Posted By Stephen M. Walt Share

The news that various Afghan and Pakistani insurgent groups are coordinating their activities more extensively is neither surprising nor encouraging. This outcome is exactly what balance of power theory (or if you prefer, balance of threat theory) would predict: as the United States increases its military presence and escalates the level of violence, its various opponents put aside their differences for the moment in order to deal with the more imminent danger.

This pattern of behavior has a long-tradition in Afghan internal politics, as my former student Fotini Christia showed in a terrific Ph.D. thesis a few years back. It's also a phenomenon we've seen in earlier foreign interventions. The various mujaheddin warlords put aside their various quarrels in order to fight the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, just as China, the Soviet Union and North Vietnam set aside their mutual fears and rivalries when the United States was fighting in Indochina.

Once the Soviets withdrew, of course, divisions within Afghan society re-emerged and made the place nearly ungovernable before the emergence of the Taliban. Something similar happened in Indochina: as soon as the United States withdrew from Vietnam, rivalries between the various communist nations and the Khmer Rouge eventually led to a Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and a short border war between China and Vietnam. It was our presence that held them together and our departure that allowed long-standing resentments to burst forth anew.

The obvious lesson is that there is little danger of some sort of powerful jihadi monolith emerging in Central Asia. It is our war effort there that is leading these groups to make common cause with each other, and the longer the war goes on, the more we can expect them to cooperate. Because our strategic interests in Central Asia are very limited (i.e., we just don't want people organizing attacks on American soil from there) our real objective should be to reduce the U.S. presence, play "divide-and-conquer," and let the natural centrifugal tendencies in this region reassert themselves. That's not necessarily the "heroic" play (which is why our commanders aren't embracing it), but wouldn't it make more sense than giving a set of un-natural allies more reason to work together?

MASSOUD HOSSAINI/AFP/Getty Images

 
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JFEYGIN

4:28 AM ET

December 30, 2010

China and the USSR

I again need to be the annoying historian and object to the idea of the Vietnam War bringing a squabbing Soviet Union and China together. Any cooperation was very short term (months) and mostly symbolic. Lorenz Luthi and Qiang Zhai showed that the USSR and PRC were at each others throats over the role of negotiations and even over whether the Soviet Union could ship aid through China. My own research actually showed that the Soviet disagreements with China over Vietnam may have pushed them closer to the United States as early as the late Johnson administration by allowing pro-detente forces in the central committee to marginalize the hawks. I am not an IR theorist, and don't like to apply paradigms to what I feel are vastly different political situations with actors driven by very different security paradigms and ideological perceptions.

 

JFEYGIN

10:07 PM ET

December 30, 2010

The point is they weren't working together

I understand what you mean but I am sticking to my position that the US intervention in Vietnam actually sped up the Sino-Soviet split and detente (this is not to say that this was the direct result of American policy but rather a right place at the right time situation- the Vietnam war was a horrible act of policy). While the animus between the PRC and the USSR did exist it did not reach a substantial policy level until after the Gulf of Tonkin event after which Khrushchev began to push the for a regional de-escalation which in turn led the Chinese to begin intervening in Warsaw Pact affairs (see Ilya Gaiduk's Confronting Vietnam book I believe). This intensified in the post-Pleiku period with China being driven out contact with other Warsaw Pact states due to splits over ties between arms control negotiations and Vietnam, the role of the NLF ext. If you read the biographies of Soviet diplomats it was actually Soviet attempts to improve relations with China in the early period of the Vietnam war that increased the split. While I will concede that the USSR did attempt to lessen the split, the result was actually the opposite. If you can read Russian there is a great account of this in Bovin and Kaptisa's memoirs, specifically on the rebuffing of Kosygin's outreach efforts. Luthi actually found evidence that the USSR and China almost broke of diplomatic relations in late 1965 (or 1966 I don’t remember the exact date) over accusations that China was stealing Soviet supplies bound for Vietnam.

One point I should make is that I think the American narrative of the China, USSR, Vietnam triangle in the creation of detente is remarkably flawed and informed by a mythology generated by Nixon administration PR campaigns. I believe linkage politics with the USSR over arms control and Vietnam begin with the resolution of articles one and two of the NPT, in fall of 1966. In my opinion this marks the United States’ concession on arms control in exchange for Soviet attempts to mediate an end to the Vietnam conflict. What the United States explicitly banked on was the Soviet Union would have incentive to do this in order to weaken the Chinese position on emerging national liberation movement.
What I have seen in Russian archives actually confirms that by the Americans were right. By 1966, disagreements with China over the Vietnam War may have actually strengthened pro-détente, anti-China forces in the politburo by making abstract disagreements over ideology into concrete problems.

While China and the USSR did both assist the North Vietnamese that does not mean there was any coordination in the effort. Rather they were acting as competing sponsors which in turn accelerated the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. My basic point is just because someone is trying to do the same thing, it does not mean that they are actually cooperating or that this leads to an alliance of some sort, it actually means the opposite. Divisions did not re-emerge as the US withdrew rather they were in part created by the American presence.

 

BLUE13326

1:06 PM ET

December 30, 2010

Waitaminute here...weren't

Waitaminute here...weren't you one of those pushing the Kerry campaign's line that we should have escalated in Afghanistan?

So, now you're saying that Bush's strategy of keeping the war relatively small there...was the correct one?

 

SCOTTINDALLAS

7:32 PM ET

December 31, 2010

I think there is a point

I think there is a point where too small a force is like underpaying a debt, the obligations increase. So, if we were to be engaged there at all, that should come with a minimal commitment--that Bush wasn't meeting. I would argue that that should mean we should withdraw, as we still haven't committed the forces necessary to create stability. Of course, our support of Karsai is troubled as well.

I think your argument is a bit petty, as we are offered not the best of all possible positions only the example Bush had provided and what Kerry was claiming. Along those lines, many thought they were getting some reduction in the military from Obama but that was truly wishful thinking and hearing what one wanted to hear.

 

MARTY MARTEL

1:40 PM ET

December 30, 2010

US deserves to be duped by Pakistan

Wow! American military commanders are discovering 10 years later what India’s home minister L. K. Advani at the time in 2001 had warned that ‘All the terrorists come from the same cesspool of terrorism’ that Pakistani society has been as long as one can remember. Terrorists are recruited by different outfits - be it Al Qaeda or Quetta Shura or Haqqani network or Hekamtyar network or Lashker-e-Teiba or Tehrik-i-Taliban - from the same work force of millions of available Pakistanis.

It is these misinformed foreign policy experts and political pundits who hallucinate and misguide American people that ’Pakistan is a victim of terrorism’ or that ’there is such a thing called moderate Pakistani society’ when nothing can be further from the truth. This is not a biased opinion of one individual but the fact borne out by majority of terrorist attacks over last two decades with origins tracing back to Pakistan.

Knowing all these facts very well, American and Western establishment continues to deliberately give Pakistan a benefit of the doubt none the less by showering billion after billion in aid year in and year out.

U. S. and Western democracies indeed deserve to be duped by Pakistan royally.

 

SCOTTINDALLAS

8:18 PM ET

December 31, 2010

What makes you think the US

What makes you think the US is being duped? The US picked up Britain's meddling hand in Indo/Pak and across the globe through WW2 and more decidedly after the 50's. Pakistan is a client state of the US. Pakistan has been prevented from uniting with Afghanistan for years. (this prevents the Pashtun people from being politically represented, much more on this in another comment to follow) This keeps us involved in the political machinations.

Every war is a choice, especially those abroad. We are in Afghanistan because we want to be. We have global commands as a chosen policy. You can't dismiss the possibility that we, or some small faction had a hand in 9/11. But, what terrorism incontrovertibly is, is a kind of radical democratization of militancy. There is nothing unique about Pakistan and terrorism. We should always keep in mind the great thesis of the Declaration of Independence. Namely, that governments owe their allegiance to the people. When we effect the decisions of foreign governments we are asking them to commit treason against their own people. When we demand treason it is the right and duty of their subjects to alter or abolish their reign. When these countries either don't have democracies, or their democracies are rigged, their response will likely be branded terrorism. Goodness, even Julian Assange is a terrorist and hasn't hurt a fly.

Pakistan does our bidding. It also will run other policies that are generally popular among it's constituents. However, a substantial population of Pakistan (the Pashtun) is at once marginalized and exploited. They are used to execute Paki policy in Kashmir and Afghanistan and India with some deniability. But, all these sorts of semi-autonomous tools work both ways. They've done our bidding as well, not only in Pakistan. Another terrorist group who Turkey watches closely, the MEK is doing our bidding in Iran. I don't know if they have any operational interaction with the Taliban--but if they do I bet the CIA had a hand in establishing that connection. Remember, Hamas was, if not created by the Mossad, it was the midwife.

Pakistan isn't to blame, it's just under American influence, and American interests aren't too well aligned with Pakistan's. Look at Egypt which is another country that has democratic yearnings that we fear, hence, we help Egypt remain undemocratic. Iran suffers the same conflict and whatever you think of Ahmedenijhad, he isn't any less popular among Iranians than most American politicians are here. Their nuclear program is supported by the people. Their people don't like our foreign policy, but they would like to trade with us, just as their gov't wishes. They are likely the most democratic Muslim country in the Middle East. Only Lebanon and ignorance of some of the smaller lower profile countries keeps me from calling them the most democratic. Israel is just as democratic as the American South was in the 1930's, if not worse, maybe 1930's OK if the Indians still had no vote while most Blacks and better integrated Indians faced Jim Crow style disenfranchisement.

So, we see terrorism in Pakistan because we've used the dangerous method of developing terror cells to fight the Soviet friendly regime in Afghanistan. These very cells have persisted and metastasized. Further, we never cut them out/off, as the ISI used them to create problems in Kashmir, and in operations more directly against India. The cells glorify folklore from their past, much as our "patriot movement" and "minuteman militias" do today. The Tea Party flys our own "Don't Tread on Me" flag. I imagine these stories are nearly ubiquitous across country and culture; and a natural symbol to glom to.

No one's duped, it just that this isn't the story we tell in high school or college. I doubt many history professors would dare broach these nasty truths in any forceful way in the basic history courses that essentially every student must take. They may include some mention, but I bet few would teach post Civil War American History by requiring Smedley Butler's, "War Is A Racket" and then hammering home those same nasty anecdotes through out. You sure couldn't do it at a state school or a conservative private school.

 

SIN NOMBRE

4:30 PM ET

December 30, 2010

Strategic misdirections

Stephen Walt wrote:

"Because our strategic interests in Central Asia are very limited (i.e., we just don't want people organizing attacks on American soil from there)...."

And therein lies the nub of the problem. If indeed we were just pursuing that interest we wouldn't be much "in there" at all—as we could rather easily monitor things from afar (offshore and in the skies) and bomb or whatever as needed to stop that attack organizing.

Instead then of pursuing our strategic interests, what we're really doing is pursuing others, with predictable results.

Really is almost laughable in a way: The U.S. is attacked on 9/11, in significant if not overwhelming part because we were pursuing other than our own strategic interests. Regardless, given that of course we still had to respond, we could easily and totally have done so (by wiping out al Queda) and walked away looking frighteningly competent and efficient and not a country to be lightly played with.

Instead however, we cover ourselves in ignominy in Iraq, stupendously empower Iran, get ourselves into a quaqmire in Afghanistan and very possibly destabilize our strong former ally Pakistan, and then, to top it all off ... fail to destroy al Queda or even kill bin Laden.

Like a man addressing a hangnail, ending up amputating his entire arm.

Indeed the *wrong* arm since even the hangnail's still there....

 

SEELE02

6:19 PM ET

December 30, 2010

Interests

Prof. Walt, you argue that the only US interest in the region is the absence of anti-US terror-plotting. What about the rich oil and above all gas reserves of the Central Asian states? Giving China (which is intensifying its ties in the region exactly for this purpose) unchallenges access to these resources just cant be in the US strategic interest.

 

RUSSELLM

9:46 PM ET

December 30, 2010

The Taliban

The Taliban were there in strength before the US came, and even now, with the combining of some forces, is not in any way as powerful as in 2001. In fact, only 9% would prefer the Taliban to the Karzia government. The Taliban, are not really like the Vietnamese and little like the holy warriors, some 300,000, who ousted the Soviets.

SENATOR JOHN KERRY (D-MA), CHAIRMAN, SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE:

"That is the key. The biggest single recruitment support factor for the Taliban today is not the presence of American troops, though that has some impact.

It is the lack of adequate governance and the fury building up within the afghan people about the inadequacy of their own government. That's pushing people towards something else, and too often that something is the Taliban."

 

SCOTTINDALLAS

8:46 PM ET

December 31, 2010

what is a nation

I think this column raises an interesting question about who "we" are. I've heard it said that "realists" consider nations as entities of themselves and don't concern themselves with the internal concerns of other nations. Well, when we are seeking to influence policy in another country, simply paying off the chief executive would be enough according to the realist described. But, if this payoff is found out, or is evident as our arrangement with many Arab regimes is to their own people their resentment grows--Invading a country or neighboring country so much more than simply favorable trade terms, acquiescence on Israel, Egypt and any other of the many compromises we demand.

But, back to "we," when do we identify with our neighbor? For many American it is easy to see Arabs, Pakistanis as other and different. But, we'd likely feel different about Australia, England or Canada. How about Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela, Brazil? Do we feel the same about a Canadian as a Mexican? Does a Texan have the same answer as a Yankee? (who me? North of the Mason-Dixon is a Yankee, Yankee.)

But how did the Cambodian or Laotian feel about the Vietnamese war? At some point, nationality is not limited to lines on a map. Do we feel the same wound when we hear of the murder of a white girl, versus a Latina or Black girl, in the ghetto?

What is a nation? The "Raiders"TM nation? If as we discuss so often that Palestinian issues effect the Pan Arab world, we can fairly expand Nationhood beyond geopolitical borders. Israel-enthusiast are indeed a multinational entity, as are some Latin enthusiasts , Anglophiles and what not. Perhaps you're not concerned with such questions as a "realist" though somehow I imagine that opening characterization to be a bit of a strawman.

 

Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.

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