There is a terrific debate raging at the moment here in Australia, sparked by Professor Hugh White at the Australian National University, on the dilemma for Australia of escalating competition between the United States, our long-standing military ally, and China, our most important commercial partner. www.lowyinterpreter.org

Think we're beginning to feel the ole New Paradigm kickin' in with more sincerity, and I'm not just talking about just the silly internet. It has more to do with the totality of modern communications, enpowered and extended by more well-educated people who are far more sophisticated in-terms of how to promote their parochial interests. The good ole days, where a clubby elite could work toward a nation's (a an alliance of nations) geopolitical best interests, and simply outdistance/finesse the masses, seem to be gone.

Sure, the American (and other) polities can and are manuipulated, but more groups are involved with manufacturing their consent. In this post-modern world, there is a more broadly based international elite that is not so constrained by nationality, religiona, or whatever (although many individual groups may be). It is more diffuse, and the ability of a some monolithic power elite to call the tune over the long rung, appears to have diminished.

Botton line is the ability of the overall "system" to self-correct toward rationalism seems to be waning, and there could be MORE of a trend for these parochial groups to all have an impact at the expense of coherent national policy or self-interest. In practical terms, what that means is that someone has to pay, and thats the masses. These various rich groups get richer, in a lot of unforeseen and unanticipatable ways, and those without the jack to be in the game pay the price. Economics, in any system that is not closely managed, becomes a zero-sum game, and the "system" is becoming more, rather than less, managed, as the overall environment becomes less forgiving. Invest accordingly.

"Now: based on what you know about these two countries, which assumption do you think is more reasonable? Based on past history, I think its safe to assume that sooner or later one side or the other is going to do something stupid."

As in the many treaties preceding WW I, Iran and China might have just entered a deal whereby the latter have access to discounted oil in exchange for some security guarantee.

I definitely agree that there is a potential for security dilemmas in the future of US-China relations, but I do not buy the structural argument that there is some inevitability of a security dilemma based simply on expanding interests. I still believe that power maintenance is one of the biggest variables, so I am not completely optimistic about the future, but we cannot ignore the many institutional and normative variables that preclude any inevitability.

Also, the argument that a leader might come to power in either country and make a "stupid" decision is a tautological—not structural—argument.

These disagreements aside, I do agree with you that shifting domestic social norms—especially in the U.S.—will play a large role in pressuring decision-makers into security dilemmas.

Professor Walt,

It seems to me that the US policy makers view the long term trajectory of the US- China relationship as something approaching that of a thawed "cold war". With the US intent on using India in some capacity to counter balance China similar to the use of China to throw off the USSR.

Alot of what was said above about China can be said about India, with its democratic politics providing similar volatility in potential decision making process. Of course our relationship with India is clouded by how close we currently are with Pakistan.

I hope you follow this post up by considering the added element of a rising India.

China does not have one overseas military base. The U.S. has over 700 overseas bases. China is gaining power in Eurasia, Asia and Africa.

This may not be a case of large powers competing as did western powers did during the last couple centuries. Increasingly, the results show that the U.S. is in danger of becoming irrelevant to the methods that have produced results for the Chinese. Eventually, the Chinese may not care what the U.S. does because our military-first approach does not affect the Chinese abilities to extend their private/public patronage politics beyond their own borders and cement very strong political alliances between themselves and foreign leaders. In some cases, their international relations are simply to export their warlord approach into other countries and seize control over mines, farms and factories.

Their arrangements are personal and private. The U.S. continues to preach “institutions”, “elections”, “democracy” and other symbols of western traditions. Continuing to think in terms of state to state completion also reflects a way of thinking that is not producing the results as has China’s methods of extending private interests into foreign soils.

The western inability to adapt and learn about different ways of doing business is most likely one more indicator of the demise of the western empire.

Bob Spencer

I love how Stephen Walt dismisses Liberalism and constructivism, in all forms, with out actually rebutting either of them. He literally presents their cases and then completely ignores them while positing his own theory.

To be clear this post is not a comment on Walt's conclusions, rather his argumentation. This post can be at best considered sloppy and weak.

A few points Walt brought up but didnt rebut. What if China sees that allowing the US to secure shipping lines are in its best interest, navies are expensive after all. What is china does become more democratic, will this lead to a lowering of nationalist rhetoric against the United States? What effect would balancing have on China's foreign policy?

Mentioning arguments that directly rebut your point and then ignoring them is not a good strategy. If he had no counter-arguments or not enough space, Mr. Walt should not have brought up the arguments.

I do not think that in the near future there will be escalating tensions between China and the US. The reason I believe this is due to the sole reason that China is even mentioned as a superpower, and that is unrelenting focus on economic growth. China's main interest is economic growth and prosperity and they have seen, by US example, that war only has negative impact on growth. It is also not in China's best interest to have a conflict with the United States because a large part of their recent success has been due to better relations, allowing MNCs to build in China. Friedman makes the point that China is in a precarious situation because if they anger their neighboring countries, those ASEAN countries may look to the US as a more viable and less hostile source for goods. In order for China to maintain its level of power in the globalizing world, their foreign policy must be flawless so as not to villify themselves in their region, and simultaneously not seem weak in the eyes of the US. I think that in the coming decades China and the US will see it is in both countries best interests to maintain trade and increase relations rather than one or the other using force to become the unilateral world power. I do agreee that at any point one leader can come into power and become an x factor and things could change drastically much like in the U.S.S.R with Gorbachev or on a more extreme note Mussolini in Italy. That being said I fully anticipate relations to increase rather than become hostile so long as coherent Head of States are in place.

Prof Walt, I appreciate your structural realist analysis, but I do not know if you really take into account domestic considerations. The biggest reason I do not think China and the US will go to war, at least not in my lifetime, is that they are so intertwined at the grassroots. There are many US citizens in China and vice versa. Some of them (definitely not all) are more loyal to their native country than the one they live in, but it just seems so unlikely that, say, the US would risk killing thousands of its citizens or China killing its middle and upper class students and businesspeople living in the US.

Such ties are growing, and with some kind of push for intercultural understanding, they would effectively prevent war between the two great powers. The grassroots are the key to checking the crazy people at the top.

China has US by its tail. US businesses are hooked to huge profits that cheap Chinese goods generate for them as a walk through any Walmart, Sears, Home Depot or Macy’s filled with Chinese goods indicate and US government is hooked to huge investments that China makes in US treasuries. So US does NOT have any leverage against China.

Nixon’s 1972 embrace of China was supposed to benefit US businesses with a billion strong Chinese consumer market. Instead Chinese Communist Party’s hold on Chinese society has strengthened thanks to huge export market in US and Europe that resulted from that Nixon embrace.

China’s forex reserves have been going up regardless of down economy in many a countries including US. With its massive ever-increasing forex reserves, China is fast becoming a lender of last resort for many a companies and many a countries in the world and the buyer of world‘s natural resources as well. No power on earth is capable of stopping this Chinese juggernaut in spite of occasional griping.

Immediate concern about China in US and the world at large has to be:

How long can this one-way trade in China’s favor continue before US says ‘enough is enough’ and no more and decides to junk WTO?

How much forex reserves China has to accumulate before the world says ’enough is enough’ and no more and decides to junk WTO?

The CCP's reliance on nationalism + economic growth means that conflict is probably inevitable. Consider:

1. In the Himal, where China challenges India in places along its border, and claims a whole Indian state, Arunachal Pradesh. China has been refusing to issue visas for individuals from that state on the grounds that it is part of China and its inhabitants Chinese. More on that in a moment....

2. The South China Sea: ante was just upped there as China threatened to go to war in order to claim the entire South China Sea. The area has quietly been the site of armed clashes in recent months, which have made the rounds in DC defense circles but not the US Golden Retriever media. Bonus insanity: the government in Taipei, the Republic of China (ROC), since it styles itself "China" also claims the entire South China Sea. Needless to say no Chinese emperor ever owned this water.

3. The Senkakus. Little islands typically described as close to Taiwan but actually closer to Japanese territory. Japan seized them in 1895 and throughout the 20th century neither the PRC nor the ROC claimed the islands. Indeed, until 1969 PRC and ROC maps showed them to be Japanese or to lie outside China. In 1968 Japanese scientists announced oil potential underneath the Senkakus and suddenly Beijing was there to claim them. This dispute is entirely artificial.

4. Taiwan: until the late 1930s Chinese thought of Taiwan as lying outside China, and no Han emperor ever owned the island. Then China suddenly started to evolve a claim to the island, and the rest is history. Based on the claim to Taiwan, the PRC and ROC both claim the Senkakus as well. As with the other claims, China hopes to browbeat its way to victory.

See the pattern? Claim/Conquest of A leads to claim on B -- meaning that China's expansive territorial claims wont stop until they are stopped by some outside force, implying that war is now in the offing. For example, China annexed Tibet in the 50s... which has led to the claim on Arunachal Pradesh -- whose population of ethnic Tibetans it dubs "Chinese." All of the territories now referred to as "disputed" were never Chinese. New claims are certain to be invented in the classic expand-until-squelched pattern.

The current mess over the Senkakus has China summoning Japan's ambassador 5 times this week to complain about Japanese arrest of a fishing boat captain who rammed a Japanese vessel in Japanese waters. This is entirely for domestic consumption. Contrast Chinese bluster with the non-controversy over the Russians, who sank a Chinese fishing boat via naval shellfire in Feb, and with the clashes in the South China Sea. This is driven by a deliberate choice to use Japan to stoke support for the current government.

As China grows stronger these dynamics will only grow stronger. The US response is muted partly because we have our own problems, partly due to the fact that so many in our foreign policy class are doing business with Beijing, and partly due to the fact that the US keeps wanting to have a relationship with Beijing, which can merely make it vulnerable to Chinese demands.

The US security relationship with Japan means that if China aims at Japan, it will provoke the US. The US and Japan actually conducted military exercises in the Senkakus a few years ago, and are currently conducting exercises simulating a joint Japanese-US mission to retake an island taken by the enemy, who of course can only be China. Our relationship with Taiwan, which is commonly but erroneously represented in our Golden Retriever media as a legal obligation, could also involve us in war. We are now moving closer to Taiwan, and forging partnerships with India.

Sitting here in Taiwan under Chinese missiles and facing a long-term drive to annex the island to China, I look at the region's future and fear. I don't know which historical analogy is correct, but to me right now China looks a lot like Japan circa 1930, pursuing a senseless war with its neighbors despite the fact that its opponents were all happy to trade with it and help its economy grow.

My $0.02.

Michael Turton
The View from Taiwan

... once past the war games and academic analysis and historical lessons, let's not underestimate the simple-but-significant roles of ego and pride when prognosticating China's decision-making and national identity evolution.

(now I'll brace myself for the onslaught of anti-Sino accusations sure to follow)