Europe has been "eroding", that is to say been in relative decline, since the First World War. It is only natural given the truly excessive importance of Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. This decline has been partly, but only partly, alleviated by European integration, but it's difficult to speak of any particularly harsh decline given how impotent the continent was during the Cold War, stripped of its colonial empires and trapped between the two superpowers...

Over the past 20 years, Europeans East and West have been freed from the Cold War. So their armies were now available to run around the Balkans and the Middle East, second in number only to those of the U.S. However this military side is secondary to the power of commerce and integration.

The Europeans have become the single largest trading bloc in the world, with common negotiations with third parties, and a common external tariff. Europe is the single most important trading partner for most countries in the former Soviet Union, the Middle East and Africa. Their currency is worth almost 40% more than the dollar. Their general fiscal outlook is, in fact, significantly better than both the United States (on average half of its deficit) and Japan (much less total debt).

Numerous other countries wish to join including all the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Turkey and even Russia has expressed interest in a common EU-Russia economic space. The EU, I think it is fair to say, has been a genuinely transformational entity in terms of the democratization of the former Soviet Empire.

Of course, Europe faces demographic stagnation and relative decline typical of developed countries which will be partly alleviated by new waves of enlargement.

I think the trouble isn't that European power is eroding or non-existent but rather that European leaders don't want to use this power but prefer being America's lackeys. If Europeans were, for example, implementing sanctions against Israel for its colonization of the West Bank instead of deferring to U.S. policy, Tel Aviv might have a stronger incentive to revise its policies. If European leaders had followed their people in opposing the Iraq War - instead of Britain, Italy, Spain and Poland collaborating in that aggression - Bush might have thought twice and Europeans would not be tainted with that disaster. As it stands, most EU leaders are infected a reflexively positive attitude towards US policy, mostly out of sycophancy - they wish to steal a little American glory - rather than any conviction as to the wisdom of said policy.

This seems a fair example of what happens when you get a professor from a famed university addressing a pack of Public Servants Who (grotesquely) Must Not Be Named -- or described -- in a handsome and comfortable airconditioned room somewhere within the contiguous 48. Pastry and coffee on the side. It's somewhat airy. The unnamable public servants is a remarkable 21st century touch. Mr Walt has a secret he can't tell. Or maybe he could, and he just doesn't want to, on Wizard of Oz lines.

Europeans have been aware for about 90 years now of how deeply they paid for World War I, mainly in the loss of the flower of their best-educated male youth; and they got a second lesson about it 21 years later at the start of World War II. Europeans also were aware by the last third of the 19th century of the enormous new power residing in the United States, developed so as to bring about the death of about 650,000 Americans in a civil war. World's mightiest military at the end of that war.

One unstated reason for any decline in America's share of the world economy has been the increasing corporate concentration on short-term profit.

I believe it was ITT that by the late 1960s was firing divisional leaders whose branch of the corporation was not making a larger profit every single quarter. Turns out that when you hold that stick over divisional executives, they become much less interested in the longterm future of their corporation, or the nation. If, for example, an executive establishes that he can have sneakers made more cheaply in Asia than in Illinois, what reason to look into whether there's some way to make them profitably and less expensively in the US?

With such decisions have come enormous amounts of technology transfer: foreign nations, usually Asian, have been taught by Americans how to beat America and what America does well, and they are eager and capable students. And, often, rascals. Large parts of the Chinese business environment seem snake pits; and many American enablers seem to have operated in an environment fairly described as shareholders = rapists, with the US economy, jobholders and technical leadership the rapees.

Such matters cascade. Japan learned how to make excellent radio and TV receivers cheaper than America's, and more than a decade ago, some leading Japanese manufacturers of these goods found they couldn't afford to make them in Japan any more.

Mr Walt does not seem to have addressed such issues as why the hell the US spends a fortune every single day to maintain amazing military establishments in in Germany and Korea in a time of serious national financial difficulty. The establishment in Germany in particular seems the governmental equivalent of the solid gold bathtaps claimed to have been installed in some private homes of corporate chiefs who have achieved fabulous personal wealth by throwing swathes of the national skillset into the economic wood chipper.

What America will be 25 years from now, presumably the interest of that unnamed government body that hired Mr Walt to enthrall it, cannot be known in detail. It seems certain, however, that by then, America will have the world's third-largest economy. Virtually all Chinese children in the PRC are taught English to help with the change in the pecking order; in some African states, all public school instruction, starting from age five or six, is given in English; the kids go home and speak another language to their families and neighbors. How many American schools not set up for immigrant Chinese populations, teach Chinese today? How many will have compulsory putonghua 30 years from now?
__________

In case you're wondering, putonghua is the Chinese name for what we rather patronizingly name Mandarin. Worth learning. The first syllable sounds like, well, poo. The last, as wah.

Were one not familiar with Dr Walt’s broad world view and unshakable intellectual integrity, one might imagine him becoming more American by the blog.

Europe, whatever that may be, covers an area of many resourceful peoples, Scandinavian, Celtic, German, Mediterranean and North African, not to mention centuries of immigrant additions. The area enjoys many rich languages and a variety of cultural and philosophical roots unmatched elsewhere on earth. Its peoples have never had problems trading and have had no external enemies since the 17th century. Efforts to force this mix into the glass slipper of US geopolitical ambitions and suborn it to Wall Street’s self destructive financial purposes have done a lot of damage but the people are awakening and it is far from too late. It is not the life and vitality of the peoples from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean that is passed, but rather US hegemonic ambitions have outstripped themselves and, like the Black Death in the 14th century, are now dying away, leaving, it is true, much destruction and economic pain but nothing a couple of generations cannot repair. I am sure everyone wishes the US well with its new Asian partners, while thanking Heaven they are all over there.

One point that is overstated.

Walt says: "The central goal of US grand strategy is to maintain hegemony in the Western hemisphere and to prevent other great powers from achieving hegemony in their regions."

That may be a central goal but US hegemony over the Western hemisphere is slipping in major ways. We simply do not have as much influence in South America as we once had. There is no way that the US would have tolerated the Chavaz government in Venezuela before 2000. Our commitments to war in the ME made it impossible to impose our will on that nation. Since then governments throughout the continent have set out on independent courses. In 2001 Argentina defaulted on its debt and ignored the IMF. Again something they could not have done in an earlier time. Brazil is emerging as a major world power and is developing is own foreign policies. Remember what happened to the Goulart government in 1965 when he tried to lead an independent Brazil.

Both China and Japan have growing economic ties with that region -- South American nations feel comfortable with these Asian powers because of their tradition of non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign nations. Good old fashioned Yankee imperialism has seen its best days.

Many of the European weaknesses that Walt highlights - an aging and/or declining population, less regional unity that may meet the eye - also apply to what he terms the "G10" of Asia. Every major Asian nation, except India, has demographics nearly as bad, if not worse than most of their European counterparts. And despite increased trade between Asian states, the region as a whole is actually less interdependent than Europe was on the eve of World War I. Geopolitical issues like territorial disputes in the South China Sea, or the obvious geopolitical rivalry between China and Vietnam, are much more potent threats to global prosperity and peace going forward than the possible dissolution of the Eurozone (which, in truth, would probably be a huge boost to many of Europe's non Franco-German economies who currently just recycle Germany's surpluses at the expense of their own domestic employment).

The common assumption that the 21st century is an "Asian century" does not really come to terms with this host of issues, or with the fact that all of East Asia - even China - is among the most urbanized and industrialized regions in the world. Accordingly, its future growth is more dependent on subtle, long-term changes like decreased savings and higher consumption, rather than easier strategies like infrastructure development.

Toivos - I do not think the US has ever had "hegemony" over South America. I do not blame it, since South America is not of much strategic importance. The only potential power is perennial nation of the future, Brazil. Venezula, while hostile, is geopolitically impotent. US attempts at further economic integration, such as the pending free-trade agreement with Columbia, are wastes of time, and many of the resources that South America provides, such as oil, are mainly of interest to nations which are not well-endowed with natural resources, such as Japan and China. If the US is "losing" in South America, well, I'm not sure that "winning" is much better.

Kunino - I find your post incoherent. Who is to say that, by comparison, Chinese terms for foreign phenomena are not also "patronizing"? When you or Walt try to project far into the future - to 2050, or even just 25 years from now - you simply assume that current conditions will not change in any way. This is absurd. For example, for the US to be the 3rd largest economy by only 2036, it would require: 1) China to grow at over 10% for at least 15 more years, when its growth is already steadily declining and likely to be halved (or more) in the next five years alone; 2) India to grow at an unprecedented pace for every single year for the next 25 years; 3) Neither nation to experience a major geopolitical shock. Such blind extrapolation is no more than wishful thinking.

Can change all those projections in a heart beat.

Don't give up on the EU yet, there are still powerful countries made up within it, namely Britain and Germany who have a lot to offer. Admittedly there are weaker countries within it that need to go in my view such as Ireland, Greece and Portugal. The problem is if one country is failing the more powerful countries are obliged to muck in and clear up after them, once the EU changes how it works then it will once again be a strong force. seo in kent

A couple of critical factors were missing in Walt's analysis. In his 5 headwinds, one he failed to note was beyond nationalism, regionalism. This will have equivocal effects, strengthening EU bonds and eroding nationalistic ones. The regions are able to appeal to EU notions like a kid playing two parents off each other.

Another is an external threat he missed. Russia/Energy. Russia is still the principle supplier of Natural Gas. You really never mentioned this. Russia is still vast, with ample natural resources. Algeria and Libya also have natural resources that are vital to Europe, and I expect them to lay low and allow Russia to play hardball. This is a mantle the Russians are happy to take up, and it strengthens them.

The gas prices spiked in 08 and 09 in Europe, and this could be your "external enemy." Otherwise, a good article, and thought provoking. That said, it isn't anything I didn't argue here, more vociferously than you did. Finally, Turkey stands as an interesting force.

Turkey and RTErdogon has consolidated its hold over the military. Could we see an 18th century redux where the Arabs again control the Med? It may sound silly, but Turkey has the largest army in Southern or Western Europe. They are wisely parlaying their continent bridging position for greater wealth and power. Likewise, Algeria has little debt, a growing military force and an unprovocative stance. These two countries have longstanding ties, which could be joined by a re-nascent Libya and Egypt.

I don't think the Turkish/Magrebi connection will try to challenge Europe, but we've already seen that they are unwilling to sit in the corner and be quiet. This leads to the most significant effect of the decline of the EU, relative to American policy. Without Europe, I'm not sure we are able to function in these countries. Our only tool is threat of force, and we're so overextended that will become increasing untenable. The world is round, as such the "polarity" is a wholly arbitrary concept. I don't know if America will realize this, or fall victim to it. Europeans seem to be figuring it out.

IF the US wasn't stumbling from one international debacle to the next that it can't afford and desperately needs an ally that it coerce into participating.........................Europe's only concern should be Europe, something which the EU fails brilliantly at grasping, the US also needs to focus it's attention on it's internal problems or else the World's only superpower won't be a super power for many more years.

I don't disagree with this analysis, but it's basically the same points that have been written by many many others about Europe for the past decade, so it's kind of amazing that a professor from Harvard gets paid for this.

Quote: " ...Today, European integration is threatened by 1) the lack of an external enemy, which removes a major incentive for deep cooperation, 2) the unwieldy nature of EU decision-making, where 27 countries of very different sizes and wealth have to try to reach agreement by consensus, 3) the misguided decision to create a common currency, but without creating the political and economic institutions needed to support it, and 4) nationalism, which remains a powerful force throughout Europe and has been gathering steam in recent years. ..."

It reminds me The Rzecz Pospolita of 1500s-1600s - 1. External enemies aplenty, but not united and always fighting each other (Ottomans, Russians, The Sacred Roman Empire, the Swedes...). 2. the unwieldy nature of RP decision-making: Elected Kings (mostly bought by Jewish money - best known example - Stefan Bathory), Liberum Veto (consensus rule). 3. common currency belonged to Jewish businesses with Magnates and Szlachta acting as warriors, and ethnic minorities as slave labor - Ukrainians, Belarusians, Lithuanians, Russians, Tatars... 4. Minority nationalism.....

Yes, and the RP was eventually swallowed by her powerful neighbors - Prussia, Russia, Austria. The only real beneficiaries were jewish merchant, traders, and money-people since they got more areas to cover with their activities - new horizons to explore, so to say.

Today's piece starts with the usual, and always unnecessary boast that "I gave a talk in Washington the other day about the future of the EU and transatlantic relations more generally, and I thought FP readers might be interested in what I had to say. Here's a short summary of what I said.

"I began with the rather obvious point that" -- and at this point, the Foreign Policy article starts. Does FP pay by the word and is this just money-grubbing? Why does the perfesser need to tell us so often that he matters and people pay him money to talk to them?

One point within this article: Mr Walt refers to the United States' remaining "committed to Europe". Not exactly what happened. The US invested parts of Europe militarily with the idea that it would be better to fight the USSR in western Europe than in Cleveland. Nothing from the vast hoard of formerly most secret Soviet documents suggests that the USSR ever had concrete plans to sweep through western Europe. Recent analogy: losing thousands of US military in Baghdad to defend the US from non-existent al-Qaeda acting in concert with Saddam Hussein. That also was a campaign to protect Cleveland.

The Europeans have noticed that the USSR evaporated and the resultant nations are too busy doing other things to offer military threats to western Europe. Under these circumstances, lonesome mooning about for NATO in a former state seems a particularly empty way to consider Europe's conduct in the 21st century.

Missing from this article about redefinition of military relations between the United States and European nations in NATO is any suggestion that the US should bring back a single soldier or a single tank at any future time -- why? -- and that the United State probably can't afford -- right now -- its elaborate military investment in Europe, and will be able to afford less and less of it at any time in the near future.

A more sensible talk might have been focussed in American capabilities in that region, rather than speculations about Europe.

My esteemed colleague Stephen Walt has consigned the European Union to the trash heap of history and asserted that the US should no longer take it seriously. Europe is in decline; NATO is in decline. The United States should focus on Asia or go it alone.

As a proponent of the Balance of Power—where he has made fundamental contributions — Walt has overlooked the very essence of the problem. Asia is rising, the West, apparently declining, and the question is what to do about it. Europe is critical in these calculations.

England faced a similar question in 1897. At the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee celebrations, Britain relished that it had just acquired another 2,600 miles of imperial territory from Cairo to Mombasa. After the Boer War, its territory stretched all the way from the Cape to Cairo. Today the United States stands astride Mesopotamia and the Afghan nexus between Russia and India. The worldwide breadth of US bases replicates British coaling stations and imperial connections of the 19th century.

Yet, each power’s “splendid isolation” was crumbling. The British needed a continental ally to reduce their imperial exposure and turned to France. Today, the US needs a whole continent as a counterbalance to the rising East led by China. Direct approaches to China will not suffice. Vice President Biden’s entourage was hustled out of the meeting with Xi Jinping this week, and Georgetown’s basketball team got into a fight with a Chinese team. The matches were then cancelled. No other Eastern power will stand up to China.

The European Union, however, is the strongest economic unit on earth with a GDP larger than that of the United States. It houses among the most important technological industries and its exports dwarf those of America. Walt rightly complains that its common currency, the Euro, does not have common political institutions to back it up. But neither did American institutions in the early days of the continental and then dollar. A little perspective would demonstrate that common currencies provide for a very large area of unhindered growth and that they increase investment over a wide free trading area. That area should be extended with the construction of an Atlantic-wide free-trading network, as recommended by Angela Merkel several years ago.

Today, economics largely determines politics. The economies-of-scale industries which determine the fate of economic development for the world as a whole reside largely in the West, Europe and the United States. China does not yet have one such industry, consigned as it is to perform the nether operations-links of the production chain for Western and Japanese companies. Further, Europe is continually adding strength by laterally expanding into what was once the Eastern Bloc and the old Soviet empire. It will soon add seven more states to its existing 27. This lateral power is a huge offset to the vertical power of a rising China. Not only this, the leading governments in Europe are all pro-American. Financial integration has proceeded as American banks help out their European colleagues and invest in Greek and Spanish bonds.

Looking at Europe today, Walt sees a sclerotic and blocked Europe of 1965 when General de Gaulle governed the pace of integration. After 1968, integration began again and it will spurt ahead once more, following the financial crisis. As Chinese GDP rises above American, for good Balance of Power reasons theUSA needs to be associated with this Europe. It is the only bulwark against the growing Sinification of world politics. Once Europe is on board, then, from a position of strength, the United States can approach Beijing.

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Posted in Fellows' Forum | Tagged Europe, European Union, Rosecrance, Walt | Leave a commentMy esteemed colleague Stephen Walt has consigned the European Union to the trash heap of history and asserted that the US should no longer take it seriously. Europe is in decline; NATO is in decline. The United States should focus on Asia or go it alone.

As a proponent of the Balance of Power—where he has made fundamental contributions — Walt has overlooked the very essence of the problem. Asia is rising, the West, apparently declining, and the question is what to do about it. Europe is critical in these calculations.

England faced a similar question in 1897. At the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee celebrations, Britain relished that it had just acquired another 2,600 miles of imperial territory from Cairo to Mombasa. After the Boer War, its territory stretched all the way from the Cape to Cairo. Today the United States stands astride Mesopotamia and the Afghan nexus between Russia and India. The worldwide breadth of US bases replicates British coaling stations and imperial connections of the 19th century.

Yet, each power’s “splendid isolation” was crumbling. The British needed a continental ally to reduce their imperial exposure and turned to France. Today, the US needs a whole continent as a counterbalance to the rising East led by China. Direct approaches to China will not suffice. Vice President Biden’s entourage was hustled out of the meeting with Xi Jinping this week, and Georgetown’s basketball team got into a fight with a Chinese team. The matches were then cancelled. No other Eastern power will stand up to China.

The European Union, however, is the strongest economic unit on earth with a GDP larger than that of the United States. It houses among the most important technological industries and its exports dwarf those of America. Walt rightly complains that its common currency, the Euro, does not have common political institutions to back it up. But neither did American institutions in the early days of the continental and then dollar. A little perspective would demonstrate that common currencies provide for a very large area of unhindered growth and that they increase investment over a wide free trading area. That area should be extended with the construction of an Atlantic-wide free-trading network, as recommended by Angela Merkel several years ago.

Today, economics largely determines politics. The economies-of-scale industries which determine the fate of economic development for the world as a whole reside largely in the West, Europe and the United States. China does not yet have one such industry, consigned as it is to perform the nether operations-links of the production chain for Western and Japanese companies. Further, Europe is continually adding strength by laterally expanding into what was once the Eastern Bloc and the old Soviet empire. It will soon add seven more states to its existing 27. This lateral power is a huge offset to the vertical power of a rising China. Not only this, the leading governments in Europe are all pro-American. Financial integration has proceeded as American banks help out their European colleagues and invest in Greek and Spanish bonds.

Looking at Europe today, Walt sees a sclerotic and blocked Europe of 1965 when General de Gaulle governed the pace of integration. After 1968, integration began again and it will spurt ahead once more, following the financial crisis. As Chinese GDP rises above American, for good Balance of Power reasons theUSA needs to be associated with this Europe. It is the only bulwark against the growing Sinification of world politics. Once Europe is on board, then, from a position of strength, the United States can approach Beijing.

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Posted in Fellows' Forum | Tagged Europe, European Union, Rosecrance, Walt | Leave a comment