In my last post I suggested that the United States and China start talking about how they would handle the collapse of the North Korean government. I should emphasize that I was not suggesting that the United States and China try to topple the North Korean regime. Beijing has zero interest in that happening right now, and we've already got more problems on our plate than we can handle.

My first point was that the North Korean regime could collapse no matter what we do (though nobody can predict when), and that it would be a good thing to have discussed how to respond in advance. My second point was that merely having such a conversation might have a sobering effect on Pyongyang, although I confess that I'm not entirely sure of that either.

I am pleased to report, however, that some people have started to think about what we should do in the event that North Korea really does start to go down the tubes. Specifically, USC's Korean Studies Institute sponsored a workshop on this topic earlier this year, and you can read a summary of their deliberations here. Kudos to the organizers, David Kang and Victor Cha, for trying to look down the road, and to help us get ready for a potentially thorny problem before it actually occurs.

 

JOEL WIT

10:55 AM ET

December 6, 2010

Lets get real

Steve: As a frequent reader and admirer of your often skeptical attitude towards the Washington foreign policy establishment, I am a little dismayed to find that you have fallen into your own bear trap. While your point that this might have a positive effect on the DPRK is well-taken, the idea is a non-starter.

First, the idea that the US should talk to China about North Korea's collapse has been around for some time now. It has been recommended in a whole library of previous reports on North Korea including one I did with Paul Stares for the Council on Foreign Relations in January 2009 (so I fell into the same bear trap as well). It may have been possible years ago--I was part of an informal discussion with Chinese military officials in 2005 in Beijing on this topic--but it has become a non-starter that is and is often floated by the Washington establishment. Its part of that universe of thinking that we should get China to pressure North Korea to do the right thing even though its become very clear that everything China is doing is intended to prevent collapse and instability on its borders. Why would it talk to us?

Second, on your broader point on collapse planning, that is also nothing new. It has been the recent fad in the Washington Korea community for the past few years. Once again, I must plead guilty since our CFR report helped stimulate the new round of tree-killing. And it is worth noting that such planning has been going on in the South Korean government and our own military for many years, although in a somewhat disjointed, haphazard way. I think problems with that planning have been fixed recently although many still remain. Many of these plans are amazingly detailed and I would bet even include setting up new government structures down to the local levels as well as the actual people who would be the new officials in North Korea.

Lastly, its worth asking the question why has collapse planning become the most recent fad. Is it because North Korea seems to be nearing collapse? Or is it another way for the Washington community to avoid the unpleasant reality that the DPRK is going to be around for some time? Of course, no one knows for sure about when collapse will happen (people have been predicting it for 20 years) but as a friend of mine in the current US government said to me, he wished we spent less time planning for collapse and more time planning for how to deal with a DPRK that is still here. I agree with him--anyone who has been to the DPRK (I was there in mid-November), talked to Europeans who have been working on the ground there (one told us talk of collapse is ridiculous) and seriously discussed this matter with people who have spent decades following the country know this emphasis is misplaced.

 

Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.

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