written.
Furthermore, a nuclear Iran could not blackmail its neighbors (or compel them to expel U.S. forces), because it could not carry out a nuclear threat without facing devastating U.S. or Israeli retaliation. The mighty Soviet Union could not blackmail any US allies during in the Cold War; indeed, it wasn't even able to blackmail weak and neutral countries. American leaders have found it equally difficult to translate our vast nuclear arsenal into meaningful political leverage. Yet Lindsay and Takeyh imply that Iran could perform this miracle today, even though it is far weaker. They never explain why or how, however; it's just another convenient bogeyman.
Fourth, fears that Iran will give weapons or technology to terrorists are even more far-fetched. One cannot rule out the possibility that Iran might share nuclear technology with a few other governments (much as Pakistan did), but there are good reasons to doubt it. Among other things, it is hard to believe that Iran would want to see more countries get nuclear weapons, especially in its own region.
More importantly, Iran is not going to give fissile material to terrorists. Having labored long and hard to acquire an enrichment capability, would any regime just hand weapons-grade uranium over to extremists over whom it had no control? Giving fissile material to terrorists is a potentially suicidal act, and Iran's leaders show every sign of wanting to retain power permanently and to live as long as they can. They could never be sure the hand-off would not be detected and that they would not be blamed (and punished) for whatever the terrorists did. There's no sign that any of Iran's leaders has a death wish, which is why they won't be giving any bombs away.
Fifth, Lindsay and Takeyh's redlines are too vague and elastic. The United States is already committed to opposing conventional aggression in the Gulf region (unless we're the ones doing it, of course), and U.S. leaders have already made it clear that they will respond to blackmail or nuclear use as well. As Lindsay and Takeyh acknowledge, the United State remains a powerful presence in the Gulf region today and will stay there long after the withdrawal from Iraq is completed. In short, the essential ingredients of containment are already in place.
In particular, threatening retaliation against "subversive activities" risks either an unnecessary war or a further challenge to US credibility. For example, many well-informed observers believe Iran has substantial influence in Iraq today, and may be actively trying to affect the outcome of the March 7 elections. Is this the sort of "subversive activity" that should trigger a US response? How about a single shipment of mortars to Hezbollah, or the capture of an Iranian intelligence agent operating in Bahrain or Dubai? In a world where the United States, Israel, and plenty of other states are conducting covert, "subversive" operations in assorted foreign countries-including targeted killings and assassinations-this item hardly seems like a redline we can or should try to enforce.
It is also worth remembering that the U.S. and its allies didn't threaten to retaliate against the USSR for the "subversive activities" that were a central part of Soviet communism's international agenda from 1917 to 1986. The United States and NATO made it clear they'd respond to traditional acts of aggression, but we knew better than to make "subversion" a key "redline" in our overall strategy of containment. The goal was prevent Soviet expansion and to out-perform the USSR over time, so that communist subversion failed to find root in any countries that mattered. As 1989 proved, that strategy was a smashing success.
Sixth, a hair-trigger, forward-leaning approach to containment will give Iran an obvious incentive to acquire a deterrent of its own. No matter how much they hedge, Lindsay and Takeyh are announcing to the world that Iran's acquisition of a small nuclear capability at some point in the future would have significant positive effects on its regional position. I certainly hope Iran isn't listening to them, because it's hard to think of a better way to convince its leaders to go ahead. Moreover, overheated talk about the need for a more robust containment strategy is likely to reinforce Iran's desire for a deterrent shield that can take the threat of regime change (an option Washington has never renounced) "off the table." But if we don't much like the idea of an Iranian bomb (and I don't), shouldn't we doing everything we can to convince Tehran that a bomb would be of little value? Perhaps unintentionally, Lindsay and Takeyh are sending precisely the opposite message.
Seventh, like most Americans writing about Iran these days, Lindsay and Takeyh never consider the one approach that might actually have some small chance of heading off an Iranian bomb. That approach would be to take the threat of regime change and preventive war off the table and accept Iran's enrichment program-on the strict condition that it ratifies and implements all elements of the NPT Additional Protocol. At the same time, the United States would engage in serious and sincere discussions about a range of regional security matters, including a public U.S. guarantee to forego regime change.
This is the sort of "grand bargain" that others have proposed in the past, and there is of course no guarantee that it will work. Moreover, many people would find any dealings with the current regime objectionable, for understandable reasons. But if an Iranian bomb is such a scary prospect, shouldn't we be pulling out all the stops to see if an acceptable diplomatic solution is possible? As near as I can tell, the sort of grand bargain sketched in the previous paragraph has never been tried; instead, we've made rhetorical gestures and incremental take-it-or-leave-it offers-all of which predictably fail-and we falsely conclude from these half-hearted efforts that more ambitious diplomacy is unworkable.
Finally, it's possible that I'm being too hard on Lindsay and Takeyh. Perhaps they are sheep in wolves' clothing, and their article is in fact a plea for a moderate and sensible strategy of containment dressed up in a lot of tough rhetoric intended to make it more convincing. If so, I fear their approach is too clever by half. Despite their apparent rejection of preventive war and assorted other qualifications, the Lindsay/Takeyh articles unintentionally reinforce an alarmist view of Iran that has been the neoconservatives' bread-and-butter for many years.
Don't forget: between 1998 and 2003, the pro-war party took an extreme position on Iraq and stuck to its guns (literally), looking for every opportunity to advance its program. 9/11 opened the door, and they were quick to seize the moment. Over time, both liberals and moderates were dragged rightward, adopting hawkish rhetoric and tortured rationales in order to show how "serious" they were. Former doves jumped on the bandwagon, the center of gravity swung inexorably to the hard-line position, and the results were disastrous. Something similar seems to be happening again; to paraphrase Yeats, "the centre cannot hold."
Why? Yeats also gives us the answer: because "The best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity."
EXPLORE:AREA STUDIES, FENCE-SITTING, MIDDLE EAST, DIPLOMACY, IRAN, MILITARY, NUKES, OBAMA ADMINISTRATION, OIL, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
Much though I deprecate apocalyptic thinking with respect to the Iranian nuclear program, I think Walt may understate the similarities between the Iranian regime's approach to a nuclear capability and that of Pakistan during the 1990s.
The Pakistani security services pursued a nuclear capability as a matter of prestige for the nation -- which they identified with themselves, and still do -- and as a way to assure access to state resources into the indefinite future. Iran's security services have the same interests. Pakistan, it is true, was also driven by its compulsion to match something its rival India had already done; this is a motivation Iran does not have to the same degree, though the fact that the hated Jewish state acquired a nuclear arsenal generations ago is sometimes a handy debating point for the regime and its apologists.
Pakistan had no more incentive to become a nuclear proliferator than Iran does. It became one anyway, because not becoming a proliferator would have required forethought, internal safeguards, and cooperation with other governments, all of which were rendered less likely by the zeal with which Pakistan's security services were committed to going nuclear. There is little reason to be complacent about Iran's proliferation potential, not when the Revolutionary Guards in particular have dramatically expanded their business activities in recent years. If you asked a senior ayatollah whether he would think it in Iran's interest to help other states acquire nuclear weapons, he would probably say no. However, it probably wouldn't be up to him.
In point of fact, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal has involved great expense to a country that can ill afford it, as well as pervasive security concerns for both Pakistan's own government and those of its neighbors and allies. An Iranian nuclear arsenal would involve the same things. These are very good reasons for Iran not to pursue a bomb, and even to avoid confronting the international community over steps that could, in theory, lead to pursuit of a bomb. They are not necessarily good reasons for the Iranian security services to follow this course, however. As was the case in Pakistan a decade ago, their interests and those of the nation they serve cannot be assumed to be identical.
I don't think the US is concerned with its credibility image, when it comes to the Middle East; neither as far as Iran is concerned nor regarding Palestine. The US pursues its own percieved interests according to its own taste, because those whom are allies of the USA in the Middle East, will still need its support for various reasons.
khairi janbek.paris/france
For those interested, there was a great debate recently hosted by the Atlantic Council between Michael Ledeen and Flynt Leverett about how to tackle the Iran issue. Ledeen was, surprisingly, anti-bombing but pro-efforts to encourage regime change. Leverett's counter-proposal was the Grand Bargain idea and the two of them got into a bit of a back and forth about whether the idea had ever seriously been proposed before.
It was pretty informative stuff. Available here: http://www.acus.org/event/iran-engagement-or-regime-change
Here's the bottom line....
The main objective of Iran's rulers is self-preservation. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are willing to do anything to stay in power. We saw this in a pretty brutal fashion this past summer, with Basij militiamen beating protesters over the head with clubs. We continue to see this today, with members of the opposition being summarily executed in show-trials, hoping that the threat of death will deter future anti-regime protests.
There appears to be nothing that the mullahs (and the IRGC generals) would do hold onto their positions. Building a nuclear program and eventually getting nuclear warheads fits right into this calculus. With a nuclear deterrent, there is no way the United States would be foolish enough to promote regime-change through the use of force. Self-preservation is a main reason for the quest for an Iranian bomb.
But if it would be foolish for the U.S. to attack an Iran with a nuclear capability, it would be downright suicidal for Iran to use such weapons in the first place.
What could Tehran possibly achieve with a nuclear weapon? Spreading their influence across the Persian Gulf? Well, this has already been done. Iran has proxy influence in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, and in the Palestinian Territories. Having a nuclear weapon will not change this fact.
What about the stupid neoconservative argument that Iran would secretly give nuclear material to a terrorist organization? This too is unlikely. It has taken Iranian scientists close to a decade to develop the infrastructure and technology needed for uranium enrichment. The idea that the Iranians would simply hand-over their most prized possession (without question) to terrorists is laughable.
And don't even talk about "wiping Israel of the map." This argument is the most ignorant on the list. Destroying Israel would only invite an even bigger wrath by the United States, with Iranian cities annihilated and millions of Iranian citizens killed. Nobody wins.
So let's take some rational advice and stop worrying about things that are not going to happen. No one wants Iran to become a nuclear power, but the world won't end if they do cross that threshold.
-Dan DePetris
http://www.depetris.wordpress.com
I believe your assessment of the only real value of Iran's possessing a nuclear weapon is accurate. Having such a weapon only limits the ability of some other states to strike at Iran with relative impunity. Iran could not strike at Israel or even its other neighbors without unacceptable punishment, thereby destroying the revolution they've worked to protect.
However, Iran's having such a weapon would establish an absolute impediment to the childish dreams the neocons and their supporters in the US and Middle East have about being able to use a big stick on Iran at will. Iran's having the bomb affects the US national interest virtually not at all. It destroys the neocons' interests totally. Hence, we are subjected to their dire pronouncements and shrieking hysteria daily. Yet again, we are expected to increase the danger to the United States and its interests and the interests of most of its citizens at the request of a small, vocal, insane minority. These are the same people who wanted to nuke the Soviets back during the 1950s and 1960s and toward whom the mockery in "Dr.Strangelove" was directed.
One gradually started to believe that, everyone knows eventually, Iran will develop nuclear weapons, and unless there are serious plans ;under the table, being devised to stop it from doing so, one can only conclude that, Iran and its allies, friends and supporters are playing the game very well and intelligently under the current circumstances, while Iran's enemies, detractors, and oppononents are really out of any ideas on how to deal with the situation. Or in blunt terms are acting very stupidly.
khairi janbek.paris/france
mr. walt is himself attacking yesterday's bogeyman.
dateline, washington d.c., march 6, 2010: george w. bush is no longer president of the united states of america.
dateline, afghanistan, march 6, 2010: it is barack obama who is increasing u.s. troops in afghanistan from 40,000 to 100,000; who is predator droning pakistan, afghanistan, yemen, and by today's report in the new york times, backing a big government offensive in somalia and is about to send in the predators and special ops there, too.
dateline, the 2008 presidential campaign: if candidate barack obama said it once, he repeated it daily--an iranian nuclear weapon is "unacceptable."
i'm not the president of the united states and i don't have all the secret information mr. obama has. but mr. obama's position is still that such a weapon is "unacceptable." to me, this is the same thing as the president saying that the war in afghanistan is a "necessary" one.
if i put my trust in mr. obama as the commander in chief, then i have to believe his simple and direct english declaratory words, "unacceptable" and "necessary." whether or not right-wingers and moderates use these terms is at this point irrelevant, because it is mr. obama, a man of the left--who rode to power on the enthusiasm of the democratic wing of the democratic party, who is using them. if mr. walt is right, he needs to attack his real intellectual opponent--mr. obama--and not the straw dog of yesterday's decision-makers.
regarding the merits/demerits of the article, i'll mention just three.
first, mr. walt thinks the iranians weak, because they cannot project their power very well. but, that is only in the conventional sense. iran has a great unconventional warfare team, which is why hezbollah and hamas are doing well. iran also has a great diplomatic team, which is why we aren't getting anywhere. so, a limited ability to do mischief in the conventional sense (iran's navy and missile forces aren't that bad, either) does not mean no ability to do great mischief.
second, mr. walt thinks there is no merit to regime change, advocating a "grand bargain" of a pledge of no regime change in exchange for a pledge of no nukes from iran. mr. walt wants to create a two-tiered world. in the first tier, "normal" countries swear off regime change, but in the second, dictatorships and terrorist countries don't--they can still seek the destruction of their enemies, but the worse they act (up to and including trying to or actually getting nukes) the bad actors move to "safe" territory. trudging out the old hitler analogy (for the purpose of asking whether mr. walt understands the logical consequences of his advocated policy) does the united states have an obligation to accommodate the pathologies of other countries, rather than institute regime change? what would mr. walt have thought about a 1940 deal with mr. hitler that said, "well, if you PROMISE to stop at the riviera and ukraine, and really, really, promise to stop your jet engine and nuclear research, let's break bread."
third, mr. walt is a prime advocate of "understanding the other side" no matter what. well, how about the bad guys of the world understanding US sometimes? if the iranians really wanted normal relations, all they have to do is act normal. why does normal conduct have to be pulled from the iranians? why is there a "crisis" at all? mr. walt writes: "But if we don't much like the idea of an Iranian bomb (and I don't) . . ." well, why doesn't he like that idea? the reason is that mr. walt at heart understands that it's the iranian's fault and that iran is today a dangerous player on the world stage that cannot be trusted. if iran could be trusted, we'd have had an agreement a decade ago--or maybe two decades ago.
keevan d. morgan, chicago
Irans international relations may add to the strategic planning
All of the factors that you mention cause me to think more.
With all of those issues in mind, should we add additional complexities of how Iran fits into an alliance with China, Russia? What goals does Iran have in their relations with the Central Asian counties that may be playing both the US against Russia and against China? How about an on-going planning process to weaken the dollars and recruit additional countries into that effort?
Most likely Iran wants to build alliances with other major powers. The amount of recent activity between Iran and other US adversaries might provide opportunities, and if we do not take advantage of those opportunities, we may find ourselves with a deeper problem.
Bob Spencer
Why US all nuclear phobia has been concentrated toward Iran only.
Dr khan netwrok revealed name of many other countries where supply has been made but US and world is ignoring all other groups.
She even ignored Dr khan and generals of Pakistan army who spread this business under CIA network.
They even never uphold or cease the bank accounts of big fish of such deals .
Oh sure they punished the pawns of such moves who were just obeying the orders of seniors.
Same thing they are trying to harass Iran by all ways but Iran stubborn management has decided to play the role of irritating fly ,directly sitting on the nose of US.
When ever US try to fly, slap would be felt on her face.
The Professor undertook deep research and made the conclusion that the Persian charismatic regime loses its appeal, becomes less attractive. These words alone sound like a highest alarm. If they don't possess nuclear / chemical / bio weapons now, they hire or steal them from the neighbours.
A lot of Iran's posturing is based on political effect. They constantly announce home-grown military hardware that is more appearance than substance. Their nuclear program may be part of the same bluster. With a non-transparent regime, you can't be sure of whether they are ahead of their boasts, or behind. Some intel indicates they are having technical problems that may inhibit their ability to do what they say they are doing, but we also cannot be sure that they are not ahead of their game and won't find out until we wake up in the morning and find a nuke has exploded on Tel Aviv.
The one thing that is certain, is that with internal dissent a growing problem, polls have shown that the one thing that will unite Iran against the outside world is a preemptive strike by Israel or the US. The are reported to have recently left some of their uranium supply above ground for about a month to try to provoke a strike for just that purpose.
It seems to me that the main problem is Israel.
They possess nuclear weapons. Have attacked Iran. Committed murder in Egypt during the war they started. And just recently, using forged passport, committed an assassination on foreign soil.
While committing war crimes/murder in Egypt, (Killing P.O.W.s) the N.S.A. spy ship, Liberty, was attacked by Israel's air force with the the loss of American lives, primarily because it had collected data of the crimes being perpetrated on the Egyptians.
I am in NO way saying Iran is a "good" guy, but when taking the view, a brief history of Israel's aggression, I can see a need to balance the odds.
I do not think Iran is in any position to cause any real problem(s) in the ME. Korea has it's nukes, and I see no change in the world as a whole.
Over all, reel in Israel, and I think a great deal of strife and stress in the ME would quiet down on its own.
Israel has nuclear weapons and so does Pakistan and India. Iran needs to acquire as many nuclear weapons as it can as quickly as possible to protect itself from the enemies of Islam and the Imam Mahdi. The great powers have been threatening Iran's ambitions. I think nuxclear issue and human rights all a game by the big powers to prevent Iran from attaining its rightful place in the world as a regional hegemon. I am tired of these Israelis and Americans keep on saying no option is off the table. For Iran too, no option is off the table including turning Tel Aviv into a parking lot when it finds it dream of getting a nuclear bomb.
If and when Iran were to ever finally secure nuclear weapons, I suspect they would find their political position in the area among their friends horribly complicated. Your comment speaks about "...turning Tel Aviv into a parking lot when it finds it dream of getting a nuclear bomb." Those are the types of pressures Iran's local clients will demand of it, but Iran will not be able to respond affirmatively because the losses will outweigh any putative gain. Iran's clients will begin to wonder why Iran is taking so long to do what it spoke about doing before acquiring nuclear weapons and they will only belatedly come to realize the Iranian regime has no intention of "...turning Tel Aviv into a parking lot..." Only terrorists whose pressure points can't be identified easily can indulge themselves in such fantasies. A national government risks far too much to go down that road, even a self-styled revolutionary government. Gradually, those clients will begin to wonder if the punishment and suffering they're enduring in Iran's interest is worth the candle when Iran will do nothing in the long run. The problem with force is that the threat is much greater than the application, as the US learns daily to its dismay in Iraq and Afghanistan after the last eight years.
With billions of US Dollars in insentives and help, being offered to American companies to invest in Iran by the US government, redcutio ad absurdum. Good luck US citizens, while consecutive US governments allow for the results of the square root of negative numbers.
khairi janbek.paris/france
Those who recommend a "Grand Bargain" as a strategy for the US to deal with the multiplicity of issues between the two countries are blind to the realities of Iran. How arrogant to suggest regime change is America's to forego. Did you not see the millions of Iranians in the streets that might have something to say about regime change?
Regime change in Iran is an inevitablity of history. The rights of so many can not be denied for ever. The astute will know that this regime has no crediblity left even in the eyes of it's own base. It is simply a matter of time before the century long struggle of Iranians for freedom will be realized. As so many of you Grand bargainers have suggested an American apology for 1953 I ask you this: Will you also apologize for your Grand Bargain with the blood thirsty oppressors of the Iranian people once the Ayatollahs have been discarded in the trash bins of history?
Mr./Ms. FreeIran, once the the dividents of the bargain have paid of, apologising or otherwise, becomes merely academic. From the looks of it, President Obama is currently out on a limb regarding Iran. He doesn't seem to be able to go to war, and doesn't seem to be able to muster enough support for crippling sanctions. A bargain seems to be on the agenda, and really, size (Grand) has nothing to do with it.
khairi janbek. paris/france
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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