Today's New York Times
has an interesting article on a diplomatic dispute between the United
States and South Korea, arising from South Korea's desire to begin reprocessing
some of the spent fuel from its large nuclear power program. South Korea gets about forty percent of
its electricity from nuclear power plants, and is reportedly running out of
space to store the spent fuel. It
is barred from reprocessing by a 1974 agreement with the United States, and the Koreans
are now pushing for a revision when the treaty expires in 2014.
U.S. officials oppose this step, fearing it will set a
precedent for other states and could make it harder to push North Korea to give up its own nuclear
program. (The problem with
reprocessing spent fuel is that it yields plutonium, which can be used to make
a nuclear bomb). There are also lingering concerns about South Korea's intentions, given that the country flirted with getting nuclear weapons back in the 1970s.
Three quick thoughts. First, as the Times
article makes clear, critics who warned that the lax U.S.-India nuclear
deal negotiated by the Bush administration would come back to haunt us should be
feeling vindicated, as South Korea has rightly complained about the obvious
double-standard here. South Korea
is a long-time U.S. ally and an NPT signatory, while India is a nuclear weapons state that has yet to sign the NPT). Yet the Indians got advance U.S.
consent for reprocessing in its nuclear deal with the United States, while South Korea is getting stiffed.
Second, the dispute also illustrates important aspect of
intra-alliance bargaining, especially when nuclear weapons are involved. The Times
story quotes Cheon Seong-whun, a senior analyst at a government-run
research institute, saying that "We will never build nuclear weapons as long as
the United States keeps its alliance with us." Probably true, but notice that this is both a reassuring pledge
and an implicit threat. What Mr. Cheon is saying -- and I'm not criticizing
him for it -- is that South Korea doesn't need a nuclear deterrent as long as it is under
the United States continues to protect it. But one
reason why South Korea might want to reprocess -- and again, I'm not saying they
shouldn't -- is so that they can go nuclear at some point in the future, should
confidence in the U.S. commitment erode.
And notice that the closer they are to an actual weapons capability, the more potential
leverage they might have over the United States.
Third, it's hard not to be struck by the basic hypocrisy of
the U.S. position, which it shares with other existing nuclear powers. Washington has no intention of giving
up its own nuclear weapons stockpile or its access to all forms of nuclear
technology. The recent New START treaty notwithstanding, U.S. government still believes it needs thousands of
nuclear weapons deployed or in reserve, even though the United States has the
most powerful conventional military forces on the planet, has no great powers
nearby, and faces zero-risk of a hostile invasion. Yet we don't think a close ally like South Korea should
be allowed to reprocess spent fuel, take any other measures that might under
some circumstances move them closer to a nuclear capability of their own.
In my view, there's nothing reprehensible or even surprising about this situation;
it merely reminds us that no two states have the same interests and that
hypocritical (or more politely, 'inconsistent') behavior is common-place in international politics. But the U.S. ability to persuade others
not to flirt with their own nuclear capabilities might be a lot stronger if we
didn't place so much value on them ourselves.
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