There are no "do-overs" in long wars

Posted By Stephen M. Walt Tuesday, September 7, 2010 - 12:18 PM Share

Last week I offered up "Ten reasons why wars last too long," which tried to explain why it was hard for leaders to recognize they are in a losing war and difficult for them to simply "cut their losses" and disengage.

Coincidentally, last week Stephen Sestanovich of Columbia University published a smart piece entitled "How do long wars become so long?" in The New Republic. TNR dropped off my "must-read" list a long time ago, but Sestanovich's piece is excellent and well worth a look. He argues that many "long wars" begin with a half-hearted, desultory effort (as in Vietnam in the early 1960s, or Afghanistan from 2003-2007), often because U.S. leaders have more pressing priorities. When it becomes clear that things aren't going well, however, presidents and their advisors normally conclude that they haven't given the war their best shot and tend to assume that a serious effort will turn the tide.

Thus, Army Gen. Maxwell Taylor, who also served as U.S. Ambassador in South Vietnam, explained the decision to escalate in 1965 by saying "we had not exhausted our alternatives." In his view, the United States still had "vast resources" to bring to bear -- and new strategies to try -- "before we thought of quitting."

This problem was the sixth point in my list of ten reasons, but Sestanovich offers an important amendment in his own piece. By the time the U.S. gets serious about these local conflicts, the situation has often deteriorated so badly that even a major effort may not succeed, or at least not quickly. But while the public will let them take "their best shot," it will expect that shot to succeed in fairly short order. Thus, presidents do not get an infinite number of "do-overs." Even if the military keeps coming up with clever new strategies, the public won't support a lengthy campaign that isn't producing visible and positive results.

The obvious implication is that Obama and General Petraeus have a few more months to show tangible results of the decision to escalate in Afghanistan. And if I were them, I'd be thinking about a Plan B. I'll have more to say on that point tomorrow.

PATRICK BAZ/AFP/Getty Images

EXPLORE:AFGHANISTAN, HISTORY, MILITARY, OBAMA ADMINISTRATION, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

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ZKP20977

6:22 PM ET

September 7, 2010

Wars/Do-Overs

I would largely agree that there are no do-overs in wars. Perhaps then this escalation by the US in Afghanistan is too little too late? Or, perhaps the war was never winnable? Or, the final scenario, we can still win.

Well one of the three of those is true. Taking the first one into account, perhaps the US should have kept higher resources/manpower early in the Afghanistan war. Obviously, they couldn't have done that because Iraq called for our attention. So, then was the war lost at that point?

Looking at the second scenario, was the war ever really winnable? History spells out that Foreign military forces imposing forms of government does not really work out well, even if it is Democracy, a.k.a "the least bad of the worst forms." The people of Afghanistan don't know we're trying to help build their country by promoting freedom after we disposed the Taliban. That is what we're trying to do, right?

Finally, the last scenario is that we can still win this. Obviously, "winning" means different things to different people. But, let's just say we can still "win." How will we define that? How will we measure that? When will we know that we've won?

The final note I want to say is that I believe American soldiers and veterans to be the bravest people on this planet and despite the fact we debate about the objectives of their mission, God Bless them for doing what they do.

MITCH22

6:42 PM ET

September 7, 2010

TNR is hit or miss

but Andrew Bacevich's bi-weekly column is a must-read for me.

http://www.tnr.com/users/andrew-bacevich

SCOTTINDALLAS

10:19 AM ET

September 8, 2010

apples and dates

Wars are not won on the battlefield but perhaps more in how the war is framed. What are the goals and are they doable. We can enter and crush a military force, easily done. What is not so easy is to enter and try to establish order and to build a new country.

You are equivocating when you compare WW2 to Vietnam, or any of our wars sense. If our goal is regime change, easy enough. Again, that is just a chance to spin the wheel. The cop can enter the house, can take one spouse to jail. The cop can't broker a solution to the problems of the household. In fact, very quickly both parties will turn on the cop.

We didn't rebuild Germany, he gave them the resources to do so. We also utterly destroyed that country. But, that's hard to justify that level of destruction for regime change, or preemptive war.

Is this so hard to grasp? Germany was next door, for France, England and the allied forces. How does that compare to Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan. We are in the neighboring countries at a sufferance. Those regimes weren't a threat to their neighbors, so we had to curry $$$ favor to even base troops there.

I really can't believe a "realist" is so detached to miss this vital difference.