Tuesday, December 20, 2011 - 1:28 PM

Victor Cha of Georgetown University scores a rare two-fer on today's oped pages, landing a piece in the New York Times and another in the Financial Times, both on the implications of Kim Jong Il's death. Victor's main argument is that new leader Kim Jong Un, (son of the deceased Kim Jong Il, grandson of Kim Il Sung) won't be up to the task of running an already-troubled regime. In his words: "Such a system simply cannot hold." He suspects this situation will encourage China to get more actively involved in internal North Korea politics (and might go so far as to "adopt" it as a quasi-province). Cha doesn't think there's much that the United States can or should do at this juncture, but he recommends that the United States start more active contingency planning for the collapse of the regime or significant internal turbulence, and redouble its efforts to establish a channel of communication on this issue with Beijing.
Victor knows a heck of a lot more about North Korea than I do, so I'm reluctant to challenge either his forecast or his prescriptions. But I can think of at least one reason why Kim Jong Un might -- repeat might -- fare somewhat better than Cha expects. If North Korea's ruling elite understands their own fragility and recognizes the dangers that a serious power struggle might pose, then Kim Jong Un can survive by default. Why? Because he's the one leader that all the potential contenders can agree on, if only to avoid the dangerous uncertainties that an open contest for power would entail.
As the history of every royal family shows, dynastic succession doesn't guarantee that you get a gifted or effective ruler every time. But it often works because having anybody in place helps ward off in-fighting among various potential contenders. And even if Kim Jong Un is mostly a figurehead, he's the only person in North Korea who can credibly claim to have been chosen by the departed Dear Leader.
All this is not to say that the regime won't have real problems in the months ahead, and I certainly won't be surprised if Cha's forecasts are borne out. But the Kim dynasty has lasted longer than one might have expected, and we shouldn't be utterly astonished if the newly ascendant "Great Successor" turns out to be the compromise candidate that the rest of the elite decides to tolerate, in order to avoid the risky process of picking someone else.
But what about the younger generation
I suspect the senior leadership will be content with the new king. It is unlikely that any of them had serious ambitions to be number 1 -- it seems likely that they have settled into a comfortable niche and would be satisfied with being part of a senior committee that guided a figurehead. However, the uncertainty lies with the the junior leadership -- the Gorbachov generation if you will. There must be many managers in their 40s and 50s that must see the total failure of their culture and economy. The Koreans are a homogeneous people, genetically at least, yet the average North Korean male is about 5 inches shorter than his South Korean counterpart. That is unquestionable evidence for an entire nation of malnourished people. It seems inconceivable that managers who see their role in the world as caring for their people (it is part of their rhetoric after all) would not work to make some real changes. As we saw in the Soviet Union, once the reform ball starts rolling, it can be very hard to control.
when it comes to north korea...
i fondly remember how completely off base the outside world, its experts included, was ref china under mao: it's much safer, Stephen, to sit back and watch.
(only people don't have such luxury are the military.)
Dr. Walt's analysis reminds me of how Leonid Brezhnev rose to power. It was said that when the ruling elites of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union decided to get rid of Nikita Khrushchev, Brezhnev was chosen as the replacement because he was so moderate that he turned out to be the only candidate whom all other major figures inside the ruling elites could agree on.
he was the consensus candidate among a group whose consensus was wed to what should have already been apparent was a failed model for how to organize a modern economy. It took the Gorbachov generation another 30 years to undermine that consensus. That could be the problem with my suggestion above -- it might take decades for a similar evolution inside North Korea.
Sorry, couldn't resist. But branding is a serious game, and the powers that be in North Korea will want some sort of figurehead to keep the masses distracted...
"If North Korea's ruling elite understands their own fragility and recognizes the dangers that a serious power struggle might pose, then Kim Jong Un can survive by default. Why? Because he's the one leader that all the potential contenders can agree on, if only to avoid the dangerous uncertainties that an open contest for power would entail. "
Thumbs up for this use of the Schelling Point concept.
E.A.
Isn't it kind of odd that leftist governments seem to invariably end up as kind of dynastic monarchies?
and now for some truth for the salty walty gang
http://dotsub.com/view/3ded8dbc-6612-4822-9d91-e605b59d05fd
So the gist of the article was that
Walt doesn't have a goddam clue what to say about North Korea but he needs to fill the bandwidth with something.
The main problem is there is no indication that Kim Jong On's succession will lead to anything different than before.
Its not like the Kims were particularly competent leaders. Anyone can run North Korea as well as them. Anyone could be promoted as the next Magnificent Leader Grand Poohbah.
The military apparatus pretty much runs itself, creates its own income through slave labor, drug and gun running, drug manufacturing, counterfeiting and extortion. As long as money of some kind flows into the country, there doesn't seem to be any limits to how far the people can be put under the government's thumb.
The true threat of the North Koreans is not of a full scale invasion of South Korea but for the ability to harass and disrupt the major economic centers of the country. Seoul by virtue of geography is dangerously close to the border. Easy range for artillery from North Korea.
The real threat of the nuclear program does not lie in their ability to make weapons. Their last test showed how far off from real nuclear capabilities they were. Their missiles are crap. The real threat is that you have a badly built, poorly maintained reactor downwind from Seoul, Beijing and Western Japan which lies near a convergence of several techtonic plates. Can you say Fukushima?
Yes I agree with you. With this uncertainty can be dangerous to the economy of Greece. Thank you for sharing.Top 10 lists
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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