Wednesday, March 31, 2010 - 12:26 PM

Interesting news from ABC (h/t Andrew Sullivan), that the CIA reportedly convinced an Iranian nuclear physicist named Shahram Amiri to defect to the United States about a year ago. Amiri was reportedly part of Iran’s nuclear research program and has now been relocated in the United States.
Three quick thoughts: First, even if he was a very talented physicist, a single defection like this isn't going to stop Iran’s nuclear research program in its tracks, or even slow it down very much.
Second, assuming he was intimately involved in Iran's nuclear program, this ought to increase our confidence in its current state of development. There's been lots of disagreement about when Iran might actually be able to assemble a nuclear weapon -- if in fact they intend to do so -- and if this guy's information is any good, then some of that uncertainty ought to be reduced. Is it time for a new National Intelligence Estimate?
Third, I wonder what Americans would think if other intelligence services engaged in energetic efforts to get leading scientists in our nuclear weapons labs to defect? Based on our reaction to prior cases of nuclear espionage (going back to the Rosenbergs), my guess is that we'd regard it as an act of considerable hostility. I'm not saying we were wrong to recruit this guy, but doesn’t it undercut that "open hand" that we've supposedly been extending to Iran? I'll bet that's how Tehran sees it.
you're trying too hard to be comprehensive and see all sides' perspectives. You're being too clever by half, in other words, if I can be so blunt.
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I'm not saying we were wrong to recruit this guy, but doesn’t it undercut that "open hand" that we've supposedly been extending to Iran?
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Maybe it does undercut the open hand, but hard choices have to be made in international politics (come on, you're a realist after all!) and if given the choice between a largely metaphorical "open hand" diplomacy, versus hard intelligence about an issue occupying a great deal of attention in policymakers' minds, wouldn't you choose the hard intelligence?
Also, you've noted that we don't understand Iranian political dynamics. But you're extrapolating from the US experience with spies, and assuming Iranians might - do?/will? - have the same reaction as the US does. Who knows how the Iranians perceive the defection (paging Dr. Jervis)?
This strikes me as one of those coups people talk about when they say the CIA gets noted for its failures while its successes remain secret.
Listen to what the Director of National Intelligence Says --
Steve,
The two latest US intelligence findings on Iran say that Iran has NOT decided to make nuclear arms.
Surprised? Yes, you should be. Our media would have you think otherwise.
But please take two microseconds to read what the DNI has been saying:
Annual Threat Assessment:
http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20100202_testimony.pdf
“We continue to assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that bring it closer to being able to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.”
And the "721" report from a few days ago:
http://www.dni.gov/reports/2009_721_Report.pdf
"…we do not know whether Iran will eventually decide to produce nuclear weapons.”
Let us re-cap: to the best of the US IC’s knowledge the Iranian government has NOT decided to make nuclear weapons. And this intelligence likely includes detailed debriefs from the defector.
OK?
Oh, and someone pls pass the msg to AIPAC also: Iran has not decided to make nuclear weapons.
Stop the sanctions -- Stop the war -- Get a clue and purge our distorted and distorting propaganda spewing media.
Pressure on Obama to act tough
Dr. Walt, you have to remember that this "open hand" that you speak of has been steadily closing over the past few months. President Obama hasn't said it yet, but I suspect that he understands his engagement policy with Iran is not working. The United States and the United Nations have yet to obtain a single sliver of cooperation from Tehran, whether this entails the disclosure of nuclear facilities or cooperation with nuclear inspectors.
Despite the health-care victory, the President is still being squeezed by Republicans and some Democrats on the Iran issue. Senators desperately want to get a unilateral sanctions bill through, even as the U.N. Security Council continues to debate a new sanctions package at the international level. Getting tough with the Iranian Government is quickly becoming the norm in the U.S. Congress (which actually bears similarity to the get-tough approach of many Senators before the invasion of Iraq).
The White House needs to show that they are willing to get tough. Perhaps this announcement is a response to this the demand of Republicans and hawkish Democrats.
http://www.depetris.wordpress.com
Juan Cole speaks the truth -- Who listens?
http://www.juancole.com/2010/03/obama-to-seek-further-iran-sanctions.html
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
Obama to Seek Further Iran Sanctions;
Amiri Defected to US, seems to deny active nuclear weapons program
President Obama is pressing for new United Nations Security Council sanctions within weeks. Although Russia and China oppose 'crippling' sanctions such as cutting off Iran's access to imported gasoline, they may agree to the watered-down US plan of imposing restrictions on companies owned by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (a major economic force in Iran). China is said by Reuters to be weakening in its opposition to new Iran sanctions, but perhaps this is only because it would not be affected by Western measures narrowly targeting the Revolutionary Guards.
But the Reuters piece appears to be based on interviews with overly optimistic US officials. Russian President Medvedev said just a few days ago that increased sanctions on Iran are "not optimal." I.e. he does not rule them out but they aren't his first choice. And China is even more opposed than Russia. Obama still has a hard path ahead.
This Reuters article also misinterprets the stance of the International Atomic Energy Agency of the UN, which continues to certify that none of Iran's nuclear material, being enriched for civilian purposes, has been diverted to military uses. The IAEA has all along said it cannot give 100% assurance that Iran has no weapons program, because it is not being given complete access. But nagging doubt is not the same as an affirmation. We should learn a lesson from the Iraq debacle.
Meanwhile, ABC News's Brian Ross got the scoop on the defection to the US of Iranian nuclear scientist Shahram Amiri. US intelligence continues to maintain that Iran has not committed to having a nuclear weapons program. Presumably this information came from Amiri and is fresh and solid, since he is a consummate insider.
Yet you get headlines like, "Iran moves closer to nukes."
Somehow American hawks can't seem to get their minds around the obvious conclusion from the CIA diction, which is that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program at the moment. It can't move closer to nukes if it doesn't have a weapons program! Moreover, that it does not have such a program is no longer a considered opinion or educated guess, but is based on the best kind of intelligence. It is the conclusion that the 16 US intelligence agencies came to in 2007, and there is apparently still no evidence that Iran has changed its mind about the undesirability and even evil of nuclear warheads (though there are no doubt hard liners who disagree with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's fatwas against nukes as un-Islamic.)
As long as the US does not object to the actual nuclear weapons of Israel, India and Pakistan (none of which signed the NPT), its obsession with Iran's civilian energy program will strike people in the region as unfair.
Iran CANNOT move closer to nukes if it doesnt have a weapon prog
Open note to US media:
Iran CANNOT move closer to nukes if it doesn't have a weapon program.
Yes, it has capabilities to start a weapons program IF it wanted to.
What does the DNI say??
Annual Threat Assessment:
http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20100202_testimony.pdf
“We continue to assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that bring it closer to being able to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.”
And the "721" report from a few days ago:
http://www.dni.gov/reports/2009_721_Report.pdf
"…we do not know whether Iran will eventually decide to produce nuclear weapons.”
Let us re-cap: to the best of the US IC’s knowledge the Iranian government has NOT decided to make nuclear weapons. And this intelligence likely includes detailed debriefs from the defector.
OK?
Chalabi, or Our worst nightmare? (which is relatively the same)
The guy defected leaving his wife and family behind?
What kind of defection is that?
You usually defect in order to lead a better, more free life in comfort with your loved ones.
The Iranians originally claimed that he was kidnapped as part of an ongoing CIA effort in collusion with their Saudi counterparts to lure suspected nuclear scientists to the Hajj and Umrah, and then kidnap them as a source of information for cracking down on Iran.
There has to be tremendous pressure on an individual, either through his tyrannical government, or by the ones receiving his defection, in order for one to leave their entire family behind (whom will surely be leading a much more stressful life under the regime, now that their husband and son has been proven to be a traitor).
---
But all of that aside. What if:
(1) this guy, or those that are willing to defect, turn out to be the Iranian versions of Ahmed Chalabi and the INC? Deliberately fabricating intelligence to suit the suspicions and paranoia of a receptive hostile administration?
or
(2) they are genuine informants, but their claims fly completely in the face of current assumptions about Iran's nuclear ambitions and/or capabilities.
Are we willing to hear and accept the idea that we've completely blown this thing out of proportion?
---
Finally, what does this say about the Saudi Royal Family? That they are willing to scoop so low as to use the performance of religious rites as opportune time to either kidnap, or lure away the citizens of other Muslim Countries that they perceive as threats to their rule?
This thing is a significant PR disaster in the making for Saudi Arabia. If countries have to worry about exposing state secrets everytime they permit a citizen to leave the country to perform their religious pilgrimage, it doesn't bode well for relations with, or trust in, the Saudi monarchy.
As long as Iran actively is killing Americans
We should be cutting everything of theirs and not only their hand if you catch my drift
Buddah:
You need an immediate De-Shekel-ing. Catch my drift.
I personally don't believe in this Iranian Science guy until I see him on Oprah confessing, and then heading straight to rehab in PHX for sexual addiction.
The definitive analysis of the 2009 Iran election:
http://iran2009presidentialelection.blogspot.com/
The statement above reflects a bias, as you'll quickly see, but I'm confident you'll agree.
In December, the Head of the AEO, Ali Akbar Salehi said, “...he (Amiri) had no links to the Atomic Energy Organization; I don't even know who Mr. Amiri is."
Before the Iraq invasion a number of Iraqis, for reasons of gain or glory, went to the US authorities offering fabricated information they knew the US would like to hear but which was later proven untrue.
This is realism? LOL!
Have to agree with Blue here. This is realism??
I wonder what Americans would think if other intelligence services engaged in energetic efforts to get leading scientists in our nuclear weapons labs to defect? Based on our reaction to prior cases of nuclear espionage (going back to the Rosenbergs), my guess is that we'd regard it as an act of considerable hostility. I'm not saying we were wrong to recruit this guy, but doesn’t it undercut that "open hand" that we've supposedly been extending to Iran? I'll bet that's how Tehran sees it.
Three quick thoughts (to borrow Steve's overused format): First, of course other intelligence services are engaged in efforts to penetrate our nuclear program. I don't use Steve's term "defect" here because generally one doesn't think of people defecting from a free society. Unlike Iran and other unfree societies, if someone wants to leave the US, they can. We don't keep family members hostage every time a scientist wants to travel, either.
Second, if Iran supplying the arms and training to murder our soldiers in Iraq isn't hostility, nothing is. The hand-wringing about how Iran might have its feelings hurt because of this is silly.
Third, way to go CIA. Score one for the good guys.
I don't really see how Steve's comments are in conflict with "realist" ideology. I believe his point was that in terms of cost-benefit analysis, what value has been gained from publicizing this defection when considering that it undermines our approach to dealing with Iran over the last year or so.
You both obviously prefer the stick to the carrot when in comes to Iran thus consider this a win but questioning how much we've really benefited isn't "un-realist."
Call it sentimental realism, which looks at North Koreans, Cubans and Iranians as if they were Americans who just happened to have been born and raised in another country. What we wouldn't like them trying to do to us, we shouldn't try to do to them.
This is a little heavier on the sentiment than on the realism, but there may be people within the Obama administration who subscribe to this way of thinking. It doesn't appear that it is a majority view, or that the President shares it. The administration seems instead to hope that creating the appearance of openness to engagement with Iran will help persuade other governments to support American efforts to pressure Tehran. Were Tehran interested in reducing tensions and relieving its isolation, the administration could strive for more than appearances -- but the current Iranian government has no such interest. Domestic Iranian politics, in fact, provide it with extra motivation to keep hostility to the United States front and center.
My reading is that Steve was concerned about the act itelf, as opposed to your take that it was the leak.
Read it again:
I'm not saying we were wrong to recruit this guy, but doesn’t it undercut that "open hand" that we've supposedly been extending to Iran? I'll bet that's how Tehran sees it.
Personally, I believe that all tracks should be pursued, sticks and carrots. It is IMO naive (and unrealistic) to fret about how the tracks other than the nice-nice tracks might be perceived.
Iran has been using negotiations for years now to buy time to develop nukes. Steve himself has told us that the reformers were also committed to nukes. Why would anyone believe that they would do anything different if all of a sudden we stopped using the hard tactics and limited ourselves to what is basically begging them to play nice, and pursuing sanctions (for which Russia and China will never be on board). If anything, they would draw the lesson that they could continue with impunity.
The hand-wringing moral equivalence is a lefty reflex. Also note the formulation -- I'm not saying we were wrong, but... -- is not explicitly saying we were wrong, but certainly indicating that the needle is tipped that way.
Why is a nuclear Iran such a bad thing?
If it isn't abundantly clear, I am for a nuclear Iran.
As I believe many others that frequent FP's blogs are.
I don't for one second buy the argument that "because Ahmedinejad says Israel should be wiped off the map, if he had nukes, he'd do it."
There's a difference between playing to a certain constituency at home in domestic politics, and being suicidal in a way that would lead to the annihilation of your regime.
First of all, elected Iranian politicians wouldn't control the football, it would be the Supreme Council and Khamenei vis-a-vis the Revolutionary Guards. All military options fall under the purview of Khamenei and the Council.
And you can't logically claim that these cats are intelligent and cunning enough to trick the entire world and develope nukes, and then turn around and say they're stupid enough to bring about the destruction of their entire enterprise by being so dumb as to launch strikes against Israel, Egypt, or the Sheikdoms. It just doesn't add up.
That plus the added realistic benefits to the US, the peace process, and a regional balance of power are too numerous for it not to be considered.
Well diplomacy will have absolutely zero effect on Iran so any advantage we can get is a good thing.
HELLO -- Iran does NOT have a nuclear weapons programme, OK?
The two latest US intelligence findings on Iran say that Iran has NOT decided to make nuclear arms.
Surprised? Yes, you should be. Our media would have you think otherwise.
But please take two microseconds to read what the DNI has been saying:
Annual Threat Assessment:
http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20100202_testimony.pdf
“We continue to assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that bring it closer to being able to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.”
And the "721" report from a few days ago:
http://www.dni.gov/reports/2009_721_Report.pdf
"…we do not know whether Iran will eventually decide to produce nuclear weapons.”
Let us re-cap: to the best of the US IC’s knowledge the Iranian government has NOT decided to make nuclear weapons. And this intelligence likely includes detailed debriefs from the defector.
OK?
Oh, and someone pls pass the msg to AIPAC also: Iran has not decided to make nuclear weapons.
"The two latest US intelligence findings on Iran say that Iran has NOT decided to make nuclear arms."
Today's News
A new report by the Central Intelligence Agency has said that Iran is still working on building nuclear weapons
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/Iran-continues-to-build-nukes-says-CIA-report/articleshow/5749110.cms
did you read the article?
it an excerpt from the 721 report which says Iran does NOT have a nuclear weapons prog.
A reporter screwed up and selectively reported and you screwed up too.
Erdogan: Nuclear Armed Countries Urge Iran Sanctions
PressTV
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has once again dismissed sanctions as a proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.
Erdogan said at a Monday joint press conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Ankara that he was opposed to new sanctions against Iran.
He said diplomacy was still the best possible means of solving the issue.
"We are of the view that sanction is not a healthy path and... that the best route is diplomacy."
Erdogan then wondered why the international community refused to impose sanctions against the Middle East's sole nuclear weapons power, in an apparent allusion to Israel.
"We are against nuclear weapons in our region. But is there another country in our region that has nuclear weapons? Yes, there is. And have they been subjected to sanctions? No," Erdogan said.
The US, which accuses Iran of seeking nuclear weapons, has been lobbying for more UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against Tehran.
Turkey, a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, is among countries that are opposed to imposing sanctions on Iran. Ankara has made it clear that any coercive measure against Tehran over its nuclear work would be of no avail.
This is while Merkel, whose country is working with the five permanent UNSC members over the Iranian nuclear issue, called on Turkey to support fresh sanctions against Tehran.
"We would be happy if Turkey votes in April on the Iran issue together with the United States and the European Union," she said.
Iran says any punitive measures against the country are legally baseless as Tehran's nuclear work is being fully monitored by the UN nuclear watchdog.
Available at:
http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=121960§ionid=351020104
Fordow and the 10 other sites............
http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/04/the-revelation-of-fordow10-what-does-it-mean.php
The Revelation of Fordow+10: What Does It Mean?
by Ivanka Barzashka
According to a recent article by the New York Times, Western intelligence agencies and international inspectors now “suspect that Tehran is preparing to build more [enrichment] sites”. This revelation, according to the newspaper, comes at a “crucial moment in the White House’s attempts to impose tough new sanctions against Iran.”
However, these “suspicions” come months after Iran publicly disclosed such intentions. Tehran declared plans to build 10 additional sites on 29 November 2009, a couple of days after an IAEA Board of Governors resolution called on Tehran to confirm that it had “not taken a decision to construct, or authorize construction of, any other nuclear facility” and suspend enrichment in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions.
At the time, the Iran’s decision to construct more enrichment sites was widely dismissed in the West as an act of defiance and unlikely more than mere bravado. On 30 November 2009 the New York Times wrote that “it [was] doubtful Iran could execute that plan for years, maybe decades”. The same article referred to a high-ranking Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) official claiming that taking the declaration seriously was “akin to believing in the tooth fairy” and that this effort would likely produce “‘one small plant somewhere that they’re not going to tell us about’ and be military in nature.”
In fact, a week before Iran’s original announcement, Ivan Oelrich and I argued in an article at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that Fordow is likely one of many similar sites. A technical analysis of the facility’s planned capacity showed that, alone, it was not well-suited for either a commercial or a military function. The facility’s low capacity also undermined other strategic roles suggested by official and quasi-official Iranian sources – that Fordow is a contingency plant in case Natanz were attacked or that Fordow was even meant to deter an attack on Natanz.
Consequently, we have argued that Iran’s decision to construct additional enrichment facilities is a logical consequence of Fordow’s small enrichment capacity. The plant, as currently designed, makes sense only if separative capacity is increased in the future, which can be done either by increasing per centrifuge performance or by adding more centrifuges. We believe, therefore, that Iran’s declarations to construct new enrichment sites should be taken seriously.
Now that we have indications for a future increase in capacity, what does this tell us about Iranian intentions? Commercial, military and, strategic justifications all become more plausible, but not by the same degree. Dispersing enrichment facilities and hardening them against attack is costly and raises suspicions that the plants are really intended as part of a weapons program. But this may not be the case. (For a more comprehensive analysis, see our article in the March issue of Nuclear Engineering International.)
First, any economic rationale of Iran’s enrichment program is suspect. Natanz may have a civilian role, but it is definitely not the most economically viable course, but it may be a price that they are willing to pay for energy security. By the same token, building many enrichment plants and protecting them against attack may be the cost that Tehran is willing to pay for insurance.
Second, multiple well-protected enrichment facilities could provide a secure backup to Natanz. This would reduce the risk of attack on the main plant since bomb-grade enrichment could take place elsewhere. However, since Natanz would be targeted because of its military, not civilian potential, the new sites would have to be able to mimic only those military capabilities. To be a viable deterrent, the new sites together would require a capacity big enough for a quick breakout option.
Third, since Iran has publicly declared its intentions to build additional enrichment facilities, they will eventually be placed under IAEA safeguards. (The sites would most likely be formally disclosed to the Agency in accordance with Iran’s own interpretation of Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement, or as little as 6 months before nuclear material enters the premises.) If the facilities are under IAEA watch, the onsite production of bomb-grade uranium or the diversion of nuclear material to a clandestine enrichment plant for further enrichment would not go undetected. This means that using the sites as part of a nuclear weapons program would likely have to be done overtly, thus making this option less likely.
Do not be mistaken – construction of the sites would increase Iranian breakout potential since Iran’s total uranium enrichment capacity would be expanded. Dispersion and hardening also creates targeting issues for a possible Israeli military attack. Iran’s decision to announce plans to construct 10 new facilities means that, if the enrichment plants are built, the nature of the breakout threat shifts from bomb-grade enrichment at a possible clandestine enrichment plant to rapid breakout at existing sites after an international crisis, which leads to expelling IAEA inspectors.
Construction of new enrichment facilities was underplayed in November 2009 but seems to have become a realistic and troubling concern now, increasing suspicion in both the IAEA and national intelligence agencies. What has changed since?
It turns out that not much. Intelligence agencies have long been looking for clandestine enrichment sites. After the sudden disclosure of the small, heavily guarded Fordow enrichment plant, the IAEA has been especially concerned with the existence of similar still undisclosed facilities. The November 2009 report noted that the agency had called on Iran to declare whether it was constructing or planning on constructing any additional nuclear sites. Iran has kept boasting about plans to construct new enrichment plants, starting with 2 facilities this year.
What indeed has changed is that Obama’s deadline for engagement has passed and, since the beginning of this year, the US has been trying to rally support for new tougher sanctions. I am not arguing for or against sanctions, but we need to be making consistent assumptions. Iran’s planned 10 new enrichment sites cannot be both an extremely dangerous development and a a figment of Iranian boasting.
If we are only now “suspecting” that Iran is building new sites (which I don’t believe to be the case), I don’t know what should be more worrying: the fact that foreign intelligence agencies are only now taking Iran’s announcement seriously or the implications of the actual construction of additional facilities.
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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