Monday, June 21, 2010 - 11:58 AM

If the United States reduced its defense budget significantly, how would this affect international affairs? I raise this point because one of the primary justifications for America's disproportionately high level of defense spending is the idea that U.S. military dominance is an essential stabilizing force in contemporary world politics. This argument has been advanced by scholars like William Wohlforth and Michael Mandelbaum, was implicit in Madeleine Albright's infamous characterization of the United States as the "indispensable power," and runs throughout the Clinton, Bush and now Obama versions of the National Security Strategy. It is also one of those well-established verities that are rarely questioned in the American foreign policy establishment.
Given our current budget situation, however, that assumption really ought to be questioned. The United States spends more on national security than the rest of the world combined, and a substantially larger fraction of its GDP than other major powers do. According to the 2010 edition of the IISS Military Balance, in 2008 the US spent about 4.9 percent of GDP on national security, and the defense budget has grown in real terms by about 3 percent per year since 2001. By contrast, China spent about 1.4 percent of its GDP on defense, Russia 2.4% Great Britain only 2.3 percent , and German and Japan roughly 1.3 percent and 0.9 percent respectively. Lucky them.
Meanwhile, the United States has been piling up impressive amounts of red ink in recent years. The federal deficit reached 10 percent of GDP in FY2009 (the highest level since 1945), and various projections suggest that total U.S debt could reach 80 to 100 percent of GDP by FY2020. (My thanks to Gordon Adams of the Stimson Center and George Washington University, the author of an unpublished paper from which I drew these numbers). This situation led President Obama to form a bipartisan commission to study ways to reduce the federal deficit, and the president and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates have both made it clear that defense spending has to be part of that process.
No doubt defense contractors and congressional hawks will try to insulate DoD from significant cuts, but that position will be politically untenable if other sectors are being slashed. In fact, if we were really serious about trying to close the deficits mentioned above, we'd be looking at cuts similar to the "peace dividend" that accompanied the end of the Cold War. Measured in constant dollars, for example, the DoD budget fell 36 percent in constant dollars between 1985 and 1998, accompanied by comparable reductions in the active-duty force and the Pentagon's civilian workforce.
So here's my question: Would similar cuts today produce a dangerous shift in the structure of world politics and invite all sorts of nasty regional instability? I don't think so. If the U.S. cut defense by 20-30 percent (an enormous reduction), it would still be devoting roughly $400 billion per year to keeping Americans safe. Our national security spending would still be six times larger than China's, ten times larger than Russia's and a whopping forty times larger than Iran's. And because many militarily consequential powers are U.S. allies, its actual position is even better than those crude comparisons suggest. Thus, even seemingly draconian defense cuts would still leave the United States far stronger than any current rivals, especially if the reductions were done intelligently.
Moreover, if you look region-by-region, it's not obvious that reductions of this magnitude would change things very much. It would have little or no effect on Europe, because a large U.S. presence isn't central to European security any longer. There's little danger of serious conflict in Europe these days (and certainly no potential threat that the European states can't handle), and all that's needed from the United States is a mostly symbolic presence to help hold NATO together and remind Europeans not to let security competition reignite on the continent. And please don't try to tell me that Putin's Russia poses a resurgent threat to the rest of Europe. NATO Europe spends roughly $300 billion on defense each year compared to Russia's $40 billion; if our European allies can't handle Russia's not-very-impressive military, then they don't deserve U.S. help.
I'd say much the same thing about Latin America and Africa. Although the United States will remain diplomatically engaged with both regions (and maintain various security partnerships with states in each area), it is not likely to undertake major military operations on either continent. The United States could sustain its current level of peacetime activity in both regions with a smaller force structure, and political developments in both places have been and will probably remain largely independent of the size of the U.S. military presence or the level of U.S. defense spending. Put differently, we wouldn't be able to determine Africa's political future even if we spent ten percent of our GDP on defense, and major cuts wouldn't make much difference either.
The Persian Gulf is a different matter, but not as much as one might think. Once the United States is out of Iraq, it will be time to revert to its previous strategy of "offshore balancing." The United States has no need to control these oil-rich regions, it just wants to ensure that no single hostile power does. So long as the Gulf is divided, oil producers will continue to deliver oil to world markets where we can buy it. We can rely on local allies and naval power to preserve our access and influence, and keep a smaller version of the Rapid Deployment Force in reserve should the situation there deteriorate. Fortunately, none of the countries in the Gulf have significant power-projection capabilities, which will make it relatively easy to maintain a stable balance-of-power in the region. Remember: a reduced U.S. budget would still leave the U.S. far stronger than any other country in the world, and it would not herald a return to isolationism. The Gulf still matters, but we would have enough to protect our interests there, particularly if we allocated assets wisely.
East Asia is another place where dramatic U.S. reductions might have noticeable effects over time. America's ability to act with impunity in areas very close to China (such as the Sea of Japan, or Taiwan) might begin to erode (though it would not disappear overnight), particularly if China built up its own forces rapidly and our Asian allies did nothing in response. What this means, it seems to me, is that we would want to reallocate a larger percentage of defense assets to Asia, thereby mitigating the effects of an overall budget decrease. We also want to devote more attention to nurturing security ties with other states in the region, who are increasingly concerned about China's rise and should be willing to do more to maintain a balance in the region. Of course, they are more willing to contribute their fair share if they understand that the United States isn't going to do it all.
And then there's Central Asia. We're now spending $100 billion or so each year trying to defeat the Taliban and establish a functioning state in Afghanistan, and there's no end in sight if we persist in that quest. (That's why you keep getting reminded that the summer 2011 "deadline" isn't particularly firm). Getting out of Afghanistan could have significant effects there, but as I've noted before, I don't think it would have particularly significant effects on U.S. security. More to the point, it is far from obvious that investing more money and lives in that mission is going to yield positive long-term effects for U.S security. In other words-and contrary to the Obama administration's positions -- it may not matter very much for us if we win or if we lose. So if reducing defense expenditures also means getting out of the nation-building business there, fine by me.
The bottom line is that major cuts in defense spending might not be nearly as destabilizing as many people think. I'm not saying it would have no effects, but they would be less dramatic than we often assume and in some cases might even be salutary. Don't forget that continuing to live beyond our means carries ample risks too, as well as sizeable opportunity costs. And if you don't believe me, just ask our last five-star general.
Of course, this blog post is hardly a systematic study of this issue, and it's possible that I'm being overly sanguine. The question of how reduced U.S. defense budget would affect world politics cries out for systematic analysis, and it is precisely the sort of topic that our intelligence services ought to be tasked with evaluating, preferably under the guidance of a smart and independent-minded director.
Because there tens of billions of dollars at stake, we know the answers we are likely to get from the Pentagon, or from think tanks that depend on defense contractors for their livelihood. Ideally, an effort to address this question would draw upon the knowledge and expertise of academic experts, journalists with regional expertise, and some members of our diplomatic corps as well.
Disclaimer: I don't for one second believe that we are going to see defense cuts of the sorts imagined here under the Obama administration, though I think downward pressure will be hard to resist. When that happens, doomsayers will undoubtedly predict disaster if the budget is held flat. If my analysis is right and even drastic cuts would have little impact, then it follows that holding the budget flat would have no negative geopolitical effects at all.
P.S,: I'm told that the Gordon Adams paper referenced above will be available shortly on one of the Stimson Center's blogs, here. This is a very useful site from which you can learn a lot.
Joe Raedle/Getty Images
How much money does the arms industry pump into party war-chests? More or less than the Israel lobby? How many senators and congressmen hold shares of Northrup-Grumman, Rayethon, Boeing, and Lockheed-Martin?
Moreover, given Obama's operating style, any small cuts to one part of the defense budget will only be tolerated when those cuts are made up, twice over, in other parts.
Nope, this empire is not gonna bow out gracefully. It's gonna go down fighting. Brace for impact.
Defense dwarfs the pro-Israel lobby on money spent. So do very many other lobbies.
See here:
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?ind=D
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?ind=Q05
The fact is, while Steve will never admit it, the simplest explanation for the pro-Israel lobby's influence makes the most sense -- at root, the majority of Americans agree with them. They are fighting a downhill battle.
At that point we would see the true influence, or lack thereof, of the pro-Israel lobby. It is one thing to get people to follow a course of action they support, the situation the pro-Israel lobby faces now. It is quite another to influence them to do something they do not support.
Any discussion of cutting the budget that does not address military spending is not dealing in reality. The U.S. has essentially been at a war funding level since the Second World War. We had to fight Korea, Vietnam, the Cold War, Iraq 1 and 2 and Afghanistan. The constant need to field a large, advanced military has significant consequences on the country and it's economy. For a good read about this, read The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. The US needs a period of disengagement where it can regroup and concentrate on improving it's economy, the basis of any strong military.
Despite the need to do this though, Prof Walt misses a couple of points in my opinion. First the United States could easily dominate any single country he has listed above. The problem with this is that the US would face significant problems concentrating all of its resources into a single theatre of war. If we take China for example, the pacific command would have to fight off the Chinese navy, which while smaller would be no push over as the episode where a chinese submarine surfaced within the protective screen of a US carrier showed. That would allow the chinese to time to concentrate their resources against a portion of the US navy before the remainder could be committeed. That is assuming that the US could commit all it's forces to a single theatre.
If the US does, and should, make significant cuts in the pentagon budget, how would we adapt our international commitments? if we are the aggressor we will have the opportunity to bring overwhelming force to bear but if we are the victim of aggression we would face significant logistical problems in concentrating our forces. this should suggest that the United States should also reduce the number of international military bases so it could concentrate it forces to discourage aggression from first order powers.
As an American civilian living in Korea, I can attest to the need to reevaluate our presence overseas.
What I want to know is, how much money does the U.S. still spend on being the de facto military force for WWII axis nations. Our large presence in Japan and Germany is more or less attributed to said nations being constitutionally barred from having standing militaries.
The main reason American post-war occupiers applied this was to prevent revanchism or a repeat of the Second World War. I think in today's geopolitical climate we have to worry about Japan taking over swaths of Asia or Germany annexing smaller European states.
These two things alone would not only reduce money spent on defense, but allow these nations to actually defend themselves.
Korea, too, is a similar example. While given the Cheonan incident, and the fact that the US has a very friendly and welcoming ally in the form of Korea, the US could use the country as its cornerstone for East Asian military presence. Not so much Japan.
Can be found here http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2010/06/25/defense-cuts-must-be-on-the-table-a-series-of-analyses/
Defense budgets are the most difficult to oversee
In nearly every country it is the same story. Big defense budgets are hardest to cut because they are the most rife with graft and corruption. So many projects are classified and top secret it's impossible to follow precisely where all the money flows, but also the easiest spending to justify. When there are no attacks, the spending is deemed a success and can't be turned off. When there is an attack, it's because we didn't have enough spending.
So the United States spends more on national security than the rest of the world combined.
Is something crazy going on here? What powerful enemies present us with military challenges demanding the billions we spend? Like my drunk and nutty naighbor who's spent thousands of bucks trying to get rid of the moles in his back yard. He's obsessed with them and even if he got rid of them, which he's not quite sure he can, he'd still be spending money getting rid of them.
Before Walt neatly lays out his sensible reasons for cutting defense spending, he should try to explain better the "irrational" forces pushing it up.
What about our security alliances?
If there are cuts in defense expenditures over the next few years (which should be encouraged given America's current political climate), the United States needs to be certain that this money does not jeopardize its current standing as a protector in our allies. Because if these cuts do in fact make our allies nervous- especially those allies in the Gulf- they may very well decide to ramp up their own defense capabilities, which in turn could propel other states in the region to up the ante as well. In this case, American defense cuts could start a new arms race...something that the Obama administration has tried to stymie.
This is just a question that should be considered during the planning phase. I'm all for saving money, especially when our own infrastructure and education system is falling behind other developed nations. But will saving money change the perception of our allies, and how will they respond to this new perception?
By the way, the U.S. security umbrella in Europe should have been drastically scaled back a decade ago. Europe is doing fine, and Russia is weak to challenge them.
http://www.depetris.wordpress.com
Here's a slightly tangential question
Here's a question about the 'offshore balancing' strategy: Given that defending US access to energy resources through market principles is a recognized vital security interest (recognized by realists), and we are seeing National Oil Companies working hard (and rather successfully) to undercut that system, how would the US ever really move to a strict 'over the horizon' stance in practice without creating a vaccuum that Russia or China will seek to more fully fill in the ME or Central Asia? Might movement towards offshore balancing create at least the potential to undercut that core national interest?
If the U.S. cut defense by 20-30 percent (an enormous reduction), it would still be devoting roughly $400 billion per year to keeping Americans safe. Our national security spending would still be six times larger than China's, ten times larger than Russia's and a whopping forty times larger than Iran's. And because many militarily consequential powers are U.S. allies, its actual position is even better than those crude comparisons suggest. Thus, even seemingly draconian defense cuts would still leave the United States far stronger than any current rivals, especially if the reductions were done intelligently.
Military spending isn't fungible like that, and you know it. The cuts would have to come from somewhere, ideally Personnel (you could save a lot of money by cutting back to the post-Gulf War I force structure) but likely from Logistics and Procurement. We'd get a repeat of the Clinton years, with the active duty forces running down their supplies of equipment and materiel because there's no money for re-supply and maintenance.
It would have little or no effect on Europe, because a large U.S. presence isn't central to European security any longer. There's little danger of serious conflict in Europe these days (and certainly no potential threat that the European states can't handle), and all that's needed from the United States is a mostly symbolic presence to help hold NATO together and remind Europeans not to let security competition reignite on the continent.
At least until they start raising their defense budgets again to compensate.
I'd say much the same thing about Latin America and Africa. Although the United States will remain diplomatically engaged with both regions (and maintain various security partnerships with states in each area), it is not likely to undertake major military operations on either continent.
That's true for Latin America, but not so much Africa. At the very least, we'd like to be able to enforce against piracy in the waters of Somalia.
We can rely on local allies and naval power to preserve our access and influence, and keep a smaller version of the Rapid Deployment Force in reserve should the situation there deteriorate.
I take it you don't mind the US becoming even more dependent on the Israelis and Saudis in the region than they are now? That's basically what this strategies entails - relying on local client regimes to "keep the peace" - and Israel would almost certainly be the main candidate for that.
America's ability to act with impunity in areas very close to China (such as the Sea of Japan, or Taiwan) might begin to erode (though it would not disappear overnight), particularly if China built up its own forces rapidly and our Asian allies did nothing in response.
"Did nothing in response"? Not a chance. A perceived serious weakness in the US commitment to our allies in East Asia would spark a serious arms race, possibly including Japan (which would make every other state in East Asia extremely nervous).
What this means, it seems to me, is that we would want to reallocate a larger percentage of defense assets to Asia, thereby mitigating the effects of an overall budget decrease. We also want to devote more attention to nurturing security ties with other states in the region, who are increasingly concerned about China's rise and should be willing to do more to maintain a balance in the region.
Maybe in some ideal world where only Operations costs were cut would this work, but massive Defense cuts would likely hit all over the budget, resulting in a general serious weakening of US military capabilities. This would particularly be the case if we have Gates or his ilk in office, since they've shown a willingness to kill and/or weaken the next generation of US conventional military capabilities to produce a big enough Garrison Army for their ends.
And if you don't believe me, just ask our last five-star general.
Eisenhower was using a strategy of Massive Retaliation combined with favoring client regimes abroad - heavy on the nukes, light on the active-duty Army. I don't see many takers arguing for this.
Keep in mind that the US 'defense' budget is significantly higher than simply the DoD budget. It seems pretty rediculous not to include things like weapons sales, veterans pensions, DHS/CIA/NSA/etc, and of course the debt from past wars in our calculations of total "national security" spending. With all those added in the amount spent is $1.003–$1.223 trillion- a stunning 14% of our GDP. That's flabbergasting to say the least.
I think it won't weaken our military but even strengthen it. If the cuts don't bring a vacuum of power, if they are done well, I think it can increase the efficiency, bring innovation and I assume that's what we really need right now.
If things go like this, in a few decades, China's military budget will own that of us, so let's try to revolutionize our military, bring some innovation! Fewer money will make brains work and find a solution.
I definitely don't disagree with most of the article, and think that there's a lot off trimming that can be done and should be done.
However, I question the belief in the "official' figures in Russia's and China's military spending ($40 and $50 billion, I believe). Not that I dislike the countries - I actually like Russia very much - but I think it's somewhat naive to believe their figures on this matter, when you compare them to those of France or Great Britain. Countries still trying to compete with the US in technology (and out-competing France and Great Britain in many respects), nuclear arsenal and maintaining one million strong armies are probably spending far more than $40 billion annually. Russia still has closed military cities, serious state funding for R&D, etc.
Just saying.
On spending, may I remind readers that dollar for dollar spending isn't the best comparison. Instead we should look at it in terms of what percent the defense spending is of our GDP*. For one thing, a dollar in China will buy far more than it will in the U.S.
On Europe and the Middle East I'm primarily in agreement however:
On Africa that is only true if circumstances remain relatively safe and stable. If Somalia or the DR of the Congo collapse or if North and South Sudan go to war and send chaos into their respective regions we might need to reconsider. However, if RAND's estimates are accurate it would be cheaper to use the U.N and about as effective.
In South/Central America, we do have to consider the possibility (albeit low) of a war between Venezuela and Columbia. I would prefer that the U.S resolve it diplomatically, but we have to consider the possibility of war and make sure that we could react quickly if necessary.
In Asia, it might be a poor decision to draw down soldiers except from Afghanistan. The risk of a Korean war is always present, and even though China won't appreciate a build up I doubt that China is going to much more helpful on North Korea than it already is.
In other words, the situation is a bit complicated and always ready for chaos to spread.
*I'm fully aware that GDP measurements have been criticized, but I haven't heard of a better one yet.
It had to happen that some would start pushing to cut our military spending fearful of the deficit. This is deficient thinking. National security is the bedrock upon which all else is built. Diminish it and we diminish our capacity to shape, respond, build, remain safe -- or tackle our financial problems.. It is a dangerous world and will remain so. It has come to pass that many in our country have become intellectually disarmed which enables them to advocate disarming physically. We need more, not less. The herd is heading for the cliff.
"National security is the bedrock upon which all else is built."
Nope.
A thorough and liberal public education is the bedrock of successful nations.
Here in Georgia they are eviserating merit teacher pay and cutting many other education programs. That is madness.
The MICC should get funding proportional to that spent on Education, with Education getting by far the higher proportion.
Walt
As I am European, rather than American, I have a rather different perspective and wonder if you are failing to see an implied premise. I assume most of the commenters are American and they assume that the US presence has been, by and large, beneficial to US security and has been making you friends around the world. My question is why start from that assumption, what evidence is their that US foreign policy and, more specifically its furtherance by your military, has been good for the security of your citizenry. The obvious, and debated in these threads ad nausiam, question regards support for Israel and its corollary military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan. All of these have lead to the support of states like KSA & Egypt and the lumping of states & non state actors like Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and the Palestinians into an opposition camp. This is where much of the budget has gone has it made the US more or less secure it has certainly made you a lot of enemies but has it been useful on balance. If we ignore the Israel and GWOT hot potato and look at the US’s use of its military pre 9/11 the focus was primarily on the US’s battle with ‘communism’ and any states or non state parties with left of centre agendas where they were in competition with right wing entities. This encompasses most of central and south America and swaths of Africa. Again these ideological wars have been polarising. To cement US public opinion for a given position, be it McCarthyism and spreading communisms or the Neocon’s Muslim caliphate, US public opinion is bent to fit the need. The result is a US public who believe Cuba and Iran are evils beyond redemption and the rest of the world think they may not be shining examples of liberal democracies but are no worse than, and probably better than, Columbia and Saudi Arabia respectively. If the US largely stopped interfering in the affairs of other countries – regardless of any financial dividend – may that not have a peace dividend in a more literal sense? Again as Americans you see the US’s ability to control the seas off China’s coast as a good thing but is it and if so for whom? Might countries locally not welcome their area being the domain of the countries form their region rather than one from a different continent. Having an imperial power control your national waters is not necessarily popular locally and as such may not throw the foreign power in a good light or help its security. If the US thinks its security is best served by carpeting the globe with overwhelming military force ready to impose its will anywhere at anytime it will be following in the footsteps of plenty of previous imperial powers but I would argue in today’s interconnected world it is not a solution that endears the US to the rest of the world or ultimately makes it more secure. I think the US’s actions since 9/11 have significantly decreased the security of everyone on the planet and Americans more than most.
can be found here: http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2010/06/25/defense-cuts-must-be-on-the-table-a-series-of-analyses/
Despite the need to do this though, Prof Walt misses a couple of points in my opinion. First the United States could easily dominate any single country he has listed above. The problem with this is that the US would face significant problems concentrating all of its resources into a single theatre of war. If we take China for example, the pacific command would have to fight off the Chinese navy, which while smaller would be no push over as the episode where a chinese submarine surfaced within the protective screen of a US carrier showed. That would allow the chinese to time to concentrate their resources against a portion of the US navy before the remainder could be committeed. That is assuming that the US could commit all it's forces to a single theatre.
If the US does, and should, make significant cuts in the pentagon budget, how would we adapt our international commitments? if we are the aggressor we will have the opportunity to bring overwhelming force to bear but if we are the victim of replica hublot aggression we would face significant logistical problems in concentrating our forces. this should suggest that the United States should also reduce the number of international military bases so it could concentrate it forces to discourage aggression from first order powers.
China does have massive, potentially civilization-ending detterrence abilities. World powers will never give up their security blanket of being able to bring down all of human society with them.SazkyOn the bright side, I prefer the Bios, because they remove the temptation of a first strike, as they would inevitably return to sender. Also, even if your numbers were right, I can imagine that if things got a lot worse, and there was a crisis, the US, Russia, or China might be willing to give up most of their cities
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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