The Comanche and the Taliban

Posted By Stephen M. Walt Wednesday, October 13, 2010 - 12:42 PM Share

One of the most enjoyable books I've read in the past year was S. C. Gwynne's Empire of the Summer Moon: Quanah Parker and the Rise and Fall of the Comanches. It's a terrific, gripping story, and I learned a great deal about aspects of U.S. history of which I was only partly aware.

In brief, the book tells the story of the U.S. effort to subdue the Comanche, the most powerful Native American tribe on the Great Plains. It was a bloody and fascinating struggle, in part because the Comanche proved so hard for the far more numerous and technologically superior Anglos to defeat. If you grew up with a John Ford/John Wayne/Randolph Scott view of the Old West, this book will be something of a revelation. And the saga of Quanah Parker himself, a Comanche war chief whose mother was a white woman kidnapped in 1836 at the age of nine, and "rescued" many years later (when her son Quanah was twelve years old), is itself a heart-rending tale of cultural conflict and personal tragedy.

As much as I enjoyed the book, I couldn't help but read it with the current war in Afghanistan in mind. In both cases, a numerically superior, wealthier, and more technologically advanced United States confronts a tribal adversary fighting on its home ground. And in both cases, the U.S. government faces an adversary that is cunning, ruthless, and by our standards even backward or barbaric.

But as my late colleague Ernest May used to warn, when you make a historical analogy, it is a good idea to make a list of the ways the two situations differ, instead of just invoking the similarities. So lest you think that the ultimate victory of the U.S. government over the Comanche heralds a similar victory over the Taliban, consider the following differences between the two situations.

First, in the war against the Comanche, total victory was a vital interest for the United States. As the American republic expanded across North America, the United States was hardly going to allow an independent and hostile tribe of semi-nomadic natives to control a large swath of the territory that Americans believed was theirs by virtue of "Manifest Destiny." I am not defending this policy on the grounds of fairness or justice, by the way; just stating an obvious fact. By contrast, Afghanistan is thousands of miles from the U.S. homeland, and what happens there ultimately matters much more to the Afghans than it does to us. All Afghans know that sooner or later the United States and its allies are going to go home, but that was obviously not the case for the European settlers who had created the United States and were now pushing rapidly across the continent.

Second, the white settlers in North America enjoyed overwhelming numerical superiority. The Comanche numbered no more than 30-40,000 people, whereas the expanding white population had already exceeded twenty-three million by 1850. Thus, even though the Comanche remained formidable warriors on their home ground, they were eventually overwhelmed by sheer force of numbers. In Afghanistan, however, some 100,000-plus U.S. and allied troops are trying to impose order on over 30 million Afghans, themselves divided into five major tribal groups. Active members of the Taliban may be only a small sub-set of that population, but the Pashtuns from which they draw their main strength comprise about 40 percent of the population. Bottom line: The United States and its allies have nowhere near the same raw numerical advantage.

Third, like other North American tribes, the Comanche proved susceptible to various European diseases. As Gwynne makes clear, smallpox, measles, and cholera all had a devastating impact on Comanche numbers, and ultimately made the task of subduing them far easier. No similar advantage exists in the war against the Taliban.

Fourth, Gwynne's account highlights the willingness of Anglo settlers to run considerable risks in the course of westward expansion. It is true that the frontier sometimes retreated in the face of Comanche successes, as settlers moved back to safer locations, but in the end they kept coming despite the obvious risks involved. This willingness to seek one's fortune in a demanding and hostile environment reflected a number of deeper social and economic forces, but the fact remains that many Americans were willing to push forward even when doing so was understood to be perilous. By contrast, few people believe winning in Afghanistan is worth large sacrifices, which may be why we now rely on drone strikes and other tactics that minimize the risk to U.S. soldiers. I'm not questioning the courage of our soldiers, by the way, just suggesting that we are more sensitive to the human costs of the war than we were in conquering North America.

Fifth, technology proved to be a decisive factor against the Comanche. The development of the Colt revolver, the repeating rifle, and the buffalo gun eliminated the Comanche's tactical advantages, and made their defeat inevitable. The destruction of the great buffalo herds deprived the Comanche of a key source of food, and eventually gave them little choice but to surrender. 

Optimists continue to hope that some combination of sophisticated counterinsurgency tactics, advanced weaponry, and other innovations may eventually turn the tide against the Taliban, and one cannot rule out that possibility entirely. But as noted above, the Comanche's central problem was a declining population, and the steady shrinking of their home territory. By contrast, the Taliban still seem readily able to melt away into the surrounding countryside or the existing society, or to flee across the permeable border with Pakistan, and trying to eliminate these sanctuaries could trigger a wider war and cause further frictions with Pakistan. No such problem existed in the campaign against the Comanche.

Finally, it is a sobering fact to realize that despite its clear interest in victory and its clear advantages in numbers, wealth, and technology, it took the United States nearly four decades to finally defeat the Comanche. If you are seeking a similarly decisive victory in Central Asia, therefore, you'd better be prepared to stay there in strength for a long, long time. As readers of this blog know, I don't think that this is worth it, given the modest stakes involved and the other tasks that we ought to be focusing on. And compared to our war effort in Central Asia, fighting the Comanche was actually pretty cheap.

Again, historical analogies ought to be used with caution, and no doubt there are other dissimilarities between these two struggles that might yield different conclusions. Whatever the implication for our current situation, Gwynne's book is still an entertaining and beautifully written book, and well worth your time.

SHAH MARAI/AFP/Getty Images

EXPLORE:ACADEMIA, BOOK CLUB, CENTRAL ASIA, NORTH AMERICA, AFGHANISTAN, HISTORY, MILITARY, PAKISTAN, SECURITY, TALIBAN, WINNERS & LOSERS
 

MARTY MARTEL

3:51 AM ET

October 14, 2010

The Comanche and the U.S. did not have an ally like Pakistan

Gwynne’s book about ‘The Comanche’ may make an interesting reading but there is no comparison between The Comanche and the Taliban.

The Comanche did not have an ally like Pakistan that Taliban has.

And the U.S. of those times did NOT have an ally like Pakistan either that will ‘run with the hares while hunting with the hounds‘.

US deliberately continues to ignore Taliban’s Pakistani connections in fueling and sustaining Afghan insurgency as reported by Matt Waldman in ‘The sun in the sky‘ on 6/13/2010, corroborated by WikiLeaks leaks on 7/25/2010 and then further corroborated by Chris Alexander, Canadian ambassador to Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005 and Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan from 2005 until 2009 in his article on 7/30/2010 titled ‘The huge scale of Pakistan‘s complicity‘.

Since U.S. of current times not just tolerates but even aids with billions of dollars the duplicitous Pakistan that shelters Afghan Taliban, US deserves to be so duped by Pakistan.

 

RBBAL

12:31 PM ET

October 14, 2010

Another difference: Genocide

Highlighting the differences is a very interesting technique. Another important difference is the ability / willingness to commit genocide. (Of course, not defending the practice but stating the obvious here).

In fighting the Comanches, Anglo settlers could easily identify their enemy and were willing to kill them all. In Afghanistan, (i) the Taliban merges with the local population, making hard to identify the enemy; and (ii) genocide is not an option (needless to state the reasons), despite the technology advances that would allow it.

 

TYRTAIOS

12:53 PM ET

October 14, 2010

Taliban are not a race of people

Personally, I think this is an interesting article, but a bit of stretch in comparing the two because theTaliban may be the insurgent, but they are not a race of people, only a minority within the greater Pashtun community as I understand it?

The U.S. government's policy out West was one of flip-flopping from playing nice to one of total subjugation of a race of people in the example here. We are not at war with the Pashtun in Afghanistan, only the Taliban, unlike out the American West, where the idea was of a total subjugation of a race of peoples.

I think the mention of the Comanche's (and all Plains' Indians) food source, the buffalo, and the fact that within two years that animal was almost completely wiped-out, which sealed the Plain' Indians fate is key here, as they had no where else to turn but to subjugation on a reservation - again, a race of people, not just a seperate insurgent entity.

The British did something similar in Malaysia by forced relocation of villages, thereby denying the insurgent their food source and support, thereby herding those insurgents not willing to surrender into killing zones.

Both examples above were not pretty (disclaimer: I am 1/2 Oglala Lakota and my family's winter count documents this) and for obvious reasons are not available to us in Afghanistan.

 

THETUMTA

9:24 PM ET

October 15, 2010

"they are not a race of people, only a minority within the grea"

Rather you like it or not, they are the dominant power within the Pasthun community. That's why Osama aligned his organization with them. They will not be easily defeated, if at all. Ask the Russians! They have time on their side.

Fortunately, Osama betrayed his "deal" with them. Unfortunately, we have not leveraged this advantage at all. I am heartened by the reports that we may have joined the negotiation process. We don't have to endorse their view, we need an enforceable agreement on their terms.
Hej!

 

DEFANNIN

1:30 PM ET

October 14, 2010

We are More Civilized Now

If we were to fight a war against the Indians today. We would first call a Tribal Council and have them adopt the constitution we wrote for them. Then we would "help" them hold "free" elections to elect a Puppet Leader we appointed. Then demand they do away with the tribal council we just used to justify the constitution and have Congress elected. Finally, we have the Puppet Leader and the Puppet Congress vote to ask us to stay and administer the country for the benefit of the tribal people.

We are so much more civilized now than in the 1800's.

 

MUHYEDIN

12:28 AM ET

October 15, 2010

Identification

I always find it puzzling and weird when someone uses the terms "we" / "us" / "our" in historical accounts, as in this post with instances like "we fought the commanche", "our victory in North America", etc. ... in reference to events and choices the author or his immediate 'tribe' had nothing to do with.

I don't know what to make of this 'we'. I don't identify with what my people did 50 years ago. Is this 'we' purely linguistic form, or is it (also) identification?

 

MUHYEDIN

12:31 AM ET

October 15, 2010

[re-write]

last par — 'my people' with quotation marks!

 

DH77190

1:35 AM ET

October 15, 2010

Taliban vs. the Comanche

There can be little comparison between the Comanche and the Taliban. While this does sound like an interesting read, the differences between the Comanche and the Taliban are so great that it would be absurd to assume that America’s battle with the insurgency in Afghanistan could be compared to America’s settlement of the west. The most obvious of these reasons being the fact that while Comanche warriors were easily identifiable, Taliban fighters car easily blend into the local populous, in effect making America’s current scenario infinity harder.

 

BLUEBIRD

3:21 PM ET

October 15, 2010

Comanche Tribe

Living next to Comanche County, in Oklahoma & having the Comanche citizens living in my small community, I can appreciate your comment. For me, regardless of vast superior forces against people fighting for their freedom, it's about each of us fighting for our freedoms from a govt. that continues to take freedoms from us.

There is another book out that is along these lines that I recommend. It's about American citizens standing up to tyranny (vast military power) & could be history asking us to rise to our destiny in life. I recommend it.
booksbyoliver.com

 

NICHOLAS WIBBERLEY

11:57 AM ET

October 16, 2010

Too many cooks

There was no one else involved in the early American fight against the Comanche. Taliban, on the other hand, have practical connections across many neighbouring borders, ideological connections much further afield, and are watched from Moscow to Beijing and beyond. Then there are so many NGOs and ‘human rights’ groups muddying the water that one cannot today decapitate a traitor or bomb a wedding party without half the world twittering about it. It is easy to forget how recent are the communication systems that disperse such disparate events at the speed of sound. Fighting a war today must be like passing your wedding night under the scrutiny of a dozen maiden aunts.

 

ROGER ALBIN

11:07 PM ET

October 16, 2010

Comanches

Pekka Hamalainen's The Comanche Empire, which won the Bancroft Prize, is a considerably superior book. Hamalainen argues convincingly that for a period of about a century, the Comanche occupied a position on the southern Great Plains analogous to the Mongols in Inner Asia. As Hamalainen demonstrates, the Comanche were less powerful than the expanding Americans, but more powerful than the Spanish-Mexican state in the Southwest. One of Hamalainen's most interesting arguments is that the Comanches facilitated the American conquest of the Southwest by seriously weakening the Mexican state.

 

GRANT

12:17 AM ET

October 18, 2010

Of course there's something

Of course there's something else to remember about the Comanche (and the Indian Wars in general). The military didn't put much effort into learning from the experiences there. Admittedly there was a school started at one point or another in the 19th century for this but it didn't last long and I can't think of any major writing or education* on how to fight Indians**.

* Major as in it was important at the time. How people view something today isn't very important as how much of an impact it had at the time for this discussion.

** By which I mean the earliest inhabitants of the Americas. Generally I call them First Nation citizens on the advice of a woman I met from the Lenape Nation.

 

Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.

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