Steve Walt asks:

"In any case, my question still stands: How often has early and rapid strategic withdrawal from a war of choice lead to disastrous results for the withdrawing power?"

I'm not sure I see what meaningful difference there is between an "early and rapid strategic withdrawal from a war of choice" and an initial decision not to enter *into* such a war in the first place. And, as a consequence, why doesn't the decision of France and GB and others not to go to war with Hitler early over, say, his remilitarizing, or the Sudeten or etc. qualify big time as such a "disastrous result"?

So here's my question: Are there good historical examples where a great power withdrew because a foreign military intervention wasn't going well, and where hindsight shows that the decision to withdraw was a terrible blunder?

Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation? You could maybe argue that they were going to be forced out, but the pull-out only exacerbated the collapse of Afghanistan into brutal civil strife and conflict by pulling out the chair from under what little government Afghanistan had.

The British in Mandatory Palestine? That might be a case of where they were going to be forced out eventually, but the immediate result was a great deal more violence resulting from the Partition, the Israeli War of Independence/Nakba, and so forth.

In the beginning of the article, it mentions hindsight is 20/20. Also, we are positing these responses all on hypothetical outcomes.

1) Korea. Knowing what we know now about North Korea, maybe America didn't stay the course long enough. Containment is one thing, but we've basically contained an atomic bomb that is apparently exporting nuclear technology to Myanmar. If the South had won, Korea would have been unified, and there wouldn't be this nuclear spectre looming over the region. Conversely, staying the course longer may have resulted in WWIII. We'll never know.

2) Somalia. I disagree with the USA withdrawing "from Somalia in 1993 following the Black Hawk Down incident, and withdrawal didn't have particularly significant strategic consequences". Once again, we are dealing with hypotheticals, but if we had continued to stay and reinforced the UN peacekeeping mission, maybe Al-Sahhab (I included the laam, even though it's silent, since that's how it's written in Arabic script) would not have had a chance to take root. Illegal fishing would also more than likely not have occured, stripping Somalia of one of its few resources. Piracy also probably would not have occured. The longterm effect is that militancy has been exported to nearby nations - Eritrea, Tanzania, and potentially Kenya, to name a few locations. Staying longer would lead to many unknowns, but with Somalia being a failed state with transnational terrorism and our various Special Operations groups still having to show up on occassion, I make the case that we didn't do enough as a nation.

Iraq in 1991? I realize this is a bit of a deviation from the question, but if you accept the fact that we were going to eventually deal with Saddam (thanks to poor foreign policy, bad leadership or whatever - obviously the real answer here is that we shouldn't have ever gone back) do you think it would have been a lot easier to topple the regime and nation-build 20 years ago than in today's world? What implications do you think that would have had in the region?

A big part of not understanding circumstances is that political strategy tends to take too narrow of a focus. With regards to Afghanistan, it is frequently said that it has never been successfully invaded. This is manifestly not true, as it has been very successfully invaded by Islam over the course of the last half millennia. A prime example of this invasion was the destruction of those enormous Buddhist statues some years before 9/11.
While we currently view the only alternative to monotheism to be atheism or agnosticism, there is great, unremarked fallacy to a single deity. A universal state, or absolute, is basis, not apex. The Source, physical or spiritual, would be the essence from which we rise, not an ideal from which we fell.
The original polytheistic gods were what we would call memes today. Group concepts to which numbers of people could identify and discuss, whether one's tribe, geographic and celestial features, community activities, from war to sex, ancestors, heros, etc. Around these concepts a network of mythological storytelling developed, so that the larger network of entities took on a life of its own and out of this sense of unity, the idea of some universal entity took hold. While philosophy generally saw through the logic of the Platonic Ideal as it applied to physical objects, the same clear thinking never fully focused on its larger application in the evolution of religion. The idea of a top down father figure deity also appealed to political regimes interested in legitimizing their own authority, which monotheism does very effectively.
The fact remains though, that it was not monotheists who first instituted democracy, but polytheists. Given the multiple theological balancing acts such a religious model requires, this is understandable, whereas monotheism only requires one king at the top to be reflected in the political order.
So while this particular little observation may seem unrelated to the problems going on in Afghanistan, it does go to the very heart of the issues being played out there, as we try to impose our rather shallow 21st century assumptions on an area of the world still fighting conflicts going back many centuries.

The invaded and then fought a long bloody counter insurgency campaign from 1899 to 1913 in the country. (The Muslim insurrection in the south has the distinction of being the longest running continual insurrection in the world in some people's estimation.) It was then sat on as a Commonwealth until the Japanese invaded and the US promptly left the country to its own devices immediately after the war in 1946, but with some hefty strings attached like what amounted to a non-competition clause and barred armed US support inside of the country which became a big problem when communist guerrillas started operating in the country in the late 50's. The country continues to be mired in corruption and a 110 year old insurgency in the south.

As a contrast, Puerto Rico which was not cut loose immediately after the war has low corruption, a strong economy and was not subject to communist insurrection.

This is the obvious answer.

The one thing the United States needed to do then in the Arab world then, at the height of its worldwide influence, was to make clear to leaders in the region that breach of some pretty clear, easy-to-follow rules (like "don't occupy your neighbors") in defiance of American power would have lethal consequences. The United States had done very well maintaining a discreet distance from the barbarous currents of Arab religion, culture and politics for over 40 years at that time; declaring victory in the Gulf War and sending home the enormous army we had moved halfway around the world to fight it led within months to a humanitarian disaster, to a major, durable American containment operation, and to no end of trouble.

The answer, though, is not obviously relevant to our position in Afghanistan today. Then, the United States was in a position of great strength with its enemy prostrate before it; now, it is beset by myriad troubles while trying to deal with allies who do not share its cause. Then, we had an opportunity to avoid deep entanglement in the backward cultures of Southwest Asia; now, our challenge is one of disentanglement.

This doesn't prove rapid withdrawal from Afghanistan at this time is the right course. Advocates of that policy tend to assume a great deal, and if any of their assumptions are wrong the consequences could be very bad indeed. The point is that after a commitment in Afghanistan that has already lasted almost nine years, looking for historical precedents in the form of military commitments that were ended too soon doesn't help. The examples we have don't fit the circumstances we face now.

I would think Vietnam would be the war that we could have won if we had stayed only a little bit longer. I find it interesting that you argue the opposite. The negative consequences of us leaving were mainly felt by the South Vietnamese, who were slaughtered in the thousands once we evacuated. That should certainly be a consideration.

The US in Somalia?

Taking up the point made by "Sin Nombre", I contend that the question should be rephrased to represent the real dichotomy, that between engagement and non-engagement, or action and inaction or, more precisely, the trichotomy of over-extension (or over-balancing), balancing, and under-balancing. Just as over-extension is about more than just starting too many wars or staying in the wrong ones, under-balancing is more than just failing to go to war or failing to pursue a war to the end, because balancing strategies abound.

Some great work has been done on the causes of under-balancing and on their dangers (Randall Schweller's Unanswered Threats, 2006, is a good example), but these have also been exaggerated for political purposes from time immemorial; just remember the rage against appeasement, at least as old as the IR discipline, the domino theory and so forth. These, as Jack Snyder famously argued, can be strong motivations for over-extension.

Starting to pursue a course of action and then retrenching could be classified as under-balancing, in the sense that in hindsight we can judge if it was the right move (in which case it wouldn't be under-balancing) or the wrong one (in which case it would). I would like to note here that under-balancing/balancing/overbalancing is, by definition, only applicable to instances in which the stakes are high for the country in question and where there was the possibility of doing too much, doing too little or doing just enough. This is the problem with Walt's focus on wars of choice. Wars of choice are excluded by definition since they are not requisites for proper balancing.

The right question then appears to be if there are cases in which under-balancing takes the form of giving up mid-course as opposed to mere inaction or doing too little too late. Right off the bat, I could think of only one good example (subject, of course, to some controversy), but I am sure there are more.

The example I have in mind is China's civil war. The US took too long to support Chiang Kai-shek and was too stingy in its help, and as soon as costs started to go up they actually dialed down the shipment of weapons. Many historians argue that up to some point in the conflict (estimates/guesses vary) a Kuomintang victory was possible had the US (or other Western powers) been more generous and emphatic in its support against Mao Zedong. The tragic consequence for the US and the West (and to the Chinese, of course) was of course a Communist China and all the problems it brought with it during the Cold War and beyond. (Though the US would still certainly have had troubles with China had Chiang won). Of course the US had good reason not to get too involved there, but in hindsight I think it would have been a good investment.

However, I would bet that we will find less good examples of this kind of under-balancing than of other kinds, or than examples of overextension. This is because the ideas and political forces that cause both overreaction and inertia are more common than those that cause retrenchment. Also, once a war or intervention is initiated, powerful forces are set in motion that make it difficult to stop, especially when the stakes in that conflict are presented as being so high. It is easier to pull out from a war of choice precisely because it is presented as being a war of choice, and a war of choice is necessarily a war in which the consequences of not going all the way are not that tragic.

Finally, I would like to react to some of the cases suggested by earlier commentators.

Someone mentioned earlier Korea as a case of retreat, but I am not convinced that victory was possible beyond what was achieved. The problem there wasn't one of lack of commitment, but of a strategic deadlock. And for what is worth, I don't think the US or the UN would have been successful in preventing the situation in Somalia from deteriorating, even less so in fully establishing order there, and though the spread of violence in the region, piracy, illegal fishing and drug trafficking are more nuisances than strategic threats to the US.

Dr. Walt Asks

"In any case, my question still stands: How often has early and rapid strategic withdrawal from a war of choice lead to disastrous results for the withdrawing power?"

I have two suggestions in my mind. One of them from a long past another one from more recent memory.

1. Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent stood at the gates of Vienna in 1529 when the whole of Balkans had been conquered by the Ottomans and the Ottoman navy reigned supreme in the Mediterranean sea. He had the chance to become the conqueror of Europe but he somehow lifted the siege due to certain issues like overstretching of military resources and went back. This is to my mind the biggest example of early and rapid strategic withdrawal leading to disastrous results.

2. The Third Reich simply did not press Britain enough after the Battle of Britain . A land invasion of Britain from all the sides (since most of the Europe was under the control of the Third Reich) would have ensured mastery over the Europe by the Third Reich.

Hi,

Arunachal Pradesh: In 1962, the Chinese attacked and decisively defeated Indian troops in Arunachal Pradesh. A couple of years later, they pulled out of Arunchal Pradesh. They're still claiming Arunacha Pradesh, which suggests that they may regret the pullout.

It is also possible that India will regret its decision to leave Sri Lanka, described in Wikipedia at:

http://www.rememberjenkinsear.blogspot.com/

Recent reports are that the Sinhalese government of Sri Lanka are leaning towards the Chinese, who helped them more recently. Also, India's large Tamil population is a bit unhappy about India's failure to protect the Tamils in Sri LLanka. But the jury is still out on this one, and probably always will be.

So yes, there are quite recent examples. Of course, in neither of these cases had the invaders been involved in an insurgency for nine years, nor were they losing at the time of the pullout.

Ray,

"The United States got out of Lebanon after a suicide bomber destoyed the Marine barracks there in 1983 and it withdrew from Somalia in 1993 following the Black Hawk Down incident, and withdrawal didn't have particularly significant strategic consequences in either case."

This is incorrect. Our willingness to withdraw in these two cases convinced a great many in the Muslim world, including OBL, that the U.S. could be defeated in a conflict because we don't have the fortitude to take casualties. And THAT has had very significant strategic consequences.

I'm no foreign policy expert, but I'd like to suggest taking another look at Mearsheimer's Nov. 2009 article (link below) regarding the possible consequences of "premature withdrawal" for US domestic politics--a matter that does not seem to have been emphasized by most of the previous posts. If the Democrats will be blamed for years for "losing Afghanistan" if we pull out now (as Mearsheimer suggests), then we will not be able to extricate ourselves short of victory or imminent defeat. (The latter is what I think happened in Vietnam.) If Mearsheimer is correct, many thousands are going to die to protect the current and long-term interests of the Democratic party, which seems very sad.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/node/68820?page=0,0

I liked Kunino's reponse, "Mention of the US's "pulling out of Somalia" is a fairly obvious misstatement. The US wasn't there by itself and wasn't at war with Somalia. Official America hushed up the course of the final US engagement there. In this, an incompetent, careless US army junior officer wrought catastrophe on the US component of a UN force, this having to be rescued by other national components of the force. The matter was such an embarrassment that Philadelphia journalist Mark Bowden, after waiting 18 months for the Pentagon or some other authority to explain what the hell had happened, took leave from his newspaper, went to Mogadishu at his own expense, wrote his book about the military scandal and titled it Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War. The subtitle was significant and well chosen."

Dan Seattle Attorney

This question is silly. You're asking people to speculate on what might have happened in various occupations.

You might as well say;

"I can think of some people who weren't aborted, and turned out to do good things, and some people who weren't aborted and turned out to do bad things, but can anyone name a time an aborted pregnancy prevented great things from happening? Clearly, then, all pregnancies should be aborted."

But this is silly. We know that many occupations have turned out quite well; see Hawaii, Texas, Korea, Japan, West Germany, etc., etc.. But what might have been is something we can't speculate on.

The Miracle of the House of Brandenburg was, in hindsight from the 20th century, a terrible blunder for the House of Romanov and for Russia. The war was going well; Prussia would have had to give up Silesia and East Prussia. Napoleon regretted the armistice of summer 1813, which benefited his enemies more than him.

After (re)-reading all the comments here strikes me that what Walt was kinda doing was engaging in the common (and utterly understandable) hope that somehow there's a different logic that applies to the profound from the mundane.

That is, of *course* there's probably lots of instances in which countries regretted either not going to war earlier or pulling out of one too soon, just as in more mundane aspects of human affairs we are almost always confronted with instances in which we know we should have acted sooner, or with more resolution. Didn't take care of your teeth when you were young? Didn't end a bad relationship before it turned into a horror story? Didn't go to see your doctor right away when you started spotting funny looking moles on your back? Didn't devote more of your income to savings early enough? And etc., etc., ad infinitum.

What one always see though when it comes to matters of grave, big import such as war and etc., in any number of different forms, are arguments that just essentially (and even somewhat romantically) try to reject the ugly idea that such mundane logic could apply to such profound matters. "It just can't be," one might hear for instance, "that there's logic behind the idea of mutual assured destruction." But there is. Or that if you don't honor the logic of giving inventors a patent for their efforts they won't refrain from inventing new AIDS drugs. But they won't.

Utterly understandable, and utterly tragic that it's true, but it is still true that the only logic we have to deal with matters of life and death and indeed all other great issues too is the exact same logic we have to deal with deciding whether to go to the dentist now or not. With all its pitfalls and limitations.

It's a pretty stupid question for two very good reasons: one, what you're suggesting or trying to suggest amounts to the practice of historicism, an impoverished philosophical pose; two, if one grants the question some relevance as stated it really can only apply to the modern era since the nature of warfare was changed so dramatically by WWI - and indeed the nature of war has been a very mutable thing throughout history. Besides, the question is far too limiting in its definitions, preconditions and what amounts to a demonstrable consequence. I mean, how would this idiotic question apply to something like the 100 Years War or Caesar's conquest of Gaul, both of which were full of instances that can be construed as relevant here? Indeed, the fall of the Roman empire can at least in part be traced to its military retreat into a garrison mentality which had the effect of inviting doom - when the Vandals invaded north Africa Rome didn't even challenge them thereby sealing its decline - would that amount to a suitable answer to your moronic question? A similar garrison mentality made Hitler's rise possible... failure to destroy the Republican Guard in 1st Gulf War made the 2nd Gulf War inevitable... was Korea a genus of surrender that made Vietnam inevitable?... these examples don't exactly fit your definitions but then like I said your definitions are stupid.

Attempts to manipulate the uses of history to prop up some biased agenda, as you're doing here, are both shameless and dangerous. Why don't you go write for the Huffington Post or something Walt? They admire bogus intellectualism of this sort.

While all cases are different, US needs to remember what happened in Afghanistan after US stopped paying attention or rather ransom money to Pakistan in that area.

‘Pakistani military organized Taliban movement and installed Taliban government in Afghanistan in 1996’ as per UN report on Bhutto killing released on 4/15/2010.

Nobody forced Pakistani government to facilitate relocation of Osama bin Laden from Sudan to Afghanistan in 1996. Democratic government of Pakistan chose to do so of its own free will.

Ex-CIA official Bruce Riedel said in an interview on 1/29/2009 that ''In Pakistan, the jihadist Frankenstein monster that was created by the Pakistani army and the Pakistani intelligence service, is now increasingly turning on its creators. It's trying to take over the laboratory.'' Pakistani Army and Intelligence Service (ISI) chose to create this ‘jihadist Frankenstein monster’ with full blessings and financing by Pakistan ’s democratic governments in 1990s.

Again and again, all terrorists lead to Pakistan. US decided to absolve Pakistan (Army, Intelligence and government) for its culpability in 9/11 attacks once Musharraf was forced to join US fight against terrorism under the threat of dire consequences by Richard Armitage in 2001. Afterall Pakistani government planned, facilitated and carried out 9/11 attacks to avenge US refusal to deliver F-16 jet fighters after Pakistan had already paid for them in 1990s.

But it did not mean that Pakistan severed all ties with the terrorists that Pakistan itself had created, nurtured, supported and sheltered.

On the contrary, Pakistani government and army continued its duplicitous game of ‘running with the hares while hunting with the hounds’. And Uncle Sam willingly tolerated such duplicitous Pakistani game while throwing away billions of hard-earned US taxpayers’ dollars in that terror center of the world.

So US can withdraw early assuming that Afghanistan is not their problem, but it can come back to haunt US again and again just as it did after Reagan embraced Islamic fundamentalists to oust Soviet Union from Afghanistan but later withdrew once Soviet Union was thrown out.

"For a case to qualify, you'd have to show that early withdrawal led to all sorts of negative consequences that might otherwise have been avoided. Hawks normally argue that getting out will embolden one's adversaries, undermine one's credibility, or jeopardize one's geopolitical position, but how often does any of these anticipated misfortunes really happen? Or you could argue that the withdrawing state was very close to winning but didn't know it, and that "staying the course" would have worked if they had just held on a little longer."
It seems to me that a critical element missing, from what here are defined as negative consequences, is the element of time. This may seem the antithesis of the discussion, but it is quite difficult to gauge such broad concerns without considering the long term. The question itself is narrow in its scope, as it simply addresses the concerns of one withdrawing nation. This can be interpreted as a selfish perspective, given the ever-growing interdependency between nation states. Also to consider are the humanitarian issues that arise, especially in missions conducted under the auspices of peace.
Applying these overlays to the withdrawal road map, it would seem a practical interpretation that there are no instances where a quick withdrawal has been beneficial. I can think of three examples where a rapid withdrawal has been detrimental; maybe not immediately to the actual "occupier/aggressor", but in the long term to the world at large, the local population who do feel the consequences directly, and the withdrawing nation with the loss of prestige and perception within the international community.
First, Lebanon; 299 French and American service members are killed in twin car-bombings, leading to an American withdrawal. The effects were not immediately felt in America, save the families and friends of the victims, however the long term effects of the event still resonate. Consider the nation who is nominally held responsible for financing this operation; the Islamic Republic of Iran. I detest the loss of life, especially American, yet the exodus from Lebanon could be argued to have set a precedent which emboldened Iran. Also, one could say that it weakened the position of the US with other rogue states, such as Syria, Iraq, and Islamic Extremists the world over. Though recent events in Iraq and Afghanistan have somewhat disproved this, it might be said that all one needs to do is bloody the nose of the American behemoth to see it turn tail. It cannot be disputed that there has been much blood-letting and outright belligerency in the Middle East since then.
Taking a different approach with Somalia, one sees the effects today of too rapid a withdrawal. Piracy is rampant in the region, causing millions of dollars to be lost to ransom payments. Somali pirates are positioned to directly interdict all shipping through the Suez Canal, causing profits and trade to suffer as shipping companies plot courses around the Horn of Africa. Brutal, oppressive militias are conducting amputations and executions for the "crime" of watching the World Cup (for example). Again, the effects of this withdrawal were not immediately felt in the US, yet they have become quite apparent as Somalia has descended further into anarchy, and made first place on the FP "Failing State List" three years running. I would be interested to explore Ethiopia's experience, after its occupation in support of the legitimate Somali government.
Finally, I would like to cite the Rwandan Genocide. Though not a clear cut case of withdrawal, per se, it can be said that the inaction of UN Peacekeepers, due to the lack of a coherent mandate, was not to the benefit of the 800,000+ who lost their lives. Furthermore, the massive influx of refugees aided in the start of the subsequent Congo Wars. This is an extreme case of inaction resulting in genocide, true, but one where a great power's (UN) influence could have been put to better use.
So, the answer to the question itself could be, at least from these examples, that there are no effects felt on the withdrawing power. However, when this question is applied to the nations surrounding the zone(s) in question, and the population occupying them, the answer is not so clear cut. Of course, this is all hypothetical. One can easily disprove all my statements by citing all the instances where long term occupations have hurt the occupier.
It is a fact that occupation and nation building require a substantial investment of time, money, and willpower to succeed. In some instances, it is far better to not become involved. But I believe that once a power has entered a weaker/failing state, for whatever reason, it is the duty of that power to clean up its own mess. To not do so goes against all considerations for humanity, and the expectation that nations and races treat one another with respect and dignity.

The really big one that comes to mind is the Teutoberg Forest, for the Romans.

Which is shares certain features with the current Iraq/Afghanistan conflicts.

the massive forces under Tiberius en Germanicus where with drawn to deal with a rebellion in Illyricum(Croatia). Leaving Varus with just 3 legions to guard the German frontier.

Varius the reacting on a rumor planted by the German Tribes(think WMD), he deviated his line of march to crush an non existing rebelion. Then while the legions where marching trough the Teutoberg Forest the where ambushed and slaughtered. After which the German Tribes swept the remaining Roman forces from northern Germany.

In response to this disaster then emperor Tiberius refused to re-invade (only a raids to recover the eagles and the death) and pulled back from northern Germany to the Rhine - Danube Line. Which ended the expansion of the Roman Empire, and the lack of expansion led to stagnation which let to the down fall of Rome.

Also many of the tribes which destroyed Rome, where from the north German plains. Namely the Saxons, Franks, Angles, and Vandals.

So the strategic withdrawal left Rome with a long Rhine frontier which it never managed to pacify. Where as the Elbe line which was the plan before the disaster, is significantly shorter and also leaves more land for the Romans to settle.

In conclusion because of the withdrawal from northern Germany, Rome gave room for its enemies to gain strength. And exhausted its legions by guarding a 3000 mile long frontier, with constant low level warfare, for over 300 years.
Both leading causes for the down fall.

OK, this is all looking/arguing cases, which is fine, but the underlying psychology that affects the decision-making is a more compelling question.

That is, when the Dr. says exploratory surgery may be in order, what else are you going to do? A reasonable course may be to go in light, learn more, then withdrawal if you're in too deep, or when you then are better able to judge things are better off left alone.

From a related perspective, to paraphrase Mearsheimer on the pressure on Great Powers, is NOT doing something a chance you can afford to take, instead to just sit back passively and hope things sort themselves out when you might possibly hope to make a difference. Drops you right into freshman philosophy and questions of free-will versus determinism. Pick your poison.

No, the psychological imperative is ALWAYS to do something, however tentative, and that something is arguably most responsibly done with a clear path left for retreat...er.... strategic withdrawal.

This is especially the case the less you know of the situation and the more a given imagination is left free to run wild and infect its better thinking.

How about the Allied intervention in Russia against the Bolsheviks during the Russian civil war? They might have strangled Bolshevism in its crib. WW1 was the top priority on everyone's minds though, and with that settled (and the Czech foreign legion out) it was hard to maintain focus on Russia (and the White forces were altogether disorganized and in some cases merely Japanese puppets causing chaos).

Correct me if I am wrong but after WWII American presence in South Korea had largely withdrawn by the time the North had invaded, at least it had withdrawn significantly enough that left the South vulnerable to Northern aggression.

Perhaps had we maintained a larger military presence in the region the North would have been disinclined to try to force reunification through military means?

The strategic impact of not doing so is the fact that the Korean war happened and has technically been going on for decades by this point, imagine the things we could focus on if we didn't have to worry about the Korean issue.

But, would the US ceasing alot of their actions in afghanistan in support of the taliban during the soviet occupation count as pulling out to early...? instead of, say, cleaning up or something... we had no troops stationed there, but we were involved.

the Mongols pulled out of Europe too soon. There is very little evidence that they would have been stopped if Ogedei hadn't died. But he did and all of the princes had to return to elect his successor. Due to succession politics, no successor was established for 4 years, and the squabbling led to the splitting of the empire. Since this entire thought process is based on philosophical whatifs, if the Mongols had an established line of succession, there would have been no reason for them to stop their outward expansion.

As an American I have never really considered it, but perhaps England regrets surrendering when they did? I don't have any analysis handy to back that up, unfortunately, but perhaps other readers do.

I tend to agree with Saint Simon.

Firstly,I find it difficult to believe that there is any instance in the history of mankind when an invading force illegally occupying another country, or nation, or ethnic group suddenly changes its mind and decides to withdraw and halt its aggression. What would be their reasons for doing this exactly, would it be out of the goodness of their hearts?

And how would such an altruistic act cause any kind of disaster, when they would be doing the locals a favour?

I'm too polite to call the scenarios stated in this article stupid, but I think it would also be an understatement to label them 'not realistic'.

The question is appealing, but useless to solving the problem at hand. We can speculate on counterfactuals (ex: not pulling out of Iraq in '91) or ruminate on the historical outcome of conflicts that differ in actors, era, politics, resources, strategy, tactics and geography.

While fluency in military history is a key analytical tool, it alone cannot inform whether or not a short-fuzed withdrawal from Afghanistan would be regrettable in history's long view -- even if certain variables are held constant. Cracking that nut requires unpacking and analyzing fact and context specific to this conflict.

Wars, by their nature, share much in common, but the devil remains in the details.

Bay of Pigs?