Monday, August 22, 2011 - 9:17 AM

It's been obvious for awhile now that Muammar al-Qaddafi's days as Libya's leader were numbered, and the only question was how many people would be killed before his government finally collapsed. Assuming early reports are right, the good news is that the collapse came without a large-scale battle for Tripoli. Ordinary Libyans were thus spared further bloodshed and destruction, though sporadic fighting is still being reported in various parts of the capital.
I've been skeptical of this whole adventure from the beginning, but not because I didn't think we could get rid of Qaddafi if we tried. Although the war took longer and cost more than the pro-war party expected, the outcome was never in serious doubt. If you're a rebel group facing a not-very-competent set of government forces, and if you can persuade the world's strongest military powers to send sophisticated air assets to help your cause, then you can probably get rid of a pesky potentate like Qaddafi. Whether our intervention was necessary or wise, however, depends on how the post-Qaddafi Libya evolves.
The danger is that we will have another "Mission Accomplished" moment, when French President Nicolas Sarkozy, NATO head Anders Fogh Rasmussen, President Obama, and their various pro-intervention advisors give each other a lot of high-fives, utter solemn words about having vindicated the new "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) doctrine, and then turn to some new set of problems while Libya deteriorates. And as an anonymous "senior American military officer" told the New York Times: "The leaders I've talked to do not have a clear understanding how this will all play out."
Neither do any of the rest of us. We can all hope that the worst doesn't happen and that Libya's new leaders exhibit Mandela-like wisdom and restraint. Nobody expects perfection, of course; I can live with the "I told you sos" from hawkish liberal interventionists if it all works out reasonably well. But it will be no small task to construct a workable government in Libya, given the dearth of effective institutions and the potential divisions among different social groups. And then there's all that oil revenue to divide up, which tends to bring out peoples' worse instincts.
As in Iraq, therefore, ousting a discredited dictator is likely to be the easy part, and the hard part is just beginning. Aren't you glad the United States and Europe have lots of time and money to devote to rebuilding yet another potential failed state?
I am normally quite impressed with Stephen Walt's insights into Realpolitik. This time I had expected him to comment on this new form of military intervention (without initial boots on the ground, although those seem to be coming soon). Instead all we get is him fretting about what MIGHT happen if the Law of Unintended Consequences rears its ugly head in Libya and everything turns to dog poop. Sure the old colonial powers (which kicked off this war) are giving each other High Fives. But I didn't hear Walt making an association with the preservation of the colonial world order, just for a little while longer. Instead his objection was triumphalism.
Mr. Walt, please go back to your computer and give us a more thoughtful analysis of Libya. And what the Foreign Policy Establishment has learned from it.
to sir Walt: what's the alternative?
same here. there's a new method/thinking, less blood has been shed. one could easily imagine a much worse situation. both in Egypt (behind the scene influence peddling) and this time in Libya (limited coordinated military support) a cool and measured non dogmatic approach, it seems, has worked. we could not be harsh on the world's older powers (whatever name we like christen them) as they did not start any of the recent conflicts in the region. this president is a keeper.
Tripoli fell on the exactly same day as the good old USSR, what a lark!
Errors in Perception - Human Factors vs. Strategic Factors
The "R2P" Doctrine (as you dub it, not sure if that's actually the acronym) is, for now (considering that I cannot predict what specifically will occur once statebuilding has begun in Libya), the part that concerns me most about the apparent "victory" of the rebels.
Libya can, I believe, be viewed as an isolated case wherein the timing and the context necessitated our and/or NATO's support of the rebels. This movement arose out of dissatisfaction stirred by the Arab Spring. In some ways, Qaddafi had never been this publicly unpopular or likely to lose his grip on Libya. That caused him to try and suppress the peaceful demonstrations and created the insurrection/civil war. But, because Libya is oil-rich, I think the argument can be made that in this specific case, assisting in a relatively uninvolved fashion (as compared to other US adventures in the Middle East) during a time of particular dissatisfaction and internal resistance makes sense. SHOULD (and that's a big 'should') Libya develop enough statecraft to engage in functional and populace-friendly international commerce, the assistance provided may pay dividends.
The problems with this are two-fold:
1) Who are the rebels? - The best any of us can really say with any confidence is that they aren't Qaddafi. We don't know what kind of government they'll want, what kind the people of Libya will want, and what that will look like to our Western populations and governments. It could be a couple of things: a newer, shinier, more intelligent and marginally liberalized authoritarian regime, it could be a democracy fundamentally founded in the ideas and beliefs of Islam (for better or worse), or it could be exactly what Americans and other westerners expect it to be. My belief is that the result will be one of the first two rather than the last one. There's no reason to believe that the rebels desire the very same institutions and philosophies of government that we seem to be projecting onto them. That seems familiar somehow...
2) What lessons does the foreign policy establishment draw? - Again, my belief is that there's certain narrow value to the United States that comes from ousting Qaddafi that comes in the form of a new friendlier economic partner that's tremendously oil-rich. However, will the US or other Great Powers in NATO be taught the lesson that what was done in Libya should be done everywhere? Even if the development of statecraft is a wild success in Libya, will that blind actors to the ability to discern the value of certain interventions over others?
I don't know the answer to these questions, but considering how much "Democratization" as a concept gets Western leaders salivating (and Democratic Peace Theory's adoration in circles in Washington), I'm skeptical that the US will be able to take the middle road and not bolster human intervention and state building as necessary central components of foreign policy.
"let's avoid a mission accomplished moment in Libya"......Tell that to Drezner.
Lessons Learned, Real and Hoped For...
The lessons learned are already being compiled in a recipe for future campaigns. Target someone without nukes (North Korea, Iran and Pakistan are very safe, at least from us) and who is not a nuclear threshold state (Saudis, breathe easy). Use as many US and NATO resources as possible except for “boots on the ground.” Boots on the ground these days means troops we’ll need to acknowledge, not special forces, spies and sneaky mercs who can and were deployed in great abundance but in great secrecy. Let the public face of the war be someone, anyone, who is not American. Label them generic rebels, and tone down the rhetoric of past misadventures (no “freedom fighters,” no “Mission Accomplished” photo-ops). Encourage the media-fueled “victory” announcements from Libya. Stir, chill overnight and you’ve deposed another of America’s formerly reliable despots in favor of a bunch of nobodies we hope will keep the oil tap wide open. Repeat.
Now, my hope will be that the media will keep an eye on Libya long enough to allow us to see what happens next. The rebels will need to shift from breaking things to fixing things, the key transition that screwed up the American adventure in Iraq. Will they be able to very quickly take control of picking up trash, keeping the water and sewage plants running, funding electrical grid upgrades, making sure teachers, cops, toll collectors and tax officials all show up to work and all the rest of the day-to-day stuff of governing? Will they get sidetracking into settling scores and reprisal killings? Security, stabilization and development done sequentially take far too long in a bubbling post-conflict environment, but are very, very hard to do simultaneously (again, see Iraq).
How conflicts like the Libya campaign will fit into the bigger US geopolitical picture will be able to be judged by the results of such mundane civil tasks. Will the US walk away from Libya in large part, the “tyrant” now gone, uncaring about what happens next as long as the oil flows? It is obvious that the US plans nothing on the scale of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that set out to fix all those problems in Iraq and Afghanistan and failed miserably. But will the US dump “experts” and money into Libya? Doing so may or may not make things work, but will increase ownership of the problems by the US, something America would most dearly like to avoid. Doing close to nothing will likely ease Libya’s transition into a permanent semi-failed state.
Breaking things is easy, fixing things is hard. The US has mismanaged that problem consistently since 9/11. Let’s see what the play is in Libya to see if anyone in Washington really learned any lessons.
Peter wemeantwell.com
As usual, his nay-saying about US foreign policy runs up against the reality on the ground; remember when Tunisia's unrest was "not going to spread?" Or when Libya was a model example of a useful US ally in the Mideast (http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/18/the_shores_of_tripoli)?
The myth that foreign excursions somehow cost the US incredible amounts of money that it cannot afford, and in turn contribute to some imagined, painful "imperial overstretch" is nonsense. The combined cost of the Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya wars is not even 1/3rd of US GDP in any given year. The Libyan war has cost about $1 billion, which, as another FP poster accurately pointed out, is "a rounding error."
This is not even close to being like Iraq. There was an organic, real popular movement here that the US simply supported; would anyone really have turned down the possibility of paying $1 billion to oust Gaddafi?
give credit only where it's due
surely you are not saying the cost of the Iraq/Afghanistan war, still counting, is worth it? 1/3 gdp! a cent is too much if it goes to waste and worse than waste. beside cost-benefit analysis, in the case of Libya we were the French aiding in our effort to oust the Brits--in the case of the bloody war in Iraq and Afghanistan we were the Germans invading the soviet union. big difference.
Walt has no need to retract anything he has written. He is a foreign policy analyst, not a fortune teller. He is very good at what he does. You follow this silly accusation with an outrageous statement on the costs of the Afghan and Iraq wars. Well over $1 trillion. When Obama proposed the stimulus of $ 0.7 trillion he ignored the advice that this amount was too low because of the high national debt. Many economists said at the time the stimulus should have been twice as much as proposed. It is quite possible that ME wars injured us financially such that when a real crisis appeared we were unable to adequately deal with it.
US foreign policy has been nothjing short of a disater in Iraq, Aghanistan, Somalia and Yemen.
There are also reports from inependent reporters that the rebels are far from victory.
>> The myth that foreign excursions somehow cost the US incredible amounts of money that it cannot afford, and in turn contribute to some imagined, painful "imperial overstretch" is nonsense.
Those are the famous last words we heard from those who supported the Iraq war and were making bold claims that it would be over n a matter of weeks, that Iraq's oil would pay would finance it and that the cost would be less that 50 billion.
>> The combined cost of the Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya wars is not even 1/3rd of US GDP in any given year.
False. The cost of Iraq alone (as estimated by Noebl Lautiette Joseph Stiglitz) was 1/3rd of US GDP as of 2007. It has likley doubled since then.
The Libyan war has cost hasonly just begun. As Walt has pointed out, the toughest and most costly stage has yet to begin - secuiring the country and imposing stability. As we saw with Iraq, it was the rebuilding phase that incurred the greatest costs in Iraq and Afghanistan.
>> There was an organic, real popular movement here that the US simply supported; would anyone really have turned down the possibility of paying $1 billion to oust Gaddafi?
Rubbish. Reports reveals that the movement is largely comprised of foreign fighters and a large number fo al Qaeda fighters.
Yes, we've gione right back to supoprting Al Qaeda.
You're drifting into Mission accomplished land. Further, your figures are a bit off. The better assessment of the costs of these 3 missions are closer to $5-6T once veteran's benefits and all the cost come due. That is more like 1/2 of GDP, or, fully 2 years of the entire federal budget. And, for what, so off-shored firms can get a few oil contracts? So a few drops of fungible oil come here, rather than China. We went to war for Total, and BP; how much tax revenue will we garner?
We don't get much oil from the Middle East or N.Africa, so again, what are the dividends? Ghaddafy may simply be guilty of driving a hard bargain for his nation's reserves. I have questions about this "uprising" being an organic part of the Arab Spring--check that, the "Arab Transition" as our CIA stenographer David Ignatius informs us. This was an armed insurrection from the start, and in that alone this is different. There are questions about US intelligence assets being there from the start.
Whatever, this country is in the hands of Hoyle now. We will see whether this was a success only over the next year to the next decade. Some will gage success in terms of oil flows, others in terms of democratic metrics. The two are inextricably linked in the long run. However, if hard negotiations seeking to protect Libya's resources for her people is resented under Ghaddafy, these same terms will be resented under anyone. So, regardless, it seems the fix is in. Betrayal of the Libyan people seems assured, so, this can't be declared a success, by either democratic nor petro-flow metrics.
This may not be very "realist" but it's more reality based and more far sighted than most Americans ever think. If we ramp up production in Libya and get 10 years of stability, only to find the people rankling under the terms, the oil companies won't consider that a victory either--their ROI's are amortized over a longer term than a mere decade. Certainly, the American people will get no ROI on this, not to mention the Libyan people.
Perhaps we've blunted China's entry into the country, but that too doesn't serve the interests of the Libyan people--as we're told, competition is good for markets. Not in America, where plutocracy and oligarchy govern the real means of production. Again, all this keeps us poorer, and inflates the cost of gov't and utilities.
i aspire to a little follow-up. i'm a big fan of the seismic fall of the soviet union. yet in 20 years zero, zero, rethinking has been done on its account. people of the ivory tower carried on as if nothing had happened. no introspect, no short or long vision adjustment, except a shallow and false "we won"!
this monster we call globalization could not be here without this most interesting collapse of the world's then 2nd power. even the rise of China can be seen in large part as a desperate effort from the ruling party to avoid or postpone a similar fate of demise.
the current much saner Obama administration ref foreign policy itself could simply be a result of the president's no drama-bama temperament (incidentally, time to dismantle that 3 am red phone to make sure even a hotheaded future prez will not be able to do anything drastic, this mentality of a civilian politician needing emergency access to the nuclear button itself a relic of the "cold war").
not wishing to do a paper long post, hope everyone sees what i'm driving at. there's nothing realistic when one does not come to terms with a new changed world, or assess each situation on a case by case basis. blind intervention is no good needs not result in sizing and seizing opportunities to do some good.
in a world where national interests can no longer be isolated, we would have very likely faced a prolonged civic strife ending in a more depressed populace under a more crazed dictator and his family in a significant country player, causing more grief to the international community, if the world powers had done nothing to help out.
Mammoth gaudy words sighted over the shoulder of the president of the United states in a cosmetic flight suit as he strode the deck of an aircraft carrier on a course devised so the news cameras could not show it was a kayak ride distance from the US mainland. The administration luxuriated in the happy idea of flashing that sign. After a time, it became clear that the mission accomplished probably hadn't been what the mission should have been directed toward, and then White House flunkeys started telling us they weren't responsible for it, it was those wascals on the aircraft carrier. And then, some years later, Mr Woodward in his latest book disclosed that the military officers delegated to planning the mission -- overcoming Iraq -- kept protesting to their commander that they hadn't been given the time or resources to do the job properly.
From time to time I muse about the cockpit conversation in the military plane that took the president to the USS Abraham Lincoln precisely one month after April Fools Day in 2003. Did this include: "I am your commander in chief, and if I want to take the controls ... "? Where did the Secret Service guy sit? Who holds that sacred historical Bush flight suit? The Smithsonian? Some lucky retired air force officer?
It was clearly the Israel lobby that pushed for war in Libya. Those damn jews and their nationalist mind control!
Ghaddafy is guilty of two principle sins, driving a hard bargain for his natural resources, and not towing the line vis a vis Israel. Sometimes the squeaky wheel gets replaced. You're the type to cheer loudly when it's one you dislike, but boy do you wail when your squeaking gets the attention directed at you.
Let's write a book about it!
Gaddafi's fall has nothing to do with Israel
And you just proved how stupid you are.
It's called a joke. Look in the mirror for the definition.
Dr. Steven Walt is prudent, wise and somewhat left-winged. I always hope he can serve as a future national security advisor, helping U.S. calibrate itself to the fast changing, multipolar world. This will do good to not only Americans, but people from all over the world.
Obviously there are some getting upset with Walt's pessimistic words. I want to say, Walt is not being pessimistic but realistic. For those who got upset I should say you just got too much used to see America arbitrarily intervene with others and to some extent enjoy this supremacy. Of couse you as ordinary people are not to blame but U.S. government and congressmen, e.g. GWB during whose presidency this supremacy culminated by carrying out unilateralism. I understand how difficult it is to change a habit. But you got to change any way. And this is being wise.
Chinese idioms say, "to retreat in order to proceed" and "a stepback makes you see how broad the seas and skies are". These idioms mean that one should not always be egocentric and thus arrogant when treating affairs. Sea and sky here mean prospects and potential opportinites. One can bring himself more choices by conceding a little bit.
Finally, this world itself cannot always operate under one rule. Trying to impose one value system to everyone will definitely lead to resistance. And this will be endless.
You know how to eliminate all your enemies? The answer is, when you no longer see your enemies as your enemies, you will have no enemies.
The article was a bit apologetic imho. Clearly, nobody expected Quaddafy to last forever, but you seem to be responding to the hawks in the media. They seem to be having the same kind of "we've finally won, suck it" moment they had when they OBL was caught. This "victory" will mean even less that that one, and I'm glad Walt isn't rushing to conclusions. This intervention had great many implications.
The Libyan war has cost has-only just begun. As Walt has pointed out, the toughest and most costly stage has yet to begin - securing the country and imposing stability. As we saw with Iraq, it was the rebuilding home_renovations phase that incurred the greatest costs in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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