Well said Pechorin^

What that quote basically says is that they do not mind double dealing. This is nothing new according to the wikileaks papers, and those actions are just old-school CIA Washington tactics being done in a information CRAZY society in 2010.

Obama needs to think outside of the box. These old ways cannot work for every situation. Who does he think he is? Ronald Reagan? LOL.

Combine Bacevich's fine article with Jane Mayer's article on the Koch Bros. They fund these think tanks who argue we should gut entitlements to continue or Military industrial complex, (of which they are profiteers.)

'Success' is taking billions of dollars of taxpayer money and sharing it where the accountability is very low, or non-existent. New friends especially are very anxious to return favors as generously as possible. Failing states are perfect in this regard. US politicians can hardly be blamed in the here and now for benefiting from this situation. Ways are quickly found to eliminate 'spoil sports' who might interfere. Even American presidents are not immune to these realities. As can be seen, "limited accountability" money, by it's nature, even if it's so-called purpose is anti-corruption efforts, ends up in the hands of those who take the notion of 'friends helping friends' very seriously.

American taxpayers have created the equivalent to an "oil revenue dependent regime" where people will do anything, say anything, to ensure their family or clan is in position to reap the tremendous rewards that come to those whose hands are on the distribution of American 'paper oil'.

While our nation may be making serious and costly errors in foreign policy, our government has grown and prospered, the military-industrial complex is prospering, and the foreign policy special interests write the policy of our nation. It's an ill wind that doesn't blow somebody some good.
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Corruption obviously makes Karzai popular with some Afghans and I don’t imagine any Afghan leader has ever been loved by all. Recognising corruption as endemic and employing it to buy off Afghan politicians is logically consistent, surely? Why walk if there’s a bus? Of course, it helps if you know where you are going but I suspect the enormous bases up on the borders that Congress is being asked to pay for are really what it's all about and once they are in place the curtain can come down.

being a lot more comments on this page a few days ago....

Sorry for this in advance = I posted this on the Afpak channel, and it is actually more germane to Walt's questions here... But yes, it is unholy-long, and perhaps inappropriate to clog up the comments with, but in the hope someone might actually read it and discuss... here goes again.

Sorry, really
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But whatever... its all just bytes anyhow! Sorry again!
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re: the NYT piece on Muhammad Zia Salehi's arrest...
An interesting piece, but the nut of it that needs to be understood is here:

""Mr. Salehi’s relationship with the C.I.A. underscores deep contradictions at the heart of the Obama administration’s policy in Afghanistan, with American officials simultaneously demanding that Mr. Karzai root out the corruption that pervades his government while sometimes subsidizing the very people suspected of perpetrating it.""

"Sometimes subsidizing" is perhaps an understatement. I'd argue the vast majority of what we Westerners call Afghan "corruption" is part and parcel of the way we do business over there at every level. (*hence, the above mentioned quote)

It expands far beyond this small element inside the Karzai regime: virtually all American activity in the region provides massive economic incentives for corruption.

One of the under-reported elements of military activities in the COIN strategy is that they often tend to come into villages, set up a talk with the locals, and more or less ask them, "how much?" "We will fund a school, a well, fix roads, etc., but we want you to stop letting Taliban operate out of here". One might point out that the idea that whether they CAN stop the Taliban from doing what they do is often ignored. Because the real issue is that Americans aren't really building many roads, schools, wells themselves - they tend to simply throw a pile of money at someone - either the villagers or some other local tribal group, and move on to the next town - not always exactly the way it happens, but it happens. Often they don't really care if the end results are achieved at all; they just want the quick & dirty effect of creating some kind of quid-pro-quo dependency-relationship with the locals, to create some kind of "the Americans pay more & do more than the Taliban" situation that may change loyalties and make life much harder for the Taliban, and easier for the military to isolate them and drive them out. We can claim we've achieved our 2 goals: eliminate the Taliban, and help rebuild ad stabilize Afghanistan. All just by throwing some money around!

But it doesn't always work that way. One might argue it never does. Once you start down that path, all you're doing is setting up the scenario for the next payout. Why "build a road" for $10,000 if you can milk the Army for $100,000? Or a cool million? Or many million? And of course, 10% or more of that would probably go to, who? - you guessed it! = the Taliban! - as Baksheesh for leaving the locals alone for a while. They'd play the same game we'd be playing: just throw the Taliban some money, and say, "keep us out of this thing for a while until the Americans leave". "Payoff money" has a lot of surprising unintended trickle-down effects.

This piece only deals somewhat with the 'high level' version of the same - our financing to the Afghan government and its officials. But the basic framework is the same... we throw them money, get a little in return, but most of the time its simply spending to keep them reliant on us, 'on our side'. When one considers how vast the US spending in the area is, the question arises - how much of it is simply flushed down a corruption-toilet? I'd guess a large majority. Many many billions. So the idea that the "new and transformed 'light footprint' Army" can achieve its goals by simply throwing money at things like Governance or Infrastructure or Stabilizing Rural Areas... it has proven to be the root of its own biggest problems. By "buying" a government, we created a corrupt crony regime; by "buying" infrastructure, we got a lot of potholes and dependent locals milking us for money; by "buying" stability, we're inadvertently directly funding the Taliban and other insurgents. We've even created an incentive for their continued fighting! Why stop fighting US troops when as long as you remain "threatening", you can continue the process of grafting "stability" money away from the regions?

Another line I found sort of funny... "Mr. Salehi is a political survivor, who, like many Afghans, navigated shifting alliances through 31 years of war. He is a former interpreter for Abdul Rashid Dostum, the ethnic Uzbek with perhaps the most ruthless reputation among all Afghan warlords."

Dostum: the same guy we gave millions to after 9/11, and who our special forces and CIA linked up with to attack and flush the Taliban out of Mazer i Sharif between September and December 2001. Who WE put back in power in the North, and who was able to leverage himself into the position of Chief of Staff to the Army in 2005, who was ousted and exiled over the "Akbar Bai Incident" in 2008, but returned in 2009 because he offered his support to Karzai during the elections... The NYT sort of glosses over the first detail, but totally ignores the fact that he isn't just a 'ruthless warlord' = he was CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AFGHAN ARMY! Has always been and still plays a significant part in Afghan politics. Why he is so demonized is beyond me; he's *normal* by Afghan standards. If you're going to mention someone like Dostum, you might as well then point out the expanded nature of his and others relationship to the broader "corruption" issue, and the complexity of the problem that dependency on American financing has created:

e.g this awesome piece:

"Afghan Warlords will Fight Taliban if US Gives Aid"

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/sep/22/afghan-warlords-will-fight-if-us-gives-aid/?feat=home_headlines&

This was just September of *last year*.

A couple of obvious issues here:

Q: If they have the ability, why are they not already fighting the Taliban in their regions?

A: Because we are, and they don't have to, as they aren't threatened by them, and they don't have to waste one red cent, one drop of blood, or bullet fighting.

Q: What would 'aid' (money and weapons) to warlords like Dostum do?
A: Probably exactly what they claim: totally eliminate Taliban and Al Qaeda presence, in a fairly permanent way, at least in the North/NorthWest, and possibly in other regions;

BUT = would they be able to go into the South and South East where the vast majority of the fighting is? Debatable, for many reasons, and it leads to a lot of other follow up issues...

Q: What else would it do?

A: Warlord armies from the North in the South and East and around Kabul and Kandahar would suddenly change the balance of power away from Karzai and the US, and allow the warlords to perhaps reestablish direct control of both their own provincial territories, as well as other provinces where they have typically feuded for power in the past, possibly reigniting a power-struggle similar to what happened after the Soviets fled, and all the warlord groups all started fighting with each other, wrecking the country in civil war.

Q: What would they want AFTER they'd ousted the Taliban?

A: Probably significant roles in running the whole country, as some have had before. Which would mean a significant reduction in US influence. They'd STILL want continued US aid, which would probably simply replace a corrupt, crony Karzai regime which is nominally loyal to the US and acting largely in its interests when possible, with a corrupt, crony Warlord regime, which would far less stable, far less (if possible) interested in legitimate election-democracy, and far less likely to kowtow to the interests of Washington.

Q: Why are they suddenly reaching out to the U.S. if the situation is currently relatively cushy for them?

A: Because we're throwing money all over the place and still achieving nothing, and they're pissed at 1) they're not getting what they think should be their share of the dough, and 2) that they are increasingly being pushed to the fringes by the corruption of the Karzai regime and the National Afghan Army, which, while still a joke compared to the potential fighting strength of the warlords, is seen as a lever by which to ultimately delegitimize the local warlords control of their own regions. If you have a national Afghan army, suddenly use of force is monopolized by the Government.... Well, this is not what these guys are either used to, or want. There is a possible hint in their outreach that if they are neglected, they could become a possible problem themselves if forced to fight for their own interests independently. They dont want to fight the US; they want to be a proxy force. But if not...well, when we "leave", who knows what they will actually do. Probably co-opt parts of the Afghan army, and fragment it, and initiate a coup under the banner of, "Who do you want ousting Karzai? Us, or the Taliban?" Frankly its probably a pretty convincing argument to many.

So what we have is an issue where

1) we hate "corruption" because it delegitimizes the Karzai regime
2) however, we are the PRIME DRIVERS of that particular "corruption"
3) the "corruption" of paying Afghan warlords to fight for us would probably achieve more military success than the "corruption" of funding the Afghan army and the Karzai regime
4) BUT - that "corruption" would likely undermine part II of the American strategy = "Stabilize Afghanistan"

So it becomes a question of which strategic goals do we really think are desirable and attainable? "Destroy the Taliban in Afghanistan, and end their influence in the country OR Stabilize Afghanistan and foster a nascent National democratic regime and National Army to serve its in interests"

This debate is not happening, or if it is happening, its not happening in public. (as per Walt's point above).

That Washington Times piece is interesting because you do see a range of differing opinions from US officials - the military folks seem to like the idea of paying others to do the fighting, or even working directly with them, side by side: we've done it before! We can do it again. And they seem fairly confident that the offers by Dostum and others is actually pretty legitimate: we know they fight, and fight well, and can probably do the job faster and better than 20yr olds from Arkansas. They have better intelligence, better contacts and relationships, and dont drive around isolated in Humvees, unable to speak the language, and offending every single local custom every 10 seconds.

The 'state department' types are clearly more skeptical: what, you want to undermine every single thing we've done since 2001 to create a lasting civil government in Afghanistan? What about Pakistan? India? Russia? China? What will they think of another semi-rogue state in Afghanistan, run by Warlords, likely to fight with each other on a semi-constant basis?

I think the military guys are like, "who cares? you failed, and the status quo is unacceptable."

There is probably more to this than this simplified analysis, but I do think the time has come to ask the question, which of the two goals is most desirable and most achievable? (A -Destruction of Taliban in Afghanistan, or B- Nation Building).

I personally think A wins hands down. B? Nice to have, but likely unattainable. Yes, making this choice means "accepting failure" in at least one dimension of American strategy, and it means walking back billions and billions invested and saying, "we're writing that off; let's start fresh, get the simplified job done, and call it a day". That may be too painful to do. But it is possibly a path to success - one FAR FAR better, in my view, than the Selig Harrison ("How to Leave Afghanistan Without Losing") proposal the other day. It would be called, "How to Cut Losses and Still Win". The problem I have with Harrison's idea, is that "leaving afghanistan" is the primary goal, apparently. He ignores BOTH strategic goals of "ending Taliban influence & establishing some stability", in my view, with primacy on how to leave without *looking* like we "lost"*, even though in all practical terms, that's what it would mean.

I also think there may be a possibility that some kind of US/Warlord/Karzai alliance could figure out some sort of compromise that would solve most of each party's goals. Karzai could remain mayor of Kabul; the Army would be under control by regional warlords; there would be a republican power sharing arrangement, sort of like Harrison's thesis, where people who could guarantee to use the army to fight Taliban/insurgents could maintain some regional control and have a say in a national parliament, and the US would maintain something of an alliance-oversight role, ensuring no one got too uppity and decided they wanted a larger piece of the pie.

But, this is just a theory from a dilettante. There are probably many fairly simple reasons this is a non-starter (some of which I mentioned - but I'm not sure which is the primary deal-breaker). However, it does at least speak to what I and others have been asking for from the broader Foreign Policy community for a long time: Tell Me a Strategic Option for Victory and Disengagement in Afghanistan. Instead, most of what we read is armchair analysis, with little in the way of prescriptions for achieving strategic goals.

Take this for what it is; sorry I wrote something so horrendously long on the 'comments' threads...