Wednesday, November 2, 2011 - 11:51 AM

You know that an idea is catching on when Tom Friedman gets behind it. He's been a reliable weathervane for some time (a cheerleader for U.S.-led globalization in the 1990s, backing the Iraq War in 2002 and then reversing course when it went south, supporting escalation in Afghanistan with his fingers firmly crossed, and lecturing Americans on their recent failings once that became fashionable, too). But in this case I'm not complaining, because some of his recent writings suggest that he's coming around to the idea of offshore balancing.
Consider his column in today's Times. He makes two basic points: 1) the strategic stakes in Central Asia aren't worth the costs, and 2) withdrawal from Iraq will exacerbate Iranian-Iraqi relations and improve our strategic position. Gee, where did I hear those ideas before? And then he goes further, pointing out that getting out of our current "land wars in Asia" will restore our freedom of maneuver and give us more strategic options. Here's the money quotation from Friedman, based on testimony from a prominent Indian scholar:
'If the U.S. steps back, it will see that it has a lot more options,' argues C. Raja Mohan, a senior fellow at the Center for Policy Research, in New Delhi. ‘You let the contending regional forces play out against each other and then you can then tilt the balance.' He is referring to the India, Pakistan, Russia, Iran, China and Northern Alliance tribes in Afghanistan. ‘At this point, you have the opposite problem. You are sitting in the middle and are everyone's hate-object, and everyone sees some great conspiracy in whatever you do. Once you pull out, and create the capacity to alter the balance, you will have a lot more options and influence to affect outcomes - rather than being pushed around and attacked by everyone.'
The United States today needs much more cost-efficient ways to influence geopolitics in Asia than keeping troops there indefinitely. We need to better leverage the natural competitions in this region to our ends. There is more than one way to play The Great Game, and we need to learn it."
One might add that playing "hard to get" a bit would also make other countries do more to retain U.S. backing, and that would be good for us too.
Although Friedman doesn't use the term in his column, the logic he's outlining here is pure offshore balancing. That strategy -- which would eschew nation-building and large onshore ground and air deployments -- would both increase our freedom of action and dampen anti-Americanism in a number of key areas. It would acknowledge that Americans are not very good at running other countries -- particularly when their histories and culture are vastly different from our own -- and that trying to do so is neither necessary nor wise. Offshore balancing would take advantage of America's favorable geopolitical position, most notably its distance from most of the world's trouble spots and centers of power. (Why should a country that has no great power rivals near its own borders be so eager to send its military forces deep into the Asian landmass, in search of monsters to destroy, especially when there are no threats to the overall balance of power in these areas? Better to follow Muhammed Ali's famous advice and "float like a butterfly, sting like a bee.)
Offshore balancing is not isolationism, however, because the United States would still be diplomatically engaged in many places and committed to intervening in key areas if and when the balance of power broke down. By eschewing costly onshore commitments and fruitless exercises in "regional transformation" and nation-building, however, it would husband the resources on which America's long-term prosperity depends and help us rebuild a society that used to be inspire others and increasingly disappoints.
Nor is offshore balancing a magic bullet or a panacea. To make it work, you need to know a lot about the diplomatic and security constellations in key areas; you need expert diplomats who know how to play hardball in subtle ways; and you need a foreign policy establishment that pursues U.S. interests ruthlessly and doesn't get sidetracked by ideological crusades or the pleadings of special interests. And in case you hadn't noticed, those features are in short supply these days.
So we have a ways to go before offshore balancing becomes a reality. But with the Times' cheerleader-in-chief on board, maybe we'll get there a bit sooner.
John J. Mike/U.S. Navy via Getty Images
EXPLORE:FLASH POINTS, CENTRAL ASIA, AFGHANISTAN, DIPLOMACY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, MILITARY, SECURITY, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
In light of the squawking over the possible military cuts that the Deficit Super-Committee are considering, how would the MIC react to a very substantial drop in spending if the Offshore Balancing concept takes root?
Retarded.... slow in catching on...
Plagiarist... no need to provide the definition except to the perpetrator.
Tom reminds me often of the dumbest guy in class. so dumb he doesn't realize he's dumb which is what qualifies him as the dumbest.
Can't we subcontract it, offshore it, or let the military do it so all we need to do is provide poor management and weak vision?
All you've got here is puffery and BS. Internationalize our Navy, then you have something. You might like thinking you're ahead of Friedman, but, Walt, I've been ahead of you. When, when will YOU offer something other than divide and conquer? The British did this and it really didn't forestall calamity in the region. International naval patrols is politically tenable, will save the US money, and not offend the MIC. Clearly, allowing problems to fester doesn't keep us from getting called to intervene and invade.
Pakistan will bring back Taliban rule if US withdraws
Mr. C. Rajamohan’s idea propagated by Tom Friedman and Stephen Walt about U. S. withdrawing and let regional players sort it out is fraught with repetition of history of what happened in 1990s that ultimately led to Pakistan-engineered establishment of Taliban rule.
Afghanistan will fall to Pakistan-controlled Taliban within five years at the most after U. S. departure unless American troops are permanently stationed there like in Japan and South Korea.
One problem with Afghanistan and Pakistan getting closer is the Pashtun people. The Pashtun are the majority population if the two countries were combined, however, under the current scenario they are almost wholly disenfranchised. Also, China and India, historical enemies are also seeking to stir the pot there as well. So, all three nations are particularly interested in courting Afghanistan. As we've long known, that region is rich in Rare Earth elements, and other minerals that make advanced electronics and weaponry work. Add to that Nukes.
It may be impossible to have much of an ability to strategically balance the forces there without some presence in the region. Beyond even what can be known from the skies, there is a vast world of intrigue that further complicates matters. Of course, that doesn't mean that we know what's going on there, being there.
My initial reaction to this offshore balancing idea was to come up with a number of scenarios where it could fail. However, given that politics is the art of the possible, then Walt has convinced me that this is a reasonably good idea. Whatever its drawbacks, no one can argue that it is better than the alternative, namely the current situation of ground wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and drone wars against a half dozen other Muslim nations.
Our number one priority should be to end all of those wars. I would prefer simple withdrawal. However, politically, that sounds too "isolationist" so maybe if we withdraw under the slogan of "off shore balancing" perhaps that will satisfy our FP establishment that we are doing so with our interventionist credentials intact.
If Tom Friedman is FOR this plan, don't we need to rethink off-shore balancing?
Bankrupt in more ways than just finances
Invading a country based on false intelligence (Friedman supported) has cost the US in blood and treasure...that sure has not helped the US economy and certainly did not help our moral standing in the world
Afghanistan as part of the Mughal Empire made sense
Historically, what is now Afghanistan was often, or usually even, part of a larger emprie based in what today are Iran, or Pakistan, or India. Or somewhere north of today's Afghanistan. This made sense. There was logic to it. But there is no sense or logic to the gigantic American military presence in Central Asia. It only weakens the US.
"1) the strategic stakes in Central Asia aren't worth the costs, and 2) withdrawal from Iraq will exacerbate Iranian-Iraqi relations and improve our strategic position. "
Only got this far when the thought flashed that SH was our best friend in the ME cause everyone was afraid of him. In a pure power politics point of view he was very useful because it made everyone around him look to the US to be the enforcer and keep him in line. With him gone they can go back to their petty little tribal arguments and ignore the US. When your hard power is exhausted, as it is now in the ME, your soft power is worthless.
The Chinese have a very clear policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. The countries that they deal with understand this. The Chinese pursue economic advantage. The US on the other hand lets every nation know that they are the world's only super power.
I guess the deal is if you deal with the US, then expect politcal interventions in your nation, deal with the Chinese and they will engage in business deals.
Steve Rosen is the only thing that you signed over at the Project for a New American Century the section on "Rebuilding Americas Defenses"
Quite a group of warmongers that you find yourself amongst over there
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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