Thursday, March 24, 2011 - 12:05 PM

Before France, Britain, and the United States stumbled into its current attempt to dislodge Muammar al-Qaddafi from power in Libya -- and let's not kid ourselves, that's what they are trying to do -- did anyone bother to ask what recent social science tells us about the likely results of our intervention?
I doubt it, because recent research suggests that we are likely to be disappointed by the outcome. A 2006 study by Jeffrey Pickering and Mark Peceny found that military intervention by liberal states (i.e., states like Britain, France and the United States) "has only very rarely played a role in democratization since 1945." Similarly, George Downs, and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita of New York University found that U.S. interventions since World War II led to stable democracies within ten years less than 3 percent of the time, and a separate study by their NYU colleague William Easterly and several associates found that both U.S and Soviet interventions during the Cold War generally led to "significant declines in democracy." Finally, a 2010 article by Goran Piec and Daniel Reiter examines forty-two "foreign imposed regime changes" since 1920 and finds that when interventions "damage state infrastructural power" they also increase the risk of subsequent civil war.
The best and most relevant study I have yet read on this question is an as-yet unpublished working paper by Alexander Downes of Duke University, which you can find on his website here. Using a more sophisticated research design, Downes examined 100 cases of "foreign imposed regime change" going all the way back to 1816. In particular, his analysis takes into account "selection effects" (i.e., the fact that foreign powers are more likely to intervene in states that already have lots of problems, so you would expect these states to have more problems afterwards too). He finds that foreign intervention tends to promote stability when the intervening powers are seeking to restore a previously deposed ruler. But when foreign interveners oust an existing ruler and impose a wholly new government (which is what we are trying to do in Libya), the likelihood of civil war more than triples.
Why? According to Downes, because deposing an existing regime and bringing new leaders to power "disrupts state power and foments grievances and resentments." To make matter worse, the probability of civil war in the aftermath of foreign imposed regime change increases even more when it is accompanied by defeat in inter-state war, and when it occurs in poor and ethnically heterogeneous countries." This isn't reassuring either, given that Libya's is still a poor society (because the Qaddafi family monopolizes the oil revenues) and it remains divided into potentially fractious tribes.
Here's the bottom line (my emphasis):
[Foreign imposed regime change] is likely to spur resistance and civil war in those countries where the United States and other advanced democracies are most likely to undertake such intervention [i.e., poor, weak states]; the situation is made even bleaker if war is needed to overthrow the existing regime. . . [O]verthrowing other governments (and bringing new leaders to power rather than restoring previous rulers) is a policy instrument with limited utility because of its potential to ignite civil wars. These conflicts may in turn result in the imposed regime's ouster or draw interveners into costly occupations."
By the way, Downes also has another paper (co-authored with Jonathan Monten of the LSE) which finds that "states that have their governments removed by a democracy gain no significant democratic benefit compared to similar states that do not experience intervention." Democratic intervention does have positive effects (on average) in relatively wealthy and homogeneous societies, but "evidence from past experience suggests that imposed regime change by democratic states is unlikely to be an effective means of spreading democracy," especially when one factors in the costs.
We should all hope that Libya proves to be an exception to this tendency, but these various scholarly studies suggest that the probability that our intervention will yield a stable democracy is low, and that our decision to intervene has increased the likelihood of civil war. Heading off that possibility is likely to require a costly and extended international commitment, which is precisely what the people who launched this operation promised they would not do. We'll see.
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EXPLORE:ACADEMIA, AREA STUDIES, ARAB WORLD, MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT, DIPLOMACY, DISASTERS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, LIBYA, MILITARY, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, WINNERS & LOSERS
There are several problems with trying to generalize from the historical record to Libya today, though. First, we can generally ignore the Cold War interventions because they were not normally attempts at establishing a democracy. If the goal is not democracy, then it is unlikely to result in one. Second, we can generally ignore pre-WW II interventions for the same reason - they weren't attempts at pro-democratic regime change. Third, in some more recent cases (Iraq and Afghanistan, for example) they weren't interventions in support of a domestic rebellion so you would expect to see a different process there than in Libya. In sum, there is very little the historical record can tell us about Libya, because its particular characteristics and external circumstances suggest it may be sui generis.
Now, that said, I don't disagree with the basic premise of Walt's post, which is that we can't reasonably expect to get a stable democracy out of this. On the other hand, I doubt most of us expect such an outcome so that really isn't a problem for us.
Its encouraging to read commentary on the Libyan operation that is grounded in social science and as such refrains from parroting the litany of vague platitudes we've come to hear from the political and media elites about the president's need to assert "American leadership," American exceptionalism," and the world community's "responsibility to protect" (R2P). So I thank Dr. Walt for that. But I take three issues with the studies you've cited (and I haven't read them, so I can only assume that some of these points are most likely already addressed by them).
The first is, for me at least, the most obvious. How many poor, heterogeneous societies can legitimately claim to call their state structure a stable, functioning democracy. Latin America and India come to mind, but none of these states is in the MENA region. Furthermore, the only true MENA democracies out there are Israel (I know the prof. and others might take issue with this assertion) and Turkey; and neither of which fit the poor/heterogeneous precondition. So my point is, these theories aren't really falsifiable and thus not compelling social science. How can we blame the intervening country if the absence of intervention was just as likely to lead to the same political result in the host country, which was a poor, fragmented autocracy?
Second, as stated above, the articles Dr. Walt cites claim that after examining over a hundred years of history that foreign interventions have not led to democracy. However, democracy promotion was hardly the policy rationale of these intervening countries in the first place. Instead they sought stability, influence, and other "realist goals" at the expense of democracy. So again, how can we fault the intervening countries for failing to bring about democracy when that wasn't their reason for intervening in the first place? I would instead argue that the US is still in the business of promoting globalizing monarchies or autocracies in lieu of democracy in the MENA. Obama would settle with any kind of leadership change in Libya, just as he has done in Egypt; he's not staying awake at night pressing for democracy in the MENA. The US is no longer willing to bear that costs.
And finally, you can't argue that it hasn't already been a relatively successful humanitarian intervention. We stopped Gadafy from entering Benghazi and exterminating the rebels. So at least that's a win for the president. But I'd also argue that the threat of humanitarian crisis isn't over and its difficult to claim that it goes away altogether in the absence of a significant Libyan leadership change or permanent intervention. Humanitarian interventions require long-term commitments, and I know Obama advisor Samantha Power knows this; she wrote the book after all. So the question is can she and others convince the president to stay indefinitely. I think, however, that this potentiality is extremely unlikely.
Look, truth of the matter is folks, if we wish to live our comfortable lives, with all the mod cons, luxuries, bloated stomachs, damaged livers, smoke filled lungs, giant TV's to watch X factor and footie on, fly to Spain for 99p, fill the kids rooms full of gadgets, etc... it's no good donning the Jesus boots and pretending to be a right on funky person who believes in rights and equalities for all, without accepting your condition is enabled by your, YES YOUR, successive governments and leaders exporting death and destruction round the world.
They will weal and deal in the most underhand, hypocritical, holier than thou ways, in order to give you want you want, whilst maintaining the power structure.
Put up or shut up !
Let those who know better get on with it.
It's the way of the world.
Or what then ?
Style of thing
Algeria and Lebanon can also claim to be democracies. Lebanon certainly is the Most democratic country in MENA. You could also list Iran, which like Turkey, isn't part of MENA.
I don't argue with your second point, but you should have acknowledged that democracy promotion was always used to explain our intervention. I agree that wasn't our real goal, nor justification, but the PR spin used to convince the public.
Except for one thing: this is not for our benefit. We little people have no saying or bearing on that except, of course, to volunteer as mercenaries to carry on the conquests and to involuntarily donate our tax dollars to do it with. Make no mistake, this is not done for the benefit of the people. This is done for the benefit of the corporations and the ruling class. We the people don't matter. We don't count. We're disposable.
Professor Walt:
Why the emphasis on quantitative studies to lend the imprimatur of social science? Are there absolutely no works that examine the topic as well employing (a) more qualitative approach(es)?
domestic upheavel vs. foreign response
I am still attached to the idea that states treat with other states based on their foreign policy rather than domestic ideologies but I believe that it is also important to determine the legitimate representative of a state in international affairs. It is unwise to engage with rulers who are not reliable but easy to deal with. Domestic politics don't matter in international affairs only in democracies. In Libyan case, I hope the entire process of military intervention is not a bungle because coalition forces have still not figured out which institution will command the military campaign despite days of military offensive.
But it is imperative on behalf of the international community to change Libyan leader because he is not a reliable ally and the state he represents is not a true unit of international relations. Dealing with Gaddafi is not a realpolitik, it is a communication between a government and a minority group in the Arab country.
The Making of a Client Regime in Libya
Mr. Walt,
Why do you believe that the West wants a democracy in Libya? Don't we just want a client regime--format whatever? Have we ever been picky before?
And aren't we sill working out of the same playbook? What is the basis for believing anything has changed?
The New York Times reports today that the UK has promised $1.1 Billion of Libyan funds (which the UK does not have any apparent legal authority to be dispensing) to a new "shadow government" whose relationship to the "previously announced national council" is "not clear".
What do you think?
As long as the new Libyan Kleptocrats agree to buy billions in weapons systems from the American Merchants of Death, shovel contracts to BP, and give Israel a pass to do beat-downs on the Palestinians, everything will be A-OK.
P.S. About the New York Times. Interesting how they've somehow missed Obama violating the War Powers Act by attacking Libya without Congressional authorization. Better to furrow their brows portentously and ruminate about the French...
The new Libyacrats (as if any serious thinking person seriously thinks Libyans would trade one autocrazy for another) will most likely continue to ensure Great Britain gets the oil and France or Commonwealth gets the weaponry contracts.
And like the rest of Arab League - any new Libyan regime will most likely not be too concerned with what all befalls rowdy, rocket rich rejectionists who rec'v more foreign aid per capita than the rest of the world combined.
France's oil company Total has a substantial stake in Libya currently. Ghaddaffy hinted at nationalizing his oil resources, and that can't be tolerated. This is truly a French and British led operation. France was the first to bomb. No article on Libya should omit the resources and contracts BP and Total have in Libya and their intimate relationship with their nation's gov'ts.
This is a relatively meaningless debate since it does not start with any clear definition of what is meant by ‘democracy’. A search for common elements in those nations we broadly accept as democracies would seem to yield little more than periodic ballots of varying integrity. The truth is that there must ever be a system of rulers and ruled and within it there will inevitably be a range between despotic rulers imposing upon people and a will on the part of people to effect their interests for themselves. The former invariably leads to oppression and the latter to chaos: the healthiest situations only arise when societies fluctuate across the middle ground and this demands struggle, conflict and sacrifice. If this fluctuation is impeded, for instance by external interference, the break when it comes will be proportionately more extreme. There is a danger in being too effete when observing such struggles from the outside because although they may be rowdy, even bloody, they are also healthy, and outside interference only serves to fragment what is otherwise a process of synthesis. I would suggest that protecting protestors is no different from protecting despots and cannot be justified by being shrouded in institutionalised humanitarianism. If citizens of one nation feel the urge to join a struggle in another, fair enough but they should do it each on his own account, as many did with great courage during the Spanish Civil War.
A new and unique observation in the Foreign Policy article. First reported, I believe by Niccolò Machiavelli in Discourses on Livy , 1520 +/-
It would help no end if our leaders had a true liberal education.
[3/25/11 11:29:23 AM] gfozzard:
Professorship of Aryan science
This time our infamous Harvard based re-discoverer of the Jewish Lobby (after the author of Protocols of the Elders of Zion) is promoting another garbage theory. In fact, the very first comment by Dr. Lake 777 pointed to the basic flaws in Walt and Downes mental equilibristics. A couple of other commenters just finished Walt off (even when they "agreed" that US should not be involved). Downes, to his credit, has not published yet his stream of thought. Perhaps he was not sure of his value of method. And he was right. No surprise, Walt has no such problems.
The real problem for us is not whether US should be involved in Libya or not. The problem is for how long we will tolerate offensive and inherently racist junk science sold to the public. There is startling difference between so called "social science" and normal science in their respective limits of the tolerance to the garbage emanating from the distinguished professors. We all remember two major cases of junk science in physics and biology: cold fusion and faked stem cell cloning. The perpetrators received death sentence immediately after people uncovered the fraud. It was death sentence for them as scientists (the Korean guy even got prison term).
But in "social science" there is still no punishment for the anti-scientific fraudulent garbage. This must change. Universities cannot do this on their own - they are too arrogant. The American citizenry that supply money for their so-called research should help them come to their senses. Or else.
The Libyan case and perhaps all of the recent middle east upheavels are dealing with the same core issues issues that do mimick or follow past military intervention blunders. The fact is that these conflicts arise from the people social revolution within the country they did not start as a bloodbath like Somalia. ALthough one could argue our failure in Somalia in the 1990's the context was far from LIbya's. I do not expect what happened in Somalia to repeat itself simply because we an allied effort and we are not going in primarily on our own. This is a Nato effort and as of yesterday March 24, 2011 NAato actually took over operations in Libya. AS is developing already this is not at all like past situatioins military intervention could very well prevail we will have to see. It all comes down to Qaddifi's determination and the will of his foreign rebel mercenaries the NATO military superioiry will rid the country of the oppressive ruler it is not like every other intervention.
The realist case for Libyan intervention
Let's not pick our poppies before they fall.
There are real benefits to the limited intervention we've seen so far, though they are cold-blooded enough to be unspeakable in the context of a news conference or sound-bite.
Right now, particularly, ongoing civil war in Libya is better than ongoing massacres. This partly because of the immediate humanitarian concern, but more importantly because neither Egypt nor Tunisia need compound political crisis with refugee crisis. In short, slow bleed is better than hemhorrage, or to put it another way, there's much to be said for the very limited goal of letting women and children escape from Benghazi.
No question, a similar intervention in the Balkans was only a qualified success. Still the firewall did hold: both against NATO mission-creep and against conflict spreading into Macedonia (and Greece/Turkey -- not, historically, the best of cooperants in the face of humanitarian crisis). Conversely, failures and bumbling in Rwanda cascaded into ongoing war in Central Africa.
Alex Downes is a great scholar asking good questions, but I'm not sure they're pertinent to the current intervention in Libya.. this particularly because we're not necessarily talking about regime change.... yet.
So far, we have a limited war for limited goals in Libya. Unquestionably, the idealists will argue that this war can only be justified by greater goals. And of equal concern, it seems quite likely that Quaddafi will do everything he can to deserve regime change.
It's going to be hard enough to prevent mission creep as it is... Perhaps it would be best if 'public realists' focused on building the firewall, rather than staring at the fire.
Yes, yes, yes, a thousand times yes...somebody in power needs to start reading this....
Not consulting recent social research about the likely results of our intervention must be tantamount to failing to consult the Delphi Oracle : How else would we know the obvious, that military intervention whether to achieve regime change and/or to infuse democracy yields mostly disappointing results?
I find this citing among the recent studies humorous: "a separate study by their NYU colleague William Easterly and several associates found that both U.S and Soviet interventions during the Cold War generally led to "significant declines in democracy."
Both U.S. and Soviet interventions led to significant declines in democracy??? I thought it had been a known fact that Soviet interventions always pursued dictatorship of the proletarians (by way of leadership from the Communist Party) and now we learn from this study that actually they led to significant decline in democracy. Someone, please, point this out to the administration.
And the Downes unpublished study : "He finds that foreign intervention tends to promote stability when the intervening powers are seeking to restore a previously deposed ruler..." Well, lets hurry and wait until Qaddafi is deposed, indeed, by the Lybian revolution, and restore him to power after that to promote stability. If that's all it takes...perfect for the Downes study.
In the meantime why not give the administration a chance to do what they claim to be humanitarian assistance, and let the Lybians worry about their democracy and stability. They must earn both and they seem to be willing.
But don't quote me, Verbatim, that this will be the outcome. We've been lied to before.
"[Foreign imposed regime change] is likely to spur resistance and civil war in those countries where the United States and other advanced democracies are most likely to undertake such intervention [i.e., poor, weak states]; the situation is made even bleaker if war is needed to overthrow the existing regime. . ."
I'm sorry but this chain of events & logic seems to be almost exactly reversed in the Libya case. There already was a civil war, the West intervened after the civil war started, and regime change has yet to happen (but in all likelihood will happen eventually).
Does this argument, and the data, support the conclusion that Western invervention in a pre-existing civil war... leads to more civil war? I'd rather see the data for those instances, and what conclusions they lead to, than ones akin to Panama, Iraq, etc... Afghanistan is the closest case raised.
Thats all I have to say. After 3 years of rhetoric and 400,000 deaths, the U.S. finally did something and saved a couple hundred thousand lives in the process. I'd personally prefer not to have my country stand by as the rebels slowly get crushed (and very likely a mass killing will ensure afterwards).
Intervention by any other name
"A 2006 study by Jeffrey Pickering and Mark Peceny found that military intervention by liberal states (i.e., states like Britain, France and the United States) "has only very rarely played a role in democratization since 1945.""
Sure, and the reason why is because neither of these colonialist powers seeks democracy. In fact, they will gladly thwart a real democracy in order to institute a dictatorship that is friendly to their interests. Interests as defined herein shall be complete control over said nation's resources. There are plenty of examples of that, one of the most poignant being Haiti. In fact, democracy is their worst enemy. In a true democracy, they wouldn't be able to control regimes and pillage countries the way they do when the instituted dictator is in their back pocket. Therefore, I have to object to the basis of this ground being on the false premise that the colonialist powers seek or play a role in democracy.
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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