I've been thinking about how the international community should
deal with the Libyan civil war, and like the Obama administration, I'm finding
it hard to come up with a policy that leaves me completely satisfied. I'd like to see Qaddafi's
regime replaced by a government that is less brutal, capricious, and
inefficient, as well as one that would be more responsive to the desires and
welfare of the Libyan people. And
the sooner the better. For this
reason, I support the various measures that have been taken to condemn
Qaddafi's actions and to freeze his assets. We should also be open to providing humanitarian aid (such
as food relief) to rebel-controlled areas, should that become necessary to avoid a large-scale humanitarian disaster.
At the same time, I'm cognizant that it is easier to take on
new military commitments than it is to relinquish them -- even in the best of
circumstances -- and that external intervention in civil conflicts often has
unpredictable and unforeseen consequences. So instead of firm prescriptions, here are a few
observations that have struck me as I've pondered.
For starters, let's acknowledge that the United States has
no vital strategic interests at stake in the outcome of the Libyan
struggle. Libyan oil production (about
1.6 million barrels/day prior to the recent violence) is valuable but not
decisive, and can be made up by increased production in Saudi Arabia. Libya has no WMD (having been
compelled to give up its various WMD programs by a protracted Western-led
sanctions campaign), and it is not a significant military power. Qaddafi has
no links to al Qaeda (in fact, he's been a target of al Qaeda sympathizers in
the past) and few, if any allies in the rest of the world. Libya's population is less than 7
million, and its economy (apart from oil) is unimpressive. Despite Qaddafi's many
unsavory qualities and hostile acts, most U.S. presidents ultimately concluded
that he was not important enough to remove from power, though the Reagan
administration did target his residence in a bombing raid back in the 1980s.
Thus, the U.S. (and international) interest here is humanitarian,
not strategic, which does not by itself mean that we should do nothing. What is going on in Libya does not
constitute genocide -- a deliberate attempt to exterminate a whole category of
people -- but the government's actions are clearly brutal, inhumane, and almost certainly
involve war crimes. It thus falls
squarely under the heading of the "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine (R2P), a new norm
of humanitarian intervention promulgated with some fanfare a few years
ago. R2P says "where a population
is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression
or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or
avert it, the principle of
non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect" (my
emphasis).
The 2005 United Nations World Summit adopted a modified
version of R2P, with the participants committing themselves to "take collective
action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and
in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity." So
if you take such pledges seriously, you might think that the international
community would be strongly united in favor of decisive action in this case.
But here's where it gets messy (as usual). Russia opposes outside military intervention in Libya, which
means that the Security Council is unable to authorize intervention along the
lines suggested by R2P. (This is one reason why some of us were skeptical about the whole R2P
initiative from the get-go). An
alternative approach would have NATO or the EU or some coalition of
regional organizations authorize outside action, but as numerous observers have
already noted, this approach generates echoes of past colonial
interference and could lend a certain (false) credence to Qaddafi's propaganda,
which has sought to portray the rebels as some sort of foreign plot. Then remember that U.S. military forces are badly overstretched (which is why Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has been pouring cold water on the idea of a no-fly zone), and we've spent the
past decade fighting wars in several other Muslim countries. Add all this up, and Obama's reluctance
to send the Marines or impose a "no-fly zone" is understandable. It is not entirely clear that such a
zone would make that much difference.
What this dilemma also highlights is the
price the United States and its allies pay for the gross imbalance
between U.S. military capabilities and those of its NATO partners. In practical terms, any strategically
meaningful military intervention in Libya would depend almost entirely on U.S.
forces and logistics. We might get
some symbolic help from our NATO allies, but as in the Balkan wars, Iraq, and
Afghanistan, the bulk of the heavy lifting would be borne by Uncle
Sam. And that means that the United States
will incur most if not all of the reputational costs for once again interfering
in the Middle East, especially if the decision went awry in any way.
Back in the 1990s, Europeans (and Europhiles) spoke glowingly about
the rise of Europe's "civilian power," which was seen as an alternative to
America's old-fashioned preoccupation with military force and as a more useful
tool in the postmodern 21st century. The Libyan crisis reminds us that this sort of civilian
power is of little use against well-armed opponents who are willing to use
force and that "hard power" of the sort that only the United States now possesses
is indispensable. (The fact that
Washington sometimes uses its capabilities unwisely is a separate issue). The problem is that the United States
has good reasons to refrain from using its hard power in this case, yet our
longtime strategic partners are incapable of action on their own. The irony is that Europe's strategic
interests are more fully engaged by events in Libya (if only because of the fear of
large refugee flows), yet Europe lacks the capacity to do much in response.
If it were up to me, therefore, I'd use all nonmilitary means at my
disposal to undermine Qaddafi's hold on power, and I'd stand ready to help
Libya reform and rebuild in the event that his government finally falls. If other states want to funnel military
aid to the rebel forces, I wouldn't object. If, as some sources suggest, Qaddafi himself might eventually
be willing to leave power in exchange for a guarantee against prosecution, I
might reluctantly take that deal for the sake of the greater good, however unjust it might
be. But based on what has occurred
thus far, I wouldn't be trying to organize a U.S.-led military intervention.
UPDATE: For contrasting views on the question of a "no-fly zone," see FP's Marc Lynch (sounding a cautionary note) here. For a vigorously argued case in favor, check out Christopher Dickey here.
Read More
(24)
HIDE COMMENTS LOGIN OR REGISTER REPORT ABUSE