Posted By Stephen M. Walt Share

The Afghanistan Study Group report that I wrote about last week is getting some predictable flak from people who hold different views about U.S. strategy there. 

It is hardly surprising, for example, that Andrew Exum lavished high praise on Joshua Foust's extended rant against the report. Exum is a counterinsurgency enthusiast and was a vocal advocate of escalating the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. As such, he is hardly likely to favor a report that questions the wisdom of this approach, despite his telling admission that our current strategy is "troubled."

It is of course possible that Exum will one day be proven right, but one would have more faith in his judgment if the situation in Afghanistan had not gone from bad to worse since Obama took his advice. Obama began escalating the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan shortly after he took office, and since then we've had a fraudulent presidential election, an inconclusive offensive in Marjah, a delayed and downgraded operation in Kandahar, and a run on the corrupt Bank of Kabul. Casualty levels are up, and aid groups in Afghanistan now report that the security situation is worse than ever, despite a heightened U.S. presence.  

This situation is no accident, as Anatol Lieven outlines here. Rather, it reflects our enduring ignorance about Afghan society and the folly of trying to build a Western-style centralized government in a multi-ethnic society that is notoriously suspicious of foreign occupiers and where the prerequisites for a Western-style political order are lacking. Given the actual situation on the ground (and the condition of the U.S. economy), the Study Group concluded that it did not make sense to spend $100 billion or more per year trying to "nation-build" in a country whose entire GNP is about $14 billion. 

As for Foust, his main criticism seems to be that the Study Group didn't consult as many Afghan experts as he would have liked, or provide a lot of nitty-gritty empirical detail to back up our analysis. This latter complaint is partly valid, but largely beside the point. Our objective was to encourage U.S. leaders to rethink the strategic stakes at issue in Afghanistan, to help them understand why the current U.S. strategy wasn't working, and to outline a plausible alternative approach. Despite his overheated rhetoric, Foust says he agrees with most of that, and he also agrees that the current U.S. approach is wrong-headed. Yet he is so eager to cast cold water on the report that he dismisses virtually all of its recommendations, even on obviously specious grounds. For example, he criticizes our call for greater effort to engaging regional partners by saying "it's been tried." But what's his alternative: that we refrain from trying to get regional stakeholders to help us neutralize the conflict? And isn't it palpably obvious that any enduring solution to the Afghan mess is going to require a lot of buy-in from its neighbors?

Moreover, Foust can't even get our arguments straight. He claims that we recommend turning Afghanistan into a "Special Forces and drone firing range," which is simply false. Like President Obama, we argued that America's only vital strategic interest in Afghanistan was to prevent it from becoming a "safe haven" that would materially increase al Qaeda's capabilities and thus make it a significantly greater threat to the United States. This situation could only occur if 1) the Taliban regained power, 2) Al Qaeda moved back into Afghan territory in strength, and 3) if it once again created large bases in which to train a substantial number of new cadres and thus become significantly more dangerous. We pointed out that if that were to happen -- and it is hardly a foregone conclusion that it will -- such large bases would be readily visible and could be targeted in a variety of ways. And unlike the 1990s, when the Clinton administration vacillated about attacking al Qaeda's compounds, there were would be little debate about going after large al Qaeda encampments today. As Greg Scoblete notes here this sort of campaign does not requires a large scale U.S. military presence, and it is far cry from turning the entire country into a "firing range."

The key point to remember is that Al Qaeda can organize small clandestine cells in a wide variety of places (including Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, Pakistan, Europe, or even the United States itself) and that Afghanistan no longer offers it any particular strategic advantages. Indeed, even if we succeed beyond our wildest dreams in Afghanistan, the government in Kabul would not be able to prevent al Qaeda from re-establishing clandestine cells on Afghan soil. In short, victory in Afghanistan won't eliminate al Qaeda, and a reduced U.S. presence there won't allow it to become significantly stronger. And if that is the case, what vital national interest is at stake?

Moreover, Terry McDermott's recent New Yorker profile of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Muhammed suggests that the existence of a "safe haven" in Afghanistan had relatively little to do with the attacks that the United States suffered on that fateful day in 2001. McDermott reports that KSM operated primarily out of an apartment in Karachi, while the attackers themselves were mostly based in Hamburg. The proper lesson to draw is that defeating al Qaeda does not depend on victory over the Taliban, and keeping 100,000-plus troops in Central Asia is probably counterproductive to the larger effort against anti-American terrorists. 

Judging from his response, Foust seems to think that our failures to date are due solely to errors in implementation, and not to the possibility that the United States is pursuing objectives that are neither necessary for U.S. security nor appropriate to the Afghan context. This view -- which is widespread among U.S. policymakers -- tends to assume that nation building can always work provided we devote enough resources to the problem, have the right policies in place, and stay the course for a long enough period. But as Jason Brownlee shows here, there is abundant evidence showing the success or failure in "nation-building" depends as much or more on the conditions prevailing in the societies we are trying to transform. And if those conditions are lacking (as they seem to be in Afghanistan), then lots of extra effort won't get us very far. Even if it could, it is by no means clear that all this extra effort would be worth it.

Meanwhile, Michael Cohen at democracyarsenal.org offers a more sympathetic critique, and says he's mostly disappointed that the Study Group didn't offer more detailed, actionable recommendations. He also chides us for making arguments that he (and others) were making a year ago. He's correct that we didn't lay out detailed "action plans" for implementing our various recommendations, but that's also largely beside the point. Until the national leadership is convinced that the present course is a non-starter, there is little point in offering detailed action plans for implementing a different course. The Group also sought to produce a report that key staffers and politicians would actually read, unlike some of the doorstop reports that think tanks often offer. And at least one reader welcomed this feature. Cohen is also correct that the Group was neither alone nor the first to identify the problems with current U.S. strategy, but so what? The question is whether one can get the relevant decision makers to finally pay attention.

The bottom line is that these various critiques have not damaged the report's central conclusion: The war in Afghanistan has become a fool's errand that is neither essential to U.S. national security nor likely to produce a satisfactory outcome. It is also an increasingly expensive undertaking, and a major distraction for U.S. leaders at a time when there is no shortage of problems to address. The current strategy is unlikely to work, and the United States and its allies will eventually have to come up with an alternative approach. Our report was intended to accelerate the strategic reassessment that we believe is inevitable, and I hope that interested citizens will read it, along with the views of our critics.

For additional defenses of the Report, see Matthew Hoh here, Justin Logan here, and Bernard Finel here

PATRICK BAZ/AFP/Getty Images

 

CEOUNICOM

5:23 PM ET

September 14, 2010

Thank you, Steven Walt

...

It is both a relief as well as depressing that at least part of the foreign policy commentariat seems to have finally come to conclusions that many laypeople have settled upon for some time.

One criticism, perhaps underserved, for I haven't read the report; I see the word "Pakistan" missing from this piece. Our policy in Afghanistan is part and parcel of American policy vis a vis Pakistan. What we decide to do in Afghanistan can't be considered without also knowing what the longer term plan is for Pakistan, that is, unless it is also intended to be a 'drone target practice' space for the foreseeable future.

I agree with all of your arguments, and have felt this way for some time, but I am still uncomfortable with some of the implications of vacating Afghanistan, in that it abandons OBL and others to their vacation retreat yet untouched. What, if any, corollary policy emerges for Pakistan in your framework? I ask in all seriousness, because in my simpleminded opinion, the 'war' we have waged has had one (of many) major goals unfulfilled: "Osama's head on a stick", as Cofer Black would have put it. Is this something we are willing to abandon entirely as part of your recommendations? Do I think we need to 'nation build' in afghanistan to achieve this? No. But there remains the question about what to do about the tribal areas and the existing sanctuary it provides to Al Q and others. No 'solution' to Afghanistan yet proposed really addresses this, as far as I've seen.

God, I'm almost sounding like Marty Martel here. But it is a question maybe worth asking.

 

SL94475

5:43 PM ET

September 14, 2010

Victory in Afghanistan

I still find it hard to believe that people still think that any sort of 'victory' can be achieved through this war in Afghanistan. From the corrupt Karzai government, problems with the Pakistanis, and the fact that the tribal layout of Afghanistan doesn't lend much for a true consolidated democracy, throwing more troops and money at this conflict just seems like the completely wrong idea. As you put it, "The war in Afghanistan has become a fool's errand that is neither essential to U.S. national security nor likely to produce a satisfactory outcome."

Without bases in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda is still operating out of places like Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan, does invading all of these countries to protect ourselves from Al Qaeda sound like a good plan? The best way to reduce the effectiveness of Al Qaeda and their influence is to take our troops out of these Muslim countries, and stop this completely flawed interventionist foreign policy, which is just adding recruit after recruit to their cause.

 

NOM DE GUERRE 1967

5:43 PM ET

September 14, 2010

I Disagree

The war in Afghanistan as it currently stands, is not in fact a fool's errand. It is currently serving its purpose admirably; it is preventing Obama from being smeared as a pacifist who is unwilling to defend the country from terrorists (assuming of course expending the lives of countless Americans on the other side of the world to no end and at a huge expense constitutes defending America, but this is of course beside the point).

 

DAV305Z

5:56 PM ET

September 14, 2010

And what of a moral obligation?

I realize Mr. Walt is an avowed foreign policy realist (except on issues regarding Israel and the Palestinians, where he magically develops a conscience), but what of our moral obligation to Afghanistan? We invaded this country and overturned a government that, by all accounts, was brutal and oppressive even by the low standards of the middle east. In so doing, we have enlisted the help of thousands of Afghan citizens, many of them women. We also killed thousands of civilians in the name of a promised better future for the country. Now, because "intellectuals" have decided such a future is too hard to achieve and doesn't satisfy our narrow strategic objectives, we're supposed to abandon these people? How awful.

 

NUR AL-CUBICLE

6:27 PM ET

September 14, 2010

Vise

You'd think that a country wedged in by 3 powers, Russia, China and India, would not need a US presence at all.

 

NUR AL-CUBICLE

6:30 PM ET

September 14, 2010

Mean as dirt

Are you kidding? The Republicans wouldn't tire of smearing Obama even if all our wars ended and our prisons, both onshore and offshore, were full. The trouble is, Obama believes in escalation (er, surge in today's parlance).

 

JAYDEE001

9:45 PM ET

September 14, 2010

Thanks for keeping the discussion going

Afghanistan is a fool's errand, no doubt, especially since the tribal areas in Pakistan have offered OBL, Mullah Omar and their retinue safe harbor since 2002. We lost the battle to keep the Taliban out while we were 'distracted' by our Iraq adventure. Like a bad weed, they have come back, moving into areas in the North - which many thought were hostile to them - even as we try to marshall the effort to drive them out of their traditional bases in the South. Our efforts will soon resemble a whack-a-mole game.

Even if we were able to assign a US military presence to each and every hamlet and burg in Afghanistan, it would not change the fact that OBL remains comfortably situated in his hideout in Pakistan - probably laughing with his buddies in the Pakistani ISI - enjoying the spectacle of the US and its allies playing our part in the theater he established for us. And, if by some chance we could somehow disturb his peace there, he could still launch strikes against us through his subsidiaries in Yemen, Gaza, Syria, Iraq, and countless other locations.

Our mission in Afghanistan should have ended when we failed to capture or kill Osama at Tora Bora. Once he escaped to the safety of Pakistan, the chance was lost. A new strategy has been in order for a long time. Study Groups can analyze until hell freezes, but we need serious leadership not interested soley in the impact a policy might have on the next election.

We really still need to figure out how we might have - in 2001 - prevented 19 or 20 foriegn nationals (with no particular reason for being here) from coming into our country, living here in relative obscurity for months, enrolling in flight schools, all while arousing absolutely no suspicion, and while they planned to carry out the largest terrorist attack in history against us. And, how they did all this while every one of our sophisticated "intelligence" agencies were asleep at the gate.

 

ANON_ANON

11:11 PM ET

September 14, 2010

You are superb

at speaking to your critics. And in this case, your critic's conduct and writing means he deserves it.

 

MARTY MARTEL

3:44 AM ET

September 15, 2010

Pakistan, the real culprit of 9/11 attacks

Terry McDermott correctly reports that KSM mainly operated from an apartment in Karachi. That brings us to Pakistan.

Ever since Pakistan’s Musharraf was forced to join US against Taliban in 2001, US government and news media has intentionally whitewashed Pakistan’s role in 9/11 attacks.

Sandy Berger, Bill Clinton’s national security advisor told 9/11 Commission in March, 2004 that ’Pakistani Army was the midwife of Taliban’. UN report on Bhutto killing confirmed this fact when it stated that ‘Pakistani Army organized Taliban and installed Taliban government in Afghanistan in 1996’.

So in a way, Pakistani government was in charge of Afghanistan when 9/11 attacks were carried out and hence Pakistani government was responsible for those attacks.

Nobody forced it but Pakistan’s democratic government of Benazir Bhutto chose of its own free will, to facilitate relocation of Osama bin Laden from Sudan to Afghanistan in 1996.

Pakistani ISI Director General Mahmud Ahmad had asked Omar Sheikh (the kidnapper of Daniel Pearl) to send $100,000 from a Dubai bank account to Mohammed Atta (the lead 9/11 hijacker) one year before those attacks. Mohammad Atta used that $100,000 for flight training, living expenses and to purchase flight tickets on the day of 9/11 attacks in US and returned unspent $25,000 back to same Dubai account. Musharraf was forced to retire ISI director General Mahmud Ahmad after Wall Street Journal exposed General Ahmad as the chief financier of 9/11 attacks.

Pakistani ISI was heavily involved in planning, financing and facilitating of 9/11 attacks as corroborated by former Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Bob Graham.

As Afghan President Karzai told a news conference in Kabul on 7/29/2010 after WikiLeaks leaks, “The time has come for our international allies to know that the war against terrorism is not in Afghanistan’s homes and villages. But rather this war is in the sanctuaries, funding centers and training places of terrorism which are in Pakistan. Our international allies have the ability to destroy these Pakistani sanctuaries, but the question is why they are not doing it?“

Even Afghanistan’s national security advisor Rangin Dadfar Spanta has asked the same question in a Washington Post article on 8/23/2010: “While we are losing dozens of men and women to terrorist attacks every day, the terrorists’ main mentor (Pakistan) continues to receive billions of dollars in aid and assistance. How is this fundamental contradiction justified? Despite facing a growing domestic terror threat, Pakistan “continues to provide sanctuary and support to the Quetta Shura, the Haqqani network, the Hekmatyar group and Al Qaeda. Dismantling the terrorist infrastructure “requires confronting the state of Pakistan that still sees terrorism as a strategic asset and foreign policy tool”.

Pakistan will definitely assure the return of Taliban rule in Afghanistan to establish its own writ if and when US departs. Al Qaeda WILL return with the establishment of Taliban rule in Afghanistan.

Does US have will power and the resources to invade and occupy Pakistan for a long time after 10 years of war in Afghanistan?

 

PFNOVAK

6:45 AM ET

September 15, 2010

Pakistan

"If Pakistan is the real culprit than what difference does Afghanistan make?"

It means that our troops are there to keep an eye on Pakistan, because that's as close as we can get to having a military presence there which would be a PR disaster, even worse than the drone strikes.

 

USERSATCH

4:45 AM ET

September 15, 2010

Agree and Disagree

I think the report has some good points and a few poorly thought out points. A few points:
We DEFINITELY need to engage Pakistan more. I believe this is the key. However, Pakistan's first and foremost concern is its security and existence. I believe we can extract leverage from them to motivate the government and the ISI to cooperate by preying on their fears of India and national survival. With strong pressure from the State Department and the absolute cancellation of US aid, Pakistan will have no choice but to cooperate. Our money currently goes to arm the military against an imaginary war with India (or into the ISI's pockets). Cut that off, and Pakistan has no friends. They will never side with the pro-al Qaeda forces as it will assuredly mean their own destruction. As long as we keep filling the pockets of the ISI, we will never solve the problem. I think its analagous to Israel--we stop propping up Israel with aid, they WILL adopt a two state solution. It's a matter of survival vs. annihilation.

Ceding the southern areas of Afghanistan is insane. The study naively concludes that the Taliban and al Qaeda are not aligned. Recent events in Kunduz and the eastern provinces show a definitely alignment of Taliban and al Qaeda interests. The major chokepoint in Afghanistan is through Khandhar and Helmand, which are STILL being neglected. Give those areas up (even more) and the effort is cooked.

I completely agree that decentralization of the archaic Soviet style government is critical. Sack Karzai, and hold provincial elections. Kabul's function should only be to promote hegemony betwen the provinces. Karzai, while perhaps not corrupt himself, is seen, and is allied with, too many corrupt people. We have to empower the local populace to fight the Taliban. This cant be done from Kabul.

 

JKOLAK

9:20 AM ET

September 15, 2010

A prime example of the "we

A prime example of the "we are losing" school of journalism.

 

MANINWARREN

2:17 PM ET

September 15, 2010

Yeah, we're there because of security...

...Energy security: http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa48119.000/hfa48119_0.HTM

 

GRANT

4:44 AM ET

September 16, 2010

Mr. Walt, I read Foust's

Mr. Walt, I read Foust's arguments and they hardly seemed like rants to me.

The report seemed to suggest that the fighting is done to a large degree on basis of ethnicity between Pashtuns and the Tajiks and Uzbeks. This may have some truth to it in parts of the nation but the report seems unable to realize that there are both Tajik and Uzbek Islamist militants that are not fighting the Taliban*.

Additionally the report states that previous attempts to create a centralized authority have failed. What of the Taliban in the late 90s? They may not have been able to force every warlord to give up their weapons and men but they certainly controlled all but a small area of Afghanistan and had 9/11 not occurred they very well might have succeeded in uniting all of the nation.

It seems to me that the report is definitely not above criticism.

* Such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan which, while not the most powerful, is rather dangerous and openly allied to Al Qaeda.

 

Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.

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