Monday, August 29, 2011 - 3:38 PM

The rebel victory in Libya is likely to gladden the hearts of liberal interventionists, who will see the NATO-aided triumph as vindicating the idea that great powers have the right and the responsibility to come to the aid of victims of tyrannical oppression. Add to that the general enthusiasm-which I share-for the broad effort to create more open and democratic orders in the Middle East, and it seems likely that the Wilsonian project that the U.S. foreign policy establishment has long embraced will get a shot in the arm. The debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan will be discounted, and the "Libyan model" (whatever that is) will become the latest strategic fad du jour.
If you'd like to read a good corrective to this sort of cheer-leading, I recommend Robert Kaplan's oped this morning's Financial Times, entitled ""Libya, Obama, and the Triumph of Realism." Kaplan is a self-acknowledged realist, and he offers a good defense of broadly realist approach to the tumultuous events in the Arab world and Asia. He reminds us that a realist strategy in these regions paid major dividends for many years, and argues that a balanced, prudent, and cautious policy is more likely to preserve key interests than the idealistic crusades favored by neoconservatives and Wilsonian liberals alike.
As you might expect, I think Kaplan is basically right. As I've noted before, we still don't know how the "Libyan revolution" is going to turn out. Even if Qaddafi set a very low standard for effective or just governance, the end-result of his ouster may not be as gratifying as we hope. More importantly, we also ought to guard against the common tendency to draw big policy conclusions from a single case, especially when we don't have good theories to help us understand the differences between different outcomes.
Looking forward, the policy-relevant question is whether it is a good idea for powerful outside powers to use military force to cause regime change in weak states whose leaders are misbehaving in some way. This phenomenon has become known as "foreign-imposed regime change" (FIRC). To answer that question, the first thing one ought to ask is what the general baseline patterns are: how often do FIRCs succeed, based on various measures of success? If Libya turns out well but the vast majority of FIRCs were failures, for example, then a prudent policymaker would be wary of trying to repeat the Libyan operation elsewhere. (The logic is the same in reverse, of course, our failures in Iraq do not mean that all preventive wars are wrong, even if that one obviously was).
The second step would be to identify the conditions associated with success or failure, and the causal mechanisms leading to one outcome or another. (Thus, far, the academic literatures suggests that FIRCs are more likely to fail when there are deep ethnic or religious cleavages in the target society, and when it is relatively poor). Even if FIRCs usually failed, for example, there might be certain circumstances when success was much more likely and where attempting regime change would therefore be more attractive. Because this is social science and not deterministic, knowing that conditions are favorable is no guarantee of success. But surely a smart policymaker would want to know both the general tendency and whether the case at hand might be an outlier.
The third step-which should be informed by the first two-would be to ask if there were specific policy steps that could be taken to increase the probability of success. And the smart follow-up question is to ask whether one's opponents have readily available strategies that they could employ to thwart our efforts). Even if FIRCs often fail, perhaps clever strategies and "policy learning" could improve the success rate over time, especially if leaders picked their spots carefully and if the other side had a limited repertoire of responses.
But notice one danger here: even when circumstances aren't propitious, advocates of intervention can fall prey to wishful thinking and convince themselves that they have figured out how to do these things properly, thereby avoiding the disasters that have befallen others. Right now, some people are undoubtedly thinking that the right combination of special forces, drones, local allies, and multilateral support are the magic formula for success. They may be right but I wouldn't assume it blindly and I wouldn't ignore the possibility that others will start thinking about ways to make sure the U.S. and its allies can't repeat this sort of thing elsewhere. Donald Rumsfeld was pretty sure he knew how the United States could avoid costly quagmires-go in light and get out early-the only problem was that getting in turned out to be the easy part. And don't be surprised if a few countries conclude that the real lesson of the Libyan intervention was that Muammar al-Qaddafi blundered when he agreed to end his WMD programs and open up to the outside world. I'm glad he did, but I suspect that leaders in Iran and North Korea will draw their own conclusions.
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EXPLORE:ACADEMIA, FLASH POINTS, ARAB WORLD, NORTH AFRICA, HISTORY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, LIBYA, MILITARY
"it seems likely that the Wilsonian project that the U.S. foreign policy establishment has long embraced will get a shot in the arm"
Professor Walt makes a common error here. Wilson believe in no such thing as democracy for non-White people. He believed, as was common at the time, particularly in your own institution of Harvard that White people were literally infected with at Teutonic Gene that made self governance a trait that they exclusively possessed.
I don't know how Wilson gets this credit, especially when discussing the Middle East when he never considered those people were worthy of self-governance. He was perhaps a shade less repugnant than some of his contemporaries, but the term "Wilsonian" is totally misapplied here.
Just like US policies like the Mexican American War and the Spanish American War "discredited" the US. Plenty of folk at the time said those "adventures" were horrible mistakes. Oh, and the Soviet Union is going to bury us. China will more than likely fly apart in the near future. The US will adapt.
"3. Isn't it odd that Professor Walt, a realist, would embrace realism's opposite, Wilsonianism"
Your error rate is pretty low but I do not think Walt is embracing Wilsonianism here.
Non-democratic countries are by definition not liberal and the West doesn't generally attempt FIRC against other liberal states. Liberal thought is a relativity recent development that is still evolving. To say that Thomas Jefferson wasn't a "liberal" because he had slaves is a silly argument. Jefferson was the epitome of liberal in the 18th century. Wilson, just because he was a racist, didn't mean he wasn't a flaming liberal in 1920. Liberalism implies certain things: people are equal, have rights, can own and use property, government is a contract between free people and should be limited. Most societies and cultures in the history of the world were not liberal. But liberal ideas are very seductive to people who don't live in liberal societies because they don't have any of the above. And societies who adopt liberal tenets generally outproduce the essentially slave societies they are competing against. Liberal societies are successful and, while there are serious problems with the above, they are the best of the horrible alternatives. Realism works, but only to a point. When societies are infected with the liberal virus they slowly and inevitably turn because most people, and people are needed to run a modern society, like to own stuff and be treated like people and not slaves. States that run on the purely realist model will fail, in the 21st century, and we can either help with the infection or we can wait and watch as those nations go through the bloody transformation themselves. But there is no telling what those future nations will think of us if we sit idly on the sidelines. And what will we think of ourselves as we watch millions die for the freedoms we now possess? And for those who think the US "earned" their liberty by themselves they need to seriously review their Revolutionary War history. If it wasn't for the French we would still be speaking English.
Wilson promoted colonialism for the Middle East, not democracy. His standards were heavily influence by racists Eugenics theories popular in the day. So, your dichotomy breaks down on the details--as it's factually wrong. Wilson spoke of democracy, but if you were brown, you needed to sit down.
its all in how you define "human"
In Wilson's mind, and Jefferson's and for most Americans over 70, black and brown people aren't really people. You're right, the early 20th century were heavily influenced by eugenics and a warped view of Darwin but that doesn't mean they weren't "liberal". Review the tenets of liberalism again. "All humans are equal". According to most racists the "other" be they black, brown, red, yellow or white aren't fully human or they are fundamentally flawed. What did the Germans call the Jews? Untermensch. Sub-humans. Now, in the 21st century, most liberals think such distinctions are nuts. Jefferson and Wilson advanced a liberal idea for white people when the majority of the world still thought in terms of "royal" blood and the divine right of a bunch of incestuous whack jobs. Ideas evolve and there is context. Its not all black and white.
inb4 Israel is the worst country in the world
PS. Zionism is the most evil thing known to mankind! How dare Jews consider themselves a people after being told they are foreign nationals worldwide for 2000 years!
I still don't understand what we "won" here, or how Libya qualifies as a success *for the US.* I think all this triumphalism emanating from the liberal interventionists comes from an inability to acknowledge a difference between success for the Libya rebels (who undoubtedly did succeed) and success for the US. So we achieved our war aims (overthrow Qaddafi, apparently, even though we began the war by explicitly ruling that out as a war aim), but how did those war aims benefit us? As Walt said in an earlier post, Libya is an unimportant country--who rules it and in what matter never particularly mattered to the US, and they still don't. It was worth it because we got rid of Qaddafi? First of all, I don't recall Clinton, or Bush the Younger, or Obama, or basically anyone at all ever even mentioning Qaddafi in any context prior to February of this year, and now suddenly he's this great monster who must be destroyed at all costs? The intervention was worthwhile because we "avenged" a handful of terrorist attacks that took place over 20 years ago? I see why overthrowing Qaddafi is good for Libya, but how is it good for the US? At best we're told some vague boilerplate about how it will generate "goodwill" toward us, or how it will unleash economic growth (again, how does economic growth in Libya affect the US, except through that fantastical "goodwill" again?), or that democracies never go to war with each other (although, when was Libya ever a prospect to go to war against the US?). If anything, Libya ought to have destroyed the notion that "feelings," whether goodwill or malice, play much of any role in IP. The Libyans hated our guts right until the moment at which they thought our actions might benefit them, at which point they turned on a dime to thinking well of us. Feelings, therefore, are manifestly a *product* of a political situation, not the political situation a product of the feelings. Ugh, I give up.
Two rules of thumb you have to follow, and you won't have any trouble understanding:
Rule #1: Whatever the media says you have to feel good about - is an American success.
Rule #2: Whatever the media says you have to feel bad about - is some other country's failure.
Exhibit for #1: Libya... and quite frankly nothing else in the IR field.
Exhibit for #2: - Afghanistan, Iraq: When they went smoothly, and third-rate militaries got trampled over, they were great victorious US wars. When they began to go south, both countries falling apart, they suddenly became labeled as wars of Iraqi and Afghan people. Uncle Sam cannot fail, remember that. Same as the Lenin power plant: it had to be renamed to Chernobyl power plant as soon as it blew up.
- China: nevermind they are rising at a stellar speed, they are in fact failing - that's why you get a doomsaying article about them every single day. It's hard to shove down lies that big on so many throats.
Two rules of thumb you have to follow, and you won't have any trouble understanding:
Rule #1: Whatever the media says you have to feel good about - is an American success.
Rule #2: Whatever the media says you have to feel bad about - is some other country's failure.
Exhibit for #1: Libya... and quite frankly nothing else in the IR field.
Exhibit for #2: - Afghanistan, Iraq: When they went smoothly, and third-rate militaries got trampled over, they were great victorious US wars. When they began to go south, both countries falling apart, they suddenly became labeled as wars of Iraqi and Afghan people. Uncle Sam cannot fail, remember that. Same as the Lenin power plant: it had to be renamed to Chernobyl power plant as soon as it blew up.
- China: nevermind they are rising at a stellar speed, they are in fact failing - that's why you get a doomsaying article about them every single day. It's hard to shove down lies that big on so many throats.
I'm not sure Libyans hated our guts. We tend to be liked in countries where we're not meddling. I'm not sure, not being clever, not certain, though I suspect they resented Ghadaffy.
I think the media declaring "success" right now is very much like Bush's infamous "mission accomplished" statement right during the Iraq War. The situation is very much alike with the brutal dictator is on his last breath and the people are cheering for their "liberators". The bigger picture is that Libya was in a 6 month civil war with a brutal dictator on one side, and on the other side you have a weird alliance between moderates and loosely affiliated Al Qaeda elements. The US and NATO has chosen the later to place their bet and tipped the scale of favor.
Since the war, thousands have died and massive amount of infrastructure has been destroyed. Considering that Libya is made up of tribes there is a good possibility of ethnic conflict coming in once the dust settles. For the average citizen of libya it will take months if not years to return to the standard of living he/she has enjoyed before. How is this win for them?
There was a good essay by a warzone journalist here on FP last week, where he described that his job was to chase the latest revolution while never have the time nor the incentive to cover the aftermath of a revolution. As the result, many if not most people in Western nations equate change with success. This builds support for the industrial military complex. The reality is that change doesn't necessarily equate to success, but people are brainwashed into thinking otherwise.
Kaplan’s world view is essentially Machiavellian which doubtless explains his popularity in certain corridors. Neither realism nor idealism stands up on its own. They are not opposites but component elements of our make up and the words themselves simply identify the fact that we function subjectively and objectively, we feel and we think It is only possible in theory to act without feeling or act without thinking (although FPREALIST’s effusions above might seem to contradict the latter). It is the historian’s task to determine the ratios involved in bringing about those events that have taken place and therefore can no longer be known, only believed with varying degrees of reasonable doubt, or none, and that is what Kaplan is doing.
Looking above I see that I might better have written that the historian’s task is what Kaplan appears to be doing because I do not feel he that has worked towards a conclusion but rather started with one and worked back which is not historical thinking, only its simulacrum.
Since the war, thousands have died and massive amount of infrastructure has been destroyed. Considering that Libya is made up of tribes there is a good possibility of ethnic conflict coming in home projects once the dust settles. For the average citizen of libya it will take months if not years to return to the standard of living he/she has enjoyed before. How is this win for them?
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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