Monday, May 17, 2010 - 8:49 AM

I've been in Istanbul since Friday, attending a conference on "Turkish Diplomacy and Regional/Global Order in the 21st Century," sponsored by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I've become increasingly curious about Turkey's recent diplomatic initiatives (some of them clearly of concern to traditionalists in the United States) but I'm hardly an expert on this issue and I saw this conference primarily as a learning opportunity. In that regard it did not disappoint, and here are few quick impressions.
What was unmistakable throughout this gathering was the sense of energy, imagination, and self-confidence displayed by Turkish officials, and especially the relatively young coterie of academics and advisors connected to them. Although a few speakers seemed a bit too self-congratulatory (a trait Americans are hardly in a position to complain about), the people who spoke are clearly proud of what the government has achieved on the international stage and they genuinely believe they are leading the country in the right direction. I might add that the younger Turkish representatives (both officials and academics) attending the conference were particularly impressive: smart, articulate, well-informed and happy to engage in debate and discussion.
Second, the current government deserves credit for harvesting a lot of low-hanging fruit (though as several speakers noted, some of these initiatives actually began back in the 1990s). In particular, they recognized that relations with many of Turkey's neighbors were needlessly conflictive, and the current "zero problems" policy (i.e., seeking to have good relations with all of Turkey's neighbors) has gone a long way toward improving ties with virtually all of them. The payoff is perhaps most notable in the case of Greece and Syria, but they can also point to better relations with Russia and even with Armenia. My sense is that these breakthroughs were in fact fairly easy to achieve, insofar as it did not involve any of the various parties making great sacrifices. Nonetheless, Turkey deserves credit for seizing the opportunity. And while Americans might not like Turkey having an improved relationship with Syria or amicable relations with Iran, it makes a good deal of sense from Ankara's point of view.
Third, Turkey is clearly trying to take advantage of its geographic position and its political history to position itself as an omnipresent mediator between various conflict regional actors. This idea led to earlier efforts to mediate between Israel and Syria, as well as the more recent initiatives toward Iran. Trying to place itself at the center of a web of different regional actors and presenting one's self as the party able to speak to all of them magnifies Turkey's importance and can enhance the government's popularity at home, but sustaining that role over the longer-term will depend on whether they can actually achieve results. Here it's hard to be as optimistic, and one wonder whether Turkish prestige will decline somewhat if they are unable to deliver.
And one cannot help but ask a few questions about the long term sustainability of this policy. As Foreign Minister Ahmet Davatoglu admitted in his speech here, the "zero-problems" policy is an aspiration but not a fully-formed reality, which is a way of admitting that being on good terms with everyone in a region like this is probably impossible. Case in point: Turkey's recent criticisms of Israel over Gaza have won it plaudits in the Arab world, but have also damaged what had been a valuable military relationship with Israel and complicated its relationship with the United States. (One reason Congress finally passed a resolution about the Armenian genocide is the fact that groups like AIPAC and the ADL no longer weighed in to protect Turkey). Similarly, Turkish credibility in the Arab world was enhanced when Parliament barred the United States from using Turkish territory to invade Iraq in 2003 (a decision that now looks rather far-sighted on Turkey's part), but it clearly raised doubts in the minds of some U.S. officials and intensified concerns about the long-term direction of Turkey's foreign policy.
In addition, as another participant at the conference noted, it is not yet clear whether Turkey's new direction as a "strategic regional power" has been institutionalized within the political establishment, or whether it is largely an initiative of the current ruling party (the Islamist AKP). And if it is the latter, then one may wonder whether this new initiative would survive a prolonged economic slump, or any other developments that made the AKP less popular and brought another group or coalition to power.
In that regard, what was missing at this conference any serious discussion of Turkey's internal developments. There was little discussion of the controversial changes to the Turkish constitution that are now underway, and virtually no mention of the alleged "military plots" that have led to the detention of a number of former officers. I had private conversations with several people at the conference on these issues, and heard a pretty wide range of views. (One participant described the whole business as a "soap opera," but how the whole business is ultimately resolved could have pretty significant effects on how Turkish democracy is perceived elsewhere). But these issues never arose in the public sessions, which focused almost entirely on diplomatic and foreign policy matters.
I came away thinking that the United States is going to have to approach relations with Turkey in a new way. The Cold War is over, Turkey's transition to democracy is probably permanent, new social forces are at work here, and Turkey's leaders are committed to pursuing a foreign policy that seeks to maximize Turkey's own national interest as they perceive it. If the U.S. government tries to deal with it the way we've dealt with previous Turkish governments, it can expect to be about as successful as we were back in 2002-2003. If we are willing to listen and approach Turkey with certain degree of flexibility, however, I think there's a good chance of building a relationship that could yield unexpected benefits for many years. That sort of nuance hasn't been exactly our forte, however, so I'm not especially optimistic. But then again, I'm hardly an expert on this topic, so perhaps I will be pleasantly surprised. Bottom line: I learned a lot, including the fact that I need to learn a lot more.
Tomorrow I am heading back to Athens, despite an incipient general strike and other disruptions. Stay tuned.
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You're not only being pedantic, but you're also wrong. Foreign policy is by and large influenced by domestic politics, except in situations of quiet/covert diplomacy. I'm sure that's what Mr. Walt was referring to.
Maybe you should read a little about neorealism, structural realism, and even the principle-agent theory.
Its a little muddy right now. This conference was about the increasing Regional political power of Turkey, hosted by Turkey. Why on earth would they then bring in the quaqmire of internal politics of a country with Turkey's history over the last 50 years or so when they want to portray a resurgent, friendly with all, energetic, imaginative Turkey? That's why internal politics was only discussed in private with a few people, and never mentioned in the open.
Undermines balance of threat theory?
"In particular, they recognized that relations with many of Turkey's neighbors were needlessly conflictive, and the current "zero problems" policy (i.e., seeking to have good relations with all of Turkey's neighbors) has gone a long way toward improving ties with virtually all of them."
The positive benefits of not having a military regime calling the shots - conflict naturally enhances their importance.
On another note, Turkey's foreign policy shift vis a vis Israel somewhat undermines the balance of threat theory in explaining their alliance. Rather, i guess it was Turkey and Israel’s common western identity and Turkey and Israel's need to reinforce this identity that was at the heart of the partnership. With AKP in and the military out, Turkey's western identity has become less prominent and the Turkish-Israeli relationship has followed suit. Meanwhile the same threats and security issues prevail.
On the other hand, it's not a stretch...
to have a panel and papers on the issue of continuity of policy across the Turkish political spectrum.
Maybe there should have been panelists representing the CHP or MHP's position on the "zero problems" policy?
But then again, we should realize that the ruling AK Party holds 60%+ of the seats in the National Assembly, and the closest oppositon party holds less than 20% of the seats by plurality.
It would have seemed a bit ridiculous to play host to the views of parties that aren't even close to ruling the country for the forseeable future. To say nothing of the fact that both AKP and CHP hold identical views on relations with the US, and membership in the EU, which are the defining issues we ought to be concerned with.
While I will not argue Turkey has done many positive things by being more assertive and acting like a post-cold war nation, and has improved relations with many of its neighbors to describe this as low hanging fruit is generous at best. Improving relations with pariah states like Syria and Iran is more a gift to them, though it does help more than hurt Turkey, but please don’t act like it was some kind of challenge.
As for Greece, I would attribute that more to inertia and growing closer (to a degree) to Europe than any active actions.
As for the serious and hard issues what has really been done? Some lip service to Armenia? Nothing on the ground has changed. Is Turkey really working with Iraq? Particularly with the Kurdish autonomous government whom they at one time threatened with war? Aside for efforts to crush the PKK I don’t see anything. And don’t get me started on Cyprus, things have only gotten worse.
Sorry but Turkeys FP looks more like defection from its real intractable problems namely Armenia, Cyprus, and the Kurds.
First I did not say improving relations with Iran and Syria would be bad for Turkey, I said in fact it was overall a good thing but it is not a FB achievement to lend credibility to pariah states even if it helps you.
As for Israel (where did I mention them in my last post?) this only reinforces my point, instead of solving any difficult issues it piles on the regional punching bag, it is like American politicians that go to Miami and beat up on Cuba, free votes!
Armenia- first I am sure they view things differently, particularly when Turkey started to bring up Nagorno-Karabakh again.
Ah Cyprus, the EU made things harder by doing what? Its mandate? Turkey is an occupying force with its army on foreign soil, you bash Israel but not Turkey for doing the same thing? Turkey is part of NATO right? So why not replace its troops with NATO ones if it cares about the population there. It could also stop pushing for separation…
As for Kurdistan, Is Turkey the #1 trade partner or is it Kurds in Turkey? The two things are very different, I would be interested to know.
Turkey's dependence on the new nuclear deal
I will be curious to see how the newly-created nuclear deal between Ahmadinejad, Lula da Silva, and Erdogan affects Turkey's credibility in the Arab world.
The deal that was struck today (as reported by FP's passport) is essentially the same as the one that was struck last October; Iran ships out some of its low enriched uranium in exchange for a higher grade. Nothing of substance is particularly new here, besides the fact that the Iranian Government will be able to keep a significant portion of its uranium stock during the transition. But nevertheless, the participation of Turkey and its willingness to host the fuel-swap deal is an example of how desperate (in a good way) the country wants to improve its stature in the world.
If the deal falls apart or if the United States and Europe doesn't bless the agreement, then perhaps Turkey (and Brazil for that matter) will suffer. But if the deal somehow works- like producing Iranian compliance or convincing Tehran that the production of nuclear weapons is detrimental to its security- then Erdogan's credibility as a ruler and Turkey's position as a mediator will improve significantly in the Arab world.
http://www.depetris.wordpress.com
Turkey is on the correct path for the long term.
Americans may, in their short sightedness, want Turkey and others, say, Pakistan, be subservient to American foreign policy.
But, what is American foreign policy but a maddening nonsense that created Israel out of thin air and plopped it on top of Palestine, 60+ years of brutal denial of the fundamental human rights of Palestinians under Israel's thumb, 43 years of Israel's ILLEGAL and complete occupation of 100% of Palestine, 20 years of Israel's Illegal occupation of southern Lebanon, 20 years of American siege of Iraq, two invasions, occupation and complete destruction of the fabric of the Iraqi society, invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, daily bombing of Pakistan, daily threats to nuclear bomb Iran.
What a foreign policy America has, no wonder everybody in the world hates with fervour this maddening nonsense of America.
Turkey and others are well advised to follow their own foreign policies that keep peace in the region instead of the maddening wars of Zionist Trigger happy Israel and its chela the Zionist Occupied America.
It was long ago when we forgot to rely on the USA governments. USA unfortunately became the most important enemy of Turkey which threatens overtly the enterity of Turkish territory and secular Turkish Republic, although there are a lot of honest and reasonable American citizens also. The state's ambivalent attitute towards Turkey on Armenian issue, becoming a spokesmen of Armenian allegations constitutes only a minor portion of the problems. I will focus on the American Armenian policy:
American politicians may watch their benefits as every politician in every country. However, the most important and unacceptable attitute of the American politicians, presidents, in addition to American journalists and public opinion in all, towards the tragic events which occurred around 1915 is that they assume the tragedy the Ottoman Turks/Muslims suffered, during the same period as absent. Such that:
The Armenians performed hundreds of revolts against the Ottomans, being organized by Armenian committees H?nçak and Ta?naksütyan (24 revolts only in September to December 1895). In 1905, the Armenians killed all the Turks and Muslims who lived in Su?a in Azarbaijan (Russian newspaper Novoye Obozrenye 6 September 1905). They do not want to remember that their grandfathers who struggled against the Ottomans in Armenian-Russian troops murdered 40% of the Muslim population in Van, Bitlis, Erzurum. ‘The Turks who had been slaughtered like animals were buried in large holes in the Eastern Anatolia’ writes Russian Lieutenant Colonel Twerdo-Khlebof in his diary (www.tsk.mil.tr/ermeni_sorunu/arsiv_belgeleriyle_ermeni_faaliyetleri/pdf/yarbay_tverdohlebov.pdf). Many mass graves have been found in the Eastern Anatolia. The Armenians who were invited to investigate these mass graves many times, insistently rejected these offers. Armenian Soviet historian A.A.Lalayan stated that the Dashnaks displayed extreme courage to massacre Turkish women, children and ill and old people (Contrarevolyutsionn?y ‘Da?naktsutyun’ ? ?mperialisti-çeskaya Voyna 1914-1918 gg.’, Revolyutsionn?y Vostok, No.2-3, p.92, 1936).
While the number of the Ottoman Armenians who had to immigrate for security was 500 000, the number of Muslims who had to immigrate to Anatolia’s more secure places to escape from the Russian- Armenian attacks in the Eastern Anatolia and Caucasia was 1 million, only during 1916 and 1917. Death rate among these immigrants and additionally the Turkish troops, because of cholera, typhus, dysentery outbreaks were very high. In Syria and Lebenon, massy death occurred because of poverty. English ships attacked the ships which carried wheat to Lebenon and had them sunk (Özdemir H,2005).
The sorrows suffered by the Turks in the WWI were not less than those the Armenians suffered. However, I feel deep sorrow not only for the Turks/other Muslims but for the Armenians also, because of the tragedy they suffered during the WWI. The Armenians had been our brothers and sisters for 800 years and still they are. However I expect the same feelings from the Armenians too. I am deeply sorry for them, since they are pledged by the hatred inside of them, which is continuously fed by their incapacitated leaders and which prevents them from focusing on even historical realities. They founded an outlaw terrorist organization ASALA and murdered 39 innocent Turkish diplomats. They pursued a ‘slandering campaign towards the Turkish Republic, lending support to three major documents which have already been shown by both the Turkish and foreign historians to be fake.It is because of this that the Armenians and Armenian diaspora strictly avoids of discussing these events with the historians from both sides, on historical documents from both sides.
Who feels afraid of bringing and displaying his proofs? Overtly, the one who does not trust his proofs.
Is it not?
Therefore the support of the American politicians including President Obana is also a support given to the Armenians' ‘fear from scholarship’ which is unsuitable for the American politicians who belong to a country which is a leader of science in the world.
No country in the world should worry about a nuclearised Iran
No country in the world should worry about a nuclearised Iran except Israel.
And rightly so, Israel has invaded all its neighbours in the past 60+ years and now threatens countries every farther away, as clearly documented by Israeli machinations behind American Invasion, Occupation and Destruction of Iraq, and Israel's threats against not only Iran but against Pakistan's nuclear capability.
Also, please don't forget the fact that Iran has no nuclear bombs and Israel has 400 nuclear bombs provided by the acquiescence of America.
As usual when the title is "Turkey" the discussion slips from dynamics of foreign policy to the "I'm right, you are wrong discussion". So I won't comment on the Armenian, Cyprus, Karabagh and Kurdistan issues.
As it becomes obvious each day (also in older articles here) there is a change of game we are witnessing today. The power centre is shifting from the Atlantic to another place.
When we pull our selves more distant from the picture and able to take a broader look on the history especially the middle east other than foreign powers (like the Mongols, Americans etc.) we will notice two major power centres which are Iran and Anatolia.
Under normal conditions there has always been power struggle between the two. So it is a real surprise for me to see the second biggest regional power in the region which is Iran came to terms with Turkey. I think here the Oscar goes to United States with the marauding policy which caused the Iraqi mess and which relentlesly supports Israel what ever it does.
On the other side Turkey is performing incredibly with his "Zero problem" policy. As most think this new policy is only based on mediating with problematic relations of neighbors between themselves, it is mainly based on rejecting the cold war ideology of "everybody is our enemy, and every neighbor is just enemies" which is mostly about himself.
For the last two hundred years the Anatolian effect on the Middle East have faded away gradually ending with the WWI, which caused Turkey to pull himself completely out of regional politics.
This not only helped the old problems with the regional countries to lay in the dust and to be forgotten by the societies and played a healing role for the sides except Armenian and Cyprus issues.
It is like plugging the power cord again. After all those years in the 21st century Turkey has finally managed to begin magnetizing the region. But this time it is using the soft power to connect with the neighbors.
Think about the 2009 Russian invasion of Georgia. Including me, most of the people thought the struggle of control over Caucasus had began between the Russian and the Turks, since Georgia being an important ally for Turkey.
But instead less then 12 months time, Turkey and Russia came to terms on lots of events.
The general climate of foreign policy of our times also helps Turkey on this.
US need some one to help him talk to Iran, Iran needs some one to talk to the West, Russia needs an ally to create a balance with its relations with the West, Syria needs some support against all the world to stand, Lebanon needs someone to help him mediate with Syria.
It was an incredible moment for me to see Bosnian and Serbian Presidents to came to Turkey and sign new agreements 10 years after the big disaster.
The dynamics which led Turkey to pull back from Caucasus, Balkans and the Middle East seems to be changed and now working on behalf of Turkey.
Who knows a new Pax Romana or another Pax Ottomana is on the corner?
This time "Soft Power" and "Listening to Others" seems to be the key words.
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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