Wednesday, April 14, 2010 - 11:03 AM

I'm still digesting the results of the Nuclear Security Summit meeting, but I'll give the Obama administration a pretty high mark on two grounds.
First, it's clear that somebody in the administration did a lot of useful pre-summit diplomacy, to make sure that there some tangible results to report at the summit itself. (This is like making sure you have a few major gifts in the bag in advance before you launch a major fundraising campaign). Cases in point: Ukraine's announcement that it would surrender all of its remaining highly enriched uranium, and the joint Canadian-Mexican project to modify a Mexican research reactor so that it no longer produces weapons-grade material. These and other steps are hardly transformative, of course, but they kept the summit from being solely an exercise in public relations.
Second, Obama acknowledged that the effort to promote greater nuclear security is primarily a political-diplomatic campaign, and one that will require sustained energy and attention. As he noted in response to one questioner: "If you are asking, 'Do we have an international, one-world law enforcement,' we don't, and we never have." In other words, Obama recognizes that there are no binding legal mechanisms or coercive power to impose greater nuclear security measures on other states, and the only way to make serious progress is to a) convince other governments that this is in their interest, b) use various carrots and sticks to persuade them to make a serious effort, and c) provide resources and technical expertise where needed.
Given the nature of the problem, one can make substantial progress even if the effort to secure all loose nuclear material is less than 100 percent successful, because every kilogram of plutonium or HEU that gets secured makes it harder for bad guys to get their hands on any. As some readers probably know, I'm less concerned about the threat of "nuclear terrorism" than some of my colleagues are. But I don't dismiss it entirely, and it is one of those (rare?) policy problems that we actually do know how to address. Securing loose nuclear materials is a lot easier and cheaper to do than addressing climate change, for example, and there are hardly any counter-arguments against it. I mean, does anybody really think poorly guarded bombs or inadequately secured weapons-grade uranium is a good thing?
So Obama's team deserves credit for this initial effort, and for managing to pull off a meeting of 47 presidents, prime ministers, and other world leaders with virtually no visible rifts, fireworks, or gaffes. On a first reading, I'd give 'em an A-.
While Obama was bowing to the Chinese, Hezbollah v. Israel, round 2 seems to be imminent:
http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2010/04/about-those-scuds.html
Obama's nuclear summit failed to focus
Obama’s nuclear summit failed to focus on ‘the center’ from where nuclear terrorism is most likely to emerge, namely PAKISTAN. Securing all the nuclear material in four years is NOT going to significantly reduce threat of nuclear terrorism since Obama’s summit gave a gapping pass to that ‘terror center’ of the world.
Obama’s summit also failed to focus on China’s central damning role in creating this threat of nuclear terrorism in the first place.
Let us NOT forget that China made this world lot more dangerous by proliferating its nuclear weapon technology to Pakistan and North Korea. Let us NOT forget that Pakistan in turn proliferated Chinese nuclear weapon technology to Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria.
Try all he may but it is doubtful that Obama or any other US President can cork the nuclear genie that US unleashed in 1945. That august body called US Senate with its 100 thinking heads will never approve a treaty ‘destroying all the nuclear weapons of all the countries in the world bar none’ even if some US President was to succeed in getting such a treaty agreed to.
Let us face it - nuclear weapon crowns not just the powerful but the powerless equally.
Five Brahmins of UN Security Council have a right to possess, improve and increase their nuclear weapons stockpiles while preaching others the evils of the same weapons.
It is highly unlikely that any of these Brahmins is going to completely let go the safety and prestige that their nuclear weapons confer upon them. They will find every excuse to hold on to their nuclear weapon stockpiles while trying to monopolize that possession.
By their very actions, these five Brahmins encourage others who want to achieve the same status as them by acquiring nuclear weapons.
Thought for the Tea-Party folks on TAX DAY
Today, Tax day, and every other day $10million goes to Israel -- for what? To do war crimes?
Where are the Tea-Party folks on THIS huge waste?
On Israel, Iran, and existential threats
"...if Iran were to have nuclear weapons Israel would lose its role as the regional superpower...."
and that, IMHO, would be a good thing.
see more at:
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/24/threats_to_israel_from_without_and_within
In February 2005 I sat in an intelligence briefing for Israeli Middle East and diplomatic affairs correspondents at the headquarters of the Israel Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem. There were probably 15 of us around a long table. At the head, various researchers took turns speaking about the threat levels coming from different parts of the Muslim world.
When it came to Iran, the intelligence researcher told us in the most foreboding tone that Iran was very close to building a nuclear weapon. It was the same ‘and-that-will-be-the-end-of-us' tone that numerous Israeli politicians had been using in the media to warn Israelis following the Iranian announcement to develop nuclear energy.
At the time, I was serving as the Middle East correspondent for The Jerusalem Post and was a member of the Gulf/2000 Project, a group led by former National Security Council member and presidential advisor Gary Sick and made up mainly of academics, journalists, diplomats and intelligence people from East and West with a professional interest in the Persian Gulf. It exposed me to a wealth of information about Iran, including the problems it faces, its own security fears and the question of the nuclear threat. And it became clear to me that the Iranian regime was not crazy enough to push a would-be red button on Israel.
But I wanted to know how the Israeli intelligence people would answer the question:"So do you think that if the Iranian regime were to develop nuclear weapons some crazy mullah would press the red button?" So, I asked.
Before they could respond, Ayala Hasson, Israeli Channel One's diplomatic affairs correspondent, shouted across the table, "But of course they'll press the button!"
Harry Kney-Tal, director of the Foreign Ministry's Center for Diplomatic Research, paused before answering: "No, we don't think there is some crazy Iranian who is going to press the button." Nuclear weapons were a form of "insurance" against being attacked, he said.
For years now, official Israel has been scaring its people into believing Iran is near the ‘point of no return' and the day it reaches it will be doomsday for Israel (of course, Israel's estimated ‘point of no return' dates continuously pass, prompting it to make new ones). But the Israeli establishment knows that there is no existential threat, that the Iranian regime is radical, but not suicidal; that if it is building weapons of mass destruction (WMD), it is in self-defense.
So why all the hype? Why the deception? The reasons are many, but they come down to money, politics, and security.
After the briefing Kney-Tal shared with me that if Iran were to have nuclear weapons Israel would lose its role as the regional superpower. "We are afraid that it will give Iran more leverage to empower its clients, "he said, referring to Hizbullah and Syria.
In other words, Iranian nukes would prevent Israel from acting as the neighborhood bully and Israel would have to think twice before it attacked its neighbors.
Yet it wasn't until last month that a senior Israeli official, Defense Minister Ehud Barak, acknowledged that Israel did not fear an Iranian attack. The Iranian regime was "radical", he said in a speech at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, but not meshugeneh (the Yiddish word for crazy).
As retired Brigadier General Uzi Eilam describes in his recently published book, "Eilam's Arc", money and politics--not security--are the key reasons for the scare. The "defense establishment is sending out false alarms in order to grab a bigger budget," said the former Director-General of Israel's Atomic Energy Commission.
Moreover, some Israeli politicians are using Iran to divert attention away from problems at home. Not only does it make them more popular among the population--Israelis understandably feel more at home in the role of victims--but it also focuses the attention away from the country's internal problems which are not being solved: poverty, racial strife, and lack of peace with its neighbors. Finally, the ‘Holocaust-is-around-the-corner' doomsday prophecy, putting Israel in the traditional Jewish role of the oppressed, gives Israeli leaders more clout when pushing for gestures from friendly countries abroad.
Interestingly, Netanyahu has tempered his own doomsday prophecies. At the recent AIPAC conference he said that Iran "might be tempted" to use nuclear weapons. It is possible that if the Israeli Foreign Ministry intelligence department is aware that Iran does not pose an existential threat, then the US and European countries have come to the same conclusion. That would take the punch out of Israel's prophecies.
Now Israel is warning that Iran could share WMD knowledge with non-state actors who will use it against Israel and other countries: "Our world would never be the same," said Netanyahu at AIPAC.
If Israel really does fear this prospect it needs the help of its allies, either to pressure or persuade Iran. So when Vice President Biden comes to town it is best not to embarrass him with the announcement of settlement expansions and then insist on making more announcements that deepen the rift; when Turkish television broadcasts a television series depicting Israel in an ugly manner, best not to humiliate the Turkish ambassador on Israeli television; when the Secretary General of the UN visits, best to send someone to greet him at the airport, and not just the security guards; and when Israel wants to make a revenge assassination for the killing of Israeli soldiers, best to let it go, rather than use fake passports of your allies (or don't get caught).
Israel's recent behavior is not conducive to achieving its stated goals. It must reassess its priorities and decide whether a settlement in the West Bank, the humiliation of diplomats, and the killing of an arms smuggler are more important than its security.
At the end of the day, Israel needs help if it wants to remain the only kid on the block with a big stick.
To give Obama an A- for holding a global nonproliferation meeting without inviting the country that Obama accuses of being the main current threat of further proliferation makes it pretty hard to take his meeting as a sincere effort. Iran should have been at the table. All should have been engaging Iranian national security representatives, pointedly looking at them--and the Israelis--as the Ukrainian concessions were announced. Further, Obama should have put the Iranians on the spot, making them a positive offer, e.g., recognizing their right to access to medical grade uranium.
Instead, Israeli nuclear rogue status was of course ignored while Iran was once again marginalized, and a conference that might have set a new tone for the world was instead shabbily politicized as a forum for further pressuring Iran with sanctions and in the process gave the lie to Washington claims that tensions with Iran are really about Iranian nuclear policy.
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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