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Why Does the U.S. Get All the Tornadoes?
Posted By Stephen M. Walt
Wednesday, February 23, 2011 - 11:26 AM
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I've been writing this blog for a couple of years now, and for the most part I'm satisfied with what I've had to say. But no social science theory is 100 percent accurate, and no social scientist is right 100 percent of the time, especially when reacting to rapidly moving events. Anybody who writes a blog and sticks their neck out is going to get a few big things wrong, which is why I tell prospective bloggers to start with a thick skin.
Case in point: My post on why the revolution in Tunisia would not spread. To say my prediction was wrong is an understatement, and some of the usual critics have seized on this opportunity to take a shot or two. Fair enough, but when I look back at what I actually wrote, I don't feel particularly embarrassed. After all, I began by noting that revolutionary events are inherently hard to forecast (for reasons that other scholars had already identified), and the actual post (as opposed to the provocative headline) made it clear I didn't think contagion was impossible, just unlikely.
Moreover, I still think my reasons for being skeptical about the possibility of contagion were cogent, even if my forecast was clearly wrong in this instance. Large-scale protests are hardly a rare occurrence in many parts of the world, but the vast majority of them do not lead governments to fall. And when a government is toppled, most of the time this does not lead to similar upheavals elsewhere, and certainly not within a few days or weeks. My original prediction was off the mark, but it would have been correct in most cases.
But not this time, which raises the obvious question: Why was this case an exception? What did I miss? Because we still don't know exactly why and how the upheaval in Tunisia caught fire so quickly, what follows is inevitably speculative. But with that caveat in mind, here's where I think I blew it.
First, although everyone knew that authoritarian regimes like the Mubarak government in Egypt were unpopular, I underestimated the degree of internal resentment. Of course, as Timur Kuran and others have shown, that is precisely why it is impossible to predict the timing of a revolutionary upheaval: Citizens in an autocracy won't express their true preferences (and especially their propensity to rebel) openly because doing so is dangerous. This tendency for what Kuran calls "preference falsification" makes it impossible for anyone to know exactly how likely a revolution might be. But with hindsight, it's clear that resentment against some of these governments was deeper and wider than we recognized.
Second, it now seems likely many commentators -- including yours truly -- were unaware of the level of anti-government organization that had already taken place in places like Egypt, and it seems clear that the Mubarak government didn't know about it either. Massive yet disciplined street demonstrations don't occur entirely by accident, and we now know that young activists had been quietly mobilizing and organizing long before the Tunisian revolt lit the fuse. Given Egypt's central place in Arab politics, Mubarak's unexpected ouster fueled the perception that change was possible elsewhere, thereby fueling similar responses elsewhere.
Third, the role of the media -- and especially new media -- cannot be discounted, if only because it facilitated that pre-revolutionary organizing just discussed. Even a smart Internet skeptic like Evgeny Morozov has acknowledged this point, though he questions how widespread this tendency will be. Here I think a lot more research and reportage will be needed before we know exactly what role the Internet, Twitter, Facebook, etc. really played, along with cell phones and Al Jazeera. I'd still be wary of generalizing too much, if only because other dictatorships may be more adept at managing these technologies than Mubarak & Co. were. Nonetheless, I now think my initial skepticism reflected an inadequate appreciation for how these technologies could facilitate revolutionary contagion, at least under some circumstances.
Fourth, one of the most surprising aspects of these various revolts has been the brittleness, indecision, and lack of resolve displayed by many of these ruling regimes, including their security forces. Egypt's security police were withdrawn from the field after a day or two of inconclusive violence, and the armed forces quickly decided they were unwilling to use force majeure against the demonstrators in order to keep Mubarak in power. More force was used in Bahrain, but only briefly. In other words, the demonstrators have not been dealing with the likes of Stalin, Hitler, Saddam Hussein, or even a Hafez al-Assad, all of whom were willing to shed buckets of their own countrymen's blood in order to retain power. The partial exception thus far is Libya, but Qaddafi's brutal crackdown seems to be backfiring and if anything may have accelerated the disintegration of his regime. Does this suggest that the so-called "rights revolution" has begun to permeate the institutions of coercion in more and more countries? I don't know, but it's a fascinating possibility.
Finally, I underestimated the sense of common identification and cultural resonance that made events in one Arab country significant for many people in others. Despite the many differences between these various states, a certain broad sense of cultural identification (i.e., as Arab) seems to have made each country more responsive to what people was seeing in other countries. I suspect that Al Jazeera amplified this sense of identification in various ways, and while I can't prove it, there is some survey evidence that supports that view. For Arabs, the fact that the initial spark was struck in Tunisia made it far more significant than a similar event in Bolivia or Burma would have been.
All that said, I don't think I got everything wrong. As noted above, I emphasized that these sorts of events are inherently unpredictable, and so are their ultimate outcomes. I've also stressed that it will take time before we know how these events will turn out or what the broader implications for the region (and for U.S. interests) will be. I'm still inclined to think that the outcomes are going to vary considerably because the contending forces in each case are far from identical. And we should remain open to the possibility that 2011 could be, to paraphrase Trevelyan, "a great turning point in [Arab] history, at which history fails to turn" (at least in some of these countries).
So while I'm not boasting about my clairvoyance (which would be pretty silly in this case, though not in some others), I'm not losing any sleep either. As my favorite Yogi said: "Prediction is very hard. Especially about the future."
FETHI BELAID/AFP/Getty Images.
EXPLORE:PERSONAL, THUMBS, ARAB WORLD, MIDDLE EAST, DEMOCRACY, EGYPT, HUMAN RIGHTS, LIBYA, WINNERS & LOSERS 
I can't recall how many times over the last 10 years I've read that these creaky old autocracies in the Middle East were bound to fall, probably sooner than later. I read it in the academic scholarship and in the journalism. The only thing missing was the date and time.
In his most recent article, Gwynne Dyer asks "Why Now?" and answers:
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The one thing that is really different in the Middle East, just in the last year or two, is the self-evident fact that the United States is starting to withdraw from the region. From Lebanon in 1958 to Iraq in 2003, the US was willing to intervene militarily to defend Arab regimes it liked and overthrow those that it did not like. That`s over now.
This great change is partly driven by the thinly-disguised American defeat in Iraq. The last US troops are leaving that country this year, and after that grim experience US public opinion will not countenance another major American military intervention in the region. The safety net for Arab regimes allied to the United States is being removed, and their people know it.
There is also a major strategic reassessment going on in Washington, and it will almost certainly end by downgrading the importance of the Middle East in US policy. The Arab masses do not know that, but the regimes certainly do, and it undermines their confidence.
The traditional motives for American strategic involvement in the Middle East were oil and Israel. American oil supplies had to be protected, and the Cold War was a zero-sum game in which any regime that the US did not control was seen to be at risk of falling into the hands of the Soviet Union. And quite apart from sentimental considerations, Israel had to be protected because it was an important military asset.
But the Cold War is long over, and so is the zero-sum game in the Middle East.
http://www.dawn.com/2011/02/20/why-now.html
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Dyer was one of those who did a lot of predicting during the Bush era--he wrote something like 4 books during that period. He was wrong about a few things (one of those books was about his errors), but right about most things. That's a good enough record to keep reading him.
Yes, I agree very much with that article.
I tried (far less effectively) to point out something similar in Walt's post regarding the recent veto i.e. if the USA comes to realize that there is no domino theory at work in the Middle East then the USA simply doesn't *need* Israel to be there as a bulwark against the the fall of the dominos.
And if it doesn't *need* Israel there so that Netanyahu can wield the IDF then what, exactly, does it *need* Israel for?
As a shining light unto the nations? Hardly.
As a role model for all the other nations in the M.E. to emulate? Ludicrous.
As the regional hub of commerce and finance? Not gonna happen.
This is the real danger for Israel i.e. it has spent decades poking its nose at just about everyone else the region, and doing so from behind Uncle Sam's coat-tails.
But if Uncle Sam ups and leaves then where, exactly, does that leave Israel?
Answer: looking mighty exposed, I'd suggest.
Mighty exposed to what?
Being the only tolerant, egalitarian nation state in the AO with a penchant for periodic, transparent elections, a literacy rate off the charts, a free, uncensored press, a military under civie command, an independent judiciary under elected gov oversight and a nat'l treasury under public accountability?
That kind of exposure, along with being surrounded by several hundred million intolerant nation states (that, for whatever reasons, cannot seem to get their various acts together as they torment women and minorities), will only serve to reinforce the totally correct idea that Little Satan is very much like Great Satan - a fun, free choice society.
If Little Satan's neighbors continue to refuse to Officially recog Little Satan and/or become overtly rowdy and intolerant of turf that makes up less than 1% of Arabic land - that will most likely increase awareness and affinity ala the Alamo for Little Satan in Great Satan - far beyond the nigh record level of support she enjoys now.
You're describing Lebanon I guess? Cause Israel is certainly not "egalitarian"
I stand by what I said: Israel has spent DECADES thumbing its nose at the neighbours, and all in the certain knowledge that it is doing so from behind the coat tails of a superpower patron.
If that superpower gets up and leaves - which it is, and sooner than you think, obviously - then Israel will need to rethink its antagonistic attitude towards the neighbours.
Will it?
No, I don't think it will: Israel is suffering from a bad bout of hubris and a crippling case of myopia, and so it will continue along its antagonistic way until those neighbours walk right up to it, taps it on the shoulder, and points out the obvious i.e. that Big Ol' Uncle Sam ain't standing between the two of them any more.
Shit will hit fan at that precise moment.
Thumbing her nose at her neighbors?
Like splitting the Strip? Or Lebanon?
Just lucky, nicht wahr? Being the only successful nation state right smack in the middle of the Arab world - and by every measure of economic, political, social, and cultural success thriving amid misery.
Without oil, without a large pop, without friendly homies on her borders, without vast real estate, without secret police, without gender apartheid and without the Suez Canal, she somehow provides her citizenry with a way of life far more humane than what is found in Syria, Iran, Lebanon, Jordan, The Strip or Egypt.
Look, Arab League has done more 'nose thumbing' than any other collective of failed states in world history. The "3 No's of Khartoum" the risible inability to Officially Recog Little Satan - not to mention being a major player in the Nakbah - abusing Palestinians as strategic resources while magically unable to assimilate their own kin - with the same dialect and customs.
Carebeful about loling the possibility of Great Satan splitting the AO and cutting Little Satan loose!
Could end up with a Greater Little Satan as a new diplopolititary term comes into fashion:
Nakbah Redux
Spare me the jingoistic nonsense, please.
"Carebeful about loling the possibility of Great Satan splitting the AO and cutting Little Satan loose!
Could end up with a Greater Little Satan as a new diplopolititary term comes into fashion:
Nakbah Redux"
You appear to be under the illusion that the IDF of today is the IDF of 1967, or even the Haganah of 1948.
It isn't, you are definitely deluding yourself if you think that Israel can attempt a military solution to its Palestinian problem *and* survive as a nation-state.
Here is a thought: there has never been a heavyweight boxing champion who has stepped into the ring thinking that he is going to lose. They ALL think that they are going to win, and when their chin does hit the canvas they are, indeed, the most astonished person in that auditorium.
You are a poster-child for zionist arrogance, luvvie and you will, indeed, be the most surprised person on Earth when the IDF's chin hits the canvas.
Hoping for things, projection and ad hominem assertions may function as analysis in curiously risible realpolitik circles - alas, it totally fails to impress or enlighten in any serious debatery, Johnnyboy.
If backed into a corner (or even if she tho't she was) isolated in nearly any diplopolititary endeavors as you suggest - and under threat - Little Satan could easily wipe clean and draw again borders au courant. Arab military power is embarrassing - fully crunk to crack heads and maintain regimes at home - yet plumb pitiful when it comes to fighting real wars.
And, in such an event - it could very well include a much larger AO than Palestine and the Strip. Little Satan may not be too hot to return turf taken fair and square in a real war with a myriad of state and non state actors who cannot even agree to an exchange of ambassadors.
And like 1948 - the rest of the world may not be hot to see a 'solution' for yet another self imposed Nakbah.
"Hoping for things, projection and ad hominem assertions may function as analysis in curiously risible realpolitik circles - alas, it totally fails to impress or enlighten in any serious debatery, Johnnyboy."
As a piece of gobbly-gooked nonsense that sentence really does deserve some sort of award.
Do they hand out Razzies for talkback?
"If backed into a corner (or even if she tho't she was) isolated in nearly any diplopolititary endeavors as you suggest - and under threat - Little Satan could easily wipe clean and draw again borders au courant. Arab military power is embarrassing - fully crunk to crack heads and maintain regimes at home - yet plumb pitiful when it comes to fighting real wars."
The IDF is a badly-trained, pathetically-lead bunch of thugs with guns.
Lots and lots of guns, no doubt.
Thuggish in the extreme, no question.
But is it an army able to take on a real opponent?
No, it ceased being that a long, long time ago.
"And, in such an event - it could very well include a much larger AO than Palestine and the Strip. Little Satan may not be too hot to return turf taken fair and square in a real war with a myriad of state and non state actors who cannot even agree to an exchange of ambassadors."
Yawn! Jingoism, splayed on with a trowel.
How predictable.
How terribly boring.
"And like 1948 - the rest of the world may not be hot to see a 'solution' for yet another self imposed Nakbah."
Look, it's obvious where your mistake lies: you think that Israel will always be able to do what it likes, and the rest of the world will simply cringe back into the corner, too horrified to do anything.
You. Are. Wrong.
All the carefully-contrived narratives that Israel has relied upon to convince the rest of the world that it should be allowed to get away with a decades-long brutalization of the neighbourhood are ALL falling away, and without that propaganda cover then Israel simply will not be able to continue with Business As Usual.
You can't see any of this, can you?
You are completely blind to what has been happening in the last few years, aren't you?
Man, the crunch time is going to come as a terrible shock to you......
Oh Johnnyboy! Reliably informed that 'realists' were always rather emo free and calculating.
Yet, you're really quite emotional.
Aren't you?
"...a decades-long brutalization of the neighbourhood."
Oh really? Compared to - oh, say Hama? When the Syrians genocided 30K to40K of their own ppl?
Or maybe when Nasser used blister WMD against Yemenis - xforming them into shrieking living blisters for the remainder of their mercifully short lives?
Or when S'Ddam butchered hundreds of thousands of Shiites, Kurds and Iranians?
Little Satan's neighbourhood is lucky. She could have 'Gone Grozny' on them.
40,000 in Chechnya in the last decade alone - if you dare to zoom out a bit.
Truth is - by any comparative (uh, realist?) standards - Little Satan has been exceptionally humane.
No, the true brutalization of the neighborhood is being done by the overtly robust girthy creepy Body Part Collector General of Hiz'B'Allah or the leadership of HAMAS (all safe as milk in Damascus).
Stashing fighters and weaponry in captive innocent civilian rich turf - then starting terroristical wars of aggression against a democratic member of the UN is far more brutal than any risible faux worries over Little Satan's tarck record
If Little Satan didn't exist - Arab world, in its current fit of denial, would have to invent something like her to explain away pitiful literacy rates, gender apartheid and general time traveling intolerance.
That is not to say there may not be legitimate concerns in the struggle over Palestine, but merely that for millions to fret and fight over such small real estate stems from a deep psychological wound.
It isn't about lebensraum or some actual physical threat. Little Satan is a constant reminder that it is a nation's culture—not its geography or size or magnitude of its oil reserves—that determines its wealth or freedom.
For the Middle East to make peace with Little Satan would be to declare war on itself, to admit that that its own fundamental way of doing business—not Crusader Zionist alliances —that makes Arab League boring, weak and poor in any measure of human endeavor.
Across the havoc of ideological divides, please consider tightening up your argument.
You appear to be mistaking me for someone else
"Oh Johnnyboy! Reliably informed that 'realists' were always rather emo free and calculating."
I am not a great believer of the "realist" school of foreign policy.
Whatever made you think that I was?
I love how you claim that Israel is *marvelous* because, well, because the Syrians do the same thing, or because Nasser also took the Big Stick to the Yemeni's.
It does equate your dinky little state with all the other dinky little states, which does rather undercut the "villa in the jungle" narrative that the Israelis so love to spin.
Israel is what it is i.e. a colonial expansionist power - circa 18th or 19th century - that was forcibly *inserted* into the region. It is, indeed, the colonoscopy of middle eastern states.
That's why it is so extraordinarily aggressive in its outlook and so exceedingly quick to resort to force; it simply knows no other way to behave.
Well, it's worked so far, no question, but what I'll pointing out is that such behaviour eventually does get old, and Israel doesn't seem to be any more aware than you are that this behaviour is very rapidly approaching its use-by date.
Israel has been offered a life-line since 2002, when the Saudi's first put their Saudi Plan on the table. Israel has not only refused to pick it up, it refuses to even acknowledge that it's there.
Israel much prefers to live by the sword, as your attitude makes So Abundantly Clear.
Well, Good For Israel. But I'll point out (yet again) that if it insists on Living By The Sword then its fate is pre-destined.
An End Date on Nation State behaviour? Again, carebeful about wishing for such - it may indeed unleash multi funintended consequences - as certain members of Arab League yet again suffer the '...shame..." of decisive defeats on and off the battlefield.
If Little Satan were truly 'extraordinarily aggressive' - the ME would be a far diff place. Repatriation and reparations to the Palestinian diaspora courtesy of Arab League (who started the entire sorry mess to begin with) along with equal status in any Arab nation state in which they are currently misused as strategic minorities along with a more bigger turf wise Little Satan. She might have even copied Libya or Kuwait - expelling Palestinians en masse from choice real estate. The Strip could have replaced Grozny as the most destroyed city on earth and certain state and nonstate 'leaders' would be either dead, in prison or in exile.
Extraordinarily Restrained is more like it.
Everybody knows Arab League totally blew it at the Annapolis Awakening - teasing hot promises then freaking and bailing on it as the day for actual action versus non profit jawflapping dawned.
Realist or not - certain histrionic terms and commentary shared by you seems to indicate an affliction with Realpolitiks "Every thing is equal" diplopolititary equivalence meme - which is the very def of 'tedious' - instead of the way more better (and accurate) 'Which one of these things is not like the other?"
Maybe for any Arab League militaries - yet for Little Satan?
Get serious. Xforming a cohort of raw conscripts with the highest literacy rate in the entire ME's amazing history into a highly disciplined, exceptionally trained corps d'guerr would prob take 90 days.
Or less.
Here's a little joke whose relevence Courtney won't understand
Q: What's the last thing that goes through a bug's mind when it hits the windscreen?
A: It's arse.
Israel shows no signs of understanding where it is heading, much less what's up ahead.
Which means it won't even have time to think "Whaaaaa?" before it goes [Splatttttttt!!!!!!!]
Spare us. Please.
Certainly not. History has tons of examples of militaries utilizing cadre au courant to 'swell' their ranks - even ten fold. Draft time America or conscript era Great Britain are perfect examples in WWII, Korea and Vietnam respectively.
Unlike Arab League militaries - Little Satan actually trains and exercises her comte d'guerr ensembe periodically.
If IDF were broken as suggested - the world would most likely NOT be enjoying cold peace in the ME
"Believing that if they fail, all their civilians would be killed. Maybe the women would be raped and then killed. Maybe everybody raped and then killed. That sort of belief really focuses the mind."
Too Jewish, for mere goy to take up, you need to read Amnesty International, you need to read about what the Israelis did to Egyptians in the 6 day War when they attacked, unprovoked their Arab neighbors.
But the US won't look the same in 9 months. The GOP austerity budget will drag us into a double dip recession, only we will have cleared all the low hanging fruit, and we will still be facing similar budget deficits. That will mean that in 2 years the next budget will have to gut the military budget. Israel will be all alone, no more financial aid from the US. Israel will likely vanish like Bedouin in the night.
Do You Have A Prediction For Saudi Arabia?
Prof. Walt,
Given your recent epiphany, would you care to make a prediction about events unfolding in Saudi Arabia?
As my favorite Yogi said: "Prediction is very hard. Especially about the future."
Except when it comes to the liberation of Iraq and its consequences, right? I don't remember you exercising much humility about the difficulties inherent in predicting the future there. In fact just the opposite.
Noone expects you to lose sleep over the failure to predict the current revolutions taking place in the Middle East. The future, by its nature, is difficult to predict in most complex situations.
Is Stephen Walt Blind, A Complete Fool, Or A Big Liar? (Peretz)
From The New Republic Online
February 23, 2011
Is Stephen Walt Blind, a Complete Fool, or a Big Liar?
By Martin Peretz
I’ve been trying to add to my knowledge of the Arab countries now in the “massacring-their-people” stage. All of the big powers have both rewarded and connived with Colonel Qaddafi to keep him and his family in power for 42 years. Not, by the way, that he is a king or anything. Moreover, he is not the first of the military colonels in the Arab world to take control of the state and turn it into a “revolutionary socialist” regime, so-called. More formally: the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. It’s been in power since 1969, which makes it the oldest continually ruling one-man regime in the world.
Anyway, in my search for new viewpoints on the Arab world, I came across an article by Stephen Walt, who is the Belfer Professor of International Affairs at Harvard (his chair was donated to the Kennedy School by a good Zionist family; so much for the control bought by Jewish money) and co-author with John Mearsheimer, a professor at the University of Chicago, of The Israel Lobby,in which I play a supporting role. I’ve written about this book on The Spine and so have others in TNR like Jeffrey Goldberg.
Walt’s Libya article was published in Foreign Policy barely a year ago. So it has the reassuring quality of being up-to-date. In the few hours he had in Tripoli, the capital city, he had the opportunity to talk with various high officials and get a real feel for the country. Here’s part of what he had to say on January 18, 2010:
My own view (even before I visited) is that the improvement of U.S.-Libyan relations as one of the few (only?) success stories in recent U.S. Middle East diplomacy. Twenty-five years ago, Libya and the United States were bitter antagonists: U.S. and Libyan warplanes clashed on several occasions in the Gulf of Sidra, and Libyan agents bombed a discotheque in Germany that was frequented by U.S. soldiers. U.S. aircraft attacked Libya more than once, targeting Qaddafion at least one occasion (and killing his adopted daughter Hannah). Libya was also held responsible for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988 (though some recent accounts have questioned its culpability) and it had an active WMD development program and received substantial nuclear weapons technology from the illicit A. Q Khan network.
Yet a fortuitous combination of multilateral sanctions, patient diplomacy, and Libyan re-thinking has produced a noticeable detente in recent years. In a rare display of policy continuity, the Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II administrations managed to simultaneously keep the pressure on and keep the door to reconciliation open. (Great Britain played a key role here too, and the effort may have succeeded precisely because Washington remained in the background). This effort paid off in when Libya agreed to dismantle all of its WMD programs in 2003 and to re-engage with the West. (A key part of that deal, by the way, was George W. Bush’s decision to explicitly renounce the goal of “regime change,” in sharp contrast to his approach to some other countries.)
Libya has also been a valuable ally in the “war on terror” (having had its own problems with Islamic radicals), and Ghaddafi’s son Saif reportedly played a key role in persuading a Libyan-based al Qaeda affiliate to renounce terrorism and to denounce Osama bin Laden last year. Overall, the remarkable improvement in U.S.-Libyan relations reminds us that deep political conflicts can sometimes be resolved without recourse to preventive war or “regime change.” One hopes that the United States and Libya continue to nurture and build a constructive relationship, and that economic and political reform continues there. (I wouldn’t mind seeing more dramatic political reform—of a different sort—here too). The United States could use a few more friends in that part of the world.
What an insightful man Walt is.
But other less pretentiously identified people—not a “professor of international affairs at Harvard”—report other facts out of Libya.
Take, for example, The New York Times dispatch this morning by David M. Kirkpatrick and Mona El-Naggar in which “witnesses” from Tripoli described the capital as a war zone. Or the Reuters report about a “weeping Libyan [who] says 26 die in coastal town attack.” Apparently, airplanes and helicopters were used to spray protestors more or less at random. Estimates of the dead ranged from 500 to 700 half a day ago.
Walt has not been heard from with reference to his year-ago evocation of this wonderful country. He began that article with a citation to Sidney Verba, a much wiser professor of government at Harvard, who had said that one should not write anything about a country one hasn’t flown over. Having spent half a day there, however, Walt was encouraged to judge the country’s politics and its culture without a drop of doubt.
He has written this week again in Foreign Policy not maybe to express second thoughts about the murderous place he praised so fulsomely a year ago. Walt perorates about Israel, on which he’s always been a cheat, and about America and those of its citizens whom he considers disloyal. This time, however, Walt has gone over the top because he, in a cowardly manner, has effectively accused President Obama of caving to the Jewish—oops, no—the Israel lobby. Jewish interests over American interests and the wrong side of history, besides.
Now back to the hundreds of Libyan dead and their murder by the government which Walt thinks so civilized. I have been pilloried for observing that Muslim life is too often cheap to other Muslims. But in the case of Libya’s dictator, this sadly seems to be the case.
Martin Peretz is editor-in-chief emeritus of The New Republic.
http://www.tnr.com/article/world/83998/stephen-walt-libya-qaddafi
Marty Peretz
That column of yours is pretty embarrassing. You honestly believe the article you are pointing at like it was a smoking gun is not outdated by the past two months in the Middle East? Supporting small steps Libya was making in the right direction is a far cry from supporting the horrible actions Qaddafi has taken in desperation now. Your trying to paint the two with the same brush shows you to be greatly disingenuous, (it seems you are hoping for readers who are blind, fools or liars.)
I've gone and read Walt's original piece...
...and I find nothing that supports Peretz's criticism.
Basically, Walt does two things in that article:
1) He gives his impressions of the place based ONLY the brief time he was there. In that portion of the article he doesn't pretend that he has a handle on the INTERNAL problems facing the Libyan regime, merely that while he was there Walt could detect no obvious signs of unrest nor any outward sign of oppression.
2) Walt then goes on to point out something that is indisuptably true: at the time of his visit the relations between the USA and Libya were rapidly improving, and that improvement did not require the use of force or the threat of the use of force by the USA, which Walt (and I) consider to be A Good Thing.
But Marty Peretz's criticisms of those two points is just..... bizarre.
They show a disconnect between what Walt said and what Peretz suggests he meant.
1) Peretz suggests that Walt's observation regarding Libya's international relations (i.e. that Libya and Washington were enjoying warming relations in Jan 2010) can't possibly be correct because Libya is now (i.e. Feb 2011) embroiled in a violent internal upheaval.
Huh? How does your "logic" flow one from the other, Marty?
2) "Now back to the hundreds of Libyan dead and their murder by the government which Walt thinks so civilized".
W.T.F.!?!? At no stage did Walt suggest that he thinks the Libyan regime is "so civilized", merely that in the few hours he spent in Libya he could see no obvious signs of outright oppression, no signs of deep resentment from the popln, and no signs of sullenness nor arrogance from the Libyan authorities with whom he met.
Or, put another way: here are some interesting observation about the regime.
But making some interesting observations about a country does not amount to an analysis of that country's ruling regime, and at no time did Walt pretend that it did.
Only Marty Preretz is pretending that it did. Not Walt. Peretz.
And Peretz does so because, obviously, he is doing what he always does i.e. pile hyperbole atop invective and then smearing it all over with innuendo.
Sort of a zionist version of Glen Beck, only without the Beckster's personal charm....
For a scholar to write about the lack of 'signs of opression' for a regime as opressive as the Gadaffi's is a huge error of judgement. At the very least it demonstrates, literally, a very superficial analytical capability, which compromises any claim to expertise.
He wasn't offering an ANALYSIS on that part of his blog.
"For a scholar to write about the lack of 'signs of opression' for a regime as opressive as the Gadaffi's is a huge error of judgement."
No, all he did was make an observation i.e. IN THE TIME THAT HE WAS THERE he could see no signs of oppression.
I for one have no problems accepting the accuracy of his statement i.e. I have no reason to think that Walt *doesn't* know what oppression looks like, and so if he he didn't see any signs of oppression then I would suggest that's because in the places that he visited those signs were not out on display.
"At the very least it demonstrates, literally, a very superficial analytical capability, which compromises any claim to expertise."
He Did Not Make Any Analytical Claims Regarding Those Observations.
He simply "observed", and then he told us what he "observed".
The analytical part of his article was regarding something completely different i.e. the only thing that he ANALYSED in that article was the warming in relation between Libya and the USA.
Which is something (why do I need to remind you of this?) that is divorced from his "observations on the ground" regarding the absence of any overt display of repression.
You may as well argue that his observations would make a very poor academic paper, or an exceptionally worthless PhD thesis.
Indeed they would, if that is how he tried to present them. But he didn't, and so he can not be criticised on those grounds.
I've been to Bali, and while I was there I saw no signs of Islamic fundamentalism. N.o.n.e.
That does not mean that I am claiming that Islamic fundamentalism is absent from Bali, nor does it mean that I am blind. It simply means that those signs were hidden from my view, and that's why I didn't see them.....
I suspect that to be able to make predictions, an analyst would need to be intensely involved with the people that are defending against change or with the people that stake their lives upon a hope or expectation of change. Those people know the personalities and the ever changing factors that could bring about change. For example, you said that you did not know how well the opposition was organized. It is also very important to understand how they are organized. Especially, what are the human factors?
The people that are defending against change and those that organize for change spend countless hours and often stay up until early morning hours talking about various personalities and what would sway the key and secondary actors to do something. Their lives depend upon their analysis; our do not.
So, the best thing to do is to make good friends with the people that are inside one of many opposition groups or are intimately defending against those groups. Once you know them well, you will discover that that they do not make predictions. They say things like “He is 40% loyal to that guy and 60% likely to cooperate with Mr. X”. We can encourage him by…; or we can find out if we can encourage him by….”
They are experienced and their lives depend upon knowing what may be true today will be different tomorrow.
How many Americans even have an interest in learning a language well enough, let alone learning about the cultural and social nuances well enough to ever make those close friends?
Bob Spencer
I should have mentioned that the Belfer Center and the Carr center for Human Rights has people that know languages and have close friends involved in the action.
Bob spencer
Prof Walt:
I am one of those who have been critical of you of late (I suppose, although I think I've been relatively reasonable in my criticism), assuming you read my comments (especially the condescending, "patronizing" one asking you to perhaps set your sights further afield - and possibly, accusing you of - gasp - being an idealist in realist clothing). And I don't blame you, really, for "getting Egypt wrong."
I would be curious to get your opinion, though, on what this says about political science, comparative politics, and the place of area studies within the two.
Sleep well.
This was kind of half-assed, I have to say. I mean, has this experience made you rethink at all your prescription for us to embrace these murderous regimes?
I'm not asking you to all of a sudden love the Jews, or even walk back your notion that all the problems in the mid-east (and why they hate us) is their fault, but maybe a thought or two to the long-term consequences of embracing despots (and alienating democracies) would be a real opportunity for growth...
Actually, I don't think you necessarily got this wrong, and we throw markers out there to see if they stick. The bolder the better, you know.
I like that you picked up on the identity question I raised, what makes a people consider themselves one. This is vital in picking enemies, battles and policies. We, so many Iraqis have told me, we divided that country according to Sunni, Shia and Kurd. Actually, Kurds are indeed Sunnis, so that is arbitrary. One would have to say Arab/Iraqi Sunni, Kurdish Sunni, Shia. Bush was good to defend Islam, to prevent marginalizing too many.
The first two points are really the same one and frankly the 2nd point only applies to Egypt. I don't think you can attribute Bahrainians with great coordination/organization, Yemen, Libya, Morocco. You underestimate the depth of the hopelessness and the fecklessness of the average citizen there. You never meet those people.
I see the vast divide between the poor masses, some of whom are doing ok, and the "Peuvoir" the connected. It shows itself here, as most who make it here were if not the elite, they were among the better half. But, I know doctors with no practice, a well off family. His brother makes more money spinning records for occasional parties than he with his medical training. He told me, he wanted me to tell you, that he would swim to America. He wanted justice for his defective car, but the courts protect the big foreign firms.
Most of those you speak to from there are typically connected, among the most Western oriented, they have Western Wonderlust. The diplomatic core doesn't elevate the common man. Increasingly I appeal to them that we are more alike that they know. They thought me nuts. I was there Aug. of 08 just before the collapse, they didn't believe me when I told them we were broke.
Anyway, back to the article. You fail to attribute the timing of speculation in these riots. These issues are most acute in the resource poor countries, Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Syria, and Jordan. I suppose it may not apply to Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq though Iran sort of straddles these categories. We saw, for the first time in history gas prices rise in the Fall and Winter months, supplies are ample. In fact, Cushing, OK home of "West Texas Intermediate Crude" was so full that prices there were and are tracking $15-10 over "Brent Light Sweet Crude." Further, our ethanol program has further exacerbated the inflation of food prices. This is directly related to QE2 and the economic straits that Europe and the US find themselves in.
Further, you failed to sufficiently address the collapse of NATO and it's effect on the retreat of the American RAJ. I don't know if you read Eric Margolis, but he is a realist with a bit more information about these doings. No offense, I think you're generally pretty much right on. I think you are earnest and I respect your work. That's why I come here, and to try to get others to see, what should be obvious to many.
"The first two points are really the same one and frankly the 2nd point only applies to Egypt. I don't think you can attribute Bahrainians with great coordination/organization, Yemen, Libya, Morocco."
Walt didn't.
The point he was making was this: in his original article he didn't think that the Tunisian revolt would spread, and part of the reason why he thought that was because he didn't realize how organized the Egyptian opposition was.
It was THAT organization in Egypt that prevented Mubarek from squashing it when it reached Egypt's borders.
You don't need all the OTHER countries to be so organized; you merely need all of those other countries to realize that "Hey, this thing is spreading!" and then they are also off and running.....
Let me put it in a way that an oil man might understand. This went from a "fire" to a "conflagration", and what caused that to happen was that the organized opposition in Egypt prevented that original fire from going out.
But once that "fire" was raised to the level of a "conflagration" then you don't need anyone else to keep stoking it: it feeds itself.
Here is an interesting read for you, SCOTT
http://www.counterpunch.org/mcenteer02232011.html
Solves most of the problems of despots in the middle east, though I have to point out that the "solution" requires the agreement of Texas.
What about it, Scott? Or do Texans suffer from the NIMBY syndrome?
I don't think that if the revolution were to have been replicated only in Egypt that Walt would be offering mea culpas, qualified as they are--and should be, I'm not a harsh critic here. So, for his second point to be substantial, must mean that organization is not a factor, and then he'd owe us a mea culpa for issuing the second point. I haven't read the Counter Punch article, yet, but we have plenty of land with less than 12 inches of rain that could use some development. I live with one North African refugee as it is, so you can't say I'm not doing my part.
I'm sorry, SCOTT, but I don't follow your logic
"So, for his second point to be substantial, must mean that organization is not a factor, and then he'd owe us a mea culpa for issuing the second point. "
You've lost me completely, I have to say.
I read Walt's second point completely differently to you i.e. I read it as meaning that Walt assumed that Egypt would act as a firewall against the spread of the revolt from Tunisia, and that he was taken by surprise when this DIDN'T happen.
That was because he didn't credit the Egyptian opposition being SO organized that Mubarek was unable to squash it.
But once Mubarek failed to squash it then Egypt ceased being a firewall; it turned into a tinderbox, and that allowed this revolt to turn into a region-wide conflagration.
well, I read it as he misunderestimated (puke) the organization of the opposition. But, the organized opposition in Egypt comes out of some history of organization there. But, these organizations, internet powered by Twitter and Facebook (puke again) weren't so well established or organized in the other countries. Walt is "defending" his missing the wave of revolutions. Even as he was making his predictions about Tunisia, Egypt was rioting. So, his explanation has to address the multinational character of these revolutions. He hasn't done that as well as he might.
He's failed to point to truly region wide commonalities; namely,
1. the quiet collapse of NATO
2. the collapse of the US Empire
3. the effects of Western stimulus on commodities prices
These three are inter-related certainly, it all is. The explosion of Egypt and Tunisia doesn't make a wave. This is Walt's third article on the issue. I appreciate that predictions are foolish, but if your metrics point to something, put it out there. I did. I've explained my reasons. I was the first to mention commodities speculation as a cause, the rest of the media is catching on. I'm essentially the only one talking about the collapse of NATO, watch, it will become a story, and we will see the full collapse of the US empire once we come to terms with the Austerity the GOP is pushing, while we continue our military adventurism. I think the battle that crushed NATO is the one they couldn't get to, in Georgia. Putin pants-ed us there, and we couldn't do anything to help Shakashvilli or whatever (aint in my spell check)
"I'm essentially the only one talking about the collapse of NATO, watch, it will become a story,"
One of the things that I found most puzzling regarding the fall of the USSR is why NATO survived it. After all, NATO existed at the counter to the Warswar Pact, and once that broke up, well, as far as I could see there was no further need for a military alliance like NATO.
The only explanation I have read that made any sense was that the Americans wanted it to linger on, and for no other reason than that this was the sole EUROPEAN organization that was controlled by AMERICA.
So its continuation allowed the USA to keep a finger in the pie of European affairs or, if you like, NATO exists *now* merely as a counterweight to the EU, and not as the military arm of the EU.
Of course, if that is true then the "retreat of the American Empire" would, indeed, kill NATO because the USA is the only thing keeping it on life support.
we're keeping NATO on Life Support, then the EU are the organs, and they've been removed and sold off in their respective austerity programs
West TX Light Sweet has been selling at $10-15 less per barrel than Brent.
Beware of social scientiests bearing predictions
"I still think my reasons for being skeptical about the possibility of contagion were cogent, even if my forecast was clearly wrong in this instance."
In other words, it made sense that I was wrong. I wonder if the good Dr. will take that as a reason for a bad essay to get an A in his classes.
Why was his prediction wrong?
Let us take an example from Taleb's "Black Swan." A Turkey can be raised for 1000 days of human intervention, keeping him well fed, watered, provided with breeding partners, and anything else he wants. It would be reasonable for the turkey to assume humans have his best interests at hart. That could very well change on the 1001st day, when he is slaughtered for food. The reasons for the slaughter could be numerous, from a Thanksgiving Meal to a farmer's craving for turkey. Yet the turkey would never and could never know.
Right now the Professor is the turkey (forgive the phrase), because made a reasonable prediction on shaky ground. Pretty much most, if not all predictions and "predictive" models fall into this camp. All the more reason we should not listen to social scientists (and economists for that matter) bearing predictions.
Honestly, why is it such a sin to say "I do not know?" for academics. It might not sound smart, but it is definitely wise at times.
Rather makes for boring reading though, NATET
"Honestly, why is it such a sin to say "I do not know?" for academics. It might not sound smart, but it is definitely wise at times."
How do governments make decisions?
Why SHOULD they make decisions when, clearly, almost all such decision-making is based upon the same shakey foundations that academics like Walt's bases his predictions upon.
But governments - for better or for worse - have to make decisions.
And if that is true (and it is) then why shouldn't academics shout advice to them from the sidelines?
After all, governments can accept that advice, or it reject that advice, but there's f**k all that they can do with "Don't listen to us because we don't know any more than you!"
All that said, I don't think I got everything wrong. As noted above, I emphasized that these sorts of events are inherently unpredictable, and so are their ultimate outcomes. I've also stressed that it will take time before we know how these events will turn out or what the broader implications for the region (and for U.S. interests) will be.
Help us understand, Steve.
You didn't get everything wrong because you noted that it was a difficult prediction to make? Or because we can't see how the future will turn out?
Here's a great idea -- throw an obvious banality or two into every post, that way you can ALWAYS say, "I don't think I got everything wrong". Oh, right, you already thought of that ;o).
I'm glad you enjoyed the discussion...
...but it is not what I was addressing. Steve propping himself up with the "at least I didn't get it all wrong" based on such flimsy excuses really does say quite a bit about the so-called "good professor".
Just like the end of the Cold War...
pretty much no political scientist predicted this one coming either. At the end of the day, the masses milling in the Arab street had a better notion of whether their regime is liable to fall than people with Phds in American campuses.
I have to say al-Jazeera has left for dead the other news networks when it comes to coverage of these events. In contrast the BBC coverage has seemed like inane pap, just video grabs with a "foreign correspondent" (who probably knows as much about Egypt as I do) providing pointless background noise.
If you want to know what is happening in the Arab world, ask an Arab, I guess.
Actually, The Daily Show outshone them all...
They seemed to have a much better handle on what was going on than any of the media that they were lampooning.
All the things that you list as things you got wrong are huge! Those are not 'exceptions', they are the essence of the societies you were writing about. If you were so wrong about such essential aspects of middle east ('Arab identification'!!, 'degree of resentment'!!!) you should really ask yourself what gave you the idea that you were qualified to write about this situation in the first place. Really, say what you want, but you were entirely wrong, you had no idea about the social and political conditions of those countries, and yet you were trying to write as an expert.
I dare say I have a good sense, and I did predict this, go check. Further, I don't see any future for "this" Israel. His views and perspectives were fair. His biggest failure was seeing the extent of the collapse of NATO, he still hasn't admitted this. But, I can understand how someone at Harvard, ensconced in the trappings of American prestige and power. We are broke, blind and alone.
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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