The Syrian tragedy

Posted By Stephen M. Walt Thursday, November 10, 2011 - 12:14 PM Share

One can only look on the continuing violence in Syria with a mixture of awe, anguish, and dismay. Awe because so many Syrians continue to protest against the Assad government, despite the enormous personal risks that this entails. Anguish and dismay because there is relatively little that outside powers can do to bring about a speedy end to the crisis, apart from the measures that have already been taken (which I support).

The Obama administration has come under some criticism for not turning against Assad sooner. I'm inclined to cut them some slack here, because it would have been far better had the United States, Turkey, and a few others been able to convince Assad to begin a genuine process of dialogue, compromise, and liberalization. So it was worth trying to see if a deal could be struck, even if that effort ultimately failed. Having tried to give the Assad regime a way out also made it much easier to line up international support for sanctions and diplomatic isolation.

The central difficulty at this stage is two-fold: 1) the regime has no easy exit options and thus every incentive to fight on, and 2) its opponents inside and outside the country -- including the United States -- do not have a lot of attractive ways to put more pressure on the regime. Let's consider each aspect in turn.

Assad's problem now is that he's lost any chance of a genuine compromise and must therefore fight on in the hopes that he can cow the opposition and restore order. Regrettably, that is precisely what his father managed to do when he crushed an uprising in Hama in 1982 (killing some 20,000 people in the process). Once an authoritarian ruler rejects compromise and liberalization and launches a bloody crackdown instead, they have to do whatever it takes to win. With 3,500 people already dead, no one in Syria would believe any offers Assad might subsequently make to share power, and Assad and his cronies undoubtedly know that the risk of future retribution will be considerable if other actors in Syria ever gain real political power.

The other option for Assad, of course, is accepting a graceful flight into exile (presumably with a pile of cash to pay for a comfortable retirement). Several Arab states have reportedly offered Assad this sort of safe haven, and other notorious dictators (such as Uganda's Idi Amin) left power in this way. But that option isn't very attractive for Assad either, because leaders with bloody hands now face international prosecution for crimes against humanity. Furthermore, this hypothetical option would only be available to Assad, his family, and perhaps his inner circle of advisors. But other members of the government are implicated in the crackdown -- most of them drawn from the minority Alawi sect -- and they would be inclined to fight on even if Assad himself were to leave. This situation helps us understand why the regime and its security forces haven't cracked yet: they just don't have a lot of options at this point and they must either hang together (or hang separately).

The problem for the United States, Turkey, and other opponents of the regime is that there are real costs and risks to trying to do a lot more than they are already doing. Syria is more urban, mountainous, and densely-populated than Libya, so an air campaign against the regime's security forces would be a far trickier affair and Syria could respond to a drone campaign or other overt military action in ways that we might find unpleasant. Moreover, Assad's security forces are mostly conducting small-scale operations against unarmed civilians, not massed army assaults on cities, so they are less vulnerable to an air campaign. Libya was also a minor player far from the center of Middle East politics, but Syria lies in the heart of the region and instability there could easily reverberate into Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey, Jordan, and Israel. Assad, for all his faults, is not as hated or despised as Qaddafi was, which means we aren't likely to get the same support from the Arab League that we had during the Libyan campaign. And we will never get UN Security Council authorization for military action, because both China and Russia are opposed. (This situation, by the way, is at least partly fallout from the Libya intervention, which Moscow and Beijing regard as having exceeded the Security Council mandate. It also reflects their enduring concern to limit U.S. efforts to dictate conditions in the Middle East.)

Hence the dismay one feels when reading news accounts and watching videos of the violence being wreaked against Syrian civilians, and when one remembers that their movement began in a completely peaceful manner. I fear that the Syrian tragedy will grind on for many months, and its principal victims will be ordinary Syrians who dreamt of a more open political order, and dared to think they could bring them about. And because societies take a long time to recover from extended bouts of internal violence (see under: Lebanon, Afghanistan, Somalia, former Yugoslavia, etc.), the consequences of this tragedy are likely to be with us for a long time after it is finally resolved.

ANWAR AMRO/AFP/Getty Images

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BANDOLERO

5:59 PM ET

November 10, 2011

Pure imperial hybris

The question whether the US could do anything about Syria, meaning "make regime change happen" in Syria is pure imperial hybris.

A much better question would be: why should the US do anything about Syria?

As US diplomats recently revealed a very large portion of the Syrian population - perhaps the majority - stands behind Bashar Assad, and that despite of - or because of - foreign attempts to make a regime change in Syria happen, with a vicious media campaign and terrorist attacks to destabilize the country. While many people in Syria support the idea of reform, almost noboy supports media lies, terrrorist attacks or foreign meddling to step further in that process. But this is exactly the course the US is heading for in it's desire for regime change in Syria. The result is quite clear: the Syrian people will increasingly dislike the US, and therefore Syrian-US relations are harmed by the ongoing US-led regime change attempts.

Let's have a look at the rationale behind the US desire for regime change in Syria. Here is what Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman had to say today:

'Syria is basically Iran's only friend. Iran is Syria's best friend, in fact it's one of Syria's few remaining friends,' he said. But 'the high probability is that a government that comes in with the consent of the Syrian people will not be an asset of Iran', said Feltman.

Feltman is known wel for being one of the greatest friends of Israel. The essence what he revealed is nothing less, then using the hostile US policy against Syria as an Israeli tool to come closer to Israels goal to get the Iranian government down. The US could live much better making friends with Syria and Iran instead of repeating the mistakes in favour of Israel down the road eading to war with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. For Israel the US war against Iraq was not that bad as it opened space for Israel to build more settlements on occupied territorries.

The the US question in relation to Syria in essnce biolls down to the following: should the US go down the road for another war in the middle east to allow Israel to build more settlements or should the US persue it's own interests like making friends with other people to be able to rebuild the US economy at home?

At the moment it looks pretty much like the US is prepared to further harm itself to advance Israels interest in the continuation of settlement building.

 

MATTHEW

10:45 PM ET

November 10, 2011

Matthew

If Assad were using drones, this could be explained away as "collateral damage."

If he invites in Hezbollah to do it, it would be shocking. But if has asked the Saudis (a la Bahrain), it would be "peacekeeping."

I hope Assad falls. However, I do know that if the USA gets involved the Syrian people will suffer a lot more. Ask the Iraqis.

 

NICHOLAS WIBBERLEY

9:29 AM ET

November 11, 2011

Go back to sleep.

The one thing you can surely do is be less squeamish, leave Syria alone, and deal pragmatically with whatever outcome ensues. A populace overthrowing authority is a natural process and should be left to work itself out. Nor is it necessary to try to identify motives for Chinese or Russian opposition to UN involvement, they just don’t agree with high-handed interventions fed by a questionable sense of moral superiority, debilitating sentimentality, and a philosophy of interference. If individuals wish to assist the Syrian revolutionaries, or Assad for that matter, there is nothing to stop them packing a light bag and off to the region, which is exactly what many did in the Spanish Civil war. The process in Syria is a natural one and should be left alone. The process in Palestine, on the other hand, is an example of the US encouraging and facilitating exactly what Assad is doing, albeit at a distance and for less obvious reasons; if an outlet is sought for the effusions of an overly delicate sensibility, they might better be directed there

 

DMAAK112

12:01 PM ET

November 11, 2011

Assad vs. ?

Just who speaks for the dissidents? What is seldom reported is that there are no national leaders among the disparate groups. There are the traditional oppositions to the Assads--the Muslim Brotherhood, disgruntled family members like Rifat and son, disgruntled cabinet members like Khaddam, etc. There are Arab opponents of Syria because of its alliance with Iran like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, Jordan, Egypt, etc. They provided material support that negates their call for talks. There is the US led campaign of diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, intense media coverage, and ambassadorial misconduct that has embolden the protestors to further confrontation and supplications for foreign intervention.

Prior to 1970, Syria suffered from a lack of self awareness. The country’s economic and political elites were divided by religion, region, tribal and ethnic segments. They were easily bought by outside interests that envisioned some sort of “Greater Syria.” Added to this, the governments of Damascus were game of musical chairs. Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt as well as British and American clandestine activities made pre-Assad Syria unstable and volatile.

Under the Assads, Syria became an independent actor. US reaction was solely dependent upon how Damascus played in our game of Mideast hegemon--favorable as in Syria’s initial invasion of Lebanon in 1976 or its military presence in Kuwait in 1990 or hostile as in its opposition to Egypt’s peace with Israel and now its support of Iran. Mr.Walt’s reference to Hama omits what most anti-Assad do. Between 1976 to 1982 Hafez Assad was opposed by many of the same groups as today, terrorism in the forms of car/bus bombs, assassinations of government officials, attacks on military personnel, etc. escalated into open rebellion. The battle of Hama has a context. This does not justify the deaths of innocents, but neither should it vindicate our euphemism of “collateral damage” every time we bomb suspected terror targets.

Presently, the new rebels pride themselves in use of technology and lack of identifiable leaders to overthrow Bashar. Problem with this is that governing is not an internet or YouTube game. What has transpired is that those who do come forward are often rejected by others. This lack of a coherent leadership is compounded by the failure to produce comprehensible political plan that can serve as an alternative to Bashar.

What is the opposition position on creating jobs for the growing numbers of young people? What ideas do they propose to aid drought stricken rural areas? Will they grant Kurds citizenship? Will they take action to prevent Kurdish areas from being used as bases to attack neighboring Turkey? What is their policy on former Iraq? Will they become active supporters of the Sunnis in their struggle with the US sponsored Shiite Baghdad regime? What economic policy will they follow--open up the country to capitalist enterprise or restrict commerce to account for the disparities of the poor?

The US is not concerned about democracy or human rights--we have supported and support regimes that have done far worse to their people than Bashar. Syria has opposed our hegemony in the Middle East and is presently aligned with Iran which is our current bogeyman. The chaos that will follow the collapse of Bashar Assad’s government is not our concern. His removal in and of itself has been the goal of both Presidents Obama and Bush.

 

Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.

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